

IdenTrust Global Common Certification Practice Statement

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1 INTRODUCTION

This IdenTrust Global Common (IGC) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) establishes how IdenTrust operates a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the purpose of issuing Certificates that can be used in an interoperable manner through Cross-certification with multiple bridges. This CPS is reviewed and updated, based on criteria that includes but are not limited to the current and expected use of the IGC PKI, operational experience, changing threats, and further analysis.

1.1 OVERVIEW

This CPS describes the practices employed by IdenTrust Services, LLC (“IdenTrust”) to operate IGC Root Certification Authority (RCA); those employed by all Subordinate Certification Authorities (SubCAs) operating under RCA; and those employed by each corresponding Certificate Status Authority (CSAs); and by Registration Authorities (RAs) to fulfill the requirements of the IdenTrust Global Common Certificate Policy, V1.5.9 September 23, 2024 (herein referred to as the “IdenTrust Global Common CP” or “CP”).

1.1.1 Certificate Policy (CP)

Certificates issued under this CPS contain a registered Certificate policy object identifier (OID), which may be used by a Relying Party to decide whether a Certificate is trusted for a particular purpose. The OID corresponds to a specific level of assurance established by the IGC Certificate Policy (CP). Each Certificate issued by IdenTrust under the IGC policy asserts the appropriate level of assurance in the Certificate Policies extension.

1.1.2 Relationship Between the IGC CP and the IGC CPS

The IGC Certification Practices Statement (CPS) states how IdenTrust establishes and implements the requirements identified in the IGC CP. If an external RA (RA) is involved in the Certificate approval process, then a Registration Practices Statement (RPS) document is created that defines the practices the RA has deployed to ensure compliance with all associated CP and CPS documents.

1.1.3 Relationship between the IGC CP and other CPs

The relationship between the IGC CP and other cross-certified CPs is asserted in the policy Mappings extension for CA Certificates issued by IdenTrust or in any Certificates issued to an IdenTrust CA that are requested by IdenTrust. This extension includes all relevant policy mappings and indicates that these policies are equivalent to each other.

1.1.4 Scope

This CPS describes all practices required to fulfill the requirements of the following policies:

- X.509 Certificate Policy for the Federal Bridge Certification Authority v3.8 dated August 2025
- DirectTrust Certificate Policy dated October 7, 2020

IGC Certificate Profiles or IGC Profiles are incorporated into this CPS by reference. Future versions of IGC Profiles may be implemented under this CPS without notice; PKI Participants are advised to refer to the latest IGC Profiles. All CAs operating under the IGC CP are operated in accordance with this CPS.

As described herein, IdenTrust operates its own Subordinate CA(s) (SubCA) and acts as an outsourced CA services provider for all SubCAs that are owned or sponsored by non-IdenTrust entities. Specifically, IdenTrust operates all CAs subordinate to the IGC Root CA in accordance with this CPS. This CPS describes the practices followed by IdenTrust, Participant CAs, RAs and third parties in performing RA functions related to generating, issuing, managing, and revoking IGC Certificates. Terms used herein have the meanings set forth in Section 1.6 below.

References and bibliography of related publications are included at the end of this document. Related publications contain information that forms the basis for PKI. A list of acronyms follows the references.

1.1.5 Interaction with PKIs External to the Federal Government

No stipulation.

1.2 DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION

This document is the IGC Certification Practice Statement approved for publication on September 23, 2024, by the IdenTrust Policy Management Authority (PMA). The following table contains subsequent revisions:

IGC Certification Practice Statement Revision History

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
1.0	April 30, 2013	Initial version to comply with IdenTrust Global Common Certificate Policy v1.1, dated April 19, 2013.
1.1	August 13, 2013	Updated throughout to accommodate IdenTrust Global Common Certificate Policy v1.2.1, dated August 13, 2013. Certificate Profiles previously included as Section 10 are separated out into a separate IGC Certificate Profiles document consistent with the CP. Released externally to auditors for Day 0 Audit of IGC test environment.
1.2	September 4, 2013	Changes made to Sections 4.12, 5.4.1 and 6.1.5 to bring CPS into conformance with CP after an IdenTrust internal mapping exercise. Version 1.2 provided to external auditors in conjunction with U.S. FBCA-required Day 0 compliance audit.
1.3	April 23, 2014	Final version approved by PMA for publication in conjunction with first production Certificate Issuance.
1.3.1	March 27, 2015	Minor modifications made to bring CPS into alignment with other IdenTrust CPSs allowing consistent practices. These include changes to: (a) Section 4.10.2 to specify target availability for Certificate status service; (b) Section 5.3.2 to specify background check frequency; and (c) Section 6.1.3 to clarify delivery method for PKCS#10 for Cross-Certificate issuance.
1.3.3	July 31, 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numerous modifications to align CPS with CP v1.3, dated July 15, 2015. Numerous term corrections and clarifications. Additions made to several sections to allow for Issuance of DirectTrust Certificates in compliance with DirectTrust CPv1.2.1. Alignment with CP v1.3.1, dated July 31, 2015. Minor changes in response to DirectTrust accreditation requirements: Addition of Group Certificates for Medium Software. Removal of Group Certificates for Basic Hardware as not necessary. Recognition of DirectTrust requirements under CA warranties.
1.4	May 27, 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removed the requirement for Machine Operators of Device Certificates to have an Individual Certificate. Revised identity verification requirements for Group Address Certificates. Increased PIV-I card lifetime to 6 years. Revised CMS-based Issuance practices for PIV-I Hardware Certificates. Revised provisions related to ECDSA Keys. Updated the table of OIDs. Added Primary Machine Operator and Secondary Machine Operator roles. Revised provisions describing Certificate policy OIDs. Revised Certificate Profile attributes to align with Certificate Profiles document.
1.4.1	August 15, 2016	Updated to comply with DirectTrust 1.3 CP.

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
1.4.2	October 12, 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removed redundant OIDs for IGC Medium Software Group Certificates. Added OIDs for IGC Medium Hardware Group Device Certificates. Added new I&A requirements to confirm NPI number for DirectTrust Address Certificates. Added miscellaneous defined terms. Clarified definition of Domain-Bound Certificates.
1.4.3	May 12, 2017	Updated section 5.3.2 Background Check Procedures to remove requirement for financial check for candidates in a Trusted Role (not required by CP).
1.4.4	June 16, 2017	Added support for smart card logon (SCL) to these 3 IGC non-PIV-I Certificate types: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic Hardware Medium Hardware Medium Hardware CBP
1.4.5	April 11, 2018	Add Group Organization OIDs.
1.4.6	June 22, 2018	Integrated SAFE-BioPharma Bridge Certificate Authority (SBCA) cross-certification with IGC.
1.4.7	November 29, 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Modified language in Sections 1.1 to update policy dates and format for improved readability. Updated language in Section 4.3 to clarify options for distributing activation code via email to a verified email address or regular mail to a verified physical address. Updating Section 4.3 to separate activation using hardware into two separate scenarios. Integrate DirectTrust CP V1.4 06262018 modifications. Modify Section 4.7.3 language pertaining to Re-Key to allow automated retrieval.
1.4.8	March 27, 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updating Section 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements to clarify language pertaining to remote access to the CA System. Updating Section 6.5.2 Computer Security Rating to align with updated CP document. Updating document to remove specific references to audits required on an annual basis and to refer to Section 8 where a table of best-practices required annual audits is recorded. This will allow one update to be made to the document when audit procedures change, instead of need to make multiple updates throughout the document. Updating format to align with RFC 3647 and the FBCA CP. Some sections were initially omitted because they pertained only to the Federal Bridge CA; however, to ensure that the document format is fully aligned, these sections have been reinserted.
1.4.9	May 29, 2019	Aligning with IGC CP v1.4.9: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To remove all references to SSL Certificate issuance General cosmetic and clean up to grammar, etc.
1.5	August 8, 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Made additional updates to remove references to SSL Certificates. Additional cosmetic and formatting changes for ease of use. Adding/updating definitions for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reasonable Reliance Supervised Remote Processing Added clarifying language to address the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For CRL Issuance Frequency Machine operators may request suspension through an LRA

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Device Certificates are dual use for signing and encryption. All other Certificates are single use ○ Language for SAFE-BioPharma affiliated Certificates to make OU required
1.5.1	January 31, 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Modifications to align with FBCA CP v2.35 to add allowance for the FBCA to be operated in an off-line status effective as of April 15, 2019. See Sections: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency ○ 4.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise ○ 5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log ○ 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods ● Enhanced language in Section 5 and in Section 8 to provide more detailed guidance with respect to audit processes and artifacts, including PIV-I card testing that must be submitted to IdenTrust to satisfy annual audit requirements. ● Updated outline format and made other formatting for ease of use and clarification.
1.5.2	April 15, 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revised language referencing the FBCA, FPKIPA, FPKIPMA, etc. per review conducted by the FPKIPA in 2019 audit review: Changes made in Sections 1, 2, 4 and 6. ● Revised language specific to DNs naming: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Changes made in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 ● Incorporated requirements for remote data proofing and clarifying use of supervised and unsupervised remote identity proofing in Definitions and Section Authentication of Human Subscribers.
1.5.3	March 1, 2021	<p>Added and or modified language as recommended by the FPKIPA as a result of comparison to the Federal Bridge Certificate Policy to the IGC Certificate Policy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Removed specific references to FPKI and replaced with more generic terms, as this CPS complies with multiple governing CP documents. ○ Removed reference to Entity CA and replaced with IdenTrust. Entity CA is an FPKI term and IdenTrust is the Entity CA as represented in the IGC CP and IGC CPS. ○ Added language in various sections to indicate that any UUID used in a PIV-I Certificate may not be the card serial number. ○ Section 1.2.2.1 IGC OIDs: Updated table to correctly reference all active OIDs. ○ Section 2.1.1 IdenTrust Repository Obligations: updated language related to LDAP to indicate that encrypted LDAP is used for communications. ○ Section 3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful: added language to indicate that the UUID used to ensure name uniqueness is appended to the commonName (CN) and should not be included as a value in an organizationalUnit (OU) attribute. Alternative methods for incorporating UUID can also be utilized if approved by the IdenTrust PMA and documented in the IGC Profiles document. ○ Section 3.2.3.1.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers: adding language disallowing remote identity proofing. ○ Section 3.2.3.3.2 Group Software Certificates: updated title to remove Software and modified language to be more explicit and removed some irrelevant text.

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Section 3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices: added language disallowing remote identity proofing for Device Certificates ○ 3.2.3.4.2 Authentication of Secondary Machine Operators: added language to indicate that Secondary Machine Operators are not named in a Device Certificate. ○ 4.2.2 Approval or rejection of Certificate Applications: Added clarifying language. No procedural changes required. ○ Section 4.3.1.1 CA Certificates: Added new requirement for CA Certificates to be checked for accuracy before providing to the requesting entity. ○ Section 4.3.1.3 Publication: Added clarifying language related to Certificate publication and the restriction against using PIV-I card serial number in any extension that is publicly viewable. ○ 4.3.2.3: Notification to Cross Certifying CAs: Added requirements regarding notification of new CA cert creation. ○ Section 4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage: revised language to shift responsibility for compliance with the CP/CPS to the Relying Party and from IdenTrust. ○ Section 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request: added language indicating that IdenTrust allows for revocation of Certificates. ○ Section 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency and Section 4.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise: removed references to Rudimentary and High Assurance as IdenTrust does not issue these types of Certificates. ○ Section 4.12 Key Escrow: removed language pertaining to Key Escrow and Key recovery is not presently offered under IGC. ○ Section 5.1 Physical Controls: adding explicit language regarding protection of the CA and definition of remote access to the CA. ○ 5.1.2.1.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility for CA, CSA, and RA Operations: Updated language regarding the method in which 24-hour surveillance is conducted and to clarify remote access to CA equipment. ○ 5.1.5.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility (Fire Prevention): Updated language regarding the method in which 24-hour surveillance is conducted. ○ 5.1.5.2 IdenTrust's Disaster Recovery Facility (Fire Prevention): Updated language regarding the method in which 24-hour surveillance is conducted. ○ Section 5.2.1.2 Certification Status Authority (CSA) Roles: added definitions for CSA Agent and CSA Operator which are equivalent to the CA Agent and CA Operator. ○ Section 5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log: removed Rudimentary and High Assurance from the table in this Section as IdenTrust does not offer these Certificate types. ○ Section 5.7.1.1 CA Incident: added new requirements for notifications pertaining to a CA compromise. ○ Section 5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted: added new requirements specific to notifications if a CRL cannot be issued. ○ Section 5.8 CA and RA Termination: added requirements regarding notification in the event of CA termination. ○ Section 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods: removed language specific to FPKI and removed references to Code Signing Certificates which are not offered by IdenTrust under IGC.

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Section 6.8 Time Stamping: added language clarifying when manual adjustments may be made to synchronize time. ○ Removed all references to remote identity proofing.
1.5.4	April 14, 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Alignment with new DirectTrust V2.0 and SAFE Identity V1.0 policy documents. ● Streamlined and simplified Trusted Role Definitions.
1.5.5	March 1, 2022	<p>Multiple updates to incorporate FPKIPA recommendations and add subsections to enable ease of use:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1.2.1 Alphanumeric Identifier-Updated version references ○ 1.2.2.1.1 Basic Assurance Certificates-Moved content into subsection. ○ 1.2.2.1.2 Non-Human Certificates-Moved content into subsection. ○ 1.2.2.1.3 Medium Hardware and PIV-I Certificates-Moved content into subsection. ○ 1.3.1.1 IdenTrust Global Common PKI Participants-Removed language requested by the FPKI and replaced with recommended content. ○ 1.3.1.2 IdenTrust Principal Certification Authority (CA)-Updated content in to include SAFE Identity information. ○ 1.3.1.3 Participant CAs-Updated section number. ○ 1.3.1.4 IdenTrust Policy Management Authority (PMA)-Updated section number. ○ 1.3.1.5 Certificate Status Servers/Authority (CSS/CSA)-Updated section number. ○ 1.3.5.3.1 Primary Machine Operator-Moved content into subsection. ○ 1.3.5.3.2 Secondary Machine Operator-Moved content into subsection. ○ 1.3.5.5 Affiliated Subscribers-Removed this section as it was redundant. ○ 1.3.6 Relying Parties-Added subsection. ○ 1.3.7 Other-Added subsection. ○ 2.2.2 Publication of CA Information-Added new content to address publication and cosmetic changes. ○ 3.1.1.1 Human (non-PIV-I)-Added requirement regarding use of UUID to ensure name uniqueness. ○ 3.1.1.2 Group Certificates-Clarified use of names for Group Certificates. ○ 3.1.1.3 PIV-I Certificates-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.1.3.1 PIV-I (Except for Card Authentication)-Added subsection ○ 3.1.1.3.2 PIV-I Card Authentication-Added subsection and requirement that PIV-I card number cannot be used for UUID. ○ 3.1.1.3.3 PIV-I Content Signing-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.1.4 Device-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.1.5 Subordinate CAs-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.1.6 Root CA-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.1.7 Cross-Certifying Bridge CA-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.5.1 Subscriber Certificates-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.5.2 Subject Identifier (subjectID)-Added subsection. ○ 3.1.5.3 Unique Identifier (UID)-Added subsection and requirement that PIV-I card number cannot be used for UUID. ○ 3.1.5.4 Device Certificates-New content regarding Device Certificates.

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3.2.2.1 DirectTrust Group Certificates-Added clarifying language pertaining to Group certs. ○ 3.2.2.3.1 Non-U.S. Applicants-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.2.3.2 Reliance on Affiliated Certificates-Added subsection ○ 3.2.2.3.3 Validation of Affiliation-Added clarifying language pertaining to LRA roles. ○ 3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers-Removed Remote Identity Proofing. ○ 3.2.3.1.1 Basic Identity -Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.1.1 Required Identity Credentials-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.1.2 Certificate Approval-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.2 Medium (all)-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.2.1 Required Identity Credentials-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.2.2 Certificate Approval-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.3 PIV-I Hardware-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.3.1 Required Identity Credentials-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.3.2 Certificate Issuance Approval-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.4 Registration Forms and Agreements-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.5.1 Email Verification-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.5.2 Mobile Phone Verification-Added subsection. ○ 3.2.3.1.7.2.1 Collection of Identity Data from an Antecedent In-Person Appearance-Updated section number. ○ 3.2.3.1.7.2.2 Records Retention-Updated section number. ○ 3.2.3.3.3 Group Certificates-Updated content pertaining to Group certs. ○ 3.2.3.3.3.1 Verification of NPI Number-Added content pertaining to use and verification of NPI Number for DirectTrust Certificates ○ 3.2.3.4.1 Machine Operator-Added subsection and content clarifying machine operator roles. ○ 3.2.3.4.1.1 Primary Machine Operator-Added subsection and content clarifying machine operator roles. ○ 3.2.3.4.1.2 Secondary Machine Operator-Added subsection and content clarifying machine operator roles. ○ 3.2.3.4.2 Machine Operator Authentication-Added subsection and content clarifying machine operator roles. ○ 3.2.3.4.2.1 Authentication of Primary Machine Operator-Updated section number. ○ 3.2.3.4.2.2 Authentication of Secondary Machine Operators-Updated section number and clarification that secondary machine operator not named in the Certificate. ○ 3.2.3.4.3 Verification of Authorization by Subscribing Organization-Updated section number. ○ 3.2.3.4.4 Device Issuance-Updated section number. ○ 3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key-Added subsection. ○ 3.3.1.1 Basic and Medium (all policies)-Added subsection. ○ 3.3.1.2 PIV-I-Added subsection. ○ 3.3.1.3 LRAs-Added subsection. ○ 3.3.1.4 SubCAs, RAs and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA-Added subsection. ○ 4.1.2.1 Establishment of Identity-Clarified language pertaining to RA Certificate Requests. ○ 4.1.2.2.1 Account Passwords-Added subsection no change in content.

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 4.11.2 End of Subscription for Subordinate CAs-Updated term SubCAs to Subordinate CAs. ○ 4.12.1.2 Key Escrow for CMS-Added clarifying language regarding key escrow for CMS. ○ 4.2.2.1 Applications by Assurance Level-Added subsection, no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.1.1 Basic Assurance-Added subsection no change in content ○ 4.2.2.1.2 Medium Assurance-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.1.3 PIV-I Assurance-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.2.1 Individuals-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.2.1.1 Required Registration Information-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.2.1.2 Certificate Application Approval-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.2.1.3 Certificate Application Rejection-Added subsection no change in content. ○ 4.2.2.2.2 - 4.2.2.2.5 Various-Renumbered section to realign with CP. ○ 4.2.3.1.2 All Other Certificates Added language regarding processing time. ○ 4.9.9 Online Revocation / Status Checking Availability-Added language to clarify Certificate signing. ○ 6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) - Added subsection no content changes. ○ 6.1.7.1 Key Usage Purposes for Signing Certificates-Added subsection no content changes. ○ 6.1.7.2 Key Usage Purposes for Encryption Certificates-Added subsection no content changes. ○ 6.1.7.3 Key Usage Purposes for DirectTrust Signing and Encryption Certificates-Added subsection no content changes ○ 6.1.7.4 Key Usage Purposes for Group Certificates-Added subsection no content changes. ○ 6.1.7.5 Key Usage Purposes for CA Certificates-Added subsection no content changes. ○ 6.1.7.6 Key Usage Purposes for RA System Certificates-Added subsection and verbiage clarifying type of cert is used for RA Systems. ○ 6.1.7.8 Key Usage Purposes for OCSP Responder Certificates-Added subsection. ○ 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls-Updated content in CP to remove the term entity CA per FPKIPA recommendation ○ 6.2.2 Private Key multi-Person Control-Added language to CPS to specify security delivery of key pairs. ○ 6.2.3.1 Escrow of IdenTrust CA Private Signature Key-Changed terminology from Entity CA to IdenTrust CA in CPS. ○ 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection-Changed terminology from Entity CA to IdenTrust CA in CPS. ○ 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements-Added clarifying content regarding equipment configurations. ○ 7.1.3.1 Signature Algorithm OIDs-Updated and numbered table ○ 7.1.3.1 Signature Algorithm OIDs-Updated and numbered table ○ 7.1.3.2 Subject Public Key Information-Updated and numbered table.

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 7.1.3.3 Elliptic Curve Public Key-Updated and numbered table ○ 7.1.4 Name Forms-Updated and numbered table. ○ 8.1 Frequency of Audit or Assessments-Updated SAFE BioPharma to SAFE Identity. ○ 8.4.2.1 Annual PIV-I Card Testing-Updated content to require submission of PIV-I test results with annual audit. ○ 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information-Updated language pertaining to PIV-I card serial numbers. ○ Reference to High Assurance Level-Removed section and content. ○ Reference to Rudimentary Assurance Level-Removed section and content. ○ Various-Cosmetic and spelling errors.
1.5.6	March 31, 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Updates based on the FBCA Policy v3.0 in these sections: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Overall updates from “Shall” to “Must” or actionable task ○ 1.3.7 added “Other Participants”. ○ 1.4.1, 3.2.3.5, 3.2.3.6 Removed SHA-1 references. ○ 1.4.2. Added reference to “id-fpki-certpcy-pivi-cardAuth”. ○ 2.2.1, 2.4, 4.3.1.3, and 4.4.2 Updated PIV-I Authentication and Card Authentication Certificates not to be distributed via public repositories. ○ 2.3 Updated Frequency of Publication within 30 days. ○ 3.1.1.1 Added Group Certificates issuance under non-PIV-I Subscribers. ○ 3.1.1.4 and 3.1.5.4 Device Subscriber issuance update. ○ 3.1.2 Common Name updates. ○ 3.2.3.1.3.1, 4.2.4.2.1.3, 4.2.3.1.1, and 4.7 Updated validity of or in-Person Identification and Certificate retrieval from 30 to 90 days effective September 1, 2023 ○ 3.2.3.1.8.3 3.3.1.1, and 4.7 Updated Initial Applicant data validity period from 9 to 12 years. ○ 3.2.3.4.1.3 Updated for Unique Software Application name. ○ 3.3.2 Updated to include biometrics. ○ 4.4.3 Added notification of CA Certificate issuance to other entities within 24 hours. ○ 4.6.6, 4.7.6, and 4.8.6 Removed text referenced in 4.4.2. ○ 4.9.1.2 Removed reference to SSL Certificates. ○ 4.9.4, 4.9.5 Updates to process Revocation Requests. ○ 4.9.7, 4.9.7.2 CRL updates from 31 to 35 days. ○ 4.9.8 Max CRL Latency from 1 to 4 hours. ○ 4.9.9 Added CRL and OCSP details. ○ 5.1.5.1 added details for compliance with local commercial building codes. ○ 5.1.8.1 Added Off-site backup facility details. ○ 5.3.3 Updated details for Training Requirements. ○ 5.3.5 Updated details for Job Rotation Frequency. ○ 5.4.1 Updated details for Types of Events Recorded. ○ 5.4.2 Updated frequency of Processing Log from 60 to 30 days. ○ 5.4.3 Added Reviewal Action to Audit Logs. ○ 5.4.5 Added details to Audit Log Backup Procedures. ○ 5.4.6 Added details to Audit Collection Systems. ○ 5.5.1 Updated Types of Events Archived table. ○ 5.7 added statement for Security Incidents. ○ 5.7.1.1 Updated CA Incident Reporting. ○ 5.7.4 Added reference to 4.10.2 for Service Availability. ○ 6 Moved statement in 6.1 to footer area.

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 6.16 Updated FIPS 182- references to NIST SP 800-56A Rev.3. ○ 6.2.1 Removed deprecated Rudimentary Assurance reference and added reference to pseudo-random numbers for Key generation material. ○ 6.3.2 Update IGC PIV-I Container Signer Certificate lifetime from 8 to 9 years. ○ 6.5.2 Added Computer Security Rating statement. ○ 6.6.3 Updated from “No stipulation” adding details to Life Cycle Security Controls. ○ 6.7 Added the last 2 paragraphs for Network Security Controls. ○ 7.1.1.1 Updated Serial Number details from at least 20-bits to at least 60-bits entropy referencing pseudo -random generator. ○ 7.1.3.1 Updated table 13 with Sha384 and sha-512 algorithms. ○ 7.1.6 Added reference to PIV-I Card Authentication and PIV-I Content Signing Certificates. ○ 7.1.9 added reference to non-critical Certificate Policies extension. ○ 9.2.3 Updated from “No stipulation” adding reference to 9.2.1. ○ 9.3.3 Added reference to applicable agreements. ○ 9.4.1 Added reference to Privacy Plan. ○ 9.4.3 Added reference to Information Not Deemed Private. ○ 9.17 Added references to Other Provisions. ● Moved the Revision History table to this Section 1.2 per RFC 3647 ● 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.4, 1.4.4, 1.3.1.2, 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 4.1, 7.1.4, 8.1, and 12 Removed SAFE Identity references as no longer offered by IdenTrust ● Removal of deprecated OIDs in Section 1.2.2.2 ● 1.6.1 Added/Updated definitions: “Key”, “Out-of-Band”, “Two-Person-Control”. ● 1.6.2 added acronyms: AES, AIA, AID, APL, CIO, CISA, CN, FIPS, FPKI, FPKIPA, GSA, HSM, HTTP, IEFTF, ITAR, ITU, ITU-T, MOA, NACI, NACLCL, PII, SIA, S/MIME, SP, SubCA. ● 7.1.7 Removed duplicate sentence. ● 7.1.5 and 9.9 Removed reference to Baseline Requirements. ● 7.3.2 Updated OCSP extension requirement. ● 9.11 Added missing sub-headers. ● 9.12.2 Updated link IGC website document library. ● 9.13.1 Updated link name to IdenTrust Claims Form. ● 10 – removed as supplicated in Appendix A ● Section 11 removed as the referenced documents are in section 1.1.4 Scope
1.5.7	August 18, 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Updates based on the FBCA 2021-2022 audit feedback mapping the same sections of the FBCA CP with the IGC CP/CPS and on the FBCA CP versions 3.1 and 3.2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1.1.5 Added missing section ○ 1.3.1.1 thru 1.3.1.5 added missing sections ○ 1.3.2.1 thru 1.3.2.2 added missing sections ○ 1.3.6 thru 1.3.7.2, Added missing sections ○ 2.1, Added first paragraph ○ 3.1.1, 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, Updates to match CP ○ 3.5 thru 3.5.5, Added missing sections ○ 4.12.1.2.2 thru 4.1.12.3.5, Added missing sections ○ 5.1.2.5 thru 5.1.2.7, Added missing sections ○ 5.2.1.3 thru 5.2.1.3.2, Added missing sections ○ 5.4.1/5.5.1, updated types of events recorded/archived ○ 5.7.3.2, Added missing section ○ 6.1.1.3 and 6.1.1.4, Added missing sections

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 6.3.2, updated certificate operational periods ○ Appendix C, D, and E, Added ● 1.2.2.2.6, DirectTrust OIDs updates ● 4.12.3 thru 4.12.4 added missing sections ● 5.2.1.8.7 Added Software Engineer Trusted Role ● 5.2.1.8.8 Added Development Operations Trusted Role ● 5.2.4, Added Development Operations and Software Engineer Trusted Roles ● 5.5 Added text from the CP
1.5.8	September 15, 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Updated section numbers to comply with the CP
1.5.9	November 8, 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 3.2.3.3.1 DirectTrust Group Domain Bound Certificate updates
1.6.0	Septgember 23, 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 1 Added Introduction language ● 1.1.2 Removed and added clarifying language ● 1.1.3 Updated section title ● 1.2.2 Added Certificate clarifying language ● 1.2.2.1 Removed language from the CPS and added it to the CP ● 1.2.2.1.3 Added Medium Software Certificate section ● 1.2.2.1.4 Updated title to Medium Hardware and PIV-I ● 1.2.2.2 Removed Group Device Signing and Encryption OID's ● 1.3 Removed CP Language ● 1.3.1.3 Updated to "No Stipulation" ● 1.3.6 Added escrow and recovery language ● 1.3.7 Added escrow and recovery language ● 1.3.9.3 Added section "Machine Operator" with language ● 1.3.11.1 Removed not applicable language ● 1.6.1 Updated "Assurance Level" definition ● 3.1.1.1 Removed Group Cert reference and added PIV-I reference ● 3.1.1.2.4 Added section number ● 3.1.1.2.5 Added section number ● 3.1.1.2.6 Added section number ● 3.1.1.2.7 Added section number ● 3.1.1.2.8 Added section number ● 3.1.3 Added I&A language ● 3.1.4.1 Removed section ● 3.1.5 Added section number and section language ● 3.1.5.1 Removed section ● 3.1.6 Added CA language ● 3.2 Removed redundant language ● 3.2.2 Updated Authentication language ● 3.2.2.2 spelt out what ISSO is ● 3.2.3.1.4 Added Mechanism language ● 3.2.3.1.5 Added verification language ● 3.2.3.1.9 Added section number to existing verification language ● 3.2.3.3.2 Updated section title ● 3.2.3.4 Added more detailed language ● 3.5 Added escrow and recovery language ● 4.1.2.2 Removed Internal TA laguage ● 4.1.2.4 Removed section ● 4.2.1 Added section number with existing language

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4.2.2 Added verifying information language • 4.2.2.1 Removed original section • 4.2.3 Added section number • 4.3.1 Added section number • 4.3.1.3 Added section • 4.3.1.12 moved language to 4.3.1.3 • 4.5.1 Added clarifying language • 4.5.4.1 moved to section 4.6.2 • 4.5.4.2 Moved to section 4.6.2 • 4.5.4.3 Moved to section 4.6.2 • 4.6.2 Added language • 4.5.6.1 Moved to section 4.6.4 • 4.5.6.2 Moved to section 4.6.4 • 4.5.6.3 Moved to section 4.6.4 • 4.5.7.1 Moved to section 4.6.5 • 4.5.7.2 Moved to section 4.6.5 • 4.5.7.3 Moved to section 4.6.5 • 4.6.2.1 Moved to section 4.7.2 • 4.6.2.2 Moved to section 4.7.2 • 4.6.2.3 Moved to section 4.7.2 • 4.6.4 Added language • 4.6.5 Added language • 4.7.2 Added language • 4.9.16 Added mechanism language • 5.1 Moved language from the CPS to the CP • 5.1.6.1 Removed section and moved under 5.1.6 • 5.4.5 Moved some language from the CPS to the CP • 5.5.7 Removed redundant language • 6.1.1.1 Added Language
1.6.1	October 2025	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Added Hyperlinks throughout the entire CPS document • 1.1.2 Updated language • 1.1.4 Updated date • 1.2.2.1 Updated language • 1.2.2.2 Added Oids for PIV-I, Medium Device SW and Medium Device HW certs OID's to include (2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.47) as called out in audit • Added 2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.37.1 and 2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.38.1 with a comment "To be deprecated" as called out in audit. • 1.3.4.1 Added language • Added section 1.3.6.1 • Added section 1.3.6.2 • Added section 1.3.6.3 • Added section 1.3.6.4 • Added section 1.3.7.1 • Added section 1.3.7.2 • Added KRA to definitions • Added KRO to definitions • 3.1.1.1 Updated language • 3.1.3 Updated language • 3.1.5 Updated language • 3.1.6 Updated language • 3.2.3.1.1 Updated language • 3.2.3.1.3 Updated language

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.2.3.1.3.1 Updated language to include Supervised Remote in-person Proofing • 3.2.3.1.5.1 Removed some language • 3.2.3.1.8 Updated Language • 3.2.3.1.9.1 Updated language • 3.2.3.3.2 Updated language • 3.2.3.4.2 Updated language • 3.2.3.4.3 Updated language • 3.2.3.4.5 Updated language • 3.3 Added section to mirror CP and Bridge • 3.3.1 Added section and language to mirror CP and Bridge • 3.3.1.1 Updated Language • 3.5.1 Added section • 3.5.2 Added section • 3.5.3 Added section • 3.5.4 Added section • 3.5.5 Added section • 4.1.1.7 Updated language • 4.1.2.1 Updated language • 4.1.2.2 Updated language • 4.3.1 Updated language • 4.4 Added language • 4.5.1 Updated language • 4.6.1 Updated language • 4.7.5 Updated language • 4.7.7 Updated language • 4.8.3.1 Updated language • 4.8.3.2 Updated language • 4.12 Updated language • 4.12.1 Added section • 4.12.1.1 Added section • 4.12.2.1 Added section • 4.12.2.2 Added section • 4.12.2.2.1 Added section • 4.12.2.2.2 Added section • 4.12.2.2.3 Added section • 4.12.2.2.4 Added section • 5 Updated language • 5.1.2.1.1 Updated lanugae • 5.1.2.1.3 Updated language • 5.2.1.5.3 Updated language • Added section 5.2.1.8 • 5.2.2 Updated language • 5.3.3.1 Updated language • 5.3.3.2 Updated language • 5.3.3.5 Updated language • 5.3.3.6 Updated language • Added section 5.3.3.10 • Added section 5.3.3.11 • Added section 5.3.3.12 • Added section 5.3.3.13 • 5.3.4 Updated language • 5.3.5 Updated language

Version	Date	Summary of Changes/Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5.7 Updated language 5.7.3.5 Updated language 5.7.4 Updated language

1.2.1 Alphanumeric Identifier

The alphanumeric identifier (i.e., the title) for this CPS is the "IdenTrust Global Common Certification Practice Statement v1.6.1" dated October 2025.

1.2.2 Object Identifier (OID)

IdenTrust is the owner of a numeric company identifier, (i.e., an object identifier (OID) assigned by the American National Standards Institute). The IdenTrust OID arc for Certificates that are Issued by CAs under this CPS is 2.16.840.1.113893.0.100

[Table 1- "CP Certificate Names, Assurance Levels, Types and Certificate Policy OIDs"](#), below defines the Certificate types and the Assurance Levels for Issuance.

Certificate Types indicate certificate functions such as Signing Certificate, Encryption Certificate or Card Authentication Certificate. Each individual Certificate Type asserts a unique policy in the form of an. Certificates may use additional OIDs to assert affiliation, compliance, intended usages or other purposes.

1.2.2.1 Assurance Levels

Certificates may use additional OIDs to assert affiliations, compliance, intended usages or for other purposes. When a CA asserts OIDs indicating compliance with a particular policy, the stipulations of that policy are followed by CAs and RAs. Specific Certificate policy OIDs are in [Table 1 CP Certificate Names, Assurance Levels, Types and Certificate Policy OIDs](#), however, Participant CA-specific Certificate policy OIDs are detailed and maintained in the IGC Certificate Profile. Participant CA is created and Certificate policy OIDs specific to that Participant CA are to be asserted in Certificates issued under Participant CA, then such Certificate policy OIDs must be defined as a part of the Certificate Profiles associated with that Participant CA and included in the IGC Certificate Profile.

Unless otherwise specified, a requirement or practice specified in this CPS applies to all Certificates that are Issued under this CPS.

Certificates that are Issued under this CPS assert one or more of the Certificate Policy OIDs in Table 1, provided in the subsection to follow. For each named Certificate, one or more Certificate Types may be Issued depending on the use case and Subscriber requirements. Certificate Types indicate a Certificate function such as Signing Certificate, Encryption Certificate or Card Authentication Certificate. Each individual Certificate Type asserts a unique policy in the form of a Certificate policy OID under this CPS.

1.2.2.1.1 Basic Assurance Certificates

Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of Basic are Issued to Subscribers of hardware or software Cryptomodules and are named Basic Hardware or Basic Software, respectively. Different OIDs are asserted to allow Relying Parties an ability to distinguish the Certificate storage type.

1.2.2.1.2 Non-Human Certificates

Certificates issued to a Device asserts the OID or OIDs associated in [Table 1 CP Certificate Names, Assurance Levels, Types and Certificate Policy OIDs](#), with a single "Certificate Name" listed among the following "Certificate Names":

1. IGC Medium Device Software;
2. IGC Medium Device Hardware; or
3. IGC PIV-I Content Signing.

All other policies defined in this CPS are reserved for Certificates not issued to Devices.

1.2.2.1.3 Medium Software Certificates

Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of Medium Software, are issued to Subscribers of software Cryptomodules and are named Medium Software respectively. OIDs are asserted to allow Relying Parties an ability to identify the Certificate storate type.

1.2.2.1.4 Medium Hardware and PIV-I Certificates

Requirements or practices for Medium Hardware Certificates also apply to PIV-I Hardware Certificates. The PIV-I Content Signing Certificate policy OID is reserved for Certificates that are Issued to a CMS for the purpose of signing PIV-I card security objects.

1.2.2.2 IGC OIDs Tables

The following tables provide all IGC OIDs:

Table 1 - CPS Certificate Names, Assurance Levels, Types and Certificate Policy OIDs

Certificate Name	Assurance Level	Certificate Type	IdenTrust Policy OID	Federal Policy OID	Bridge Policy OID
IGC Basic Software	Basic	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3 .2	
		Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.3		
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.2		
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.4		
IGC Basic Hardware	Basic	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.5	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3 .2	
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.6		
		Card Authentication Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.7		
		Identity Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.2.8		
IGC Medium Software	Medium Software	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3 .3	
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.2		
		Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.3		
		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.4		
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.5		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.1 00.3.6		

Certificate Name	Assurance Level	Certificate Type	IdenTrust Policy OID	Federal Policy OID	Bridge Policy OID
IGC Medium Software CBP	Medium Software CBP	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.14.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.14	
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.14.2		
IGC Medium Hardware	Medium Hardware	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.12.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.12	
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.12.2		
		Card Authentication Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.12.3		
		Identity Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.12.4		
IGC Medium Hardware CBP	Medium Hardware CBP	Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.15.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.15	
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.15.2		
		Card Authentication Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.15.3		
		Identity Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.15.4		
IGC PIV-I Hardware	PIV-I Hardware	Identity Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.18.0	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.18	
		Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.18.1		
		Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.18.2		
IGC PIV-I Card Authentication	PIV-I Card Authentication	Card Authentication Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.19.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.19	
IGC PIV-I Content Signing	PIV-I Content Signing	PIV-I Content Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.20.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.20	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.47
IGC Medium Device Software	Medium Device Software	To be deprecated	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.37.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.37	
		Device Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.37.2		
IGC Medium Device Hardware	Medium Device Hardware	To be deprecated	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.38.1	2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.3.38	
		Device Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.38.2		

1.2.2.3 DirectTrust OIDs

The following table provides all DirectTrust OIDs as defined in the DirectTrust CP:

Table 2 – DirectTrust CP Certificate Names, Assurance Levels, Types and Certificate Policy OIDs

Certificate Name	Assurance Level	Certificate Type	IdenTrust Policy OID	DirectTrust OID
Covered Entities (CE) IGC Medium Software	Medium Software	Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.3	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.2.1 (CE) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.0.2.0 (CP) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.5 (IAL2 Assurance)
		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.4	
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.5	
		DirectTrust Address Signing		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.6	
		DirectTrust Address Encryption		
Business Associates (BA) IGC Medium Software	Medium Software	Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.3	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.2.2 (BA) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.0.2.0 (CP) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.5 (IAL2 Assurance)
		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.4	
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.5	
		DirectTrust Address Signing		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.6	
		DirectTrust Address Encryption		
Healthcare Entities (HE) IGC Medium Software	Medium Software	Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.3	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.2.3 (HE) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.0.2.0 (CP) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.5 (IAL2 Assurance)
		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.4	
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.5	
		DirectTrust Address Signing		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.6	
		DirectTrust Address Encryption		
Patients IGC Medium Software	Medium Software	Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.3	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.2.4 (Patients) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.0.2.0 (CP) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.5 (IAL2 Assurance)
		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.4	
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.5	
		DirectTrust Address Signing		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.6	
		DirectTrust Address Encryption		
Non-Declared Entities (ND)	Medium Software	Group Organization Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.3	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.2.5 (ND)

Certificate Name	Assurance Level	Certificate Type	IdenTrust Policy OID	DirectTrust OID
IGC Medium Software		Group Organization Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.4	1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.0.2.0 (CP) 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.5 (IAL2 Assurance)
		Group Address Signing Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.5	
		DirectTrust Address Signing		
		Group Address Encryption Certificate	2.16.840.1.113839.0.100.3.6	
		DirectTrust Address Encryption		

Valid DirectTrust OIDs not currently used in IGC Certificate end-entity profiles:

- 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.1;
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.2; and
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.41179.1.4

1.3 PKI PARTICIPANTS

The CA is the basic building block of a PKI. The CA is a collection of computer hardware, software, and the people who operate it. The CA is known by two attributes: its name and its public key. The CA performs 4 basic PKI functions:

1. Issues Certificates (i.e., creates and signs them);
2. Maintains Certificate status information and issues CRLs;
3. Publishes its current CRLs, so users can obtain the information they need to implement security services; and
4. Maintains archives of status information about the expired Certificates that it Issued.

A CA may Issue Certificates to users, to other CAs, or both. When a CA Issues a Certificate, it is asserting that the subject (the entity named in the Certificate) has the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key contained in the Certificate. If the CA includes additional information in the Certificate, the CA is asserting that information corresponds to the subject as well. This additional information might be contact information (e.g., an electronic mail address), or policy information (e.g., the types of applications that can be performed with this Public Key.)

When the subject of the Certificate is another CA, the Issuer is asserting that the Certificates issued by the other CA are trustworthy.

The CA inserts its name in every Certificate and CRL it generates, and signs them with its Private Key. Once users establish that they trust a CA (directly, or through Certificate path discovery) they can trust Certificates that are Issued by that CA. Users can easily identify Certificates that are Issued by that CA by comparing its name. To ensure the Certificate is genuine, they verify the signature using the CA’s Public Key. As a result, it is important that the CA provide adequate protection for its own Private Key. For more information regarding the Federal PKI, IdenTrust suggests reading “Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal Public PKI infrastructure”¹ from which the definitions above were derived.

¹ <https://www.idmanagement.gov/governance/>
<https://playbooks.idmanagement.gov/fpki/>

1.3.1 PKI Authorities

1.3.1.1 Federal Chief Information Officers Council

No stipulation.

1.3.1.2 Federal PKI Policy Authority (FPKIPA)

No stipulation.

1.3.1.3 Federal PKI Management Authority (FPKIMA)

No stipulation.

1.3.1.4 FPKI Management Authority Program Manager

No stipulation.

1.3.1.5 IdenTrust Policy Management Authority (PMA)

The IdenTrust Policy Management Authority (PMA) oversees the adoption, administration and application of the CP, this CPS, and any relevant Registration Practice Statement (RPS) with CAs, RAs, Certificate Status Authorities, and other PKI Participants.


The IdenTrust PMA communicates with other Policy Approval Authorities concerning the Cross-Certification existing between the IGC Root CA, Subordinate CAs and the applicable Bridge Certification Authority and conformity to the applicable CP, this CPS, and other applicable requirements. The IdenTrust PMA also has charge of the future development and amendment of this CPS. Further explanation of how the IdenTrust PMA meets these responsibilities is described in the appropriate Section for that PMA responsibility (see Section [1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures](#), [8.6.1 IdenTrust Audit Submission](#) or [9.12 Amendments](#)).

1.3.1.6 IdenTrust Global Common PKI Participants

IdenTrust operates the IGC PKI, which is a hierarchical PKI, meaning CAs are arranged hierarchically under a “Root” CA that Issues Certificates to Subordinate CAs. These CAs may Issue Certificates to CAs below them in the hierarchy, or to users. In a hierarchical PKI, every Relying Party knows the Public Key of the Root CA. Any Certificate may be verified by verifying the certification path of Certificates from the Root CA. The IGC PKI is used and operated by PKI Participants.

Below is Figure 1, which is an illustration of how PKI Participants are legally bound by contract. For simplicity, Figure 1 does not attempt to illustrate the contractual relationship among IdenTrust’s Policy Approval Authority (“IdenTrust PAA”), the IdenTrust Policy Management Authority (“IdenTrust PMA”) and certain other PKI Participants. For the same reason, it also does not attempt to illustrate the distinctions and legal relationships among Local Registration Authorities, Trusted Agents, and other PKI Participants identified in this CPS.

This CPS is an assertion of the Certification practices that IdenTrust, Participant CAs, RAs, and others implement. The rights and obligations of all PKI Participants are bound by this CPS, CP, and other contractual documents between IdenTrust and other PKI Participants as described herein.



1.3.2 IdenTrust Principal Certification Authority (CA)

IdenTrust acts as a Principal CA and may issue Certificates that are cross-certified under other Certificate Policies. IdenTrust issues end-entity Certificates, as well as subordinate CA Certificates to other Entities and/or external party CAs.

A CA is an Organization that attests to the binding between an identity and cryptographic Key Pair. CA functions primarily consist of the following:

- Providing Key management functions, such as the generation of CA Key Pairs, the secure management of CA Private Keys, and the distribution of CA Public Keys,
- Binding between an identity and cryptographic Key Pair by Issuance of a Certificate,
- Issuing Certificates in response to approved Certificate applications,
- Publication of Certificates in a Repository, where Certificates are made available for potential Relying Parties,
- Initiation of Certificate Revocations, either at the Subscriber's request, the request of a Subscribing Organization; or upon the CA's own initiative; and
- Revocation of Certificates, including by such means as issuing and publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or providing Revocation information via Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or other online methods.

IdenTrust is a CA and has Issued itself the IdenTrust Global Common Root Certificate. This CA is operated as a root under the IGC CP. Subordinate CA Certificates are Issued by the IGC Root CA. Certificates are Issued to Subscribers

by Subordinate CAs.

As a provider of CA services, IdenTrust also ensures the availability of all Certificate management services for Certificates that are Issued under the IGC Root Certificate, including the mechanisms to Issue, Revoke and provide status information about Certificates. As the operator of each CA, IdenTrust also operates a Certificate Status Authority for the Certificates that are Issued by each CA.

CAs, except Participant CAs, may delegate their Registration functions to RAs who meet the financial requirements of Section [9.2 Financial Responsibility](#).

IdenTrust Issues Subordinate CA Certificates signed by the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA to well-established, responsible external Organizations that meet the financial requirements of Section 9.2, called Participant CAs. Participant CAs enter into an IdenTrust Participant Certification Authority Agreement (“Participant CA Agreement”), which provides that, at a minimum, IdenTrust operates the Participant’s CA on behalf of Participant CA and the Participant CA agrees to perform all RA functions in a manner satisfying all RA requirements of the Participant CA’s RPS, this CPS, and CP. The Participant CA Agreement provides that the Participant CA is required to gain written authority to operate from IdenTrust prior to commencing production operations, and that IdenTrust does not grant such authority until the Participant CA is able to demonstrate its ability to satisfy the aforementioned RA requirements and has undergone an external compliance audit in accordance with Section 8 of this CPS.

Subsequent to production operations, the Participant CA is required to undergo an annual compliance audit in accordance with Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) of this CPS. Such audit results must be provided by the Participant CA to IdenTrust by May 31st. of each year for inclusion in IdenTrust’s external compliance audit.

Participant CAs are prohibited from issuing IGC CA Certificates to any entity other than for the purpose of Cross-Certification. Any such cross-certification must be approved in advance by the IdenTrust PMA. By default, Participant IGC CA Certificates are constrained to Issuance of only end-entity Certificates. More than one layer of Participant CA between Subscribers and the IGC Root CA is prohibited.

Participant CAs are prohibited from issuing IGC SSL Certificates. Participant CA Certificates are technically constrained so as to disallow Issuance of IGC SSL Certificates.

Participant CAs are prohibited from delegation of their RA responsibilities under this CPS with the exception of contracting TAs.

Participant CAs are prohibited from contracting operation of a CMS or RA System to any entity other than IdenTrust.

A Participant CA that has been Issued a CA Certificate (where the Participant CA is identified as the Issuer in the Distinguished Name field of the Certificate) is responsible for Certificates that are Issued under its CA Certificate.

IdenTrust maintains physical, administrative, and operational control over the CA infrastructure for all Subordinate CAs created from the IGC Root Certificate, regardless of whether the Subordinate CA Certificate has been Issued to IdenTrust or a Participant CA. The CA Private Keys of all Subordinate CAs are in the custody of IdenTrust. The IGC Root CA and all Subordinate CAs that are part of the IGC PKI are referred to collectively herein as CAs.

An entity that has been Issued a CA Certificate is legally responsible for Certificates that are Issued under its CA Certificate (where the entity is identified as Issuer in the Distinguished Name field of the Certificate). IdenTrust performs the CA functions on behalf of Participant CAs while they are responsible for the performance of Registration Authority functions.

This CPS is an assertion of the certification practices that IdenTrust implements in accordance with CP. Participant CAs and External RAs must provide an assertion of Registration practices within their RPS in accordance with this CPS and the CP.

1.3.2.1 IdenTrust Cross-Certified Certification Authority (CA)

IdenTrust designates at least one CA within its PKI to receive a cross-certificate from the FBCA, referred to in this CPS as the Entity cross-certified CA. In addition, this CPS may refer to CAs that are “subordinate” to the Entity cross-certified CA.

IdenTrust ensures that no CA under its PKI shall have more than one trust path to the FBCA.

1.3.2.2 Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA)

The FBCA is operated by the FPKIMA and is authorized by the FPKIPA to create, sign, and issue public key Certificates. As operated by the FPKIMA, the FBCA is responsible for all aspects of the issuance and management of a Certificate including:

- The Certificate manufacturing process,
- Publication of Certificates,
- Revocation of Certificates,
- Re-key of FBCA signing material, and
- Ensuring that all aspects of the FBCA services and FBCA operations and infrastructure related to Certificates issued under this CPS are performed in accordance with the requirements, representations, and warranties of the “X.509 Certificate Policy for the Federal Bridge Certification Authority”.

1.3.3 Card Management System (CMS)

The CMS manages smart card token content. In this policy the context the CMS regarding CMS requirements are generally associated with the PIV-I policies; however, an External RA may also use the CMS to request smart card credentials that are not PIV-I, as noted in specific sections of this CPS. A CMS is only deployed within IdenTrust or an authorized RA Organization. IdenTrust, as the CA, is responsible for ensuring that each CMS implementation meets the requirements described in the IGC CP, this CPS and the requirements stated in Appendix B. A CMS never issues any Certificates that express the PIV-I Hardware or PIV-I Card Authentication policy OIDs.

1.3.4 Registration Authority (RA)

A Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that is responsible for collecting and confirming a Subscriber’s identity and other information for inclusion in the Subscriber’s Certificate. RA functions include the following:

- Establishing an environment and procedure for Certificate Applicants to submit their Certificate applications (e.g., creating a web-based enrollment page),
- The I&A of Individuals or entities who apply for a Certificate,
- The approval or rejection of Certificate applications,
- The initiation of Certificate Revocations, either at the Subscriber’s request or upon the entity’s own initiative,
- The I&A of Individuals or entities submitting requests to renew Certificates or seeking a new Certificate following a Re-Keying process and processes (above) for Certificates that are Issued in response to approved renewal or Re-Keying requests,
- Authenticating the subject’s identity,
- Verifying the attributes requested by the subject for their Certificate,
- Assigning distinguished (unique) names to subjects; and
- Distributing Cryptomodules and associated software to Subscribers.

RAs are Organizations, whereas LRAs are Individuals; and only financially responsible Organizations will be RAs. CAs may delegate their registration functions (but not the responsibility of the CA to IdenTrust) to external Organizations that meet the financial requirements of Section [9.2 Financial Responsibility](#). Such RAs are referred to in this CPS as “External RA’s (see External RAs below).

Through their LRAs and Tas, RAs will accept Certificate applications, collect, and confirm Applicant identity information, and approve Certificate Issuance. An RA uses a system (RA System) to support services for

Applicants/Subscribers and LRAs. The RA System can be hosted by IdenTrust or by the External RA. An RA System provides Applicant/Subscriber services including Certificate lifecycle support such as Applicant's registration (only with IdenTrust-hosted system), Certificate retrieval and Revocation/Suspension requests. LRA services provided by IdenTrust-hosted RA Systems include upload of Applicant information, Certificate application approval, generation of Activation information, support for emails notifications, and Suspension and/or Revocation approval. The RA System may also include a card issuance system that securely interacts with the CA as necessary to personalize cards and Cryptomodules. Communication between the RA System and an Individual (i.e., Applicant, Subscriber or LRA) is protected by securely encrypted sessions (i.e., Server or Client-authenticated SSL/TLS encryption, depending on whether a Certificate is available for mutual authentication). The server uses a Device Certificate Issued under an IdenTrust SSL Certificate Issued under a policy that achieves authentication of a Web\Application Server in-line with industry best practices and chains to a Root CA embedded in major browsers. LRAs always establish Client-authenticated sessions with the system and an Access Control List (ACL) allows only authorized LRAs to use the system's services.

An RA may communicate with a CA system for Certificate Issuance, Suspension or Revocation through either:

1. An LRA who initiates a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session with the CA and manages Certificates through a web-based interface, or
2. An RA System installed in a secure area of an RA facility that submits Digitally Signed ASN.1 or XML DSIG structures via a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session.

1.3.4.1 External RAs

IdenTrust may delegate certain registration functions to external Organizations that meet the financial requirements of Section [9.2 Financial Responsibility](#). Such RAs are referred to in this CPS as "External RAs."

External RAs are bound by written agreement with IdenTrust, called an RA Agreement, under which at a minimum the External RA agrees to perform all delegated RA functions in a manner satisfying all RA requirements in their RPS, the IGC CP and this CPS. The RA Agreement also requires the External RA to gain written authority to operate from IdenTrust prior to commencing production operations, understanding that IdenTrust does not grant such authority until the External RA is able to demonstrate its ability to satisfy the aforementioned RA requirements and have undergone an external compliance audit in accordance with Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) of this CPS.

Subsequent to production operations, the External RA is required to undergo an annual compliance audit in accordance with Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) of this CPS.

External RAs are prohibited from delegation of their RA responsibilities under this CPS with the exception of contracting TAs.

External RAs are prohibited from contracting operation of a CMS for IGC PIV-I Certificate Issuance to any entity other than IdenTrust.

1.3.5 Certificate Status Servers/Authority (CSS/CSA)

As a provider of CA services, IdenTrust ensures the availability of all Certificate management services for Certificates that are Issued under the IGC Root Certificate, including the mechanisms to Issue, Revoke and provide status information about Certificates. As the operator of each CA, IdenTrust also operates a Certificate Status Authority for the Certificates that are Issued by Participant CAs.

IdenTrust operates a server-based Certificate Status Authority (CSA) consisting of Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responder(s) for each CA to provide Revocation status information for Certificates. Certificate status for all Certificates that are Issued by CAs covered by this CPS is provided through CSAs operated by IdenTrust. OCSP Responders are Issued CA-delegated Certificates in order to ensure interoperability with cross certified partners.

IdenTrust also publishes CRLs containing Certificate status information (see Section 2.2).

1.3.6 Key Recovery Authorities

While IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it, the recovery of escrowed keys is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS.

1.3.6.1 Key Escrow Database

The online master HSM allows for key recovery to be performed in an online fashion. The enterprise customer interacts with a CMS (card management system) accessible from the customer facility. The CMS then sends an API call to the IdenTrust system requesting the key recovery. The IdenTrust system performs the key recovery using the online HSM and then returns the user key to the CMS. The CMS then injects the key onto a smartcard or token.

1.3.6.2 Data Decryption Server

IdenTrust does not support a Data Decryption Server (DDS) system as this is optional see section 1.3.6.2 of the IGC CP.

1.3.6.3 Key Recovery Agent

The RA role at IdenTrust acts as a Key Recovery Agent, see section [5.2.1.2 Registration Authority Trusted Role](#).

1.3.6.4 Key Recovery Official

Organizations (Enterprise Customers) appoint KROs to support the key requestor identity verification and authorization validation tasks detailed in their Registration Practice Statement (RPS).

1.3.7 Key Recovery Requestors

While IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it, the recovery of escrowed keys is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS.

1.3.7.1 Internal Third-Party Requestor

An IdenTrust Employee acts as an internal Third-Party Requestor who is authorized to obtain subscriber keys for the issuing Organization or on behalf of the issuing organization of which the CA issues subscriber certificates.

1.3.7.2 External Third-Party Requestor

An External Third-Party Requestor is an individual outside of IdenTrust and the Issuing Organization and have a court order to obtain the decryption private key of a Subscriber.

1.3.8 Subscribers

A Subscriber is an entity to whom or to which a Certificate is Issued. Subscribers are named in the Certificate subject and hold, either directly or through its designated Custodian (authorized third party), a Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key listed in the Certificate.

Subscribers include:

- Users affiliated with a legal entity requiring a Certificate for use in accordance with this CPS,
- A CA's users,
- Primary Machine Operators; or
- PKI operations personnel at IdenTrust, and Participant CAs.

Note that while CAs are sometimes considered "Subscribers" in a PKI, for the purposes of this CPS, the term "Subscriber" refers only to end-entities.

1.3.8.1 Custodian

A Custodian acts in the capacity of an agent or authorized third party of a Subscriber. The Custodian holds and manages the Private Keys of a Subscriber Certificate, on behalf of that Subscriber, in a Custodial Subscriber Key Store. The Custodial agent, who is appointed by the Custodial entity is typically referred to as the Information System Security Officer (ISSO).

1.3.9 Affiliated Organizations

Subscriber Certificates may be issued on behalf of an organization other than the organization operating the PKI that has a relationship with the Subscriber; this is termed affiliation. The organizational affiliation will be indicated in the Certificate. IdenTrust contacts the Affiliated Organizations associate with a Certificate application to verify the affiliation at the time of Certificate application and requesting revocation of the Certificate if the affiliation is no longer valid.

1.3.9.1 Local Registration Authority (LRA)

The Local Registration Authority (LRA) is an Individual who collects (or receives process documentation from Trusted Agents (TAs”) and confirms each Subscriber’s identity information for inclusion in the Subscriber’s Certificate). LRAs are Individuals, whereas RAs are Organizations. The LRA and the RA Administrator are Trusted Roles held by Individuals who are subject to the requirements of Section [5.3 Personnel Controls](#). LRAs and RA Administrators comply with this CPS and the CP in the performance of their duties. LRA duties are similar to the duties of the RA. LRA services a limited population as authorized by the RA. LRAs collect and confirm each Subscriber’s identity and information for inclusion in the Subscriber’s Certificate.

Except where otherwise indicated, all requirements applicable to RAs apply to LRAs, including but not limited to physical protection of the LRA’s workstation, audit logging, implementation of computer security controls, implementation of network security controls.

1.3.9.2 Trusted Agent (TA)

The Trusted Agent (TA) collects information and confirms each Subscriber’s identity in support of Subscriber registration. TAs are required to be bound by their respective CA or RA through written agreement to perform their duties in compliance with this CPS and the CP, which include:

- Perform in-person identification of Applicants;
- Collect copies of identification documents and declarations of identity; and
- Deliver end-user support to Applicants, Subscribers and Subscribing Organizations, such as distribution of Cryptomodules, troubleshooting, and assistance with Certificate lifecycle event requests.

TAs may be provided web pages, forms, instructions, and other resources to facilitate the work of TAs, but TAs do not have privileges within CA or RA Systems to perform Certificate lifecycle functions. They act on the behalf of a CA or RA to confirm the identity of the Subscriber as necessary for Certificate Issuance or Certificate Revocation and to deliver support to Subscribers.

IdenTrust TAs are bound through an IdenTrust Trusted Agent Agreement.

1.3.9.2.1 Internal TAs

TAs may be specified by a Subscribing Organization through written agreement between the Subscribing Organization and the contracting CA or RA as authorized to verify Applicant identity data and also authorize affiliation of Applicants and Devices to the Subscribing Organization. Such TAs are referred to in this CPS as “Internal TAs.”

Contracting CAs or RAs are required to obligate both the Subscribing Organization and the Internal TA by written agreement to perform their respective duties and obligations under this CPS, and to maintain records of Internal TAs authorized by Subscribing Organizations.

The function of Internal TAs differs from that of standard TAs (those where such written authorization from a Subscribing Organization as described above does not exist) in 3 ways:

- Internal TAs may only conduct identity proofing for Issuance of IGC Affiliated Certificates, with such Organization affiliation required to be the same as that with which the Internal TA is affiliated,
- Internal TAs may potentially utilize an Antecedent In-Person Appearance to fulfill the requirements for in-person identity proofing (see Appendix C); and
- Internal TAs may assert affiliation of Applicants for which they submit registration data, which affiliation may be relied upon by the RA or CA for Certificate Issuance.

IdenTrust Internal TAs are bound through a Subscribing Organization Agreement Trusted Agent Addendum.

1.3.9.3 Machine Operators

See sub-sections below for Primary Machine Operator and Secondary Machine Operator.

1.3.9.3.1 Primary Machine Operator

A Primary Machine Operator is an Individual responsible for registering Devices with the LRA. The Primary Machine Operator is employed by or the authorized agent for the Subscribing Organization and expressly authorized by a Subscribing Organization to represent that Subscribing Organization with respect to the Device Certificate. The Primary Machine Operator is responsible for the operation and control of a Device and assumes the obligations of Subscriber for the Certificate associated with the Device, including but not limited to:

- A duty to protect the Private Key of the Device at all times;
- Sign and submit, or approve a Device Certificate application on behalf of the Subscribing Organization;
- Sign and submit a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Subscribing Organization, or, when the Organization is an affiliate of the CA, acknowledge and agree to the Certificate terms of use on behalf of the Subscribing Organization; and
- If the Primary Machine Operator desires to, designate Secondary Machine Operators.

The Primary Machine Operator must provide (a) personally identifying information and (b) evidence of affiliation with the Subscribing Organization of the Device, in each case with form and substance sufficient to sustain a verification of identity commensurate with the Certificate Assurance Level of the Device Certificate being requested and in accordance with the requirements for Human Subscribers as detailed in section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#) of this CPS.

If a Primary Machine Operator designates any Secondary Machine Operators, then the Primary Machine Operator is responsible to provide the names of all such Machine Operations in the Secondary Machine Operators List which is a part of the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement. The Subscribing Organization is responsible for making Secondary Machine Operators aware of the limited role and scope of responsibilities of Secondary Machine Operators with respect to managing the Device Certificate.

1.3.9.3.2 Secondary Machine Operator

Secondary Machine Operators are not named in the Device Certificate with which they are associated. Secondary Machine Operators may be designated in relation to a given Device Certificate by the Primary Machine Operator of such Device Certificate by inclusion in the Secondary Machine Operators List included in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement submitted to the CA as a part of the Registration process for the relevant Device Certificate. Verification of identity or affiliation of Secondary Machine Operators is not required during the Registration process.

The Subscribing Organization for a given Device Certificate is responsible for obtaining agreement from and compliance by Secondary Machine Operators to the same Subscriber Agreement as the Primary Machine Operator for such Device Certificate is bound.

With respect to the Device Certificate to which a given Secondary Machine Operator is identified to the IdenTrust CA, such Secondary Machine Operator may interact with the IdenTrust CA only for purposes of requesting

suspension or revocation of such Device Certificate on behalf of the applicable Subscribing Organization. Except as provided in the immediately preceding sentence, all other interactions with the IdenTrust CA by a Machine Operator relative to a Device Certificate will be the responsibility of a Primary Machine Operator of that Device Certificate.

1.3.10 Relying Parties

A Relying Party is an Organization, Subscriber, Device, or any entity that relies upon the information contained within a Certificate and upon Certificate status received from a CSA. As an example, a Relying Party may use a Certificate to verify the integrity of a digitally signed message, to identify the creator of a message, to authenticate a Subscriber, or to establish encrypted communications with a Subscriber.

1.3.11 Other Participants

1.3.11.1 Certificate Policy Management Authority (PMA)

The PMA for this Policy is the IdenTrust Policy Management Authority, which administers Policy decisions.

1.3.11.2 Certificate Policy Manufacturing Authority (CMA)

The Issuing CA remains ultimately responsible for the manufacture of IGC Certificates. However, the Issuing CA may subcontract manufacturing functions to third party CMAs who agree to be bound by this Policy.

1.3.11.3 Repositories

The Issuing CA will perform the role and functions of the Repository. The Issuing CA may subcontract the performance of the Repository functions to a third-party Organization that agrees to fulfill the functions of a Repository, and who agrees to be bound by this Policy, but the Issuing CA remains responsible for the performance of those services in accordance with this Policy.

1.3.11.4 PKI Sponsors

Individuals who are employed by the Sponsoring Organization or by an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Organization but is not the Subscriber. The Sponsoring Organization verifies that PKI Sponsors are individuals that:

- (i) sign and submit, or approve a request for a Certificate issued to an Electronic Device on behalf of the Organization, and/or
- (ii) (ii) sign and submit a Certificate Agreements on behalf of the Organization, and/or
- (iii) (iii) acknowledge and agree to the Certificate Terms of Use on behalf of the Organization when the Organization is an affiliate of the CA.

1.3.11.5 Trusted Agents

Authorized entities acting as representatives of Affiliated Organizations to verify the Applicant's or PKI Sponsor's identification during the registration process. Trusted Agents do not have automated interfaces with CAs.

1.4 CERTIFICATE USAGE

1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

IGC Certificates that are Issued pursuant to this CPS may be used for authentication, for Access Control, to create Digital Signatures, to support verification of Digital Signatures, and to achieve confidentiality using encipherment. Extended key usages are specified in the applicable Certificate Profiles found in the IGC Certificate Profiles.

Signing Certificates may be used in applications where:

- i. The identity of communicating parties needs to be authenticated,
- ii. A message or file needs to be bound to the identity of its originator by a signature; and/or

- iii. The integrity of the message or file has to be assured.

Encryption Certificates may be used in applications where a message or file needs to be protected against disclosure to anyone else except the Subscriber of the Certificate and intended recipients.

Group Certificates are primarily used for S/MIME message signature verification and S/MIME message encryption under Direct where non-repudiation of identity is not required.

The following table provides guidelines for Certificate usage by assurance level:

Table 3: Assurance Level Definitions

Level	Definition
Basic	This level provides a basic level of assurance relevant to environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance. This may include access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is not high. It is assumed at this security level that users are not likely to be malicious.
Medium	This level is relevant to environments where risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may include transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of fraud or involving access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is substantial. This level of assurance includes the following Certificate policies: Medium, Medium CBP, and Medium Device.
PIV-I Card Authentication	This level is relevant to environments where risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may include contactless smart card readers where use of an activation PIN is not practical.
Medium Hardware	This level is relevant to environments where threats to data are high or the consequences of the failure of security services are high. This may include very high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk. This level of assurance includes the following Certificate policies: Medium Hardware, Medium Hardware CBP, Medium Device Hardware, PIV-I Hardware, and PIV-I Content Signing.

1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificates that are Issued under the provisions of this CPS are not used for:

- Any application requiring fail-safe performance such as:
 - a. the operation of nuclear power facilities,
 - b. air traffic control systems,
 - c. aircraft navigation systems,
 - d. weapons control systems, or
 - e. any other system whose failure could lead to injury, death, or environmental damage; or
- For use in any software or hardware architectures that provide facilities for interference with encrypted communications, including, but not limited to:
 - a. (a) active eavesdropping or
 - b. (b) traffic management of Domain Names or IP Addresses that the Organization does not own or control; or
- Transactions where applicable law prohibits the use of Certificates for such transactions or where otherwise prohibited by law.
- Certificates that map to id-fpki-certpcy-pivi-cardAuth are used only to authenticate the hardware token containing the associated private key and are not interpreted as authenticating the presenter or holder of the token.

1.5 POLICY ADMINISTRATION

1.5.1 Organization Administering this CPS

This CPS is administered by:

IdenTrust Services, LLC
5225 Wiley Post Way Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

1.5.2 Contact Person

Questions regarding the implementation and administration of this CPS should be directed to:

Attn: PMA Chair
IdenTrust Services, LLC
5225 Wiley Post Way Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Email: policy@IdenTrust.com

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The suitability and applicability of the CP is determined by the IdenTrust PMA. The PMA determines the suitability of this CPS to the CP based on a compliance analysis performed by the PMA itself or a party independent from the CA and is not the CPS author.

1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

The IdenTrust PMA is responsible for approval of this CPS. All CAs operating under the CP must meet all requirements of this CPS applicable to the IGC Certificates to be Issued under the CA before commencing operations.

1.5.4.1 RPS Approval Procedures

The IdenTrust PMA is responsible for approval of all RPS documents compiled by External RA organizations that operate under this CPS. All RPS documents are approved before an RA can commence operation of the PKI.

IdenTrust notifies external RA organizations when CP and/or CPS updates occur and will require an update to the RPS document to ensure compliance with new/modified CPS requirements.

1.6 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

Capitalized terms and acronyms used herein and in related agreements and other documents incorporating CP or CPS have the following meanings. Where the context and usage of a term implies that a substantive conflict occurs between the definition of a term as provided in this CPS and the definition in CP, the definition provided in CP will govern interpretation of the term.

1.6.1 Definitions

Term	Definition
Accept or Acceptance	Acceptance is a Subscriber act that triggers the Subscriber's rights and obligations with respect to the Certificate under this CP, and this CPS. Indications of Acceptance may include without limitation: (i) using the Certificate (after Issuance); (ii) failing to notify the CA or RA of any problems with the Certificate within a reasonable time after receiving it; or (iii) other manifestations of assent or Acceptance. Acceptance is further explained in Section 4.4.

Term	Definition
Access Controls	Access Controls are mechanisms that restrict or grant access to physical or logical resources based on predefined policies. Access Controls are described specifically in Section 2.4 (Access Controls on repositories), Section 5 (Facility, Management and Operational Controls) and Section 6.5 (Computer Security Controls).
Account Password	An Account Password is a value selected by an Applicant and known only to that Applicant which value is provided during the Registration process and utilized to authenticate when Retrieving a Certificate.
Activation Code	An Activation Code is a randomly generated, secret numeric code created by the CA or RA and securely delivered to the Applicant for use by the Applicant for authentication purposes.
Activation Data	Activation Data is private data used or required to access to a component or to activate KSMS (i.e., password/PIN, or a manually-held Key share used to unlock Private Keys). See Section 6.4.
Affiliated Certificate	A Certificate that is issued to an individual and the organization with which that individual is affiliated.
Antecedent Event	An Antecedent Event is an event through which an Applicant has previously provided in-person proof of identity. As an example, an Applicant may have previously provided proof of identity to an HR Individual. See also Sponsor Antecedent.
Applicant	An Applicant is an Individual that submits an application and identifying information to the CA or RA for the purpose of obtaining or renewing a Certificate for the Individual or, with respect to Certificates associated with a Device, for a Device.
Assurance Level	Assurance Level is the strength and security of the authentication and the level of confidence the system has, depending on the type of credentials used, the number of authentication actors and the strength of the cryptographic transactions.
Authorizing Official	An Authorizing Official is an Individual designated in a written agreement within a CA, or RA who can appoint and authorize other Individuals to act as LRAs or Trusted Agents for that Organization.
Business Associate	A Business Associate (BA) helps Covered Entities carry out health care activities and functions under a written business associate contract or other arrangement with the Business Associate that establishes specifically what the Business Associate has been engaged to do and requires the Business Associate to comply with the requirements to protect the privacy and security of protected health information.
CA Certificate	The CA Certificate is an IdenTrust issued Certificate containing the Public Key that corresponds to the CA Private Signing Key used by a CA to create or manage Certificates.
CA Private Signing Key	The CA Private Signing Key is the Private Key that corresponds to the CA's Public Key listed in the CA Certificate and used to sign and otherwise manage Certificates.
Card Authentication Certificate	A Card Authentication Certificate is a Certificate that is Issued to a smart card controlled by the Organization identified within the Certificate.
Card Management System	The Card Management System (CMS) is responsible for managing the content in smart cards. In the context of this CPS, the CMS requirements contained throughout this CPS are mandatory for the IGC PIV-I policies and optional for other Certificate policies. CAs issuing PIV-I Certificates must ensure that all CMSs meet the requirements described in this document. The CMS must not be Issued any Certificates that express Assurance Levels of PIV-I Hardware or PIV-I Card Authentication.

Term	Definition
Certificate	A Certificate is a computer-based record or electronic message that: (i) identifies the CA issuing it; (ii) names or identifies its subject (see Distinguished Name); (iii) contains the Public Key of the subject; (iv) identifies the Certificate's Validity Period; (v) is Digitally Signed by a CA; and (vi) has the meaning ascribed to it in accordance with the legal infrastructure in which the Certificate is used (e.g., the CP, contractual agreements, and other system rules governing the course of dealing, usage and trade practice). A Certificate includes not only its actual content but also all documents expressly referenced or incorporated within.
Certificate Chain	A Certificate Chain is an ordered series of Certificates connecting a Subscriber's Certificate to the Root Certificate. Successive and superior CA and Subordinate CA Certificates up to the Root Certificate connect superior Certificates (which may be self-signed) in a Certificate Chain. For Subscribers under this CPS, a self-signed Root Certificate is Issued in compliance with this Policy.
Certificate Information System (CIS)	The Certificate Information System is a database maintained by IdenTrust that contains account information about Applicants and Subscribers.
Certificate Policy (CP)	A Certificate Policy is a specialized form of administrative policy related to Certificate management. A CP addresses generation, production, distribution, accounting, compromise recovery and administration of Certificates. Indirectly, a CP can also govern the transactions conducted using a communications system protected by a Certificate-based Access Controls. By controlling critical Certificate extensions, such policies and associated enforcement technology can support provision of the security services required by particular applications.
Certificate Profile	A Certificate Profile is the format and contents of data fields in a Certificate that identify the Issuer, the subject, the Public Key, and other information about the subject. Certificate Profiles for this CPS are specified generally in Section 7.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)	A Certificate Revocation List is a list of Certificates that have been Revoked prior to the expiration of their Validity Period.
Certificate Status Authority (CSA)	A Certificate Status Authority is the component of a PKI that provides authoritative responses to online requests for Certificate status information, such as Certificate validity, validation of the entire Certificate Chain, and Revocation status. Certificate Status Authority is more fully defined in Section 1.3.1.5.
Certificate Type	Certificate Type defines a more granular Certificate usage or function within a particular Assurance Level. Certificate Types under this CPS are defined as: Signing Certificate, Encryption Certificate, Identity Certificate, Card Authentication Certificate, Content Signing Certificate, Device Certificate, Group Domain-Bound Certificate; and Group Address Certificate. Certificate Types are assigned unique Certificate policy OIDs and are listed in Table 1 by Certificate name and Assurance Level.
Certification Authority (CA)	A Certification Authority (CA) is an Organization that attests to the binding between an identity and cryptographic Key Pair. Certification Authority is more fully defined in Section 1.3.1.3.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)	A Certification Practice Statement is a statement of the practices that a CA employs in creating, issuing, managing, and, revoking Certificates in conformance with a particular CP.

Term	Definition
Client (application)	A Client is a system entity, usually a computer process acting on behalf of a human user, which makes use of a service provided by a server.
Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session	A Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session is a session securely communicated through use of the Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer cryptographic protocols. For Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Sessions described in this CPS, both the Client and the server authenticate to each other using a Certificate. Upon mutual validation of identity, the resulting session is encrypted using Public Key Cryptography.
Content Signing Certificate	A Content Signing Certificate is a Certificate that is utilized by a CMS to Digitally Sign content embedded in smart cards.
Covered Entity	A Covered Entity (CE) is an individual, organization, or agency that protects the privacy and security of health information and provides individuals with certain rights with respect to their health information.
Cross Certificate/Cross-certification	Cross-certification is the Issuance of a Certificate used to establish a trust relationship between 2 PKIs. The Cross Certificate is the Certificate Issued by 1 PKI to another PKI for Cross-certification.
Cryptographic Service Provider	A Cryptographic Service Provider is an independent software module or set of programs (e.g., an application program interface, or “API”) used with a given Device to provide a concrete implementation of a set of cryptographic algorithms to be used for authentication, encoding, encryption and other cryptographic functions.
Cryptographic Module	A Cryptographic Module is the set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that implements cryptographic logic or processes, including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained within the cryptographic boundary of the module.
Custodian	A Custodian is an organization or authorized third party that operates a Custodial Subscriber Key Store.
Custodial Subscriber Key Store	A Custodial Subscriber Key Store holds keys for a number of Subscriber Certificates in one location.
Device	A Device is a non-Human Subscriber of a Certificate. Examples of Devices include but are not limited to routers, firewalls, servers, and other Devices capable of securely handling Private Keys and properly implementing PKI technologies.
Device Certificate	A Device Certificate is a Certificate Issued to a Device and can be managed by a Machine Operator, Custodian, etc.
Digital Signature/Digitally Sign	A Digital Signature is the result of or mathematical transformation of a document or message through use of cryptography. To Digitally Sign a message is the act of applying a Digital Signature. A Relying Party in receipt of a document or message with a Digital Signature can accurately determine: (i) whether the transformation was created using the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key; and (ii) whether the message or document has been altered since the transformation was made.
Direct Project	The Direct Project is an initiative from the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for Health Information Technology that created a set of standards and services that, with a policy framework, enables simple, routed, scalable, and secure message transport over the Internet between known participants.
Directory Information Tree	A Directory Information Tree is data represented in a hierarchical structure containing the Distinguished Names (DNs) of directory service entries.

Term	Definition
DirectTrust	DirectTrust.org, Inc. (DirectTrust) is a non-profit and competitively neutral entity operated by and for participants in the Direct community and other communities involved in electronic health information exchange that benefit from leveraging a healthcare-centric PKI. The Direct Project developed the original Direct Ecosystem Community Certificate Policy Version 0.9 in accordance with its consensus process.
DirectTrust Accredited Trust Anchor Bundle (ATAB)	The ATAB has as participants Health Information Service Providers (HISPs), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and Registration Authorities (RAs) that have achieved accreditation through either the DirectTrust HISP Accreditation Program for HISPs or the DirectTrust-EHNAC Trusted Agent Accreditation Program (DTAAP-CA/RA) for CA/RAs.
DirectTrust Certificates	DirectTrust Certificates are those Certificates that are Issued for use within Direct as defined in the Direct Project Applicability Statement for Secure Health Transport and more specifically by the DirectTrust Certificate Policy. DirectTrust Certificates may be Issued under this CPS asserting IGC OIDs and OIDs belonging to DirectTrust, asserting compliance with DirectTrust CP.
DirectTrust Governmental Trust Anchor Bundle (GTAB)	The GTAB is to facilitate voluntary, interoperable Direct Message exchange between governmental agencies and private sector members of the DirectTrust community. The DirectTrust Governmental Trust Anchor Bundle creates a single community of trust shared by participating governmental agencies and private sector provider organizations.
Distinguished Name (DN)	A Distinguished Name is a unique name-identifier for the Issuer or the subject of a Certificate so that he, she, or it can be located in a directory. For example, a DN might contain the following attributes: common name (cn), email address (e) or (mail), Organization name (o), Organizational unit (ou), locality (l), state (st) and/or country (c).
Domain Bound Certificate	A Domain Bound Certificate is a Certificate that contains a Health Domain Name in the form of a dNSName in the subjectCommonName and subjectAlternativeName extensions of the Certificate.
Encryption Certificate	An Encryption Certificate is a Certificate Issued to a Subscriber that can be only used for encryption services.
Enrollment Work Station (EWS)	An Enrollment Work Station is the customer side computer application that interfaces with the CMS to accomplish Certificate registration.
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)	FHIR is a draft standard describing data formats and elements and an application programming interface for exchanging electronic health records. The standard was created by the Health Level 7 International health-care standards organization.
Government Entity	A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country (such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).
Group Address Certificate	A Group Address Certificate is a Group Certificate that contains a Health Endpoint Name in the Certificate subject. Group Address Certificates may be held by a third party that controls and manages access to the Private Key of the Certificate. See Section 3.1.1.3.
Group Address Encryption Certificate	A Group Address Encryption Certificate is a Group Address Certificate that can be only used for encryption services.
Group Address Signing Certificate	A Group Address Signing Certificate is a Group Address Certificate that can only be used to create a Digital Signature.
Group Certificate	A Group Certificate can be either a Group Domain-Bound Certificate or a Group Address End-Entity Certificate.

Term	Definition
Group Domain-Bound Certificate	A Group Domain-Bound Certificate is a domain bound Device Certificate that contains a Health Domain Name in the Certificate subject. Group Domain-Bound Certificates may be held by a third party that controls and manages access to the Private Key of the Certificate. See Section 3.2.3.23.
Group Domain-Bound Encryption Certificate	A Group Domain-Bound Encryption Certificate is a Group Domain-Bound Device Certificate that can be only used for encryption services.
Group Domain-Bound Signing Certificate	A Group Domain-Bound Signing Certificate is a Group Domain-Bound Device Certificate that can only be used to create a Digital Signature.
Government Agency	A Government Agency is an agency, unit, department, division, or other subdivision of any governmental authority of any jurisdiction.
Healthcare Entity	A Healthcare Entity (HE) is an entity involved in healthcare, that has agreed to protect private and confidential patient information consistent with the requirements of HIPAA although it is not a Covered Entity or Business Associate as defined under HIPAA at 45 CFR 160.103.
Health Information Service Provider (HISP)	A Health Information Service Provider (HISP) is an entity that processes Direct-compliant messages to and from Direct addresses, each of which is bound to a Direct-compliant X.509 digital Certificate. Acting in the capacity of an agent for the Subscriber, the HISP may hold and manage Private Keys associated with a DirectTrust Certificate on behalf of the Subscriber.
Health Domain Name	A Health Domain Name is a string conforming to the requirements of RFC 1034 and identifies the organization that assigns the Health Endpoint Names. Example: direct.sunnyfamilypractice.example.org. A Health Domain Name must be a fully qualified domain name and should be dedicated solely to the purposes of health information exchange.
Health Endpoint Name	A Health Endpoint Name is a string conforming to the local-part requirements of RFC 5322. Health Endpoint Names express real-world origination points and endpoints of health information exchange, as vouched for by the organization managing the Health Domain Name. Example: johndoe (referring to in individual), sunnyfamilypractice, memoriallab (referring to organizational inboxes), diseaseregistry (referring to a processing queue).
Hypervisor	Computer software, firmware or hardware that creates and runs virtual machines. A hypervisor uses native execution to share and manage hardware, allowing for multiple environments which are isolated from one another, yet exist on the same physical machine. Also known as an isolation kernel or virtual machine monitor.
ID Form	The ID Form a document incorporated into the Subscriber Agreement and is a document that, among other things (a) is used by the Applicant to provide personally identifying information as part of the Registration process, (b) must be signed by the Applicant, and (c) contains a declaration of identity by the Applicant.
Identification and Authentication (I&A)	Identification and Authentication is the process of affirming that a claimed identity is correct by comparing the claims offered by an Applicant with previously proven information. I&A requirements for this CPS are fully described in Section 3.
Identity Certificate	An Identity Certificate is a Certificate Issued to a Subscriber that can be used to authenticate the Subscriber by a Relying Party.
IdenTrust subjectID	An IdenTrust subjectID is included in the subjectDN field of Certificates as an (ou) attribute and, for Certificates where use includes authentication of the subject of the Certificate, is also utilized as a User Principal Name (UPN) structure in the subjectAlternativeName extension of the Certificate. The IdenTrust subjectID in any given Certificate issued by the IdenTrust CA is to be unique among IdenTrust subjectIDs operational within the PKI.
IdenTrust SubjID	Has the same meaning as IdenTrust subjectID.
Individual(s)	An Individual is a natural person and not a juridical person or legal entity.

Term	Definition
Issue / Issuance	To Issue, or Issuance is the act performed by a CA in creating a Certificate, listing as Issuer itself or, alternately, listing as Issuer a name which the CA has obtained a license to use for such purpose. Issuance also involves notifying the Applicant of Certificate contents, that the Certificate has been created and that the Certificate is available for Acceptance.
Issuer	An Issuer is the Organization that owns a CA Private Key used to Digitally Sign Certificates and (a) is named (or uses a name to which it owns or has licensed for such purpose) as the Issuer in the Issuer DN field in a Certificate.
Identity Verification Provider (IVP)	An Identity Verification Provider is an Organization that provides affirmation of identity and claims made by an Applicant in support of I&A. IVPs are considered authoritative and must be able to demonstrate through policy and audit that the data is accurate and maintained with appropriate integrity, privacy, and confidentiality.
Information System Security Officer (ISSO)	The Information System Security Officer is an individual who is responsible for establishing and maintaining the enterprise vision, strategy, and program as it relates to information systems security, to ensure information assets are adequately protected. The ISSO will play a role in authenticating the Subscriber application when a Group Certificate is issued under this policy.
Key	A general term used throughout this CPS to encompass any one of the defined Keys mentioned in these general definitions section.
Key Compromise	Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.
Key Generation	Key Generation is the process of creating a single Key (symmetric cryptography) or a Key Pair (asymmetric cryptography).
Key Pair	A Key Pair is 2 mathematically related Keys consisting of a Public Key and its corresponding Private Key. Key Pair properties ensure that: (i) one Key can be used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted using the other Key; and (ii) even knowing one Key, it is computationally infeasible to discover the other Key.
Key Recovery Agent (KRA)	An individual authorized to interface with the key escrow database in conjunction with one or more other key recovery agents) to cause the key escrow database to carry out key recovery requests, as specified by this policy.
Key Recovery Official (KRO)	An individual authorized to authenticate and submit key recovery requests to the Key Recovery Agent on behalf of requestor, as specified by this policy.
Key Storage Module (KSM)	A Key Storage Module is secure software or a hardware Cryptomodule used to store Private Keys and to perform private key operations such as Digital Signature generation. KSM is used in this policy to refer to Cryptomodules used by a Subscriber in daily operations. KSM is inclusive of software and hardware Cryptomodules as well as different form factors such as smart cards or USB tokens. See also Cryptographic Module.
Licensed Notary	A Licensed Notary is an Individual commissioned by a Government Agency to perform notarial acts within that government's jurisdiction and whose commission remains in good standing. Licensed Notaries may include but are not limited to consulate officers, court clerks and may include bank officers or other Individuals.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol is a protocol used by browsers and Clients to look up information in directory services based on the x.500 standard.
Local Registration Authority (LRA)	A Local Registration Authority is an Individual who collects and confirms Applicant identity information and any other information provided by the Applicant for inclusion in a Certificate. Local Registration Authority is more fully defined in Section 1.3.5.1.
Machine Operator	A Machine Operator may be a Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator.

Term	Definition
NPI Number	A National Provider Identifier or NPI is a unique 10-digit identification number issued to health care providers in the United States by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Non-Declared Entity	A Non-Declared Entity (ND) is an entity that has not asserted it will protect personal health information with privacy and security protections that are equivalent to those required by HIPAA and is not a Patient / Consumer.
Object Identifier (OID)	An Object Identifier is a unique numeric identifier registered under the ISO registration standard to reference a specific object or object class. OIDs are used within this CPS to uniquely identify the CP, Certificate Types, cryptographic algorithms, and other objects within the PKI.
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)	Online Certificate Status Protocol is an internet protocol described in RFC 6960 used to obtain Revocation status of a Certificate.
OCSP Request	An OCSP Request is a message by a Relying Party to a CSA requesting the current status of a Certificate via OCSP. An OCSP Request includes but is not limited to the following data attributes: (i) date and time of the request; (ii) requester identifier (iii) Certificate serial number; (iv) Issuer DN hash; and (v) Issuer Key hash.
OCSP Response / OCSP Responder	An OCSP Response is the message sent by the CSA in response to an OCSP Request, which indicates whether the status of the Certificate in question is valid, Revoked, or unknown. The OCSP Response includes but is not limited to the following data attributes: (i) date and time of the response; (ii) Certificate serial number; (iii) Issuer DN hash; (iv) Issuer Key hash, (v) success or failure indication; and (vi) Digital Signature of the OCSP Responder.
Operational Period	An Operation Period is a Certificate's actual term of validity, beginning with the start of the Validity Period and ending on the earlier of: (i) the end of the Validity Period disclosed in the Certificate, or (ii) the Revocation of the Certificate.
Organization	An Organization is an entity legally recognized in its jurisdiction of origin, (e.g., a company, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, Government Agency, non-government Organization, university, trust, special interest group, or non-profit corporation).
Out-of-Band (OOB)	Out-of-Band is communication methodology between parties utilizing a means or method to communicate that differs from another means or method of communication also used by the parties. As an example, a party could use a courier to communicate one piece of information to a party, and the internet to communicate a different piece of information. Out-of-band communications must protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data.
Participants	Participants include all entities operating within an OBB PKI. Participants include but are not limited to those entities described in Section 1.3 of this CPS.
Participant CA	A Participant CA is a legal entity that is Issued a Subordinate CA Certificate by the IGC Root CA. A Participant CA is operated and managed by IdenTrust. The Participant enters into an Agreement with IdenTrust, which requires that IdenTrust operate the Participant CA and requires the Participant CA to follow and adhere to the provisions of this CPS and the relevant CA CPS when performing RA functions.
Passphrase	A Passphrase is Activation Data created and used by the Applicant for authentication and delivered to the CIS in a secure manner. The Passphrase later presented by the Applicant for authentication to the CIS prior to performing Certificate management tasks (e.g., retrieving the Certificate).
PKI Service Providers	PKI Service Providers are CAs, RAs, CSAs, and Repositories providing services described in this CPS or within the PKI defined by this CPS.

Term	Definition
Policy Management Authority (PMA) / Policy Approval Authority (PAA)	A Policy Management Authority is an Organization or committee established for a PKI responsible for making recommendations or for setting, implementing, interpreting, and administering policy decisions regarding a CP and may in some instances be responsible for resolving disputes between parties subject to the CP. A Policy Approval Authority is an Organization or Committee responsible for approval of CPs, CPSs, and other policy documents related to a PKI.
Policy Qualifier	An attribute within the Certificate Policy descriptor that is included in a Certificate Profile and is used to provide additional information specific to the named Certificate Policy and Certificate policy OID.
Private Key	A Private Key is the Key of a Key Pair kept secret by its holder, used to create Digital Signatures or to decrypt data encrypted with the holder's corresponding Public Key.
Public Key	A Public Key is the Key of a Key Pair publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key via a Certificate. The Public Key is used for Validation of a Digital Signature and encryption of data.
Public Key Cryptography	Public Key Cryptography is a type of cryptography also known as asymmetric cryptography that uses mathematical algorithms and unique Key Pairs of mathematically related numbers. The Public Key can be made available to anyone who wishes to use it, while the Private Key is kept secret by its holder. Private Key can be used to decrypt information or generate a Digital Signature; the corresponding Public Key is used to encrypt that information or verify that Digital Signature. In addition, the Public Key cannot be used to derive the Private Key without a large work factor.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	A Public Key Infrastructure is a set of policies, processes, server platforms, software and workstations used for administering Certificates and Public-Private Key Pairs, including the ability to Issue, maintain, and Revoke Certificates.
Re-Key	Re-Keying a Certificate consists of creating new Certificate with a different Public Key (and serial number) while retaining the remaining contents of the old Certificate that describe the subject. The new Certificate may be assigned a different validity period, key identifiers, specify a different CRL distribution point, and/or be signed with a different key. Re-Key of a Certificate does not require a change to the subjectName and does not violate the requirement for name uniqueness.
Reasonable Reliance	Reliance on a Certificate is considered Reasonable Reliance when a Relying Party has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the CP and this CPS; • Verified the Digital Signature and Certificate were valid at the time of reliance by using OCSP or the RFC 5280 certification path validation process as required by CP and this CPS; and • Used the Certificate for purposes appropriate under the CA'S CPS, without knowledge of any facts that would cause a person of ordinary business prudence to refrain from relying on the Certificate, and under circumstances where reliance would be reasonable and otherwise in good faith in light of all the circumstances that were known or should have been known to the Relying Party prior to reliance.
Registrar	A Registrar is the person performing the in-person confirmation of the Subscriber's identification. Some restrictions based on the specific IGC Certificate Assurance Level apply to the type of Registrar who can perform identification. Registrars who are eligible to perform in-person identification under this CPS are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LRAs • TAs • Licensed Notary or other person certified by a Government Agency who is certified as being authorized to confirm identities (e.g., a driver's license bureau employee, a Dept. of State consular office employee, a court clerk, or a county clerk).

Term	Definition
Registration	Registration is the process of receiving or obtaining a request for a Certificate from an Applicant, and collecting and entering the information needed from that Applicant to include in and support I&A and the Issuance of a Certificate.
Registration Agent	A Registration Agent is an Individual appointed directly by a CA or RA. A Registration Agent may also be an LRA or Trusted Agent appointed by a CA or RA or may also be a Licensed Notary or other official of a Government Agency. A Registration Agent assists CAs and RAs by providing in-person I&A in accordance with Section 3.
Registration Authority (RA)	A Registration Authority (RA) is an Organization that is responsible for collecting and confirming an Applicant's identity and any other information provided by Applicant for inclusion in a Certificate. Registration Authority is more fully defined in Section 1.3.2.
Registration Authority Agreement	A Registration Authority Agreement is an agreement entered into between an Organization and a CA authorizing the Organization to act as a Registration Authority for the CA, and detailing the specific duties and obligations of the RA, including but not limited to the procedures for conducting appropriate I&A on Applicants.
Registration Practices Statement (RPS)	The Registration Practices Statement (RPS) describes the registration practices of an External Registration Authority in performance of duties and obligations to fulfill the requirements of the IdenTrust Global Common Certificate Policy.
Relying Party	A Relying Party is an Organization, Subscriber, Device, or any entity that relies upon the information contained within a Certificate and upon Certificate status received from a CSA. Relying Party is more fully described in Section 1.3.6.
Repository	A Repository is an online system maintained by or on behalf of a CA for storing and retrieving Certificates and other information relevant to Certificates and Digital Signatures, including CPs, CPSs and information relating to Certificate validity or Revocation.
Requestor	A Requestor is an authorized agent of an Organization who invites an Individual to apply for an Affiliated Certificate.
Revocation or Revoke a Certificate	Revocation is the act of making a Certificate ineffective permanently from a specified time forward. Revocation is affected by notation or inclusion in a set of Revoked Certificates (e.g., inclusion in a CRL).
Root Certificate	A Root Certificate, also known as a Trust Anchor, is a CA Certificate Issued by a CA at the top of a hierarchical PKI. For the PKI described under this CPS, The Root Certificate is the self-signed CA Certificate Issued by and to the IGC Root.
Secondary Machine Operators List	The Secondary Machine Operators List is a list of individuals who are designated by a Primary Machine Operator to act in the role of Secondary Machine Operator. Initial list of individuals so designated must be made in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement prior the submission of the completed and fully executed Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement to the CA in connection with an application Registration process for the relevant Device Certificate. Then after, from time to time, the Primary Machine Operator may submit an updated list to the CA as provided in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement, and each such updated list, once recorded by the CA, shall supersede the version of the list recorded by the CA prior to such updated list being recorded. The CA shall record submitted to the CA in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement as part of the Registration process in the CA database. Any updated lists provided to the CA by the Primary Machine Operator as provided for in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement will be recorded by the CA by adding such updated list to the archived documents associated with the relevant Device Certificate account record.

Term	Definition
Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control	Separation-of-Duties or Multi-party Control are procedures or techniques whereby no single Individual possesses the equipment or authorization to view, alter, or otherwise have access to sensitive or confidential information in a particular PKI. Tasks are separated into multiple subtasks and distributed to more than one Individual, requiring the participation of 2 or more Individuals to complete the task. The purpose of Separation-of-Duties and Multi-party Control is to reduce risk of PKI compromise.
Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session	Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Sessions as described in the CP are those sessions in which a Subscriber or Client is directed to a specified secure URL (https://). The SSL-enabled client software confirms the identity of the IdenTrust secure server by validating the Certificate presented by the server. The subsequent session established is encrypted through use of the Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security cryptographic protocols.
Signing Certificate	A Signing Certificate is a Certificate Issued to a Subscriber that can be used to create Digital Signature to establish integrity of content.
Sponsor	A Sponsor is an Organization that authorizes Issuance of a Certificate to an Individual or a Device. (e.g., an employee's supervisor who authorizes the Issuance of a Certificate to the employee, or the head of an information systems department that authorizes Issuance of a Device Certificate to specific device). The Sponsor is responsible for either supplying or confirming Certificate attribute details to the CA or RA; and is also responsible for informing the CA or RA if the relationship with the Subscriber or Device is terminated or has changed such that the Certificate should be Revoked or updated.
Sponsor Antecedent	A Sponsor Antecedent is an Organization that attests to the validity of an Applicant through their on-going relationship, date of Antecedent Event and provides unique Applicant identity information to the Registration Agent.
SSL / TLS Certificate	An SSL / TLS Certificate is a Certificate Issued to a Device that is utilized to establish an encrypted session between a Client and a server. SSL/TLS Certificates are not issued under the IGC policy.
Subject Name or Subject Distinguished Name	See Distinguished Name (DN).
Subordinate CA (SubCA)	A Subordinate CA is an Organization Issued a Subordinate CA Certificate by the IGC Root CA. All Subordinate CAs under this CPS are required to be operated and managed by IdenTrust. All Subordinate CAs are required to follow and adhere to the provisions of the CP and this CPS when performing RA functions.
Subscriber	A Subscriber is an end-entity Individual (Human Subscriber) or Device (Non-Human Subscriber) to whom or to which a Certificate is Issued. Subscribers may use Certificates for purposes indicated by the Certificate Type. Where Certificates are Issued to Devices, there must be an Individual (Primary Machine Operator) who is responsible for carrying out Subscriber duties.
Subscriber Agreement	The Subscriber Agreement is a legally binding contract that provides terms and conditions applicable to a Certificate that is applied for by an Applicant and, if Issued, Issued to that Applicant as the Subscriber of that Certificate.
Subscribing Organization	A Subscribing Organization is an Organization that authorizes affiliation with Subscribers. Subscribing Organization is more fully described in Section 1.3.5.
Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement	The Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement is completed by and submitted in conjunction with Registration for some types of Certificates.
Suspension or Suspend a Certificate	Suspension is the act of making a Certificate ineffective temporarily from a specified time forward. Suspension is affected by notation or inclusion in a set of Suspended Certificates (e.g., inclusion in a CRL).

Term	Definition
System Transaction	The successful execution of all of the following components and steps: (i) Creation of a Digital Signature; (ii) Verification that the Subscriber's Digital Signature was created by the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate; and (iii) Verification that the Certificate was valid by using OCSP and the RFC 5280 certification path validation process as required by the CP and this CPS.
Trust Anchor	See Root Certificate.
Trusted Agent	A Trusted Agent (TA) is an Individual who acts on behalf of the CA, RA, or LRA to collect and/or confirm information regarding Applicants and/or Subscribers, and where applicable to provide support regarding those activities to the Applicants and/or Subscribers. Trusted Agents are more fully defined in Section 1.3.7.5.
Trusted Role	A Trusted Role is a role involving functions that may introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously. The functions of Trusted Roles form the basis of trust for the entire PKI.
Two-Person Control	Continuous surveillance and control of positive control material at all times by a minimum of 2 authorized individuals, each capable of detecting incorrect and/or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed and each familiar with established security and safety requirements.
User Principal Name (UPN)	A User Principal Name is an attribute used in PKI, the format of such attribute being an Internet-style login name for a user based on the Internet standard RFC 822.
Virtual Machine Environment	An emulation of a computer system (in this case, a CA) that provides the functionality of a physical machine in a platform-independent environment. It consists of a host (virtual machine) and isolation kernel (hypervisor) and provides functionality needed to execute entire operating systems. At this time, allowed VMEs are limited to hypervisor type virtual environments. Other technology, such as Docker Containers, is not permitted.
Validity Period	Validity Period is the intended term of validity of a Certificate, beginning with the notBefore date asserted in the Certificate and ending with the notAfter date asserted in the Certificate.
Zeroize	Zeroize is to erase electronically stored data by altering or deleting the contents of the data storage and overwriting with binary zeros so as to prevent the recovery of the data.

1.6.2 Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AIA	Authority Information Access
AID	Application Identifier
APL	Approved Products List
ASN.1	Abstract Syntax Notation (version 1)
ATAB	Accredited Trust Anchor Bundle (DirectTrust)
BA	Business Associate
CA	Certification Authority
CHUID	Card Holder Unique Identifier
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CISA	Certified Information Systems Auditor
CE	Covered Entity
CIS	Certificate Information System
CMS	Card Management System

Acronym	Definition
CN	Common Name
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSA	Certificate Status Authority (interchangeable with CSS)
CSS	Certificate Status Server (interchangeable with CSA)
DN	Distinguished Name – See Subject Name/Subject Distinguished Name
DNS	Domain Name System
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EWS	Enrollment Work Station
FASC-N	Federal Agency Smart Credential Number
FBCA	U.S. Federal Bridge Certification Authority
FHIR	Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resource
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FPKI	Federal Public Key Infrastructure
FPKIPA	Federal PKI Policy Authority
GSA	General Services Administration
GTAB	Government Trust Anchor Bundle (DirectTrust)
HE	Healthcare Entity
HIPAA	HIPAA is the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
HISP	Healthcare Information Services Provider
HSM	Hardware Security Model
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
I&A	Identification and Authentication
IGC	IdenTrust Global Common
IGC PIV-I	IdenTrust Global Common – Personal Identity Verification Interoperable
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISSO	Information System Security Officer
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulation
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
ITU-T	International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunications Sector
IVP	Identity Verification Provider
KSM	Key Storage Module
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LRA	Local Registration Authority
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
NA CI	National Agency Check with Written Inquiries
NA CLC	National Agency Check with Law Enforcement Check
ND	Non-Declared Entity
NPI	National Provider Identifier OID
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OOB	Out-of-Band

Acronym	Definition
OTC	One Time Code
OTP	One Time Password
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PIV	Personal Identity Verification
PIV-I	Personal Identity Verification – Interoperable
PMA/PAA	Policy Management Authority / Policy Approval Authority
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request for Comments
SIA	Subject Information Access
S/MIME	Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
SP	Special Publication
SSL/TLS	Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security
SubCA	Subordinate Issuing Certificate Authority
TA	Trusted Agent
UPN	User Principal Name
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
UUID	Universally Unique Identifier
X.500	The ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union-T) standard that establishes a distributed, hierarchical
X.509, v.3	The ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union-T) standard for Certificates adopted as ISO/IEC 9594-8 (2001). X.509, version 3, refers to Certificates containing or capable of containing extensions.
XKMS	XML Key Management Specification
XSMS	XML Subscriber Management Specification

2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 REPOSITORIES

The publicly accessible repository system are designed and implemented to provide 99% availability overall and limit scheduled down-time to 0.5% annually.

2.1.1 IdenTrust Repository Obligations

IdenTrust performs the role and functions of the Repository and provides information over the Internet concerning the status of Certificates that are Issued under the IGC Root Certificate at:

<http://validation.identrust.com/crl>

The information on each site depends on the form of the information and the protocols for accessing and using it. Certificates, Certificate status information, CRLs and other relevant information is as described below in Section [2.2 Publication of Certificate Information](#).

IdenTrust operates Repositories to support the PKI operations of IdenTrust, its CAs and all Cross-certified Relying Party populations. Mechanisms used for posting information into a Repository include:

- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or Directory Server Systems that provide access through encrypted Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP);
- Availability of the information as required by the Certificate information posting and retrieval stipulations of this CPS; and

- Access Control mechanisms when needed to protect Repository service availability and information as described in Section [4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements](#).

2.2 PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATE INFORMATION

At a minimum, all CAs publish CA Certificates and CRLs.

2.2.1 Publication of Certificates and Certificate Status

Certificates that are Issued to Subscribers under the provisions of this CPS are created with a CRL Distribution Point (CDP) that contains the locations where the Certificate can be validated, i.e., where Revocation can be checked by others using CRLs retrieved by using HTTP GET (and from an LDAP Directory as a secondary mechanism).

PIV-I Authentication and Card Authentication Certificates are not distributed via public repositories. CRLs are published in DER-encoded format (binary).

The latest CRLs for end-entity Certificates are published at:

[http://validation.identrust.com/crl/igcca\[x\].crl](http://validation.identrust.com/crl/igcca[x].crl).

[x]: Iteration of the Subordinate IGC CA.

2.2.2 Publication of CA Information

The IGC Root CA is a self-signed Certificate. Revocation information for the IGC Root CA Certificate is not published. Information regarding Certificate Issued to the IGC Root CA can be found at:

[http://validation.identrust.com/roots/igcrootca\[x\].p7c](http://validation.identrust.com/roots/igcrootca[x].p7c).

[x]: Iteration of the Subordinate IGC CA.

IdenTrust publishes Subordinate CA Certificates at:

[http://validation.identrust.com/certs/igcca\[x\].cer](http://validation.identrust.com/certs/igcca[x].cer)

[x]: Iteration of the Subordinate IGC CA.

CA Certificates can be downloaded by the following the instructions and utilizing the links found at:

<https://www.identrust.com/support/documents/igc-standard>

Past and current versions of this CPS are published to a repository made accessible through links on IdenTrust's website. The complete CPS may not be publicly published; however, a redacted version of the CPS containing information suitable for disclosure is available to Subscribers at:

<https://www.identrust.com/support/documents/igc-standard>

2.2.3 Interoperability

IdenTrust provides IGC Certificate status responses via both HTTP and OCSP through a highly scalable infrastructure designed to be highly available. Certificates and status are not published via LDAP.

Directory interoperability information is provided in Section [10 Directory Interoperability Profile](#).

2.3 TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION

All information to be published in the Repository, including this CPS and any revisions are published within 30 days of approval. CA Certificates are published to the Repository immediately upon Issuance. Certificates of Subscribers are not published to a publicly available Repository. CRLs are published to the locations indicated above immediately upon Issuance as specified in Section [4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency](#).

Mechanisms and procedures are designed to ensure CA Certificates and CRLs are available for retrieval 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with a minimum of 99% availability overall per year, and scheduled down-time not to exceed 0.5% annually.

Availability applies to the system as a whole rather than each component and excludes network outages.

2.4 ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES

The IdenTrust Repository contains only the information that is intended for public dissemination described in Section [2.2 Publication of Certificate Information](#). Certificates that contain a UUID in the subjectAlternativeName extension are not published to publicly accessible repositories.

IdenTrust does not impose Access Controls on the Repository for "read" operations. However, as a condition to accessing or using the Repository or other Certificate status services, the PKI Participant must Accept and agree to the terms of use for the Repository, or Certificate status services as specified at that site or as otherwise specified herein.

Administrative access to the Repository is through Access Control mechanisms requiring Individual authentication for logins. Role-based Access Controls prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting, or modifying Repository information. CRLs are Digitally Signed and time-stamped to detect any modification.

The Repository is physically located in the secure room in IdenTrust's primary facility and has the physical Access Controls described in Section [5.1 Physical Controls](#).

See also Section [5 Facility Management and Operational Controls](#) and Section [6 Technical Security Controls](#) for further descriptions of the Access Controls on the Repository.

3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1 NAMING

3.1.1 Types of Names

IdenTrust only generates and signs Certificates that contain a non-null subject Distinguished Name (subjectDN) complying with the X.501 standard. Names used in Certificates are X.501 Distinguished Names (DNs).

Table 4 *Level of Assurance Naming Requirements* (below) summarizes the naming requirements that apply to each level of assurance for this CPS.

Table 4 - Level of Assurance Naming Requirements

Level	Requirements
Basic	Non-Null Subject Name, and optional Subject Alternative Name if marked non-critical. Email addresses may optionally be included in Subject Alternative Name. If included, email addresses must be verified.
Medium (All Policies) PIV-I Hardware	Non-Null Subject Name, and optional Subject Alternative Name if marked non-critical. Email addresses may optionally be included in Subject Alternative Name. If included, email addresses must be verified.
PIV-I Card Authentication	Non-Null Subject Name, and Subject Alternative Name.

Content Signing Certificates must clearly indicate the Organization administering the CMS.

3.1.1.1 Subject Names

Certificates issued to Subscribers include distinguished names that are comprised of a base distinguished name (Base DN) and additional relative distinguished names (RDNs).

A Device Subscriber name contains a unique name for the device and does not take the form of a Human Subscriber name.

Role-based and group Certificates may be issued under any non-PIV-I human Subscriber policy.

- Role-based Certificates identify a specific role on behalf of which one or more Subscribers are authorized to act rather than the Subscriber's name. Where the organization is implicit in the role, it may be omitted. Where the role alone is ambiguous, the organization name is present in the DN.
- The subjectName DN in a group Certificate does not imply that the subject is a single individual, e.g., by inclusion of a human name form.
- PIV-I Card Authentication subscriber certificates subjectDN does not contain the Subscriber's common name. The DN populates the serialNumber attribute with the UUID associated with the card by taking one of the following forms:
 - For PIV-I cardAuth certificates with an Affiliated Organization:
serialNumber=UUID, ou=Affiliated Organization Name {Base dn}
 - For PIV-I cardAuth certificates with no Affiliated Organization:
serialNumber=UUID, ou=Unaffiliated, ou=entity CA's Name {Base dn}
- The UUID is encoded within the serialNumber attribute using the UUID string representation defined in Section 3 of RFC 4122 (e.g., "f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6"). The UUID is not the serial number of the PIV-I card.
- For PIV-I Hardware Certificates, asserting no affiliation, the subjectDN contains the value "Unaffiliated" in the last Organizational unit (ou) attribute or for certificates asserting affiliation, the certificate contains the Subscribing Organization name in the Organizational unit (ou) attribute. If the Organization does not have a specific need to include an Organizational unit (ou), the organization name may also be used for the value in the (ou).

3.1.1.2 Subject Alternative Names

PIV-I Hardware and PIV-I Card Authentication Certificates include a subject alternate name extension, containing a UUID value encoded as a URI as specified in Section 3 of [RFC 4122].

PIV-I Card Authentication Certificates do not include any other name in the subject alternative name extension.

Subscriber Certificates that contain id-kp-emailProtection in the EKU include a subject alternative name extension that includes a rfc822Name.

For Device Subscriber Certificates that assert serverAuth in the Extended Key Usage, wildcard domain names are permitted in the dNSName value only if all sub-domains covered by the wildcard fall within the same application, cloud service, or system boundary within the scope of the sponsoring organization.

3.1.1.2.1 PIV-I (Except for Card Authentication)

DNs for PIV-I Encryption, Signing and Authentication Certificates include the Subscriber's common name (cn) and may be expressed in one of the following formats:

- cn = <firstname MI lastname>; or
- cn= <firstname middlename lastname>; or
- cn= <firstname middleinitial lastname> or
- cn= <firstname lastname>.

The subjectDN contains either the value "Unaffiliated" in the organization (o) attribute or if affiliated, the Subscribing Organization's name in Organization (o) attribute.

The Organizational Unit (ou) is populated with the actual organizational unit name; or if an organizational unit does not exist within the organization or the organization deems organizational unit to be unnecessary, then the organization name may be used in the (ou) attribute.

3.1.1.2.2 PIV-I Card Authentication

PIV-I Card Authentication Certificates subjectDN do not contain the common name (cn) attribute. Instead, the serial number attribute in the subjectDN is populated with the UUID as described in Section [3.1.5.1 Subject Identifier](#) and Section [3.1.5.2 Unique Identifier](#) of this CPS. The subjectDN contains either the value “Unaffiliated” in the Organization (o) attribute or if affiliated, the Subscribing Organization’s name in Organization (o) attribute.

The UUID included in a PIV-I Certificate must not represent the PIV-I card serial number.

3.1.1.2.3 PIV-I Content Signing

PIV-I Content Signing Certificates indicate the Organization administering the CMS in an appropriate relative Distinguished Name attribute (e.g., Organization (o), organizational unit (ou), or domain component (dc) attribute).

3.1.1.2.4 Individuals (non-PIV-I)

DNs include the Subscriber’s common name (cn) and may be expressed in one of the following formats:

- cn = <firstname MI lastname>; or
- cn= <firstname middlename lastname>; or
- cn= <firstname middleinitial lastname> or
- cn= <firstname lastname>.

To ensure uniqueness of names, the unique Subject ID in the form of a UUID is appended to the subject name and included in the CN. Alternative methods of establishing uniqueness of names may be utilized providing that the format of attributes used to ensure uniqueness are compliant with the requirements of the FPKI profile document and RFC 5280 and have been approved by the IdenTrust PMA. Accordingly, such approved alternative methods are documented in the IGC Profiles document.

The subjectDN contains either the value “Unaffiliated” in the organization (o) attribute or if affiliated, the Subscribing Organization’s name in Organization (o) attribute.

Organizational Unit (ou) attributes may be included based on customer need and may include the following:

- The actual organizational unit name; or
- If an organizational unit does not exist or the organization deems it unnecessary, the organization name may be used in the (ou) attribute.

Certificates are required to contain the Subscriber’s verified email address as UPN within the subjectAlternativeName extension field.

3.1.1.2.5 Device

Certificates that are Issued to Devices use the name of the device, service, application, or another identifier, provided that each name or identifier must be confirmed with the Organization in accordance with Section [4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications](#).

A Device Subscriber name must be a unique name for the device and must not take the form of a Human Subscriber name.

3.1.1.2.6 Subordinate CAs

CA Certificates that are Issued by the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA subjectDN is “cn = IGC CA [x]², or in the case of Participant CAs, cn = a unique CA name designated by the IdenTrust PMA for the Subscribing Organization.

² [x]: Iteration of the SubCA. (e.g., IGC CA 1, IGC CA 2, etc.)

The subjectDN contains o = “IdenTrust” as the name of the Organization that owns and is legally responsible for the CA, ou = “IdenTrust Global Common” and optionally, c = country of Issuer, designated by a two-letter international country code.”

3.1.1.2.7 Root CA

The Issuer and subjectDN for the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA is “cn = IdenTrust Global Common Root CA [x]³, o = IdenTrust, c = US.”

3.1.1.2.8 Cross-Certifying Bridge CA

The subjectDN for the Cross Certificate Issued to cross-certifying bridges is “cn = [bridge name] CA, ou = [cross-certifying bridge ou], o = [entity legal name], and optionally, c = [Cross-Certification bridge country]”.

Implementation of the above naming conventions is found in the IGC Certificate Profiles.

3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful

Names used in Certificates identify Subscribers and their Organizations. Names are never to be misleading.

When DN's are used, the common name in the distinguished name represents the Subscriber in a way that is easily understandable for humans. For Human Subscribers, this will typically be a legal name.

The Directory Information Tree will accurately reflect Organizational structures using the “o” (Organization) and “ou” (organizational unit) attributes in the subjectDN.

The Access Controls for the registration system are configured such that LRAs and RA Systems are granted only Certificate lifecycle management rights for Subscribers within a certain domain or Organization namespace. These restrictions help prevent the LRA and RA System from issuing Certificates to unauthorized persons and are enforced by the CA.

When User Principal Names (UPNs) are used, they are populated with the Subscriber’s verified email address ensuring uniqueness using the following structure: “unique name@Domain” where “unique name” is either a UUID or subjectID (see Section [3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names](#)). Subscribing Organizations provide the Domain(s) that are to be used for those Applicants who are affiliated. The Domain(s) association is ensured based on the Subscribing Organization’s obligations agreed to in accordance with Section [9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Affiliated/Organizations](#). Only Applicant emails with authorized Domains in the system are accepted during registration. For Unaffiliated Applicants the association is created based on the verification of control over the email containing the Domain. For all Applicants, (affiliated and unaffiliated), the Domain is extracted from the email provided during registration.

Name uniqueness is provided by unique identifiers described in Section [3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names](#).

The minimum names contained within subjectDN of a Subscriber Certificate are:

- The subject:commonName field lists the legal name of the Subscriber of the Certificate as verified through the identity proofing process described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#). The name will include first name, middle initial or name (if available, but not enforced) and last name.
- In the case of a Device Certificate, the subject:commonName field identifies the Device by its identifier as specified in IGC Profiles.
- The subject:organization (o) lists the name of the Subscribing Organization with which the Subscriber is affiliated.

When DN's are used, the common name respects name space uniqueness requirements and is not misleading. This

³ [x]: Iteration of the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA. (e.g., IdenTrust Global Common Root CA 1, IdenTrust Global Common Root CA 2, etc.)

does not preclude the use of pseudonymous Certificates as defined in Section [3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers](#). The subject name in IdenTrust CA Certificates match the issuer CA name in Subscriber Certificates issued by the IdenTrust CA, as required by RFC 5280.

When User Principal Names are used, they are unique within the CA namespace and accurately reflect Organizational structures.

When UUID is required in the subject Distinguished Name, it is appended to the Subscriber's name and included in the Common Name (CN) attribute, unless an alternative method for incorporating UUID has been approved by the IdenTrust PMA and documented in the IGC Profiles document.

If UUID is included in a PIV-I Certificate, the UUID does not represent the PIV-I card serial number. When included in a Certificate, the UUID is expressed using the UUID string representation defined in Section 3 of RFC 4122 (e.g., "f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6").

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

All CAs are prohibited from issuing Certificates with anonymous or pseudonymous identities.

DNs in Certificates Issued to end entities may contain a pseudonym to meet local privacy regulations as long as name space uniqueness requirements are met and the name is unique and traceable to the actual Subscriber.

- This is controlled via in-person I&A, or for Basic Assurance, via automated I&A vetting.
- For Medium Assurance, the names match the forms of ID used for vetting.
- For Basic Assurance, the name should match the forms of ID used for vetting, however, in the case of Notaries, the certificates need to match the notary commission.

CAs under this policy may issue role-based or group certificates that identify subjects by their organizational roles. Each role or group certificate issued, does meet the name space uniqueness requirements detailed in section.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names in Certificates are interpreted using the X.501 series of specifications and ASN.1 syntax. Email names in the subject alternativeName extension field are interpreted using RFC 5322, specifies the format of Internet email messages. Email addresses and FQDNs can be resolved through DNS. Sections 4.1.2.4 and 4.2.1.7 of RFC 5280 that describes how character sets and strings are to be interpreted in Issuer, subject, and alternative name extension fields. RFC 2253 explains how an X.501 Distinguished Name in ASN.1 is translated into a UTF-8 human-readable string representation, and RFC 2616 explains how to interpret Uniform Resource Identifiers for HTTP references.

Rules for interpreting PIV-I Hardware Certificate UUID names are specified in RFC 4122.

IdenTrust as the CA only use valid Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs) in accordance with the applicable Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The IdenTrust PMA is responsible for ensuring and enforcing CAs and RAs name uniqueness within the X.500 name space. Uniqueness is ensured for the Distinguished Name, subjectDN or when other name forms are used in the Certificate using subjectID or UID as described below in section 3.1.5 subsections.

3.1.5.1 Subject Identifier (subjectID)

A subjectID based on information input by the LRA or TA, may be passed into the CA through the RA System of a Subscribing Organization as a fully formed UPN with the Subscriber's verified email address. The subjectID may be utilized as a UPN structure in the subjectAlternativeName extension field of Certificates intended for authentication, as defined by Certificate type in the Certificate Profiles document.

Each subjectID used by IdenTrust in Certificates that are Issued by the IdenTrust CA will be unique among

subjectIDs used in Certificates that are Issued by the IdenTrust CA. The subjectID consists of 3 components:

1. IP Address of the CA system (4 bytes);
2. Current date and time (8 bytes); and
3. A sequence number (4 bytes).

The resulting value is expressed as a 32-character hexadecimal number and is used to distinguish Subscribers and referenced as a UUID. The IdenTrust subjectID in the form of a UUID, is appended to the Subscriber name and included in the commonName (CN) of the Certificate, unless an alternative method for incorporating UUID has been approved by the IdenTrust PMA and documented in the IGC Profiles document. The Subscriber's IdenTrust subjectID remains the same when an existing Certificate is used as the basis for issuing a new Certificate (e.g., issuing Encryption Certificate based on Signing Certificate). Each time the Subscriber undergoes initial identity validation as specified in Section 3.2; the Subscriber is assigned a new IdenTrust subjectID.

3.1.5.2 Unique Identifier (UID)

For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware, the UID and UPN are used to ensure uniqueness.

A Unique Identifier (UID) is generated under the parameters defined for a UUID in versions 1, 4 or 5 in RFC 4122. The resulting value is expressed as a 32-character hexadecimal number. The UID can be used by itself, which will populate an OU field in the subject extension, or it can be used in conjunction with the "@" symbol and the domain name from the Applicant's email address to create a UPN structure. In either case, the UID remains the same when an existing Certificate is used as the basis for issuing a new Certificate. Similarly, each time an existing Subscriber undergoes initial identity validation to obtain another Certificate; the Subscriber is assigned the same UID and UPN.

The PIV-I card serial number is never included in the subject distinguished name.

3.1.5.3 Device Certificates

Device Certificate uniqueness is ensured through the inclusion of IP addresses, program component identifiers, serial numbers, or other similar identifiers (Subject Name) expressed within the subjectCommonName (cn) of the subjectDN of the Device Certificate.

Device Certificate names are controlled as not to take the same form as a human subject.

3.1.5.4 CA Certificates

The IdenTrust CA Administrator ensures name uniqueness among CAs by reviewing each CA Certificate Profile before it is implemented to ensure that no two-CAs use the same name.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

IdenTrust as Issuing CA does not knowingly use trademarks in names unless the subject has the rights to use that name. CAs with Name Claim Disputes are escalated to the IdenTrust PMA to resolve any name collisions brought to its attention affecting interoperability.

Applicants are prohibited from using names or marks that infringe upon the intellectual property rights of others. An Applicant is not guaranteed that its Certificate's subjectDN will contain any requested trademark, and an Applicant requesting a specific name may be required to demonstrate the right to the use of that name. CAs and RAs may request evidence of ownership of trademarks or the findings and orders from courts or other tribunals. A Certificate will not be Revoked merely because there is another rightful owner of a name or mark when the subjectDN is sufficient for identification within the PKI and is non-infringing or otherwise not deceptive. Without incurring any liability to an Applicant or Subscriber, the CA or RA may reject any application or Revoke a Certificate because of a name or trademark dispute.

Any PKI Participant aggrieved by a decision may proceed under the Dispute Resolution Procedures outlined in Section [9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions](#). If appropriate, IdenTrust will coordinate with and defer to an appropriate naming authority. If it is determined that the intellectual property rights of a third party have been

infringed because a Subscriber provided incorrect information in order to receive the infringing name or mark in its Certificate, that Subscriber hereby agrees to indemnify and hold IdenTrust, the CA, and the RA, harmless for any losses or damages arising out of the use of such name or mark.

3.2 INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

CAs and RAs may designate one or more employees as LRAs and may also enroll TAs to perform I&A in accordance with this Section.

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

In all cases where the Subscriber named in a Certificate generates its own Keys, an RSA PKCS#10 Certificate signing request is used to establish that an Applicant holds the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key included in a Certificate. The PKCS#10 is submitted by the Applicant in a secure manner and verified by the CA as part of the Certificate Issuance process as described below in Section [4.3 Certificate Issuance](#). This occurs during a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS Encrypted Session with the IdenTrust CA system.

Proof of possession of the Private Key is established by verifying that the Applicant's Digital Signature in the PKCS#10 was created by the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the PKCS#10 as described in the Issuance processes under Section [4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements](#).

For Private Keys used for Encryption Certificates, the Keys can be generated by the Applicant, RA, or the CA. Proof of possession of the Private Key for Encryption Certificates is established in the same manner as described in this Section. In the case when the Encryption Private Keys are generated by the Applicant, proof of possession of Encryption Private Key is established by verifying that the Applicant's Digital Signature in the PKCS#10 was created by the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the PKCS#10. The IdenTrust PMA has determined the use of Encryption Certificate Private Keys to create a Digital Signature only in a PKCS#10 for the purpose of establishing proof of possession is an acceptable use of such Private Key.

For the PIN-Protected Certificate Issuance process described in Section 4.3.1.2 [Subscriber Certificates](#), an LRA generates the Keys either:

- (1) directly on the party's Cryptomodule, or
- (2) in a Key generator that securely transfers the Key to the party's Cryptomodule. In this case, proof of possession is not required.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

CAs Issue Certificates to individual Subscribers having an affiliation with an Organization who are not acting in a personal capacity but rather in a professional capacity.

Prior to approving the inclusion of Organizational identity information in an Affiliated Certificate, the RA verifies:

1. The Organization with which the Subscriber is to be affiliated has authorized the affiliation,
2. The physical address where the Organization conducts business and the telephone number where its representatives can be contacted; and
3. The authority of requesting representatives.

3.2.2.1 DirectTrust Group Certificates

DirectTrust Certificates are defined in IGC Profiles and will reference the DirectTrust Community X.509 Certificate Policy in the Policy Qualifier.

There are 2 types of DirectTrust Group Certificates:

- Group Domain-Bound Certificates: These Certificates are Affiliated Device Certificates
- Group Address Certificates: These Certificates are Affiliated End-Entity Certificates

For DirectTrust Group Certificates, in addition to Organization verification, the CA or RA verifies the Applicant has

represented in an agreement signed in the presence of a notary that the Organization is qualified under one of the following categories:

- A HIPAA Covered Entity,
- A HIPAA Business Associate; or
- A Healthcare-related organization which treats protected health information with privacy and security protections that are equivalent to those required by HIPAA.

Each organizational Certificate must represent a legally distinct entity.

3.2.2.2 Custodial Managed Certificates

Group Certificates are Certificates that are issued to an affiliated Subscriber, but the Certificate/Private Keys are held in a Custodial Subscriber Key Store and managed by a Custodian who is designated by the Affiliated Organization. The individual typically referred to as the Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO), physically controls the Subscriber Private Keys and the Custodial Subscriber Key Store.

For custodial-managed Group Certificates the procedures detailed under the following sub-sections are executed:

- Authentication of the Individual-Organization Affiliation
- Authentication of Organization Identity

Additionally, verification that the ISSO associated with the application meets the following criteria:

1. The ISSO is affiliated with the Sponsoring Organization named in the Certificate Application
2. The ISSO who is authorized by the Sponsoring Organization is still active in the ISSO role

3.2.2.3 Affiliated Certificates

CAs Issue Affiliated Certificates to Individuals affiliated to a Subscribing Organization. The Subscribing Organization need not be incorporated, but it must conduct business. A Subscribing Organization must not be an Individual acting as a consumer in a personal capacity. An Individual acting in a business capacity as a sole proprietor, professional consultant, or fictitious entity (e.g., “dba” as allowed by local law), may be considered a Subscribing Organization for the purposes of populating the “o” attribute with the Subscribing Organization name in the subjectDN field of the Affiliated Certificate.

3.2.2.4 Non-U.S. Applicants

If the Applicant is located outside the United States, a CA may impose through a Subscribing Organization Agreement or Subscriber Agreement additional restrictions in view of other jurisdictions’ laws governing privacy, consumer protection, and other rights of Individuals. For example, if an Applicant is located within the European Community, the Subscriber Agreement may contain an additional attestation from the Applicant that the information provided is to be considered business data rather than personal data under European Directive 95/46/EC and/or that the Applicant gives his/her unambiguous consent to the processing of such data by IdenTrust.

3.2.2.5 Reliance on Affiliated Certificates

The Applicant is affiliated with the Subscribing Organization through the Applicant’s status as employee, contractor, or agent of the Subscribing Organization. Because it is the Subscriber that holds the Private Key, any verifiable Digital Signature created by that Private Key is attributable to the Subscriber only, and Organizational authority cannot be inferred from IGC Certificates that are Issued under this CPS. IGC Certificates that are Issued under this CPS do not assert roles or authorizations.

In other words, Certificates that are Issued under this CPS do not imply any grant of authority by the Subscribing Organization. A Relying Party can infer from verification of a Digital Signature by reference to a valid IGC Certificate that a Digital Signature is attributable to the Individual Subscriber listed in that Certificate. A Relying Party must not infer that the Individual Subscriber acted on behalf of the affiliated Subscribing Organization solely based on verification of a Digital Signature created by an IGC Certificate.

3.2.2.6 Validation of Affiliation

LRAs do not approve Issuance of a Certificate to an Individual Subscriber without first confirming the following:

1. Authorization by the Subscribing Organization with which the Applicant is to be affiliated. The Subscribing Organization may authorize affiliation in one of 2 ways:
 - Receipt of an attestation letter signed in ink or Digitally Signed by an authorized representative (e.g., a supervisor, administrative officer, information security officer, Authorizing Official, or Certificate coordinator of the Subscribers' Subscribing Organization), provided such letter has been verified inclusive of the authenticity of the authorizing representative and the representative's authorization to act in the name of the Organization; or
 - Receipt of an Affiliated Certificate request for an Applicant from an Internal TA, where the Internal TA has already been authorized by a Subscribing Organization through a Subscribing Organization Internal Trusted Agent Addendum to provide assertion of affiliation, where such Certificate request is for the same Organization affiliation as that of the Internal TA. Such request must be signed in ink or Digitally Signed by the Internal Trusted Agent.
2. Confirmation of the existence of affiliation between the Subscribing Organization and the Applicant. This consists of confirmation of the employment, contractor, or agency relationship. Confirmation of affiliation may be conducted in one of 2 ways:
 - Internal TAs confirm affiliation of the Applicant prior to submission of Applicant data to the CA or RA; or
 - The LRA initiates communication with the Subscribing Organization using an independently verified point of contact, i.e., LRA obtains telephone numbers for the Subscribing Organization from a trusted, independent third-party source of such information. The third party may be the Human Resources department or any Individual in a capacity within the Subscribing Organization to confirm the affiliation.

3.2.2.7 Authentication of Subscribing Organization Identity

LRAs confirm the existence and name of a Subscribing Organization in one of the following ways:

1. A reference to a source unrelated to the prospective Subscribing Organization such as a secretary of state or other Governmental registry, or a commercial database of business information,
2. Presentation to the LRA of a copy of a Governmentally Issued document attesting to the Subscribing Organization's legal existence, together with reasonable proof of the authenticity of that document. Secretaries of state in the United States generally issue "Certificates of good standing" to the effect that the Organization in question is in existence at the time the Certificate is issued. Such a Certificate is signed by an official representative of the secretary of state. Documents submitted for this purpose must be "fair on their face," i.e., bear no apparent indication of forgery, fraud, tampering, etc.,
3. In the case of an Organization that is not registered with a state regulatory agency (such as a partnership or unincorporated association), presentation of a copy of the partnership agreement, association rules, assumed name registration, or other document attesting to the Organization's existence,
4. Independent acquisition of (without reference to the data provided by the Applicant for a Certificate) the name, address, and telephone number of the Organization, which are confirmed by a telephone call with a representative of the Organization made to the telephone number independently obtained by LRA.

RAs keep evidence of authorization of Organization affiliation and confirmation of Organization identity including legal company name, type of entity, principal address (number and street, city, ZIP, or postal code), telephone number, and when deemed necessary, domain name registration, certified copy of the Certificate of registration issued by a Government entity, date of formation, names of directors and officers, and the method(s) by which the LRA verified the Organization information.

3.2.2.8 Participant CA and Registration Authority Representatives

Authentication of identity and authority of representatives of Participant CAs and IdenTrust external RAs are performed as follows:

1. Participant CA Agreements and RA Agreements identify a Primary Authorizing Official and other Authorizing Officials. For each Authorizing Official, contact information, facsimile of the person's manual (ink) signature and the SHA-2 hash of the Individual's Public Key and the SHA-2 hash of the Individual's Public Key Certificate.
 - a. Alternatively, the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Participant CA or RA provides IdenTrust with a signed and sealed Certificate of Incumbency that contains the manual signatures of Authorizing Officials, contact information (see previous paragraph), and a statement that such Individuals possess sufficient authority to act on behalf of and to bind the Organization with respect to the CA or RA functions to be performed.
2. Each agreement specifies that the designated Authorizing Official has authority on behalf of that party to communicate with IdenTrust regarding all matters relating to the performance of the agreement, including the authority to appoint and remove other Authorizing Officials by notifying IdenTrust in writing.
3. IdenTrust requires that a request, authorization, or approval be given by a representative of the other party must be in writing and Digitally Signed or signed on paper by the Authorizing Official using letterhead of that party. Digitally Signed communications are authenticated in accordance with this CPS. Paper communications are authenticated by reviewing the authenticity of the letterhead and the manual signature of the Authorizing Official.
4. Written communications of Authorizing Officials with IdenTrust are also confirmed by oral conversation via telephone with the Authorizing Official at the phone number in the Schedule attached to the agreement.
5. All oral communications are reduced to writing and with written communications are recorded as digital images and archived by the IdenTrust Operations Group in accordance with Section 5.5.

3.2.2.9 Applicable Bridge CA Representatives

Authentication of identity and authority of representatives of any applicable Bridge CA will be performed as follows:

1. The Board of Directors of the Bridge CA shall adopt a corporate resolution identifying and authorizing those Individuals authorized to act with the authority of the Bridge CA Operator regarding all matters related to Cross-Certification of the applicable Bridge CA with the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA.
2. The applicable Bridge CA shall provide IdenTrust with a copy of the resolution and minutes of the Board Meeting where such resolution was approved and contact information for each authorized representative, including name, address, phone number, and email address.
 - a. Alternatively, the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Bridge CA shall provide IdenTrust with a signed and sealed Certificate of Incumbency that contains the manual signatures and contact information of the authorized representatives with a statement that such Individuals possess sufficient authority to act on behalf of and to bind Bridge CA with respect to the actions to be taken.
 - b. In addition to providing contact information and the manual signature of such persons, the paper forms can also include the SHA-2 fingerprint of each authorized representative's Public Key and the SHA-2 fingerprint of each representative's Certificate.
3. CA actions require that a request, authorization, or approval be given by a representative of the applicable Bridge CA in writing, either Digitally Signed or signed in ink by the authorized representative of Bridge CA on paper using letterhead of the Bridge CA. Digitally Signed communications are authenticated in accordance with this CPS. Paper communications are authenticated by reviewing the authenticity of the letterhead and the manual signature of the authorized representative.

4. Written communications from Bridge CA to IdenTrust are also confirmed by oral conversation via telephone with the authorized representative at the phone number provided to IdenTrust by Bridge CA.
5. All oral communications are reduced to writing and with written communications are recorded as digital images and archived by the IdenTrust Operations Group in accordance with Section [5.5 Records Archival](#).

LRAs record the confirmation of affiliation in an auditable log in the RA System when approving an Applicant for Issuance of a Certificate.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

Individual identity IGC Certificates, including PIV-I Hardware Certificates are only Issued to Human Subscribers. The Issuance of an IGC Certificate is based upon authenticating the identity of the Applicant as explained in the following Sub-Sections.

3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers

The authentication process requires the collection and verification of the Applicant's information. Both, information collection and verification, may be performed via in-person identity proofing, or through automated processes. The verification process of Applicant identity information is dictated by the Assurance Level of the Certificate.

Applicant information is collected either from the Applicant directly, a Subscribing Organization initiating a Certificate request on behalf of an Applicant, or through submission of Applicant data by an Internal TA. Collection of Applicant information and Certificate application is described thoroughly in Section [4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational](#) Requirements and its Sub-Subsections.

For any on-line application or review of identity information prior to application submission, IdenTrust maintains a Subscriber account that is protected by an Account Password provided by the Subscriber to ensure that the verified Applicant Issued Certificates are properly bound. Upon entry of the Account Password by the Subscriber, a hash of the password is generated and stored for comparison purposes as needed for subsequent Subscriber authentication to the Subscriber account. The Subscriber Account Password is used as one of the authentication factors at time of Certificate retrieval.

Upon receipt by the CA or RA of a Certificate application, identity is established through verification of Applicant's identity as required for the IGC Certificate Assurance Level by Registrars, TAs, and/or LRAs. Identity verification for the different IGC Certificate types is described in the following sub-sections.

3.2.3.1.1 Basic Identity

For the Assurance Level of Medium Software, the identity is established via in-person identity proofing, or through an automated process. Most commonly, the process is automated. No in-person identity proofing or paper forms are required of the Applicant for automated identity proofing.

For automated identity verification, the RA System performs record checks either with the applicable agency, institution, or through credit bureaus or similar databases. The RA System verifies Applicant name, address, date of birth and other information provided by Applicant for identity proofing sufficient to ensure data provided is accurate and identifies a unique Individual.

3.2.3.1.1.1 Required Identity Credentials

To meet the requirements for completing the automated identity proofing algorithm, Applicant data submitted must include at least one form of identification from List 1 below:

List 1:

- Currently valid credit card number,
- Alien Registration Number,

- Passport number; or
- Currently valid Government-Issued driver's license number or Government-Issued identification card number.

In addition to the requirements above, the Applicant must provide 2 or more of pieces of information from List 2 below:

List 2:

- Social Security Number,
- Date of birth,
- Place of birth,
- Current employer name; or
- Address (number and street, city, ZIP code); or
- Telephone number.

3.2.3.1.1.2 Certificate Approval

RA System identity proofing algorithms use the Applicant's data and correlate them with information collected from independent data sources for consistency. If a high correlation is found, the application is approved, and no additional human intervention is needed. If a lower or no correlation is found, the application is placed into an exception process and additional information is requested from the Applicant (i.e., telephone or utility bill, notarized documentation, etc.). An LRA reviews the additional documentation and approves or disapproves the application.

The information used for the verification algorithm may change from time to time to take advantage of technology and data quality enhancements. Automated verification includes electronic verification of email as described in Section [3.2.3.1.5.1 Email Verification](#).

Upon Certificate approval by the automated RA System or by the LRA in the case of automated RA System exceptions, the approval date is captured by the RA System as the date identity was established and the Certificate is queued for Issuance as described in Section [4.3.1.5 Activation Code Used with an Account Password after I&A Processes](#) of this CP.

3.2.3.1.2 Medium (all)

Issuance requires identity to be established no more than 90⁴ days before initial Certificate Issuance. If more than ninety (90) days have passed since the in-person appearance, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

Establishing identity requires in-person identity proofing before a Registrar or Trusted Agent (see Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#)). In the event a Subscribing Organization has specified an Internal TA, an Antecedent In-Person Appearance as described in Appendix C, the Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing Process may suffice as meeting the in-person identity proofing requirement.

For in-person identity, the Applicant appears before the Registrar with a completed ID Form and required credentials.

3.2.3.1.2.1 Required Identity Credentials

Credentials required are 1 National Government-Issued picture I.D., or 1 REAL ID Act compliant picture ID⁵, or 2 Non-National Government I.D.s, one of which must be a picture I.D. (e.g., Non-REAL ID Act compliant Driver's

⁴ 30 days prior to September 1, 2023

⁵ REAL ID Act compliant IDs are identified by the presence of the DHS REAL ID star

License). Any credentials presented must be unexpired.

Acceptable National Government-Issued picture IDs include:

- A U.S. Government or foreign National Government passport or passport card with photograph,
- A U.S. Federal or foreign National Government driver's license with photograph,
- A U.S. Federal or foreign National Government employee ID card with photograph,
- A U.S. Federal or foreign National Government military ID card with photograph,
- An Alien Registration Receipt Card with photograph,
- A Certificate of Citizenship with photograph; or
- Other similarly trustworthy and currently valid photo ID Issued by a U.S. Federal or foreign National Government, as defined on IdenTrust-approved registration forms.

Acceptable Non-National picture IDs include:

- A state or local Government-issued driver's license with photograph,
- A state or local Government-issued ID Card with photograph; or
- A student ID from a College or University.

Other acceptable forms of ID include:

- An employer identification card,
- A social security or national health card,
- An original or certified copy of a birth certificate,
- A voter registration card,
- A concealed weapons permit,
- A pilot's license; or
- A marriage license.

The Applicant signs the ID Form in the presence of the Registrar as a declaration of identity and indication of Acceptance of the Subscriber Agreement. The Registrar then follows form instructions, verifying the Applicant matches the provided credentials and signs and/or notarizes the form. Signatures made are under the format set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (declaration under penalty of perjury) or comparable format under non-US law.

3.2.3.1.2.2 Certificate Approval

Upon receipt of the ID Form, the LRA records the information set forth below for Issuance of each Certificate:

- Identity of the Registrar who performed the in-person identity proofing, if applicable,
- The signed declaration by the Registrar that he or she confirmed the identity of the Applicant,
- Unique alphanumeric identifiers (e.g., driver license number, notary ID number) and Issuance and/or expiration dates collected from the credentials or IDs of the Registrar and the Applicant,
- The date and time of the confirmation; and
- The declaration of identity (ID Form) signed by the Applicant.

In the event of an Antecedent In-Person Appearance (see Appendix C), an I-9 form signed by the Applicant and provided by an Internal TA of the Applicant's Subscribing Organization may be utilized as the signed declaration of identity.

If an Applicant is unable to appear before a Registrar, the Applicant may be represented by a trusted person who is already a holder of an IGC Certificate of the same or higher Assurance Level of the Certificate being applied for by Applicant. The trusted person will present information sufficient for registration at the level of the Certificate being requested, for both themselves and the Applicant who the trusted person represents. Information provided by the trusted person directly to an LRA or TA must be signed in ink if provided in paper form, or Digitally Signed with the trusted person's IGC Certificate if provided in electronic form. A trusted person may appear on behalf of an Applicant only for those severe situations where in which an Applicant cannot physically appear for in-person identification (e.g., a physically disabled Applicant). The use of a trusted person as proxy for an Applicant is not

for convenience, (e.g., a spouse may not appear for an Applicant solely because the Applicant is travelling or out of country). All Certificate applications submitted by a trusted person on behalf of an Applicant must be approved by the IdenTrust Risk Management Committee prior to Certificate Issuance.

3.2.3.1.3 PIV-I Hardware

PIV-I identity is verified in accordance with the requirements specified for issuing PIV in Section 2.7 of FIPS 201. For PIV-I, the use of Antecedent In-Person Appearance is not applicable.

Data entered into the CMS through the Enrollment WorkStation (EWS) and certain actions and activities performed by the LRA or TA, are automatically captured by the CMS, such as biometrics data and supporting documentation, as described in this Section.

The Applicant is required to present the following 2 identity source documents to establish the Applicant's identity, documents must be original documents issued by the authority responsible for issuing such documents. The documents must be listed among acceptable documents listed and included in Form I-9, OMB No. 1115-0136 Employment Eligibility Verification. At least one document must be a valid form of State or Federal Government-Issued picture identification (ID).

Biometric information of the Applicant is collected during the application process. Such biometric information includes:

- Two electronic versions of the Applicant's fingerprints which, upon successful completion of the Registration process, will be uploaded through the CMS to the smart card that is provided by the LRA or TA and issued to the Applicant. These electronic fingerprints will be relied upon for automated authentication during usage. Fingerprints of the Applicant must be collected each time a smart card is Issued; and
- An electronic version of the Applicant's facial image, which, upon successful completion of the Registration process, will be printed on the aforementioned smart card and uploaded through the CMS to the smart card. A facial image of the Applicant is collected each time a smart card is Issued.

3.2.3.1.3.1 Certificate Issuance Approval

Access to EWS by an LRA or TA must require the LRA or TA to use a Certificate of which such LRA or TA is the Subscriber and such Certificate must be confirmed by the EWS as Valid in order for such access to occur. The Assurance Level of such Certificate must be equal to or above the Assurance Level of the PIV-I Certificates that will be issued via the EWS.

The Applicant described in this process is also defined as the Subscriber of the Certificate, if Issued, for which such Applicant applies.

Issuance requires identity of the Applicant to be established no more than 90⁶ days before initial Certificate Issuance. If more than 90 days have passed since the in-person appearance of the Applicant for identification purposes the LRA or TA must repeat the in-person or supervised remote in-person identification process before proceeding with the Certificate enrollment.

Establishing the identity of an Applicant requires the Applicant to appear in-person before and present required credentials to a TA or LRA. Such TA or LRA serves as the Registrar for purposes of establishing the identity of the Applicant in-person or using the supervised remote in-person process. The role of Registrar cannot be performed by any entity that is not a TA or LRA.

For Supervised remote in-person proofing, the required documentation is identical to that of the In-person proofing requirements, additionally, Supervised remote in-person proofing requires a TA or LRA to witness

⁶ Effective September 1, 2023

every step of the verification and document collection process this includes capturing, witnessing and verifying approved biometrics, this ensures that the applicant is the individual requesting the certificate (see [NIST SP 800-63A](#)).

3.2.3.1.3.2 Registration Forms and Agreements

For PIV-I enrollment, the LRA or TA will perform identification and authentication of the Applicant by using the EWS software to record and compile data provided by the Applicant, and to record and compile required forms and agreements necessary to the enrollment process.

The Applicant must provide information and supporting documentation to the LRA or TA sufficient to complete the enrollment process and to populate the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement. The Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement may be presented and completed electronically within the EWS system or may be a presented and completed on paper.

The Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement must be signed by the LRA or the TA, acting as the representative of the Subscribing Organization authorizing the Applicant/Subscriber to receive a PIV-I Certificate.

If the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement is presented electronically, the LRA or the TA may Digitally Sign the agreement where appropriate for his or her role as Registrar and using the Certificate that he or she uses to authenticate for purposes of accessing the EWS system; or

Alternatively, the LRA or TA may sign a paper copy where appropriate for his or her role as Registrar and of the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement in ink.

The Applicant/Subscriber must also sign a declaration of identity before a Certificate application can be approved. The Applicant/Subscriber will comply with this requirement by signing the ID Form which is included as a part of the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement.

If the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement is presented electronically, it is permissible for the Applicant to use the Private Keys of another valid Certificate that is Issued to him or her for Digital Signing, provided that such Certificate is of an Assurance Level that is equal to or higher than the Assurance Level of the PIV-I Certificate for which he or she has applied; or

As an alternative, it is also permissible for the Applicant to Digitally Sign the ID Form that is included in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement using the Private Keys of the Signing Certificate that is part of the PIV-I Certificate for which he or she has applied and been Issued, provided that (a) such PIV-I Certificate is generated immediately upon authentication of the Applicant's identity made in connection therewith, and (b) such act of Digitally Signing the ID Form occurs as a part of (either integrated into or logically contiguous) the Issuance process. In the event the Applicant does not Digitally Sign the ID Form, then the PIV-I Certificate must immediately be Revoked, or

As an alternative, the Applicant may sign a paper copy of the ID Form in ink.

A copy of the completed and fully executed Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement that has been signed by the LRA or TA and the Applicant, and Authorizing Official of the Subscribing Organization must be retained as a part of the Applicant data record within the EWS.

Upon completion of Applicant enrollment, the LRA or TA will finalize the Applicant enrollment according to the process supported by the Subscribing Organization's EWS at which point the application is transmitted through the CMS to the CA or RA for processing.

Following CA or RA processing, the PIV-I hardware is prepared by the LRA or TA, via the CMS and distributed to the Applicant, either immediately or on a deferred basis.

3.2.3.1.4 Appeal or Redress of Denied Application

IdenTrust provides a mechanism for appeal or redress of a decision, in the event an Applicant is denied a credential based on the results of the identity proofing process.

IdenTrust provides notification to the Applicant and provides instruction for remediation of unacceptable application criteria.

3.2.3.1.5 Electronic Verification of Email and Mobile Phone

When a Subscriber email address is included in a Certificate or used as part of identity verification, the email address is verified (see sub-sections below).

3.2.3.1.5.1 Email Verification

An RA System or CMS of a Subscribing Organization may utilize a directory of email addresses maintained by the Subscribing Organization for an authoritative source of email addresses. Where such a directory is used to verify an Applicant's email address, additional verification of the Applicant's email address is not required.

IdenTrust's online registration process verifies email addresses electronically through an automated process:

1. An automated email containing a one-time code (OTC) is sent to the Applicant's email address provided in the application by the RA System.
2. Within the automated email message there is a link that guides the Applicant to a server-authenticated SSL/TLS secured web site and instructions to the Applicant to authenticate by entering the OTC delivered in Step #1.
3. The Applicant authenticates by providing the OTC from the email message into the RA System through the SSL/TLS secured session.

Upon verification of the Account Password by the RA System, verification of email address is complete, and the verification status is updated automatically by the RA System within the Applicant's application record.

3.2.3.1.5.2 Mobile Phone Verification

The registration process described in Section [4.3.1.5 Activation Code Used with an Account Password after I&A Processes](#) for IGC Basic Software Certificates allows delivery of Activation Data via 2 electronic channels. In such cases where an Applicant selects this method for Activation Data delivery, the Activation Data is sent only to a mobile phone number verified to be in the Applicant's possession.

The method used to verify an Applicants mobile phone is similar to email address verification:

1. An SMS (text) message containing an OTC is sent by the RA system to the Applicant's mobile phone number as provided in the original application.
2. The Applicant authenticates the mobile phone by entering the OTC from the SMS message into the RA System through the SSL/TLS secured session.

3.2.3.1.6 Who May Perform In-Person Identification

IdenTrust uses the term "Registrar" to mean the person performing the in-person confirmation of the Subscriber's identification. Some restrictions based on the specific IGC Certificate Assurance Level apply to the type of Registrar who can perform identification.

In-person identification for the Issuance of Individual Certificates may be performed by, and in the presence of one of the following types of Registrars:

- An LRA,
- A TA; or
- A Licensed Notary or other person certified by a Government Agency who is certified as being authorized to confirm identities (e.g., a driver's license bureau employee, a Dept. of State consular office employee, a court clerk, or a county clerk).

The Registrar or the Applicant submits the information collected from the Applicant directly to the CA or RA in a secure manner. Packages may be secured in a tamper-evident manner (e.g., sealed in an overnight delivery package commonly used by domestic and international couriers) to satisfy this requirement. The Registrar may

also utilize an RA System-provided secure web interface for Digitally Signing and submitting Applicant information. For all Assurance levels except for PIV-I Hardware, Applicant proof of identity from an Antecedent In-Person Appearance may be submitted to a CA or RA by an Internal TA, provided a relationship exists between the Subscribing Organization and the Applicant sufficient for the Internal TA to uniquely identify the Individual identity proofed to be the same Individual as the Applicant ([see Appendix C](#)).

For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware, only LRAs and TAs may perform the in-person identification of Applicants. Identity proofing by other types of Registrars such as notaries is specifically prohibited.

3.2.3.1.7 Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing Process

A simplified alternative in-person proofing process is possible when an Antecedent In-Person Appearance has occurred.

Utilization of an Antecedent In-Person Appearance to meet the requirement for in-person identity proofing as defined below is limited to Affiliated Certificates. The use of Antecedent In-Person Appearance for Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of IGC PIV-I Hardware is prohibited.

Only one-use case is authorized for utilization of an Antecedent In-Person Appearance under this CPS, which is an Internal TA, where such Internal TA has access to identity data provided by the Applicant through an Antecedent In-Person Appearance. The Internal TA in this case is usually within the Subscribing Organization's HR department or a department head.

See Appendix C.

3.2.3.1.8 ID Proofing Relationships

IdenTrust verifies, that the Subscribing Organization has an established relationship with the Applicant, that the relationship is sufficient enough to enable the authenticating TA to, with a high degree of certainty, verify that the Applicant is the same person that was identity proofed through the Antecedent In-Person Appearance see [Appendix C – In-Person Antecedent](#) for how ID Proofing Relationships is accomplished and for the identity data collected for an Antecedent in-Person Event.

3.2.3.1.9 Records Retention

While I-9s are normally kept by employers for 33 years after the date of hire or one (1) year after the date employment ends, I-9s used as proof of an Antecedent In-Person Appearance or as substitutes for signed declarations of identity are kept for 10.5 years as required by Section [5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive](#).

3.2.3.1.9.1 Verification of Applicant Data from an Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing

On receipt of the ID Form from the Internal TA, an LRA verifies:

- The Internal TA submitting the ID Form has been authorized to do so through execution of a Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement Internal Trusted Agent Addendum executed by an Authorizing Official of the Subscribing Organization to which the Applicant is to be affiliated; and
- The ID Form has been fully completed and signed in ink under penalty of perjury or Digitally Signed by the Internal TA.

The Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing Process requires that the Certificate Validity Period does not exceed twelve years from the Antecedent In-Person Appearance date. To ensure that the Validity Period of a Certificate Issued based on an Antecedent In-Person Appearance, the LRA enters the date of the Antecedent In-Person Appearance as the date of registration into the RA System. The RA System then ensures the Validity Period does not exceed twelve years beyond the registration date entered as described in Section [3.3.1.1 Subscribers-Basic and Medium \(All policies\)](#). In the event a requested Certificate's expiration would exceed twelve years from the Antecedent In-Person Appearance, the Applicant is required to undergo new identity proofing.

If any of the above requirements are not met or there is any question by the verifying LRA regarding the authenticity of the data provided by the Internal TA, the application is rejected and the Internal TA is notified to instruct the Applicant to appear for an in-person identity proofing process as defined in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). Otherwise, the LRA enters the Applicant identity information into the RA System, creating a non-activated Subscriber Account for the Applicant.

3.2.3.1.10 Binding the Certificate Request to the Identity

The RA System sends an automated email message to the Applicant at the Applicant’s work email address as provided on the Subscribing Organization Trusted Agent ID Form inviting the Applicant to complete their Certificate application. The invitation includes a web link to begin the process that is linked within the RA System to the non-activated Subscriber account. The RA System requires the Applicant to answer 3 questions from the list below or other information obtained during the application process, one of which must be email address, to begin the authentication process to the RA System:

1. What is your work email address? (required),
2. What is your date of birth?
3. What is your home address?
4. What is your home telephone number? Or
5. Who was your previous employer?

The RA System compares the email address provided by the Applicant in response to the questions to the email address associated with the Subscriber Account referenced within the web link invitation. If a match, the RA System then verifies the remaining questions were answered correctly. If the Applicant failed to answer any question correctly, the Internal TA is notified to instruct the Applicant to appear for an in-person identity proofing event as described in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). If the Applicant successfully answered all 3 questions, the RA System presents the Applicant with an additional 3 random questions such as those from the list below to finish the RA System authentication process:

1. Who is your direct manager?
2. What was your date of hire?
3. What is the number of your [ID Form 1]⁷ provided on your I-9 form at time of hire?
4. What is the number of your [ID Form 2] provided on your I-9 form at date of hire? Or
5. What are the last 4 digits of your Social Security Number?

The RA System verifies the questions were answered correctly. If the Applicant failed to answer any question correctly, the Applicant is instructed to appear for an in-person identity proofing as described in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). If the Applicant successfully answered all 3 questions, the RA System prompts the Applicant to enter a Subscriber Account Password, review all data for accuracy, pay for the Certificate and any related hardware (if payment is required) and Accept the Subscriber Agreement.

Upon Acceptance of the Subscriber Agreement, the Certificate is deemed approved within the RA System and the process of Issuance begins, utilizing one of the activation processes defined in Section [4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance](#) and Section 4 sub-sections, commensurate with the type of Certificate to be Issued.

3.2.3.2 Authentication of Human Subscribers for Role-based Certificates

Role-based Certificates are not Issued under this CPS.

⁷ The RA System requests the identifying number of the specific credential type used on the Applicant’s I-9 form, as recorded by the TA from the antecedent in-person identity proofing event, ex., “What is your Passport number?”, if Passport was a credential type referenced on the I-9 form.

3.2.3.3 Authentication of Human Subscribers for Group Certificates

A Group Certificate corresponds to a credential with a Private Key that is shared by multiple Subscribers. Multiple different Group Certificate Types are defined for Issuance under this CPS and have differing I&A requirements, see the following sub-sections:

3.2.3.3.1 Group Domain-Bound Certificates

Group Domain-Bound Certificates are Device Certificates and assert Organization name in the subjectName DN, which must be in the form of a FQDN. Group Domain-Bound Certificates affiliated Certificates.

For Group Domain-Bound Certificates, the CA or RA verifies and records the following:

- Organization authentication as described in Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#);
- Authentication of a human Sponsor for the Certificate in accordance with Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#) at a Medium Assurance Level,
- Verification of authorization of the Subscribing Organization with an authoritative source within the Subscribing Organization (e.g., corporate, legal, IT, HR, or other appropriate organizational sources) using a reliable means of communication,
- The Device associated with the Group Domain-Bound Certificates according to Section [3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices](#); and
- For DirectTrust Certificates, Organization HIPAA Status, HIPAA Covered Entity's, verification that a healthcare provider or healthcare organization only use the Certificate of a Subscriber if that Affiliate provides care on behalf of the Subscriber and if the Subscriber is a HIPAA Covered Entity.
- For DirectTrust Certificates, Organization HIPAA Status, a Covered Entity can only be an Affiliate of another Covered Entity and cannot be an Affiliate of a Business Associate, except when the Covered Entity is providing services to or on behalf of the Business Associate.

3.2.3.3.2 Group Certificates

For Group Certificates, the CA or RA verifies and records the following:

- Organization authentication as described in Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#)
- Verification of authorization of the Group Certificate Sponsor and the Subscribing Organization with an authoritative source within the Subscribing Organization (e.g., corporate, legal, IT, HR, or other appropriate organizational sources) using reliable means of communication,
- For DirectTrust Certificates, Organization HIPAA status and membership agreement between the health information service provider (HISP) and the Subscriber; and
- For DirectTrust Group Address Certificates issued to Covered Entities (CE) confirmation of the NPI Number to be included in the Certificate subjectAltName extension in accordance with Section [3.2.3.3.1 Group Domain-Bound Certificates](#).

In addition to the above authentication requirements, the following procedures are performed for members of the group:

- Group Address Certificates do not assert non-repudiation,
- The Organization responsible for management of the Group Certificate(s) is responsible for ensuring control of the Certificate Private Key(s), including maintaining a list of Subscribers who have access
- The use of the Private Key(s), and accounting for which Subscriber had control of the Key at what time,
- The subjectName DN does not imply that the subject is a single individual, e.g., by inclusion of a human name form,
- The list of those holding the shared Private Key is provided to, and retained by, the applicable CA, RA, or a designated representative; and
- The procedures for issuing tokens for use in shared key applications comply with all other stipulations of this CPS (e.g., key generation, private key protection, Subscriber obligations).

3.2.3.3.3 Verification of NPI Number

For Group Certificates issued to Covered Entities (CE) the LRA verifies that the Applicant provided National Provider Identifier (NPI) number corresponds to the Applicant named in the Certificate application. The NPI number is verified by using the NPI Registry that is available at <https://npiregistry.cms.hhs.gov/>, where the LRA will search by the Applicant provided NPI number and confirms that the individual's name returned in the NPI Registry search is that same as the Applicant named in the Certificate application.

3.2.3.3.4 Authentication of Subscribers for Group Certificates

Group Certificates are allowed under the IGC CP and this CPS. To approve an application for an IGC Group Certificate, the Issuer CA or RA will confirm the information identified in Section

[3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#) with respect to the authority of Information System Security Officer (ISSO) (or equivalent) and validation of the Sponsoring Organization. The CA or RA records the steps taken to verify this required information as a part of the Certificate application record.

In addition to the authentication of the Subscriber (and their organization when required), the following procedures are performed:

- The Custodian (e.g., authorized third party), ISSO or equivalent is responsible for ensuring control of the Private Key, including maintaining a list of any Users who have access to or use of the Private Key, and accounting for which User had control of the Private Key at what time.
- The subjectName DN does not imply that the subject is a single individual, e.g., by inclusion of a human name form; and
- The Custodian (e.g., authorized third party), ISSO or equivalent is responsible to maintain a list of those holding the shared Private Key that must be provided to, and retained by, the applicable CA or its designated representative.

NOTE: These obligations are conveyed to the ISSO or equivalent, through the Certificate registration form that is signed by the ISSO and authorizes the Applicant to be issued a Group Certificate under the organization for which the ISSO represents. Users must be identity proofed at a level corresponding to the level of assurance asserted in the Certificate. If the identity proofing component is performed by the Subscriber Organization, then the compliant RA must retain documentation that the Subscriber Organization is bound through a legally binding contract with or an attestation to the RA to identity proof Users in accordance with the requirements corresponding to the level of assurance of the associated Certificate. This information must be made available by the Subscriber Organization to the RA upon request.

Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing Events may be used for authentication of Sponsors or Individuals for Group Certificates.

3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices

Devices (i.e. routers, firewalls, and Servers) may be named as Certificate subjects. IdenTrust Issues different types of Certificates for such Devices, with the type of Certificate being dependent on the type of Device. IdenTrust verifies the type of Device during I&A according to the Assurance Level of the Certificate applied for. By following such processes IdenTrust reduces the likelihood that the identifying information contained in the Certificate is misleading.

For each Certificate with a Device named as the Certificate subject, the Device has a human Sponsor, referred to in this CPS as a Primary Machine Operator.

The Primary Machine Operator is an Individual responsible for providing the following Registration information:

- Equipment identification (e.g., serial number) or service name (e.g., DNS name),
- Equipment Public Keys,
- Equipment authorizations and attributes (if any are to be included in the Certificate),

- Contact information to enable the CA or RA to communicate with the Primary Machine Operator when required; and
- Designation of Secondary Machine Operators.

These Certificates are Issued only to Devices under the Primary Machine Operator’s control (i.e., require Registration and validation that meets all issuing CA requirements, as well as requiring re-validation prior to being re-issued). In the case where the Primary Machine Operator is changed, the new Primary Machine Operator reviews the status of each Device under his or her responsibility to ensure it is still authorized to receive a Device Certificate. The CA’s CPS describe procedures to ensure that Device Certificate accountability is maintained.

The Device Registration information is verified to an Assurance Level Commensurate with the Certificate Assurance Level being requested. Acceptable methods for performing this authentication and integrity checking include, but are not limited to:

- Verification of Digitally Signed messages sent from the Primary Machine Operator (using Certificates of equivalent or greater assurance than that being requested), and
- In person identity proofing of the Primary Machine Operator, including verification of the identity of the Primary Machine Operator as both an Individual and as associated with the Subscribing Organization as confirmed in accordance with the requirements of this CP at a level of assurance equal to or higher than that of the Device Certificate being applied for.

3.2.3.4.1 Machine Operator

There are 2 Machine Operator roles—a Primary Machine Operator and a Secondary Machine Operator.

3.2.3.4.1.1 Primary Machine Operator

A Primary Machine Operator is named as such under the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement entered into in connection with a Device and such Primary Machine Operator represents the Device that is named as Certificate subject in a Certificate issued in connection with such Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement; provided, however, with respect to revocation and suspension requests, only a Primary Machine Operator may represent a Device to the IdenTrust CA. The Primary Machine Operator works with the LRA, RA or TA to register Devices in accordance with this Section [3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices](#). The Primary Machine Operator may designate Secondary Machine Operators in relation to a Device Certificate to which the Primary Machine Operator acts on behalf of the Subscriber.

Primary and Secondary Machine Operators may share responsibilities for the Device, as well as the duties of a Subscriber.

Primary Machine Operators do not need to be Trusted Roles; however, they do have their identity verified to a level of assurance equal to or higher than the Device Certificate for which they are responsible.

3.2.3.4.1.2 Secondary Machine Operator

Secondary Machine Operators are designated by being named as such on the List which is included in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement, by the Primary Machine Operator, during the Device Certificate Registration process and are archived in the CA database as a part of the Device Certificate account.

Secondary Machine Operators share responsibilities with the Primary Machine Operator as duties of a Subscriber that is a Device; provided, however, Secondary Machine Operators are prohibited from interacting with the CA in any way with reference to the Device Certificate of such Subscriber save for communicating to the CA a request for the Suspension or Revocation of such Device Certificate.

Secondary Machine Operators are not Trusted Roles and do not require identity verification by the CA.

3.2.3.4.1.3 Machine Operator Authentication

The Primary Machine Operator is responsible for providing the following registration information and providing supporting documentation when requested by the RA:

- Equipment identification – Subscribing Organization’s registered domain name/service name (DNS name), Device serial number; FQDN(s); unique software application name; or public IP addresses,
- Equipment or software application Public Keys,
- Equipment or software application authorizations and attributes (if any are to be included in the Certificate); and/or
- Contact information to enable the RA to communicate with the Primary Machine Operator and Subscribing Organization when required.
- Designation of Secondary Machine Operators

The registration information is verified by the LRA. Acceptable methods for performing this authentication of registration information provided by a Primary Machine Operator and ensuring the information has not been tampered with include, but are not limited to:

- Verification of Digitally Signed messages sent from the Primary Machine Operator; and/or
- Registration by the Primary Machine Operator, with In-person identity proofing of Registration of the Device by the Primary Machine Operator, including verification of the identity of the Primary Machine Operator confirmed in accordance with the requirements of Section [3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity](#) of this CPS at a level of assurance equal to or higher than that of the Device Certificate being applied for.

3.2.3.4.2 Authentication of Primary Machine Operator

Part of the Device Registration process, the Primary Machine Operator is named in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement. Identity Verification and affiliation of the Primary Machine Operator are conducted at the level commensurate with level of verification required for the Device Certificate to be Issued. In addition to the responsibilities detailed in Section [3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices](#), the Primary Machine Operator is also responsible for the operation and control of a Device and assumes the obligations of Subscriber for the Certificate associated with the Device, including but not limited to a duty to protect the Private Key of the Device at all times and manage Device Certificate lifecycle events.

Should a Secondary Machine Operators will be designated in conjunction with the Device, then the Primary Machine Operator is also responsible to provide an initial list of Secondary Machine Operators in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement which will be maintained accordingly.

3.2.3.4.3 Authentication of Secondary Machine Operators

Secondary Machine Operators are allowable for the purpose of managing a Device that has been issued a Device Certificate, they also act as back up to the Primary Machine Operator to manage Certificate Suspension and/or Revocation of the Device Certificate, when needed. The name(s) of the Secondary Machine Operator(s) are not named in the Device Certificate.

During the Device Registration process, the Primary Machine Operator will designate the Secondary Machine Operator(s) by providing names and contact information for the designees in the Secondary Machine Operators List, which is a part of the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement, The Secondary Machine Operators List will be archived as a part of the Device Certificate account record, until and unless the list is updated by the Primary Machine Operator. A Primary Machine Operator may add or remove Secondary Machine Operators by submitting a new Secondary Machine Operators List via an email sent from the Primary Machine Operator’s confirmed email address, which is provided in the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement. The CA will upload the new Secondary Machine Operators List into the Device Certificate account record to be referenced if an email or phone request for Certificate Suspension and/or Revocation is initiated by a Secondary Machine Operator.

Confirmation of Identity and Affiliation with the Subscribing Organization is not required for Secondary Machine Operators.

3.2.3.4.4 Verification of Authorization by Subscribing Organization

Device Certificate Issuance and affiliation is authorized by submission of a Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement, signed by a Subscribing Organization Authorizing Official.

3.2.3.4.5 Device Issuance

IdenTrust does not issue Device Certificates to Individual Subscribers without affiliation to a Subscribing Organization. Additionally, the Authorization Agreement specifies the authorized Primary Machine Operator, any Secondary Machine Operator(s) and authorizes affiliation of the Device Certificate.

3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information

CAs are prohibited from including unconfirmed Subscriber information in Certificates. This prohibition is enforced by the IGC Certificate Profiles and procedures in this CPS, which only allow verified information to be included in Certificates.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

The authority of representatives for Participant CAs, RAs and applicable Bridge CA is established using the procedures described in Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).

Certificates that assert Affiliation are Issued only after verification of Applicant Affiliation with an authoritative source within the Subscribing Organization (e.g., corporate, legal, IT, HR, or other appropriate organizational sources) using reliable means of communication.

Once a Subscribing Organization has been authenticated (see Section 3.2.2) and has entered into a Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement naming a Subscriber as an Authorizing Official, the Authorizing Official may appoint and remove other Authorizing Officials (or Sponsors) who are authorized to approve affiliation of Applicants and Devices, and to request Certificate lifecycle events for the Subscribing Organization, e.g., request Suspension of a Subscriber's Certificate or request Revocation of a Subscriber's Certificate in the event Organization-Individual affiliation is broken. CAs are required to maintain a list of Subscribing Organization Authorizing Officials.

CAs and RAs may rely on TAs and internal TAs to provide documentary proof that I&A has been performed according to Section [3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity](#) and to indicate Subscribing Organization authorization to affiliate an Applicant or Device with the Subscribing Organization

In the instance where an Applicant applies for an Affiliated Certificate and there is no Internal TA, the Applicant is provided a Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement and instructed to have it signed by an officer or Individual of the Subscribing Organization able to agree to and bind the Subscribing Organization to its duties and obligations as described in the Agreement. If Organization identity has not already been established, the LRA verifies Organization identity according to the processes identified in Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#) prior to approving Issuance of the Affiliated Certificate.

Certificates issued to Subscribers do not assert authority to act on behalf of the Subscribing Organization in any implied capacity.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

To ensure PKI interoperability, IdenTrust:

- Operates a PKI that has undergone a successful compliance audit pursuant to Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) of this CPS.†
- Requires that all External RA organizations complete an annual audit by an independent third party and provide audit results to IdenTrust.†
- Issues Certificates compliant with the profiles described in the IGC Certificate Profiles; and

- Makes IGC PKI Certificate Status information available to Relying Parties in accordance with Section 2 of this CPS.

3.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

If a Participant CA Re-Key is required, a new Certificate is issued to the Participant CA by the Root CA. Prior to issuance, the Participant CA is Identified through current Signature Key or the initial Registration process. If it has been more than 3 years since the Participant CA was identified as stated in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#), identity is re-established through the initial Registration Process.

3.3.1.1 Subscribers – Basic and Medium (All policies)

For routine Re-Key requests of both Basic and Medium Assurance Level Certificates, identity may be established through use of a previously Issued (unexpired) Private Keys of a Signing Certificate, however, For Basic Assurance Level Certificates, identity is re-established through initial registration process at least once every 15 years from the date identity was originally established and for Medium Assurance Level Certificates, identity is re-established through initial registration process at least once every 12 years from the date identity was originally established

To establish proof of possession, the Subscriber presents his or her Certificate to establish a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted Session, requiring use of the Private Key. IdenTrust's RA Systems further validates the authenticity of the Certificate presented by verifying that the Certificate was Issued by the IGC PKI, that the Certificate is still valid in the relational database, and by comparing the subject name in the Certificate with the subject name in the Subscriber database. The RA System requires that the IGC Certificate utilized for identification be of an Assurance Level equal to or higher than the Certificate to be Issued. This is accomplished by an automatic check of the Certificate against the configuration of that Certificate type within the Subscriber database.

3.3.1.2 Subscribers – PIV-I

I&A for Re-Key of PIV-I Certificates may be initiated by an LRA through a CMS. In such cases the Subscriber authenticates through presentation of his or her fingerprint that must match the Subscriber's fingerprint stored on the same smart card on which the Subscriber's PIV-I Certificates to be Re-Keyed are stored. Following such authentication, the CMS can write new Certificates to the smart card.

Utilization of a previous identity proofing event for routine Re-Key requires that the Subscriber not be due for new in-person identification. In the event the Subscriber is due for new in-person identification, the processes described in Section [3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity](#) of this CPS are required to re-establish identity.

To ensure that the validity period of a Certificate Issued on the basis of an electronic authentication does not extend beyond the in-person identification limits stated above, the IdenTrust RA System does the following:

- Counts the number of digitally authenticated Issuances since the last in-person identification;
- Compares the date of the Subscriber's last in-person identification stored in the Subscriber database to ensure that the Certificate's proposed validity period will not extend beyond the next in-person identity proofing deadline; and
- Sends the Subscriber Re-Key notification emails with instructions to appear in-person before an RA for identity proofing, if required, beginning ninety (90) days prior to Certificate expiration.

3.3.1.3 LRAs

The process for Re-Keying LRAs is the same as for Subscribers.

3.3.1.4 SubCAs, RAs and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA

The I&A process for Re-Keying SubCAs, RAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs is the same as stated above, except that if it has been more than 3 years since identity was established, it must be re-established. Certificate validity is as defined in the table in Section [6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods](#).

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation

Suspended, Revoked, or expired IGC Certificates cannot be Re-Keyed. Subscribers without a valid IGC Certificate will be re-authenticated by the CA or RA through a completely new IGC Certificate application, unless identity can be verified through the use of biometrics on file through the chain of trust defined in FIPS 201.

3.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUESTS

Revocation requests authenticated on the basis of the Certificate's associated Key Pair are always accepted as valid. The identity of the person submitting a Revocation request in any other manner is authenticated in accordance with Section [4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request](#). Other Revocation request authentication mechanisms may be used as well, including a request in writing signed by the Certificate Holder, and sent via trackable courier in a sealed, tamper-evident envelope. These authentication mechanisms balance the need to prevent unauthorized Revocation requests against the need to quickly Revoke Certificates and are explained in Section [4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension](#).

3.4.1 Revocation Requests Submitted by an RA

In the event a Subscribing Organization is also an RA, a revocation request for any Certificate associated with such Subscribing Organization must consist of:

- A verbal request for revocation initiated by a Subscribing Organization manager can be executed as long as (a) the requesting manager is known to the LRA or can be confirmed by the LRA as a Subscribing Organization manager; and (b) such manager can be authenticated as currently in that managerial role; and (c) such manager has authority over the function associated with the Certificate, or manages the individual named as the Subscriber of the Certificate to be revoked; or
- A digitally signed email request from a Subscribing Organization manager can be executed as long as (a) the requesting manager is known to the LRA or can be confirmed by the LRA as a Subscribing Organization manager; and (b) such manager can be authenticated as currently in that managerial role; and (c) such manager has authority over the function associated with the Certificate, or manages the individual named as the Subscriber of the Certificate to be revoked; or
- Receipt of a list via email from an authorized representative of that Subscribing Organization's human resources department, which list identifies terminated employees or representatives of the Subscribing Organization and (a) the authorization of such authorized representative is pre-established; or (b) the authorization of such authorized representative can be confirmed by the LRA via confirmation through the Subscribing Organization's human resource department; or
- A Certificate revocation request can be executed based on the removal of an individual named as the Subscriber of such Certificate from a directory used by the Subscribing Organization as an authoritative data source for information regarding employees or representatives; or
- Other methods that support a Subscribing Organization's requirements for Revocation.

3.5 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR KEY RECOVERY REQUESTS

While IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it, the recovery of escrowed keys is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS.

3.5.1 KRA Authentication

KRA Authentication is done via the online HSM. The enterprise customer interacts with the CMS (card management system), via the customer facility, sending an API call to the IdenTrust system (HSM).

3.5.2 KRO Authentication

Using the RA workstation, the KRA verifies the KRO's identity and authorization via the CMS sending an API call to the HSM requesting the key recovery. The IdenTrust system then performs the key recovery using the online

HSM and then returns the user key to the CMS, the CMS would then inject the key into a certificate that has the same or greater strength than that of the key being recovered.

3.5.3 Subscriber Authentication

The Subscriber identity is established as specified in Sections [3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key](#), [3.3.1.1 Subscribers – Basic and Medium \(All policies\)](#) and [3.3.1.2 Subscribers – PIV-I](#)

3.5.4 Third-Party Requestor Authentication

The KRA or KRO verifies the identity and authorization of the Requestor prior to initiating the key recovery request as stated above in Sections 3.5.1 KRA Authentication and 3.5.2 KRO Authentication.

Third-Party Requestor identity authentication is commensurate with the assurance level of the certificate associated with the key being recovered. Identity is established using one of the following methods:

- Procedures specified in Section [3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity](#) during initial registration for the specified certificate assurance level (an assurance level equal to or greater than the assurance level of the certificate whose corresponding private key is being recovered).
- Certificate-based authentication (e.g., digitally signed e-mail or client-authenticated TLS) that can be verified using current, valid (i.e., un-revoked) public key certificates at the requested certificate assurance level (an assurance level equal to or greater than the assurance level of the certificate whose corresponding private key is being recovered).

3.5.5 Data Decryption Server authentication

IdenTrust does not support a Data Decryption Server (DDS), as this is optional see IGC CP Section [1.3.6.2 Data Decryption Server](#).

4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION

When operating as a CA participating in a cross-certified program (such as Federal Bridge and DirectTrust), IdenTrust complies with all application and acceptance of cross-certificate requirements as specified in the governing CP document. The IdenTrust PMA authorizes the applications for cross-certification with an external policy prior to IdenTrust personnel processing applications for Cross-Certificates under such program.

All communications among CAs, RAs, LRAs, TAs, Subscribers and Applicants supporting the Certificate application and Issuance process are authenticated and protected from modification using mechanisms commensurate with the requirements of the data to be protected by the Certificates being Issued. When an IGC Certificate Private Signature Key is used to authenticate to IdenTrust systems for the purpose of Issuance of another IGC Certificate, the Certificate used is of the same or higher Assurance Level than the Certificate to be Issued. Any electronic transmission of personal information and shared secrets is encrypted using a means commensurate with the type of transmission and the sensitivity of the data.

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Certificate application submissions vary with the entity to which the Certificate is Issued and whether affiliation with a Subscribing Organization is to be asserted.

4.1.1.1 Individual Unaffiliated Certificates

For Individual Unaffiliated Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An Individual who agrees to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement; or
- An Individual who is already a Subscriber, holding a valid, unexpired IGC Certificate of the same or higher Assurance Level than the Certificate being applied for.

4.1.1.2 Individual Affiliated Certificates

For Individual Affiliated Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An Individual who agrees to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement; or
- An Individual who is already a Subscriber, holding a valid, unexpired IGC Certificate of the same or higher Assurance Level than the Certificate being applied for,
- An Authorizing Official or Sponsor of a Subscribing Organization with which the Applicant is to be affiliated;
- An Internal TA as authorized by a Subscribing Organization in accordance with Section [3.2.5 Validation of Authority](#); or
- A compliant Custodian (e.g., authorized third party) creates the Certificate Signing Request based on input received from the Subscriber as validated by the RA or CA during the identity proofing process.

4.1.1.3 PIV-I Certificates

For PIV-I Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An Individual who appears in person and agrees to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement; or
- An Individual who appears in person and is already a Subscriber, holding a valid, unexpired IGC PIV-I Certificate.

4.1.1.4 Device Certificates

For Device Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An Individual who agrees to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement and undergoes Individual identity proofing as specified in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#).
- An Individual who is already a Subscriber holding a valid, unexpired IGC Certificate of the same or higher Assurance Level than the Certificate being applied for,
- An Authorizing Official or Sponsor of a Subscribing Organization with which the Applicant is to be affiliated; or
- An Internal TA as authorized by a Subscribing Organization in accordance with Section [3.2.5 Validation of Authority](#).

4.1.1.5 LRA Certificates

For LRA Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An employee, contractor or agent of a CA or RA who has been appointed as an LRA by an Organization Authorizing Official. Authorizing Officials for entities other than IdemTrust are specified in their relative agreements, e.g., Participant CA Agreement, RA Agreement, or in a Certificate of Incumbency.

4.1.1.6 RA Systems Certificates

For RA Systems Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- An employee, contractor or agent of a CA or RA who has been appointed as an RA Administrator by an Organization Authorizing Official. Authorizing Officials for entities other than IdemTrust are specified in their relative agreements, e.g., Participant CA Agreement, RA Agreement, or in a Certificate of Incumbency in accordance with Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).

4.1.1.7 Participant CA Certificates

For Participant CA Certificates an application may be submitted by:

The authorized representative of the Participant CA who is named in the Participant CA Agreement or in a Certificate of Incumbency in accordance with Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).

4.1.1.8 Bridge CA Cross Certificates

For Bridge CA Cross Certificates an application may be submitted by:

- For a Cross-Certifying bridge, the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and/or those authorized representatives through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or in a Certificate of Incumbency in accordance with Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).
- For IdenTrust, the person(s) appointed by the IdenTrust PMA or the IdenTrust Chief Information Officer (CIO) and specified in a MOA.

4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

Upon initiation of a Certificate application by an authorized Individual or Organization as described above in Section [4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application](#), Applicant identity information is collected and identity is established according to the processes described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#), and its sub-sections. If the requested Certificate is Affiliated, Subscribing Organization identity and authorization for affiliation is also established in accordance with Section [3.1 Naming](#) and its sub-sections.

4.1.2.1 Establishment of Identity

Requests made by a CA for a Subordinate CA are submitted to the IdenTrust PMA for approval.

For IGC Basic Software Certificates, identity is deemed to have been established on the day the RA System successfully completes automated identity verification, or if an in-person identity proofing process was utilized, the date the I&A information is received and entered into the system by the LRA.

For all other IGC Certificates, identity is deemed to have been established only after the I&A documentation is reviewed, approved and entered by the LRA, into the RA System. The identity establishment date is the date the I&A paperwork was entered into the RA System as approved by the LRA.

Upon completion of the registration process, all identity-related data for the Applicant and establishment thereof has been recorded in the RA System database.

The following Sections discuss in more detail the collection and verification of identity data, and Certificate Issuance processes.

4.1.2.2 Information Collection

During the application phase of registration, Applicant information required for identity verification is collected in one of the following manners:

- Applicants may provide registration information through an online Certificate application process via a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS secured web site hosted by IdenTrust;
- Applicants, assisted by an LRA or TA during an in-person identity proofing process may provide identity information into an EWS connected to an RA System and/or CMS;
- Subscribing Organization Sponsors, in accordance with Section [3.2.5 Validation of Authority](#), may provide identity information for an Individual Applicant or multiple Applicants via an online Certificate application process over a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS secured web site or through a secure web services interface hosted by IdenTrust.

All Applicant information required for the type of Certificate to be Issued is collected through one of the above processes.

For PIV-I Hardware Certificates, the LRA or TA-assisted method through the EWS is required for collection of biometric data. The process for PIV-I data collection is more fully described in Section [4.1.2.7 Submission of Forms](#).

4.1.2.3 Account Passwords

In addition to Applicant information, a hash of the Account Password selected by the Applicant is collected, which is later utilized with an Activation Code provided to the Applicant to authenticate to the RA System at the

beginning of a Certificate retrieval process.

As part of the registration process, the Applicant is required to create 3 questions and secret answers, which together serve as a mechanism to reset their Account Password in case they forget it before they are able to download their Certificate. The reset Account Password process is activated by the Subscriber providing his or her Activation Code, which was received initially in a letter when the account was first opened and by clicking on an Account Password reset URL. This process sends an OTC and specified URL to the email address on file for the Subscriber; currently OTC's cannot be sent to a mobile phone number. After receiving the OTC, the Subscriber must enter both the Activation Code and the OTC at the specified URL to gain access to the 3 questions that were selected during registration. (The 3 questions were selected by the Subscriber from a list of 10 randomly selected questions that were randomly generated from a pool of password-reset questions). If the answers are correct, the Subscriber is allowed to change the Account Password, which is immediately hashed and stored in the RA system for further use.

4.1.2.4 Documents Provided to Applicants

All Applicants are required to Accept a Subscriber Agreement acknowledging their duties and obligations, and to sign a declaration of identity.

Applicants utilizing an online registration process are required to Accept an online Subscriber Agreement during the registration process. Acceptance of the online Subscriber Agreement is recorded by the RA System. If the Subscriber Agreement is not Accepted, the application process is terminated.

Applicants appearing for an in-person identity proofing per Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#) are provided or may download a forms package that includes:

- An In-Person Identification Form (ID Form), which Applicants are instructed to complete and take to an approved Registrar, which may be an LRA, TA, Notary or other Individual certified for in-person identity proofing per Section [3.2.3.1.2 Medium \(all\)](#) of this CPS. The ID Form includes a declaration of identity and Applicant Agreement to the Subscriber Agreement, required to be signed in ink in the presence of the Registrar. It also includes Registrar instructions, and boxes or lines for the Registrar to initial or fill in when verifying the accuracy of the identifying information presented; and

4.1.2.5 In-Person Verification of Identity Using the ID Form

The Applicant signs the ID Form in the presence of the Registrar, who then performs the following:

- Records the type, serial numbers and expiration dates for the identification documents presented by the Applicant,
- Verifies that the identification documents are protected against forgery, modification, or substitution (e.g., holograms and other security features), and that the Applicant is the holder of the identification documents presented and that the picture and name on the Photo ID match the appearance and name of the Applicant; and
- Signs (or notarizes if the Registrar is a notary) the ID Form.

The Applicant's ID Form contains:

- A record of the identity of the Registrar,
- A signed declaration by the Registrar that he/she confirmed the identity of the Applicant,
- A record of the credentials used to verify the Individual's identity (e.g., ID type and number); and
- A record of the date of the in-person identity confirmation.

4.1.2.6 Verification of Identity using the ID Form for Internal Trusted Agents

Internal TAs may utilize data from an Antecedent In-Person Appearance as described in [Appendix C](#). The ID Form for Internal Trusted Agents allows the Internal TA to specify what data is collected and provide additional identity information used to authenticate the Applicant as part of the Certificate binding process.

The LRA enters the date of the Antecedent In-Person Appearance from the ID Form into the RA System as the date identity was established.

4.1.2.7 Submission of Forms

The ID Form and the Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement (if required) are submitted to the CA or RA either by courier in a sealed, tamper evident envelope, Digitally Signed, and submitted through a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS secured website or sent in a Digitally Signed and encrypted email.

In cases in which the Registrar is not an LRA or TA, the Applicant submits all the application information directly to the applicable CA or RA by courier in a sealed, tamper evident envelope.

In cases in which the Registrar is a TA or LRA, the Applicant, TA or LRA may submit the information by courier in a sealed, tamper evident envelope. To reduce processing time, the LRA or TA may Digitally Sign and submit the information through a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS secured web site, or in a Digitally Signed and encrypted email.

For the purposes of electronic submission, ID Forms may be scanned and sent by LRAs and TAs, provided the scan is in full color and of suitable quality for viewing by the LRA, and provided the submission is Digitally Signed by the LRA or TA.

Digitally Signed Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreements may be submitted via email by the Applicant, an Authorizing Official of the Subscribing Organization, a RA, or a TA.

4.1.2.8 In-Person Verification of Identity for IGC PIV-I Hardware Certificates

For PIV-I Hardware Certificates, verification of identity is required to be conducted in person, by an LRA or TA. Other Registrars such as Notaries are not permitted. The identity proofing session is conducted utilizing an EWS securely connected to the CMS that walks the LRA or TA through the registration process with the Applicant. Forms of ID may be captured through entry of identity document data into the CMS directly by the LRA or TA or through the use of ID Forms.

The LRA or TA assists the Applicant through an online registration process, collecting from the Applicant any required information not already supplied by a Subscribing Organization Sponsor. The LRA or TA physically reviews, records identity document description and numbers, and enters the information into the CMS. In such cases where a paper ID Form is utilized, the ID form is scanned and uploaded into the CMS. Use of Antecedent In-Person Appearance data for PIV-I identity verification is not permitted.

The LRA or TA captures and ensures successful recording of both a facial image and fingerprint utilizing biometric capture devices connected to the EWS.

Upon Acceptance of the Subscriber Agreement by the Applicant, the Certificate application is queued in the CMS for review and verification.

4.1.2.9 RA Administrator and LRA Access to RA System Functions

All access to RA Systems, inclusive of a CMS, is authenticated through use of a Private Key corresponding to the LRA or RA Administrator's IGC Certificate

RA Administrators are the holders of and authenticate with an IGC Certificate of the highest Assurance Level as Issued by the CA in connection with the RA. An LRA is a holder of and authenticates with an IGC Certificate with an Assurance Level equal to or higher than the Assurance Level of the Certificates on which they will be performing LRA duties. Additionally, the authority of the person to act as LRA or RA Administrator is confirmed by an Authorizing Official of the RA through submission of an Authorization Form signed or Digitally Signed by an Authorizing Official. Upon receipt of a properly completed Authorization Form and approval by the applicable CA or RA, the ACL is updated to reflect authorization to use the RA System.

During this same process, access is granted to the RA Administrator or LRA for only those domains or Subscribing Organization name spaces (see Section [3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful](#)) that the RA is authorized by the CA or RA to administer.

4.1.2.10 Participant CAs

Prior to the Key Generation process described in Section [6.1.1 Key Pair Generation](#), the Applicant for a Participant CA Certificate has first enter into a Participant CA Agreement with IdenTrust. During this contracting process, personnel authorized to act on the Applicant's behalf for purposes of Key Generation and Certificate Issuance are identified. If necessary for confirmation of identity during an in-person visit to IdenTrust by such authorized representative, IdenTrust may request, review, and obtain a copy of the representative's Government-Issued Photo ID.

4.1.2.11 Bridge Cross-Certificate

Authorized representatives of Cross-Certifying bridges are identified in accordance with Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#). If necessary to confirm the identity of the authorized representative during an in-person visit to IdenTrust, IdenTrust may request, review, and obtain a copy of the representative's Government-Issued Photo ID.

4.2 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING

Information in Certificate applications are verified as accurate before Certificates are issued. The following procedures are used in verifying information in Certificate applications.

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The CA or RA verifies the identity of the Applicant in accordance with Sections [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#) and [3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests](#) and their sub-sections:

- Verify the authority of the Applicant and the integrity of the information in the Certificate request,
- Generate and sign a Certificate, if all Certificate requirements have been met (in the case of a RA, have the CA sign the Certificate); and
- Make the Certificate available to the Subscriber.

4.2.1.1 Individuals and Devices

Identity of Applicants is established according to the procedures defined in Sections following the procedures defined in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#).

4.2.1.2 Basic Assurance

For Certificates asserting Assurance Level of Basic, when performance of I&A is an automated function, there is no in-person identity proofing.

4.2.1.3 Medium Assurance

For all other Certificates that are Issued to Individuals, and Certificates asserting Assurance Level of Basic where an in-person identity proofing process has been used, the Registrar examines the identification documents for the Applicant as specified in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). The Applicant, in the presence of the Registrar, signs the ID Form, which includes a declaration of identity. Upon successful verification of identity, the Registrar signs (or notarizes, if a notary) the ID Form.

When a Certificate can be Issued immediately after the Registrar collects and examines the Subscriber's information, the Registrar can sign the ID form and then the Applicant can Digitally Sign the declaration of identity with the newly Issued Certificate.

4.2.1.4 PIV-I Assurance

For IGC PIV-I Certificates, the LRA or TA utilizes the EWS connected to the CMS to guide the Applicant through the Applicant enrollment process, including capture of the Applicant's identity source documents, collection of biometric data, Applicant's entry of a Subscriber's Account Password, and Acceptance by the Applicant of the

Subscriber Agreement within the EWS as well as execution by the Applicant of a declaration of identity, in each case as provided for in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#).

In the case of Certificates asserting PIV-I Hardware Assurance Level requiring the collection of biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and facial image), these data are also collected and examined by the TA or LRA along with the other documentation described above.

4.2.1.5 Local Registration Authorities

Local Registration Authorities are identified and Issued Certificates as Individuals. (Based on the Public Key and a Certificate thumbprint added to the ACL, the LRA is granted rights to perform RA functions). Prior to updating the ACL for RA functions, an IdenTrust LRA Authorization Form signed by the RA's Authorizing Official is submitted to IdenTrust and reviewed by an IdenTrust LRA to confirm the LRA's appointment by the RA. The LRA is granted Certificate management rights only for those domains or namespaces that the LRA has been authorized to administer.

4.2.1.6 Representatives of RAs, Participant CAs and the Bridge CAs

Representatives of RAs, Participant CAs and the Bridge(s) CA(s) are identified through ordinary business processes that include confirming position, title, and chain-of-command through correspondence on official letterhead, Digitally Signed e-mail, by telephone, through the contract negotiation process and by the execution of written contracts, which designate authorized representatives, as described in Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#). If necessary to confirm the identity of an authorized representative during an in-person visit to IdenTrust, IdenTrust may request, review, and obtain a copy of the representative's Government-Issued Photo ID.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

The CA or RA is responsible for verifying that registration information is correct and accurate;

- Verifying the information is correct and accurate,
- Ensuring the I&A requirements as defined in Section [3.1 Naming](#) and [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#) and their sub-sections of this CPS have been followed, including review of all required documentation and the Subscriber Agreement,
- Ensuring the application process requirements as defined in Sections [4.1 Certificate Application](#) have been met; and
- Approve or reject the application.

Guidelines for approval or rejection of Certificate Applications are provided in the following sub-sections.

4.2.2.1 Basic Assurance Level Application

For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of Basic for which automated identity proofing has been successfully completed, approval or rejection is an automated process as described in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). Where automated identity proofing has been utilized, the RA System records the date of approval as the date identity was established.

4.2.2.2 Medium Assurance Level Application

For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of Medium, an authorized LRA is responsible for the approval or rejection of an application. The LRA is an Individual different from any Registrar used for the collection of Applicant information, i.e., an LRA involved in the process of collecting information for a given Applicant is prohibited from approving that Applicant's Certificate application to maintain multi-Person control.

IdenTrust maintains a list of Public Keys and Certificate thumbprints of LRAs that are authorized to submit Certificate approvals, and the RA system restricts LRAs to those domains or namespaces for which the LRA is authorized to approve.

To approve or reject non-PIV-I Certificate applications, the LRA accesses the web-based Certificate management interface of the RA System via a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session, authenticated through use of the LRA's Medium Hardware or PIV-I Hardware Signing Certificate Private Key, whose corresponding Public Key has been registered in the RA System's ACL.

If necessary, the LRA uploads into the system the application that has been verified or will be verified. For Certificate applications that are submitted using an electronic registration process, the LRA does not have to upload the information in the system but is required to compare the information in the applications with the information in the database. The LRA verifies the completeness of the application, the completion of all required forms, and ensures all information used to identify the individual has been adequately verified. Any information not already verified, e.g., identity of Subscribing Organization, is verified by the LRA. The LRA then approves or rejects the application, and if approved the Certificate is queued by the RA System for Issuance. The LRA records the date of the in-person identity proofing into the RA System as the date identity was established.

4.2.2.3 PIV-I Assurance Level Application

For Certificates asserting Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware, a CMS is used to manage the Certificate approval process. The CMS maintains an ACL of the PIV-I Certificate thumbprints and Public Keys of LRAs authorized to approve PIV-I Certificate applications. The CMS restricts LRAs to those domains or namespaces for which the LRA is authorized to approve.

For Certificate applications where an LRA or TA conducts an assisted enrollment of the Applicant through an EWS, the LRA does not have to upload any additional information, but is required to ensure the completeness of the application, that required Applicant and biometric data has been collected, that the Subscriber Agreement was electronically Accepted within the EWS by the Subscriber, and that that the application was Digitally Signed by the LRA or TA within the EWS. Verification is conducted through the CMS, which programmatically ensures each of the required steps is completed and allows the LRA to view all application data. The LRA then approves or rejects the application, and if approved the Certificate is queued by the RA System for Issuance. The LRA records the date of the in-person identity proofing into the RA System as the date that identity was established.

4.2.2.4 Binding the Applicant to the Certificate

Binding between the Applicant and the information provided in the application is conducted in an automated manner, for email addresses and/or mobile phone numbers as described in Section [3.2.3.1.1 Basic Identity](#). This binding also serves as a methodology to deliver Activation Data in the form of an OTC to the Applicant as part of the registration process.

Binding between the Applicant and the approved application in the RA System or CMS is maintained in one or more of the 3 following ways:

1. For the applications based on information submitted online (see processes described in Section [4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance](#)), an Account Password is submitted by the Applicant at the time of online enrollment. The Account Password is hashed and stored in the database. At a later point, the LRA approves the application by verifying that the information, such as Subscriber name and Subscribing Organization, in the paperwork provided by the Applicant matches the information in the request. Then, the LRA provides Activation Data to the Applicant using a verified piece of information from the application as an OOB delivery method (e.g., physical address, email address or mobile phone). In order to retrieve the Certificate, the Applicant provides the registration Account Password and the Activation Data provided by the LRA,

2. For applications based on information that the Registrar submits directly to the RA System (see processes described in Sections [4.3.1.1 CA Certificates](#) and [4.3.1.2 Subscriber Certificates](#)), the LRA manually approves the application prior to submitting the information to the system, ensuring the binding between the Applicant database record and the verified Applicant. Then, when using the RA System, the LRA provides Activation Data to the Applicant using a verified piece of information from the application as an OOB delivery method (e.g., physical address, email address or mobile phone). To retrieve the Certificate, the Applicant provides the Activation Data provided by the LRA; or
3. For PIV-I Hardware Certificates, binding between the Applicant, the registration process and the Certificate is through Applicant use of biometric data at time of card and Certificate activation. This is accomplished through the EWS, whereby biometric data (Applicant/Subscriber fingerprints and facial image) is provided at the time of Certificate activation and compared to the biometric data collected during the application process and stored in the CMS. Such comparisons of biometric data must be successful in order for the activation process to be initiated.

The binding processes between Subscriber, Certificate and Cryptomodule are more fully described in Section [4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance](#).

4.2.2.5 Required Registration Information for Individuals

The LRA reviews the identity confirmation forms, authorization forms, and any other supporting documentation submitted by Applicants, Subscribing Organizations or Registrars (e.g., photocopies of identity documents and biometric data) determining each Applicants identifying information is (i) internally consistent, and (ii) consistent with the information contained in the application for the Certificate.

For all applications received, the LRA ensures the following minimum information is recorded in the RA System or CMS:

- Applicant's name as it appears in the Applicant's request for a Certificate,
- Method of application (i.e., on-line or in-person) for each data element accepted for proofing, including electronic forms,
- Name of document(s) presented for identity proofing, including:
 - Issuing authority,
 - Date of Issuance,
 - Date of expiration; and
 - All fields verified,
- Source of verification (i.e., which databases used for cross-checks),
- Method of verification (i.e., on-line, in-person),
- Date/time of verification as the date identity was established,
- Names of Subscribing Organizations or IVPs providing identification services, if any,
- Fields that failed verification, if any,
- Status of current registration process (Suspended or ended),
- All identity verification data,
- All associated error messages and codes, if any; and
- Date/time of process completion or Suspension.

4.2.2.6 Certificate Application Approval

An LRA may approve Certificate Issuance if:

- All steps in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#) required for the type of Certificate to be issued have successfully been completed; and
- The Certificate fee has been paid (or other satisfactory payment arrangements exist).

4.2.2.7 Certificate Application Rejection

The LRA will reject a Certificate application if:

- A required step in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#) cannot be successfully completed,
- The Applicant fails to respond or does not provide requested documentation within a reasonable timeframe,
- More than 90 days have elapsed since the date identity was established,
- The biometric data does not seem to correspond to the Applicant or is not complete,
- Payment has not been received or other satisfactory payment arrangements have not been made; or
- The LRA reasonably believes that Issuance of the Certificate may create an unnecessary risk to the reputation of a PKI Participant.

Upon approval of the Certificate by the LRA, the Certificate is queued for Issuance as described in Section [4.3 Certificate Issuance](#).

4.2.2.8 Devices

Approval or rejection of Device Certificate applications is fully described in Section [3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity](#) of this CPS, Authentication of Devices. Upon completion of the process described in Section 3.2.3 and or it's sub-sections, the Device Certificate application is queued for Issuance as described in [Section 4.3 Certificate Issuance](#) and or that of its sub-sections of this CPS.

4.2.2.9 LRAs

An application for a Certificate by an LRA is approved or rejected in the same manner as other Subscribers.

4.2.2.10 RAs

Registration Authority applications are reviewed by the CA's PMA and approved or rejected based on whether the Organization meets requirements found in the RA Agreement, including financial responsibility (Section [9.2 Financial Responsibility](#) of this CPS).

4.2.2.11 Participant CAs

Applications for Participant CA Certificate Issuance are reviewed by the IdenTrust PMA and approved or rejected based on whether the Organization meets requirements found in the Participant CA Agreement and Section [9.2 Financial responsibility](#) of this CPS.

4.2.2.12 Bridge CA

An application for Cross-Certificates to be Issued to a Bridge CA will be reviewed by the IdenTrust PMA and approved or rejected based on the criteria and process in Section [3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation](#) and those agreed upon with the Applicant Bridge CA.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

IdenTrust processes all completed applications and issues certificates within 90 days of Identity verification.

4.2.3.1 Individual and Devices

LRAs and TAs will respond promptly to all Certificate applications. This is especially important for all IGC Certificates that are issued within 90 days of the date identity was established.

Certificates are made available for retrieval by the Applicant following completion of the steps listed in this Section [4.2 Certificate Application Processing](#) and provided that the Public Key has been properly delivered and all other technical prerequisites for Certificate Issuance have been met.

4.2.3.2 All Other Certificates

For all Medium Assurances and PIV-I Assurances, application processing from the time the complete Certificate application is posted on the CA or RA system to Certificate Issuance within 90 days.

4.3 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

The process to begin Issuance of a Certificate begins once an IGC Certificate has been approved. Upon Certificate approval, identity proofing is deemed complete and the Applicant becomes a Subscriber in the RA system.

4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

Upon receiving a certificate request and before certificate issuance, the CA/RA verifies the following:

- Verify identity of requestor.
- Verify authority of requestor and integrity of the information in the certificate request.
- Verify all attribute information received from a subscriber before inclusion in a certificate.
- Build and sign a certificate if all certificate requirements have been met (in the case of an RA, have the CA sign the certificate).
- Make the certificate available to the Subscriber after confirming that the Subscriber has formally acknowledged the obligations.

Listed verification items in this section are detailed in the sub-sections below.

4.3.1.1 CA Certificates

IdenTrust authenticates all requests for a CA Certificate per Section [4.1.2.1 CA Certificates](#). Upon issuance, each Certificate issued by the participating CA is manually checked to ensure each field and extension is properly populated with the correct information before the Certificate is delivered to the Entity.

4.3.1.2 Subscriber Certificates

The Issuance processes in this Section ensures that Certificates and their Private Keys are securely bound to the Applicant's registration and the Subscriber. Issuance processes are performed by actors associated with the CA or the RA as identified. Upon Issuance of a Certificate, CA, RA, and Subscriber warranties as described in Sections [9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties](#), [9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties](#) and [9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties](#) of this CPS become effective.

An RA may use one or more of the following processes to initiate retrieval of a Certificate that has been approved for issuance

4.3.1.3 Publication

PIV-I Certificates shall not contain the card serial number in any extension distributed via publicly accessible repositories (e.g., LDAP, HTTP). PIV-I Authentication and Card Authentication Certificates are not distributed via public repositories.

4.3.1.4 Activation Code-Account Password Process with Automated I&A

This process is applicable only to IGC Basic Software Individual Subscriber Certificates.

This process uses one Activation Code. In all cases where only one Activation Code is delivered to the Applicant, the Activation Code may be delivered via email to the Applicant's confirmed email account or alternatively the Activation Code may be delivered via a blind mailer (PIN mailer) to the Applicant provided and confirmed physical mail address.

NOTE: Activation codes cannot be used to retrieve an approved Certificate without being used in conjunction with a validated Account Password, which is known only to the Applicant. The Account Password is provided by the Applicant during the registration phase of the application process.

For this scenario, the Certificate Issuance process requires initial online enrollment by the Applicant with Applicant identification conducted in an automated manner as described in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human](#)

Subscribers.

1. As one of the initial registration steps, the Applicant is directed to a specified secure enrollment site (<https://>) and initiates a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session. During this online enrollment session, the Applicant creates a profile with the Applicant's name and email address. The Applicant also creates an Account Password to be used later during Certificate retrieval. A hash of the Account Password is submitted to the RA System.
2. Additionally, during the initial online enrollment session, the Applicant's email address is automatically verified through delivery of an OTC needed to further progress the registration via an OOB method as described in Section [3.2.3.1.1 Basic Identity](#).
3. After the RA System successfully completes automated I&A, an Activation Code is randomly generated by the system and emailed to the Applicant's verified email address. Alternatively, the Activation Code may be mailed to the Applicant's confirmed mail address in a PIN-mailer or in a tamper-evident envelope.
4. The Applicant is instructed to access a specified secure retrieval site (<https://>), that is either hosted by the RA System where a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session is initiated. For authentication purposes, the Applicant enters the Account Password and Activation Code to proceed.⁸ The Applicant is presented with the Subscriber Agreement and must Accept it to continue
5. The Applicant continues with the Key Generation, Certificate generation⁹, and Certificate loading process during which the Certificate Issuance system ensures that the appropriate Cryptomodule and Key lengths are being used. To ensure that Keys are properly generated and stored in Cryptomodule that meet the requirements of Section [6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#), programs are run that enforce restrictions on the Cryptographic Service Providers that can be used by the Applicant. If the required Cryptographic Service Provider is not found, the Applicant receives an error message.
6. The Applicant generates a Key Pair within the boundaries of the Cryptomodule and uses the Private Key to sign the Public Key in an RSA PKCS #10 Certificate request. During this same SSL/TLS session, additional scripts are run by the Certificate Issuance system to ensure that the Key length meets minimum requirements and that the PKCS#10 is valid. Upon verification of the Applicant's Digital Signature on the RSA PKCS #10 Certificate signing request (using the algorithm specified in the request), the requested Certificate is generated by the CA and delivered to the Applicant during this same SSL/TLS session.
7. If there is no requirement for Encryption Key escrow, a second Private Key for an Encryption Certificate is generated using the same method explained in step (6). If there is a requirement for escrow of the Encryption Key, Encryption Keys are created and delivered as explained in Section [6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber](#).

If the Key Generation, Certificate generation, and Certificate loading processes are successful, the Applicant is notified of Certificate Issuance as described below in Section [4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by IdenTrust of Issuance of Certificate](#).

⁸ Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period begins from the date the I&A is approved by the LRA and entered by the LRA into the RA System. If more than 90 days have passed since the date identity was established, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

⁹ The Certificate's Subject Distinguished Name (DN) is assembled at this point. All information used in the DN is taken from the verified application data provided to the CA system by the LRA. The Common Name and Organization fields are populated with exactly the same information entered in the application. The Country field is optionally populated with the ISO 3166 standard 2-character code that represents the country in the application. The Organization Unit is populated with a unique ID generated as explained in Section 3.1.5.

4.3.1.5 Activation Code Used with an Account Password after I&A Processes

This process uses one Activation Code. In all cases where only one Activation Code is delivered to the Applicant, the Activation Code may be delivered via an email to the Applicant's confirmed email account (see Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#)) or alternatively the Activation Code may be delivered via a blind mailer (PIN mailer) to the Applicant provided and mailed to the address provided by the Applicant.

NOTE: Activation codes cannot be used to retrieve an approved Certificate without being used in conjunction with a validated Account Password, which is known only to the Applicant. The Account Password is provided by the Applicant during the registration phase of the application process.

This scenario requires initial online enrollment by the Applicant where some Applicant data may be submitted by a sponsoring Subscribing Organization or by a Trusted Agent. The Applicant completes the online registration process, which includes review of any Applicant data that has been prepopulated by the RA System and completion of any missing data.

1. As one of the initial registration steps, the Applicant is directed to a specified secure enrollment site (<https://>) and initiates a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session. During this online enrollment session, the Applicant creates a profile with the Applicant's name, email address, Organization name and other necessary information. The Applicant also creates an Account Password to be used later during Certificate retrieval. A hash of the Account Password is submitted to the RA System.
2. Additionally, during the initial online enrollment session, the Applicant's email address is automatically verified through delivery of an OTC (Activation Data) needed to further progress the registration via an OOB method as described in Section [3.2.3.1.1 Basic Identity](#).
3. After the LRA approves Certificate Issuance (via Client-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session), an Activation Code is randomly generated by the system and is either emailed to the verified email account or alternatively the Activation Code may be mailed to the address provided by the Applicant.
4. The Applicant is also instructed to access a specified secure retrieval site (<https://>), that is either hosted by the RA System where a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session is initiated. For authentication purposes, the Applicant enters the Account Password and Activation Code to proceed. The Applicant is presented with the Subscriber Agreement and must Accept it to continue.
5. The Applicant continues¹⁰ with the Key Generation, Certificate generation¹¹, and Certificate loading process during which the Certificate Issuance system ensures that the appropriate Cryptomodule and Key lengths are being used. To ensure that Keys are properly Generated and stored in Cryptomodule that meet the requirements of Section [6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#), programs are run that enforce restrictions on the Cryptographic Service Providers that can be used by the Applicant. If the required Cryptographic Service Provider is not found, the Applicant receives an error message.

¹⁰ Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period begins from the date the I&A is approved by the LRA and entered by the LRA into the RA System. If more than 90 days have passed since the date identity was established, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

¹¹ The Certificate's Subject Distinguished Name (DN) is assembled at this point. All information used in the DN is taken from the verified application data provided to the CA system by the LRA. The Common Name and Organization fields are populated with exactly the same information entered in the application. The Country field is optionally populated with the ISO 3166 standard 2-character code that represents the country in the application. The Organization Unit is populated with a unique ID generated as explained in Section 3.1.5.

6. The Applicant generates a Key Pair within the boundaries of the Cryptomodule and uses the Private Key to sign the Public Key in an RSA PKCS #10 Certificate request. During this same SSL/TLS session, additional scripts are run by the Certificate Issuance system to ensure that the Key length meets minimum requirements and that the PKCS#10 is valid. Upon verification of the Applicant's Digital Signature on the RSA PKCS #10 Certificate signing request (using the algorithm specified in the request), the requested Certificate is generated by the CA and delivered to the Applicant during this same SSL/TLS session.
7. If there is no requirement for Encryption Key escrow, a second Private Key for an Encryption Certificate is generated using the same method explained in step (6). If there is a requirement for escrow of the Encryption Key, Encryption Keys are created and delivered as explained in Section [6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber](#).

4.3.1.6 Activation Code Delivered via Hardware Installation Kit

For Certificates stored on hardware, a Cryptomodule installation kit may be sent to either an Applicant or the TA. The Cryptomodule installation kit contains the Cryptomodule and Cryptomodule interface device (e.g., card reader), software drivers for the Cryptomodule (which includes the Cryptographic Service Provider necessary to operate the Cryptomodule), and instructions for the Applicant to follow to activate the Cryptomodule. Only when 2 Activation Codes are sent to the Applicant may an Activation Code also be sent with the Cryptomodule Installation Kit so that in any case, at least one Activation Code is delivered directly to the Applicant by a channel that is separate from the delivery of the Cryptomodule.

4.3.1.7 PIN-Protected-Cryptomodule Process

After approval of Certificate Issuance by the LRA (during a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted session), a Key Pair and Certificate are generated and installed on the Subscriber's Cryptomodule by an LRA. The Cryptomodule is immediately protected with an Activation Code generated by the RA System. The Activation Code and Cryptomodule Installation Kit are sent by the LRA through separate channels to the Applicant. To enforce principles of Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control, two LRAs (LRA-1 and LRA-2) are involved in the Certificate Issuance process. An RA System is located in a secure room at an RA site LRA-1 generates¹² the Signing Key Pair for the Subscriber within the boundaries of an approved Cryptomodule while the Cryptomodule is connected to the RA System. The Private Key is used to sign the Public Key in an RSA PKCS #10 Certificate signing request. In a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted session (see Definitions), the PKCS#10 is transmitted to the CA within a Digitally Signed data structure (e.g., XKMS/XSMS). The CA system verifies the Digital Signature of the RA System on the data structure. The PKCS#10 is processed to confirm that the request was signed with the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key contained in the request. Upon verification of the Digital Signature on the PKCS#10 Certificate signing request (using the algorithm specified in the request), the requested Certificate is generated¹³ by the CA, returned to the RA System, and installed on the Cryptomodule in a PKCS#7 format by the RA System. Depending on whether the Encryption Keys are escrowed or not, the Private Keys will be generated as explained above for non-escrowed Key; or, for escrowed Keys, they are created and delivered as explained in Section [6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber](#).

¹² Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period begins from the date the I&A is approved by the LRA and entered by the LRA into the RA System. If more than 90 days have passed since the date identity was established, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

¹³ The Certificate's Subject Distinguished Name (DN) is assembled at this point. All information used in the DN is taken from the verified application data provided to the CA system by the LRA. The Common Name and Organization fields are populated with exactly the same information entered in the application. The Country field is optionally populated with the ISO 3166 standard 2-character code that represents the country in the application. The Organization Unit is populated with a unique ID generated as explained in Section 3.1.5.

1. The Cryptomodule is protected by an Activation Code that is randomly generated by the RA System and delivered to LRA-2 in a sealed PIN-mailer, or is immediately sealed by LRA-2 in a tamper-evident envelope. LRA-2 sends the Activation Code to the Applicant separately by mail or courier in a tamper-evident envelope. As part of system configuration and the assignment of access rights, separate role-based privileges are designated for LRA-1 and LRA-2 so that one role can only generate the Key Pairs and the other can only generate the Activation Code, as described above. Alternatively, the Activation Code may be sent to the Applicant's verified email address.
2. Immediately after installing the Certificate on the Cryptomodule, LRA-1 attaches the Subscriber's name to the Cryptomodule, places the Cryptomodule in an Installation Kit and marks the kit for delivery purposes with the name and address of the Applicant (or the name and address of the Trusted Agent). The Cryptomodule Installation Kit is sent through a separate channel to the Applicant or TA.

Later when the Applicant has received the Activation Code and the Cryptomodule Installation Kit, the Applicant is instructed to activate the Cryptomodule and immediately replace the initial Activation Code with personally chosen Activation Data. Using his or her Certificate, the Subscriber is instructed to Digitally Sign the Subscriber Agreement and an acknowledgement of receipt of the Cryptomodule using the associated Private Key and to send them to the Registration Authority for record keeping and archival.

4.3.1.8 Activation Code Not Required due to In Person Activation (PIV-I)

For IGC PIV-I Hardware Certificates, the smart card is sent to the RA in advance. At the time of smart card personalization, the EWS interacts with and authenticates the smart card through use of a factory-set key used for initial card communication. The factory-set key is replaced with a diversified key by the CMS as part of the personalization process.

This method is available only for IGC PIV-I Assurance Certificates.

After the Issuance of a Certificate has been approved by the LRA, a TA or a different LRA provides the smart card to the Applicant in order to download Certificates and signed biometric data as part of an assisted card personalization process requiring the Applicant to authenticate using biometrics collected during the registration process.

In the event cards are loaded and personalized using a batch process, each card is locked until the applicable Applicant is available for card Activation. The Applicant authenticates during the Activation process by using biometrics collected during the Certificate application process (Applicant/Subscriber fingerprints and facial image), which are compared to the fingerprint and facial biometrics collected during the Activation process. Upon successful activation the card PIN is changed by the Applicant and the card is activated.

After the LRA approves Certificate Issuance, the Applicant appears in-person before the TA or LRA different than the Certificate approving LRA, who authenticates the Applicant based on previously collected biometric data.

1. The smart card is placed in the personalization station where the facial image is printed on it. Subsequently, the station connects to the CMS and all the Certificates and signed biometric data are transferred into the smart card securely.¹⁴
2. The TA or LRA different than the Certificate approving LRA instructs the Applicant to change the PIN in the smart card and through the personalization workstation authorizes the CMS to set to an Applicant-selected PIN and activate the smart card.

¹⁴ Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period begins from the date the I&A is approved by the LRA and entered by the LRA into the RA System. If more than 90 days have passed since the date identity was established, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

The Subscriber uses the newly issued Certificate Private Signing Key to formally acknowledge the receipt of the smart card with all Certificates and to Digitally Sign the Subscriber Agreement that contains a declaration of identity.

4.3.1.9 Activation Code Delivered via CMS and EWS Directly

An alternate acceptable process requires an Activation Code that is managed by the CMS and the EWS directly and is changed in the smart card by the Applicant when the Certificates are Issued. The process of Key and Certificate generation; the biometric data collection, signature and store in the smart card are performed in the presence of the Applicant.

4.3.1.10 Two-Activation-Code Process

After the Issuance of a Certificate has been approved by the LRA (via Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted Session¹⁵), 2 Activation Codes are generated by the RA System, and are sent by 2 LRAs through separate channels to the Applicant.

To enforce principles of Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control, 2 LRAs (LRA-1 and LRA-2) are involved in this process. As part of system configuration and the assignment of access rights, separate role-based privileges are designated for LRA-1 and LRA-2 so that each role can only receive 1 of the 2 Activation Codes¹⁶, as described in the process below,

1. LRA-1 assembles the Cryptomodule Installation Kit and places the first Activation Code in a sealed envelope and ships it with the Installation Kit either to the TA or the Applicant.
2. LRA-2 sends the second Activation Code by mail or email to the Applicant using information contained in the Applicant's Profile.
3. Following the instructions provided with the Installation Kit (or downloaded from the registration system), the Applicant installs any necessary drivers and/or Cryptographic Service Providers onto the system where the Cryptomodule interface device is connected.
4. The Applicant then accesses a specified secure retrieval page (<https://>) hosted by the RA System and initiates a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session. For authentication purposes, the Applicant enters both Activation Codes provided during the registration and approval process. The Applicant is presented with the Subscriber Agreement and must Accept it to continue.

¹⁵ Unless otherwise indicated, in this Section, all communications between LRAs and the CA system are via Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session using an IGC Medium Hardware Assurance or IGC PIV-I hardware Assurance Certificate Issued to the LRA and a valid SSL Server Certificate that chains to one of IdenTrust's Root Certificates (e.g., DST Root CA X3 or IGC Global Common Root).

¹⁶ The Activation Code 1 is a 10-digit number and the Activation Code 2 is 9-digit number. Both Activations Codes are generated using a 48-bit seed, which is modified using a linear congruential formula. The numbers are compared against all previous numbers to ensure they have not previously generated. If the number has previously been used, the process is repeated until an ungenerated number is created.

5. The Applicant continues with Key Generation¹⁷, Certificate generation¹⁸, and Certificate loading process during which the Certificate Issuance system ensures that the appropriate Cryptomodule and Key lengths are being used. To ensure that Keys are properly Generated and stored in Cryptomodules that meet the requirements of Section [6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#), programs are run that enforce restrictions on the Cryptographic Service Providers that can be used by the Applicant. If the required Cryptographic Service Provider is not found, the Applicant receives an error message.
6. The Applicant generates a Key Pair within the boundaries of the Cryptomodule and uses the Private Key to sign the Public Key in an RSA PKCS #10 Certificate request. During this same SSL/TLS session, additional scripts are run by the Certificate Issuance system to ensure that Key lengths meet minimum requirements and that the PKCS#10 is valid. Upon verification of the Applicant's Digital Signature on the RSA PKCS #10 Certificate signing request (using the algorithm specified in the request), the requested Certificate is generated by the CA and delivered to the Applicant's Cryptomodule during this same SSL/TLS session.
7. If there is no requirement for Encryption Key escrow, a second Private Key for an Encryption Certificate is generated using the same method explained in step (6). If there is a requirement for escrow of the Encryption Key, Encryption Keys are created and delivered as explained in Section [6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber](#).

4.3.1.11 Manual PKCS#10 Process

Some devices are not capable of submitting a PKCS#10 during an interactive web-based session described in the processes outlined above. In that case, the Applicant is instructed to create the Key Pair according to the manufacturer's or system developer's instructions and to create and submit a PKCS#10 Certificate signing request.

1. The Applicant generates the Key Pair and exports the PKCS#10 Certificate signing request in base-64 encoded format.
2. The Applicant is directed to a specified secure enrollment site (<https://>) and initiates a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session. During this online enrollment session, the Applicant creates a profile with Subscriber name, email address, Organization name and other necessary information. The Applicant also creates an Account Password to be used later during Certificate retrieval. A hash of the Account Password is submitted to the CA. The Applicant pastes the base-64 encoded PKCS#10 into a web form and submits it to the CA. The PKCS#10 is verified to ensure proper Key lengths are used and that the information in the PKCS#10 matches the information provided by the Applicant in the profile (e.g., the FQDN or identifier of the Device). The Digital Signature on the PKCS#10 request is verified by the CA to establish proof of possession. The Applicant is then instructed that he or she will be notified when the Certificate has been approved.
3. When the Certificate is approved, an Activation Code is generated and sent to the Applicant through a digitally signed and encrypted email, in a PIN-mailer or in a sealed, tamper-evident envelope. Following instructions provided in the envelope (or downloaded from the registration system), the Applicant is directed to a specified secure retrieval site and a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session is initiated.

¹⁷ Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period begins from the date the I&A is approved by the LRA and entered by the LRA into the RA System. If more than 90 days have passed since the date identity was established, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

¹⁸ The Certificate's Subject Distinguished Name (DN) is assembled at this point. All information used in the DN is taken from the verified application data provided to the CA system by the LRA. The Common Name and Organization fields are populated with exactly the same information entered in the application.

4. In the event a digitally signed and encrypted email is used to transmit the Activation Code, the Applicant must already be (a) a Subscriber of an Individual Certificate at an assurance level equal to or higher than the assurance level of the Device Certificate being applied for and (b) affiliated with the same Subscribing Organization as the Device Certificate being applied for.
5. For authentication purposes, the Applicant enters the Account Password and Activation Code to access the retrieval page.¹⁹ The Applicant is presented with the Subscriber Agreement and must Accept it to continue. The Certificate is generated and downloaded to the Applicant's Device where it is installed on the hardware according to the manufacturer's or system developer's instructions.

The Applicant confirms completion of the activation process by testing the newly installed Certificate.

4.3.1.12 Certificate Issuance to CAs, CSAs and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA

Certificate signing for CAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs requires approval from IdenTrust senior management. The Certificate signing ceremony for CAs, CSAs, CMSs, and Bridge CAs is performed in the secure room described in Section [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#). The ceremony is scripted, videotaped, and witnessed. Pursuant to Sections [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#) and [3.2.5 Validation of Authority](#), the CA Administrator reviews the documentation provided by the entity applying for the CA, CSA, or CMS Certificate to validate the request (e.g., reviews authorizing signatures, authorizations, and accompanying Certificate request identifiers) and to ensure that the Certificate and Key Pair are bound to the party making the request.

Pursuant to Section [3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key](#), the CA system also verifies the Digital Signature on the PKCS#10 Certificate signing request to establish proof of possession. In order to prevent collisions among the Certificates that are Issued by the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA, the IdenTrust CA signing product ensures uniqueness of the Certificate serial number.

The Certificate signing ceremony is performed and the Certificate is signed using the CA Private Signing Key and the PIN Entry Device (PED) and associated PED key(s) for authentication to the CA Cryptomodule via Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control (see Sections [6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control](#) and [6.2.8 Method of Activation Private Keys](#)).

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by IdenTrust of Issuance of Certificate

Notification of Certificate issuance is provided according to procedures in the following sub-sections:

4.3.2.1 Notification to Subscribers

Issuance notification of a Certificate is provided to a Subscriber during the secure online Certificate Retrieval process. The Subscriber is led through a series of interactive screens that assist the user in retrieving, testing, and confirming the Certificate. Activation material provided by IdenTrust, in conjunction with user provided confirmation information is required during this process.

A follow-up email is also sent to the Subscriber as notification that the Certificate has been generated and delivered.

4.3.2.2 Notification to RAs, CAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs

IdenTrust notifies the designated representative of the RA, CA, or the Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs when it has

¹⁹ Effective September 1, 2023, for all Certificates, a 90-day period is calculated based from the date identity was established. The 90-day period is calculated based on the in-person identification date value entered into the RA System by the LRA (based on the review of the ID Form as described in Section 4.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.5). If more than 90 days have passed since the in-person appearance, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

Issued the Certificate to the RA, CA, or Cross-Certifying Bridge CA.

4.4 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

Before effective use of private keys, Subscribers agree to and signs a Subscriber Agreement and accept responsibilities as defined in section [9.6.3 Subscriber Representation and Warranties](#).

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

In addition to this section, the following sub-sections define conduct constituting Certificate Acceptance:

During the Certificate Retrieval process the Subscriber must acknowledge acceptance of the Certificate.

Subscriber Agreements also set forth additional, alternative conduct that constitutes Acceptance by the Subscriber, including but not limited to:

- Failing to notify the CA or RA of any problems or errors with the Certificate within a reasonable time of downloading or retrieving it; and
- By using a Certificate, a Subscriber Accepts the Certificate, warrants the accuracy of its contents and agrees to the obligations, representations, and warranties of Section 9.6.3 Subscriber Representation and Warranties (above) and to the terms and conditions of the Subscriber Agreement.

4.4.1.1 Certificate Acceptance by Participant CAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CA

Issuance and publication of a SubCA Certificate or Cross-Certificate constitutes Acceptance unless the CA or the Bridge CA notifies IdenTrust that it does not Accept the Certificate and requests that it be Revoked.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

Subordinate CA Certificates are published by IdenTrust in the Repository upon Issuance.

The publication of Subscriber Certificates is optional and is implemented based on the CA particular needs.

PIV-I Authentication and Card Authentication Certificates are not distributed via public repositories.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

IdenTrust notifies the Cross-Certifying Bridge PAAs and personnel of the Bridge CAs when it has Issued any CA Certificate that chains to the IGC Root CA.

For any CA Certificate issued under this policy, IdenTrust will also notify the CA under which the issuing CA Root Certificate is cross-certified, at least 2 weeks prior to the issuance of the new CA Certificate or issuance of new inter-organizational CA Cross-Certificate. The notification asserts that the new CA cross-certification does not introduce multiple paths to a CA already participating in the associated PKI. In addition, all new artifacts (CA Certificates, CRL DP, AIA and/or SIA URLs, etc.) produced as a result of the CA Certificate issuance are provided to the cross-certified entity, within 24 hours following issuance of the CA Certificate.

4.5 KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Subscribers or Custodian (e.g., authorized third party) are notified of their obligation to protect their Private Keys from access by other parties. Subscribers are required by agreement to use Private Keys only in accordance with the usages listed in the key usage extension and extended key usage extension of the Certificate and for purposes allowed by Subscriber Agreement, the CP, and Section [1.4 Certificate Usage](#) of this CPS. Furthermore, a Subscriber is required by agreement to not use the Private Signing Key after the Certificate has been Revoked or has expired.

The Subscriber may continue to use the decryption Private Key solely to decrypt previously encrypted information after the associated Certificate has been Revoked or has expired.

Use of the Private Key is limited in accordance with the key usage extension in the certificate (see Section [6.1.7](#)

[Key Usage Purposes \(as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field\)](#) OCSP constraints are observed if the extended key usage extension is present and implies any limitations on the use of the Private Key. The OCSP Responder Private Key is used only for signing OCSP Responses.

4.5.1.1 RA and LRA Private Key Usage

LRAs using the RA System web interface may use their Keys to Digitally Sign Certificate management transactions and to authenticate via Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session. When an RA hosts its own Certificate registration and approval system, LRAs will use their Keys to Digitally Sign Certificate management transactions and to authenticate via Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Sessions. The RA System connects via Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS, its Keys are used to Digitally Sign Certificate management transactions submitted to the CA system, and the RA Administrator is responsible for ensuring proper Private Key usage.

4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Certificates that are Issued pursuant to this CPS conform to IGC Profiles. Public Keys, information contained in Certificates, and related information stored in the Repository may be used only in accordance with the usages listed in the key usage extension and extended key usage extension of the Certificate. Such information may not be used other than as allowed by the CP or as allowed herein. The use of such information for any unauthorized purpose, such as for sending unsolicited commercial mass messages (junk email, spam, and the like) is expressly forbidden.

Relying Parties may use or otherwise rely on Certificates that are Issued pursuant to this CPS on the following terms and conditions. Relying Parties assume responsibility for the following:

- Be held responsible to understand the proper use of Public Key Cryptography and Certificates,
- Verify Certificates that are Issued hereunder, through the use of Certificate Chains, OCSP and CRLs in accordance with X.509, v.3,
- Trust and make use of a Certificate only if such Certificate has not expired or been Revoked and only if the Certification Path can be verified to the IGC Root Certificate and/or the US Federal Common Root Certificate using RFC 5280 Certification Path validation rules,
- Comply with all laws and regulations that might be applicable to the Relying Party's export, import, or use of the Certificate and related information,
- Make their own judgment and rely on the Certificate only if the same constitutes Reasonable Reliance in the circumstances, including determining whether a particular type of Certificate is appropriate for the purpose or transaction contemplated and also taking into consideration the following additional factors:
 - Any legal requirements for the identification of a party, the protection of the confidentiality or privacy of information, or the legal enforceability of Digital Signatures in accordance with any laws that may apply,
 - All facts listed in the Certificate, or of which the Relying Party has or should have notice, including this CPS and the CP,
 - The economic value of the transaction or communication, if applicable,
 - The potential losses or damage which might be caused by an erroneous identification or a loss of confidentiality or privacy of information in the application, transaction, or communication,
 - The applicability of the laws of a particular jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction specified by the CP or this CPS,
 - The Relying Party's previous course of dealing with the Subscriber, if any,
 - Usage of trade, including experience with computer-based methods of trade; and
 - Any other indicia of reliability or unreliability, or other facts of which the Relying Party knows or has notice, pertaining to the Subscriber and/or the application, communication, or transaction.

Additional Relying Party obligations are found in Sections [1.3.8 Subscribers](#), [4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties](#) and [9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties](#) and elsewhere in this CPS.

4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL

See sub-sections below

4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

Certificate Renewal is not supported for Subscribers, see Section [4.7 Certificate Re-Key](#).

CSA OCSF Responder Certificates are Renewed monthly as long as use of the corresponding Key Pair has not extended its usage period (see Section [6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods](#)).

Cross-Certificates are renewed more frequently than the corresponding CA in consistency with the Certificate lifespan outlined in the IGC Certificate Profiles as long as the Key Pair usage period has not been exhausted in accordance with Section 6.3.2 parameters.

4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

Renewal requests are initiated differently based on the type of Certificate renewal as defined below.

- Designated Machine Operator may request renewal of a Device Certificate.
- CSAs are operated within IdenTrust facilities and are managed by the IdenTrust CA Administrator who requests that the OCSF Responder Certificate is renewed.
- For the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA, those people identified pursuant to Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).

4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Renewal requests are processed by type according to the details provided in the following sub-sections:

4.6.3.1 Processing Device Renewal Requests

In advance of the Certificate expiration an automated emailed notification is sent to the individual who is designated in the Certificate as the Machine Operator. The Machine Operator may request renewal via the IdenTrust online Certificate management system. All renewals are processed according to the Initial Registration process as described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#).

4.6.3.2 Processing OCSF Renewal Requests

Prior to expiration of each OCSF Responder Certificate, the CSA Signing Key is re-signed during a Certificate renewal ceremony performed in the secure room under Two-Person control where the ceremony is scripted, witnessed and video-taped. The prior OCSF Responder Certificate is not used as basis for the renewal and is left to expire.

4.6.3.3 Processing CA Renewal Requests

For Cross-Certification, the CA and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA should be renewed and ready for Cross-Certification 3 months prior to the scheduled expiration of the Cross-Certificate. The prior Cross-Certificate is not used as basis for the renewal and is allowed to expire unless the Bridge CA requires Revocation which, if required, is executed in a subsequent ceremony.

4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Notifications of new Certificate Issuance for Renewals are made according to the type of Certificate as described below.

- Notifications for Renewed Device Certificates are processed according to the Initial Registration certificate notification process as described in Section [4.3.2.1 Notification to Subscribers](#).
- The CA Administrator is present and needs no notice of OCSF Responder Certificate Issuance.

- For the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA, see Section [4.3.2.2 Notification to Ras, CAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs](#)

4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

Acceptance of Renewal Certificates are processed by type according to the details provided below.

- Acceptance of Renewal Device Certificates are processed according to the Initial Registration Certificate Acceptance process as described in Section [4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance](#) and section 4.4.1 sub-sections.
- The CA Administrator Accepts the OCSP Responder Certificate by allowing it to be published in the Repository and installing the newly Issued Certificate to the OCSP Responder to be sent out with the responses.
- For the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA, see Section 4.4.1 (section reference above).

4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

As specified in Section [2.2 Publication of Certificate Information](#) and [4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA](#).

Renewal OCSP Responder Certificates are published in the Repository.

4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The IdenTrust PMA and other relevant entities are notified upon issuance of all ca certificates. The process for notification of other entities is specified in relevant agreements between the IdenTrust PMA or CA and other entity via electronic communication.

For the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA, see Section [4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities](#).

4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY

Re-keying a Certificate consists of creating new Certificates with a different Public Key (and serial number) while retaining the remaining contents of the old Certificate that describes the subject. The new Certificate may be assigned a different Validity Period, Key identifiers, specify a different CRL distribution point, and/or be signed with a different Key. Re-Key of a Certificate does not require a change to the subjectName and does not violate the requirement for name uniqueness. Certificate Replacements are allowed under certain circumstances. See sub-section heading **Certificate Replacements** below for specific details.

After Certificate Re-Key, the old Certificate may or may not be Revoked, but must not be further re-keyed, renewed, or modified.

Certificate Replacements

Dependent on Certificate type, IdenTrust provides for the replacement of Certificates when the Subscriber's Private Key has not been compromised and there are no changes to the Certificate. In the case where a non-escrowed Private Key is lost or damaged, including in the event the Subscriber has lost control of a software or hardware Cryptomodule on which the Certificate is stored, the Certificate cannot be replaced, and the identity of the Subscriber must be established through the initial registration process described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#).

The most common reason for Certificate replacement is a forgotten Certificate PIN or password. Upon receiving an authenticated request to replace an IGC Basic Certificate from a Subscriber, the RA records the following Certificate replacement transaction data:

- Certificate serial number,
- Certificate common name,
- Certificate policy OID,
- Date/time of completion of replacement process,

- Name of Subscriber; and
- All associated replacement data.

In the event of replacement, the LRA Revokes the previously issued Certificate.

Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of Basic do not require retrieval within the 90-day period of the date identity is established. For such Certificates, the Certificate may be replaced based on original establishment of identity provided the Certificate Validity Period does not exceed 12 years from the date identity was established. IGC Medium Software Certificates may be replaced according to the processes above provided the Certificate is retrieved within 90 days from the date identity was established. If more than 90 days have passed since the in-person appearance, the system prevents the Applicant from proceeding with Key Generation and notifies them that in-person identification must be repeated.

For all other IGC Certificates, replacement is not permitted under any circumstance.

4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key

If a Certificate were allowed to expire before attempting to Re-Key, a disruption would occur, by Creating a new Key Pair and obtaining a new Certificate, prevents a disruption in signing activities.

4.7.1.1 Re-Key by Subscribers and LRAs

End-entity Certificates are Issued with 1-, 2- or 3-year validity. At least 3 months prior to validity expiration, the CA, RA System or CMS may automatically notify the Subscriber that he or she must Re-Key and re-establish identity through the process described in Section [3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key](#).

For PIV-I end entity Certificates, Re-Key is allowed provided the validity of the new Certificate does not exceed the lifetime of the PIV smart card on which the Certificate is stored. In the event Re-Key would extend beyond card validity, Issuance of a new PIV smart card is required.

For Device Certificates, the Machine Sponsor is required to follow the same steps to re-establish identity for Certificate Re-Key as would a normal Subscriber, described in Section 3.3.1 (see sub-section link above). Primary Machine Operators may also opt to add, remove, or edit subject names during Re-Key. If the contents of a Device (e.g., the Organization information), the LRA will request verification information in accordance with the verification processes set forth in Section [3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices](#) of this CPS before the Re-Key process can be completed.

4.7.1.2 Re-Key for RAs

For RA Systems, IdenTrust will contact the RA Administrator to schedule Re-Keying at least 3 months prior to the scheduled expiration. The prior Certificate is not used as basis for the Re-Key and is allowed to expire.

4.7.1.3 Re-Key for CSAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs

CSA Re-Keying consists of a Key Generation Ceremony performed in accordance with Section [6.1.1 Key Pair Generation](#). For Cross-Certification, the CA and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA should be Re-Keyed and ready for Cross-Certification 3 months prior to the scheduled expiration of the Cross-Certificate. Neither the prior Certificate in the CSA nor the Cross-Certificate is used as basis for the Re-Key and is allowed to expire. For the Cross-Certificate, if the Bridge CA requires Revocation, such Revocation is executed in a subsequent ceremony.

4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

Authorized requesters for Re-Key depends on the type of Certificate. See below for specific details.

- For Subscribers and LRAs, see Section [3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity](#) and Section [4.1.1 Who can submit a Certificate application](#).
- For RAs, those individuals identified pursuant to Section [3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity](#).

- For CSAs and the Cross-Certifying Bridge CA, those individuals identified pursuant to Section 3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity as stated above.

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

Certificate Re-Key requests are processed according to the Certificate type. See sub-sections below for specific details.

4.7.3.1 Processing Re-Key Request for Subscribers and LRAs

During re-keying, the Subscriber must present his or her valid IdenTrust-issued IGC Certificate to establish a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted session via the IdenTrust Certificate management application. The Certificate management application validates the authenticity of the Certificate presented by verifying that

- a) it was issued by IdenTrust,
- b) by comparing the status of the Certificate in the relational database to confirm it is not revoked; and
- c) that the Certificate is still valid (not expired).

The database utilized for this process is the same one used to issue the CRLs and provides a real-time check of the Certificate status to verify its validity (see definition of “Client-authenticated SSL/TLS” in Section 1.6.1 Definitions).

IdenTrust offers re-keying services through subscription renewal rekeying. Beginning ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the Certificate, e-mails are sent to the Subscriber directing him or her to a Certificate management interface where the currently valid IdenTrust-issued IGC Certificate is used to authenticate the Subscriber through a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted session.

If the Subscriber successfully uses his or her Certificate to enter the Certificate management application interface, the Subscriber will complete the re-key online through an automated process. The Subscriber is eligible for immediate retrieval of the rekeyed Certificate if the following criteria is met:

- The maximum Validity Period for Key Pair Usage as defined in Section [6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods](#), Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods have not been exceeded,
- The Subscriber confirms that no information in the Certificate has changed,
- The Subscriber reviews and accepts the terms of the Subscriber Agreement; and
- The Subscriber provides payment for the new Certificate.

If the Subscriber changes any information during the process, the re-key application will be referred to an RA Operator for manual review. If it is determined that the Subscriber has changed their name, affiliation, or any data contained in the Certificate, the RA will notify the Subscriber that he or she is not eligible for re-key and will need to apply for a new Certificate and must appear for in-person identity proofing.

If the modified information is not information that is included in the Certificate, (such as a telephone number), the RA Operator will approve the re-key request and send a notification via courier or U.S. mail first class including the retrieval instructions for the re-keyed Certificate.

If the Subscriber cannot present their Certificate or changes specific information related to verification (personal information, organization affiliation, etc.) he or she is not eligible for re-key and must apply for a new Certificate and appear for in-person identity proofing.

4.7.3.2 Processing Re-Key Request for RAs

Re-Key for RAs is performed in the same manner as Initial Certificate Issuance. See Section [4.3 Certificate Issuance](#) and section 4.3 sub-sections.

4.7.3.3 Processing Re-Key Requests for CSAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CAs

Re-Key for CSAs and Cross-Certifying CAs are performed in the same manner as Initial Certificate Issuance.

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Notification for Certificate Re-Key is performed in the same manner as initial Certificate Issuance.

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

See section [4.4.1 Certificate Acceptance by Participant CAs and Cross-Certifying Bridge CA](#) for how Conduct constituting Acceptance of a Certificate Re-Key is performed.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

See section [4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA](#) for how Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by IdenTrust is performed.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

See section [4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities](#) for how IdenTrust performs the Notification of Certificate Issuance for a Re-Keyed Certificate.

4.8 CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

Certificate modification, sometimes called Certificate update, is not supported for Subscribers and LRAs. See the Re-Keying process described above in Section [4.7 Certificate Re-Key](#).

4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate Modification

CAs may request Certificate modification for any reason, provided they address interoperability concerns as described in Section [4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests](#). CA Certificate modification requires approval in writing by the IdenTrust PMA.

4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

A CA may only request a modification of its own CA Certificate(s).

Subscribers with valid certificates, request modifications via the secure IdenTrust online Certificate management system. The Subscriber authenticates through the presentation of his or her active Certificate or by providing the account number and account password associated with the Certificate.

4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

Modification requests are processed by type according to the details provided in the following sub-sections:

4.8.3.1 Processing Modification Requests for Subscriber Certificates

Certificate Modification identity-proofing is achieved using 1 of the following Processes:

- The Registration process as described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#), or
- I&A for re-key as described in Section [3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Request](#), except the old Key can also be used as the new Key.

4.8.3.2 Processing Modification Requests for Subordinate CA Certificates

The CA making a Modification request of a CA Certificate enters into a written agreement with the IdenTrust PMA, other Bridge PAA as appropriate, and any affected CAs to address interoperability concerns. Proposals to modify CA Certificates are processed as follows:

The CA seeking modification, will survey any associated CAs to determine potential effect on relying applications and whether the proposed modification creates interoperability concerns. Any concerns raised by a CA should be addressed. If there are no remaining concerns, the Root CA may re-Issue a SubCA Certificate with the requested modifications. The old CA Certificate will not be Revoked unless all Issues related to the transition from the old CA

Certificate to the new CA Certificate have been resolved. The Public Key for the modified CA Certificate will remain the same. Otherwise, Key changeover processes of Section [5.6 Key Changeover](#) will be implemented for Certificate modification.

The new CA Certificate is provided to, and must be Accepted by, the CA prior to distribution

4.8.3.3 Processing Modification Requests for CA Cross-Certificates

Assuming all applicable Cross-Certification requirements are met, the Cross-Certifying CA(s) will re-sign the subject CA's Public Key obtained from the previously Issued Cross-Certificate. The subject CA's Public Key may be verified by comparing the 2 Public Keys. The Cross-Certifying CA will re-certify the subject CA's Public Key with the Modified Certificate contents. The new Cross Certificate is provided to, and must be Accepted by, the subject of the Cross Certificate prior to distribution. The Modified Cross-Certificate will be distributed to all PKI Participants, including vendor partners who create IGC Certificate enabled applications using one or all of the procedures listed in Section [6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties](#).

4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

See Section [4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by IdenTrust of Issuance of Certificate](#).

4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

See Section [4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance](#).

4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

See Section [2.2 Publication of Certificate Information](#) and [4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA](#).

4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Notice of CA Certificate modification will be provided to all PKI Participants as outlined in Section [4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities](#).

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION

All Certificate Revocations are authenticated according to the procedures described in this Section.

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

Certificate Revocations are processed according to Certificate type as described in the following sub-sections.

Revoked Certificates are included in all new publications of the CRL until the Certificates expire. All Revoked Certificates are published to at least one CRL.

4.9.1.1 Circumstances for Revocation for Individual and Device Certificates

Subscriber Certificates are Revoked under the following circumstances:

- Subscriber or other authorized agent requests Revocation,
- Identifying information or affiliation components of any names in the Certificate become invalid,
- An Organization terminates its relationship with the CA such that it no longer provides affiliation information;
- Subject can be shown to have violated the stipulations of its respective Subscriber Agreement or the stipulations of this CPS or the CP,
- Private Key has been compromised or is suspected of being compromised,
- The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused,
- The Issuing CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate,

- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee is made aware of a possible compromise of the Private Key of the Issuing SubCA Certificate and reaches a determination Revocation is in the best interest of the PKI.
- The PMA or Issuing CA suspects or determines that Revocation of a Certificate is in the best interest of the integrity of the PKI,
- The Issuing CA is made aware that a Subscriber no longer has an affiliation with the Subscribing Organization or is no longer authorized to hold the Certificate;
- The Issuing CA is made aware that information included in the subjectDN of a Device Certificate no longer accurately represents the Subscribing Organization, or Device,
- The Applicant rejects a newly Issued Certificate,
- The Issuing CA determines Issuance of the Certificate did not follow necessary procedures specified by this CPS or information in the Certificate is inaccurate, false, deceptive, or misleading,
- The Subscriber fails to meet contractual obligations,
- The Issuing CA or Issuing CA of the SubCA Certificate ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide Revocation support for the Certificate,
- The Issuing CA's right to Issue under this CPS is Revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository,
- The technical content or format of the Certificate is deemed by the IdenTrust Risk Management Committee to present an unacceptable risk to PKI Participants,
- Termination of the service agreement held between the Subscriber and the Custodian that holds the Private Key ends; or
- The Subscriber, Custodian (e.g., authorized third party) or RA requests Certification revocation.

4.9.1.2 Circumstances for Revocation for CA

CA Certificates are Revoked under the following circumstances:

- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee determines whether the CA fails or has failed to meet contractual obligations,
- The SubCA requests Revocation in writing,
- The SubCA notifies IdenTrust that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization,
- IdenTrust Risk Management Committee is made aware of compromise or suspected compromise of SubCA Private Keys and reaches a determination Revocation is in the best interest of the PKI
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee obtains evidence that the SubCA Certificate was misused,
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee determines that any of the information appearing in the SubCA Certificate is inaccurate or misleading,
- The Issuing CA or SubCA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide Revocation support for the Certificate,
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee determines the technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to PKI Participants; or
- CA termination pursuant to Section [5.8 CA and RA Termination](#).

4.9.1.3 Circumstances for Revocation for All Certificates

The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee may require Revocation of any IGC Certificate if it is determined Revocation is in the best interest of the PKI.

4.9.1.4 Certificate Problem Reporting

IdenTrust provides Subscribers, Relying Parties, Subscribing Organizations, application software suppliers and other third parties with clear instructions and contact information for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to utilization of and reliance upon Certificates. These instructions are available online at the IdenTrust website in the support section at www.IdenTrust.com. This page lists a telephone number to contact

help desk representatives during business hours and an email contact to ensure reporting will be received 24/7.

Once a report is received either by email or telephone, a help desk representative will file a ticket for the report including the details provided by the contact. The help desk representative will provide the following information for the report when possible:

- Account number,
- Name and Contact Information of the Individual/Organization Reporting the Certificate,
- Subscriber, Organization, Domain and/or PKI Sponsor name,
- Nature of the Issue (illegal activity, Private Key Compromise, etc.); and
- When the issue was discovered.

Once that ticket is filed, the help desk representative will forward contact information with the details and ticket number to the appropriate level of management or Security Office via email. Upon creating a record of the contact, the following considerations are assessed to determine the appropriate action:

- The nature of the alleged problem,
- The number of Certificate problem reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber; and
- The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that he/she did not receive the good they ordered) and relevant legislation.

Upon review, the IdenTrust Security Office, or an appropriate level of management, will determine whether Revocation, Suspension, or other action is warranted. If it is determined that Revocation or Suspension is necessary, security or management will send an official request to a help desk representative or an LRA to execute the specified action accordingly. When deemed necessary based on the content of the report and the findings by security and management, IdenTrust will forward the complaint to law enforcement.

All email contact associated with the case must be saved and documented by the help desk representative.

To respond to high-priority Certificate problem reports IdenTrust maintains the Certificate problem reporting page 24/7 whether by telephone contact during office hours or email contact during evening, weekend, or holiday hours.

CAs and External RAs are required to provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Subscribing Organizations, application software suppliers and other third parties with clear instructions and contact information for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to utilization of and reliance upon IGC Certificates.

CAs and External RAs are required to contact IdenTrust in the event of any Certificate problems or suspected compromise.

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

Various individuals are authorized to request Revocation of a Certificate, depending on the type of Certificate to be Revoked, as follows:

- A Subscriber may request Revocation of his or her own Certificate at any time for any reason.
- A Sponsor or an Authorizing Official of a Subscribing Organization may request Revocation of a Subscriber Certificate with affiliation to that same Subscribing Organization. As an example, a Sponsor may request Revocation of a Certificate held by a Subscriber no longer employed by the Subscribing Organization and no longer affiliated to the Subscribing Organization.
- A Primary Machine Operator or Secondary Machine Operator of a Device may request the Revocation of its Certificate.
- An RA Administrator or an Authorizing Official may request Revocation of a Certificate used by an RA System.

- An Authorizing Official of a CA may request Revocation of their CA Certificate. A CA may Revoke a Certificate that it Issued to an Individual or Device. A CA may also identify other entities authorized to submit Certificate Revocation requests
- An operator of a CMS may request Revocation of a CMS Certificate or Content Signing Certificate.
- A RA or TA may request the Revocation of a Subscriber's Certificate on behalf of the Subscriber and the Subscribing Organization. The Subscribing Organization, through its Authorizing Officials, may appoint other Individuals (e.g., HR personnel, Security Officers, Officers of the Organization, Purchasing Agents, etc.) to request Revocation in their Subscribing Organization Agreement with the relevant CA
- A CA may summarily Revoke Certificates that it has Issued.
- An RA's Authorizing Official may request Revocation of any Certificates held by an LRA, RA Administrator and TA to whom the RA sponsored the Issuance of a Certificate.
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee may request Revocation of a CA Certificate, CMS Certificate, PIV-I Content Signing Certificate or RA System Certificate when the CA or RA fails to comply with obligations in its agreement with IdenTrust or with requirements in the CP, this CPS or the entity's RPS
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee or the PMA may require Revocation of any IGC Certificate if it is determined Revocation is in the best interest of the PKI

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Revocation requests are processed according to the type of Certificate for which Revocation has been requested and by whom the Revocation request has been made. These procedures, by Certificate type and requester are described in the following sub-sections.

When a Revocation request is submitted via email or phone the LRA or TA will document the reason for the request and archive this documentation. Reason codes are included in the CRLs Issued by IdenTrust, including the reason code of Revocation because of Key compromise.

IdenTrust allows Certificate revocation and will Revoke Certificates upon receipt of sufficient evidence of compromise or loss of the Subscriber's corresponding private key.

4.9.3.1 Revocation Request by a Subscriber

A Subscriber's Certificate may be Revoked either by sending a Digitally Signed Revocation request to the RA, by establishing a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS Encrypted Session (using the Signing Key Pair associated with the Certificate being Revoked) with the RA System described in Section [1.3.4 Registration Authority \(RA\)](#), or by contacting the RA's LRA or TA on the phone to place the request stating the reason for Revocation. The Subscriber or Sponsor is required to indicate the subject of the Certificate to be Revoked, the reason for the Revocation request, and

4.9.3.2 Revocation Request by a Machine Operator

Additionally, Device Certificates may be Revoked by the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator who authenticates and requests Revocation using a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS Encrypted Session and the account number and Account Password used by the Primary Machine Operator or Secondary Machine Operator during initial registration.

If the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator no longer has the account number or cannot remember the Account Password, then identifying information of the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator obtained during registration may be used to authenticate the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator's request (e.g., the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator can be called at the phone number previously established for the Primary Machine Operator as described in Section [3.2.3.4 Authentication of Devices](#)).

The authority of the requesting Primary Machine Operator can be made by accessing the Subscribing Organization

Authorization Agreement which is archived as a document included in the Device Certificate account record that is associated with the Revocation request and confirming that the requesting individual is designated as the Primary Machine Operator.

In the case of a phone request for Certificate Revocation made by a Secondary Machine Operator, confirmation of the request is made by confirming that the requesting individual is included on the current Secondary Machine Operators list, which can be accessed through the Device Certificate account record that is associated with the Device Certificate to be revoked.

If the requester is not designated as the Primary Machine Operator or identified as a Secondary Machine Operator by inclusion in the archived documents mentioned above, then the request for Suspension will be denied.

In addition, a Digitally Signed request from the Primary Machine Operator that enables the LRA to verify association of the Primary Machine Operator with the Device Certificate using the electronic records in the RA System is considered valid.

If the Revocation request cannot be authenticated by the Private Key or the Account Password for the Device Certificate to be Revoked, then the Subscriber, Subscribing Organization Sponsor or Primary Machine Operator may be authenticated by in-person appearance before the LRA or TA, or alternatively, on the phone by providing 3 pieces of information previously collected as part of the identity proofing process (e.g., ID number, ID Issuance place, DOB, etc.). The Subscriber, Subscribing Organization Sponsor or Primary Machine Operator should first attempt to contact the LRA or TA who was involved during the Issuance of the Certificate or the TA of their Subscribing Organization.

When a TA intermediates a Revocation request, the LRA will authenticate TA Digitally Signed Revocation request emails by verifying (i) the TA has a valid Certificate of commensurate Assurance Level of the Certificate to be Revoked; and (ii) the authority to request actions on behalf of the Subscribing Organization. The authority to request is validated based on lists put together by LRA based on the paperwork that nominates the TA. The list will contain identifiers that uniquely identify the TA (i.e., Name, Certificate's thumbprint / fingerprint / serial number).

The Subscriber or Primary Machine Operator is required to present an acceptable form of photo identification (see Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#)), which the LRA or TA reviews to identify and authenticate the Subscriber or Primary Machine Operator making the Revocation request. TAs must notify the LRA immediately upon validating the Revocation request and request that the LRA Revoke the Certificate.

A Subscriber ceasing its relationship with the Subscribing Organization must, prior to departure, Revoke the Certificate and should surrender to the LRA or TA any Hardware Cryptomodule that was Issued to the Subscriber. The Subscribing Organization Sponsor should be involved in proactively informing the TA or LRA about the departure in order for the LRA and TA to collect the Cryptomodule. If not already Revoked by the Subscriber, the LRA or TA Revokes the Subscriber's Certificate. LRAs and TAs are provided with instruction about their obligation to store the Cryptomodule securely to protect it from malicious use between surrender and Zeroization (see Section [6.2.10 Methods of Destroying Private Keys](#)).

If the Cryptomodule cannot be obtained from the Subscriber, then the Subscriber's Certificate(s) will be immediately Revoked, expressing the reason code as "Key compromise." Promptly following Revocation, IdenTrust updates the Certificate status in the Repository and updates the CRL. Alternatively, a Subscribing Organization may opt for not collecting any Cryptomodules due to logistical difficulties (e.g., Subscriber is terminated under unfriendly conditions, Subscriber in a remote location, etc.) and instead always request Revocation of the Certificates as if the Cryptomodule was not obtained from the Subscriber. In these cases, the Revocation request will always result in a "Key compromise" code.

The CA will make a centralized location available to the Subscriber and Subscribing Organization for Cryptomodule destruction. Cryptomodules received in this location will be Zeroized or otherwise physically destroyed. A record in the form of an inventory of all Zeroized/destroyed Cryptomodules will be kept that shows at a minimum the sender, model and, if possible, serial number of the Zeroized/destroyed Cryptomodules.

4.9.3.3 Procedure for Revocation Request of Subscriber Certificate by Other PKI Participants

When a request for Revocation does not originate from the Subscriber, it must be made by an authorized person who meets the requirements of Section [4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation](#), and it must be accompanied by adequate proof of identity and authority. LRAs and TAs are provided with instructional material on methods to authenticate Revocation requests made by third parties.

The LRA or TAs validate the credentials of the requesting party and determine if the Revocation request meets the requirements of Section [4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation](#). It is the responsibility of the LRA or TA to investigate the alleged reason for Revocation and to determine whether Revocation is appropriate. If Revocation is appropriate, the LRA or TA documents information concerning the identification of the requestor and the reason for the request. TAs will forward the Revocation request via Digitally Signed email and mail the documentation supporting the request to the LRA for archival.

Requests for Revocation of all other Certificates are done either with a Digitally Signed request using the Private Key corresponding to the Certificate being Revoked, or by the authenticated request of an authorized representative of the RA, CA, or CBCA, who are identified and authenticated.

4.9.3.4 Procedure for Revocation by LRA

Account restrictions exist in the CA and RA Systems that prevent an LRA from requesting or approving the Revocation of Certificates of Subscribers who are not within their own Organization, domain, Subscriber community, etc. The LRA's Certificate is compared against the ACL and, if authorized for that domain or namespace, the LRA submits the request for Revocation.

The LRA will Revoke the Certificate through a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session with the CA System. Alternatively, the LRA can Revoke the Certificate through an RA System that submits the Revocation to the CA via a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session using a Digitally Signed data structure (ASN.1 or XKMS/XSMS). The CA will change the Certificate status in the Repository from valid to Revoked. Revocation occurs when the serial number and other identifying information for the Certificate is published in a CRL. In any event, all Certificate Revocation requests should be promptly communicated to the CA.

It is not required to send Subscribers notice of Revocation. In the event Revocation notice is desired, it is the LRA's responsibility to send the Subscriber an email notice with brief explanation of the reasons for Revocation and to archive such notice. CA and RA Systems may be configured to automatically send Revocation notification emails to Subscribers.

4.9.3.5 Procedure for Revocation by Non-Authorized Requestors

Any Certificate Revocation requests from other, non-authorized requestors must be submitted to IdenTrust, not the CA. If IdenTrust determines that Revocation is appropriate, it will submit a Revocation request to the CA as specified below.

4.9.3.6 Procedure for Revocation by IdenTrust

Authorized representatives of IdenTrust may communicate Revocation requests and Revocation determinations to CAs or RAs by Digitally Signed email. The LRA will validate the request by verifying the signature on the Digitally Signed message and confirming that the representative has appropriate authority. The LRA will execute the Revocation and will send the Subscriber an email notice and brief explanation of the reasons for Revocation and will archive the notice with the identifying information for the IdenTrust representative and the reason for making the Revocation request.

4.9.3.7 Procedure for Revocation of CA or CSA Certificates

IdenTrust will Revoke the CA and CSA Certificates it has Issued to a CA in breach of its contractual obligations or if the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate has been or is suspected to have been compromised. In any event, prior to taking such action, the Head of IdenTrust Operations will convene a meeting

of management representatives (including representatives of the CA, RA and IdenTrust PMA) to assess the situation and make an appropriate decision concerning a course of action (see Section [5.7.3 Entity CA Private Key Compromise Procedures](#)).

4.9.3.8 Procedure for Revocation of CMS, RA, and IGC PIV-I Content Signing Certificates

IdenTrust will Revoke the CMS, RA, and PIV-I Content Signing Certificate it has Issued to a CA or RA in breach of its contractual obligations or if the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate has been or is suspected to have been compromised. In any event, prior to taking such action, the Head of IdenTrust Operations will convene a meeting of management representatives (including representatives of the CA, RA, and IdenTrust PMA) to assess the situation and make an appropriate decision concerning a course of action (see Section [5.7.3 Entity CA Private Key Compromise Procedures](#)).

4.9.3.9 Procedure for Revocation of Cross-Certified Bridge CA Certificates

IdenTrust will Revoke the Cross-Certificates it has Issued if the subject of the Certificate is in breach of its contractual obligations or if the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate has been or is suspected to have been compromised. In any event, prior to taking such action, the Head of IdenTrust Operations will convene a meeting of management representatives (including representatives of CAs), the IdenTrust PMA, and the Cross-certified Bridge PAAs to assess the situation and make an appropriate decision concerning a course of action (see Section [5.7.3 Entity CA Private Key Compromise Procedures](#)).

4.9.3.10 General Guidance for All Situations not Specifically Addressed

Persons authenticating Revocation requests must balance the risk of an unauthorized request and the potential harm caused by Revoking the Certificate against the harm caused by not Revoking the Certificate.

TAs and LRAs are trained to expedite authentication and authorization checks on Revocation requests and to submit them to the CA as soon as possible.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

There is no Revocation grace period. In the case of Key compromise, Subscribers are required to request Revocation within one hour. For all other reasons, Subscribers are required to request Revocation within 24 hours.

4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

CA Certificates are revoked once all necessary notification periods have elapsed.

IdenTrust will revoke Subscriber Certificates as quickly as practical upon receipt of a proper revocation request. Revocation requests are processed before the next CRL is published, excepting those requests validated within 2 hours of CRL issuance. Revocation requests validated within 2 hours of CRL issuance are processed before the following CRL is published.

4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties

Reliance upon Revoked Certificates is always hazardous and could have damaging or catastrophic consequences in certain circumstances. IdenTrust assumes no liability for reliance upon a Revoked Certificate; it is therefore advisable to check for Revocation in every instance before relying on a Certificate. If it is temporarily infeasible to obtain current Revocation information, then the Relying Party must either reject use of the Certificate, or assume all risk, responsibility, and consequences of reliance upon it.

A Relying Party must check the most recent CRL each time reliance is to occur upon a Certificate. Reliance on an outdated CRL can cause a recent Revocation to escape the Relying Party's notice. The `thisUpdate` field indicates when a CRL was Issued and `nextUpdate` when the next version is to be Issued.

4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

CRL issuance encompasses both CRL generation and publication. See the table below for guidelines for issuing

frequency of routine CRLs. CRLs may be issued more frequently than specified below.

Table 5: Maximum Interval for Routine CRL Issuance

Assurance Level	Maximum Interval for Routine CRL Issuance	
	Online	Offline
Basic	24 hours	35 Days
Medium (all policies)	24 hours	35 Days
PIV-I Card Authentication	24 hours	35 Days

CAs may be operated in an offline manner if the CA only issues:

- CA Certificates,
- CSS Certificates (optionally); and
- End user Certificates solely for the administration of the principal CA (optionally).

However, the interval between routine CRL issuance will not exceed 35 days. IdenTrust must meet the requirements specified in Section [4.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise](#), for issuing Emergency CRLs.

NOTE: Such CAs will also be required to notify the cross-certifying CAs upon Emergency CRL issuance. This requirement may be included in the MOA between the cross-certifying CA and IdenTrust.

The frequency of CRL issuance depends on the type of CRL as defined in the following sub-sections.

4.9.7.1 CRL Issuance Frequency for CAs

The CRL Format for Certificates that are Issued by Subordinate CAs is found in the IGC Certificate Profiles. It states that the value for the nextUpdate field in CRLs for CAs is 24 hours. IdenTrust Issues and publishes CRLs no less than once per 24hour period, even if there are no changes or updates to be made (Periodic CRLs). CRLs may be Issued more frequently (Interim CRLs) if a Revocation occurs. The superseded CRL is then removed from the directory system and replaced with a new CRL.

4.9.7.2 CRL Issuance Frequency for Root CAs

IdenTrust Issues and publishes the CRL for Certificates that are Issued by the IdenTrust Root CA at least every 35 days. In the case of CA compromise or Key compromise, IdenTrust Issues an emergency CRL within 18 hours of notification. The superseded CRL is then removed from the directory system and replaced with a new CRL.

4.9.7.3 CRL Issuance Frequency for All CAs

IdenTrust publishes a new CRL prior to the time specified in the Next Update field of the active CRL. Upon publishing a new CRL, the Root CA and Participant CA and all old CRLs published in the Repository are removed.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency of CRLs

IdenTrust publishes an Interim CRL within 4 hours of receiving a properly authenticated Revocation request.

4.9.9 Online Revocation / Status Checking Availability

The IdenTrust Certificate Status Authority (CSA) supports OCSP and provides online Certificate status information in Digitally Signed OCSP Responses for Certificates that are Issued by CAs that are indicated in OCSP Requests submitted by Relying Parties. The CSA service is optional for Certificates that do not assert an Assurance Level of PIV-I hardware. The CAs that opt to implement it will be Issued Certificates that include a pointer to the OCSP Responder in the Certificate authority information access extension. For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware, the CSA service is provided via CA-delegated trust model OCSP as specified in RFC 6960.

Each OCSP Responder is Issued a Certificate signed by the same CA Private Key that signed the Certificates that will be validated by the OCSP Responder. Many applications will not validate properly unless the same CA Key has been used to sign the OCSP Responder Certificate as has signed the Certificate in question.

IdenTrust operates and maintains CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of 10 seconds or less. IdenTrust Root CA Certificates, CRLs, and online Certificate status information are available for retrieval 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with a minimum of 99% availability overall per year, and scheduled downtime does not exceed 0.5% annually, excluding network outages.

IdenTrust OCSP Responders are based on CRLs that are consistent with the specifications outlined in Section [4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency](#) regarding latency.

4.9.10 Online Revocation Checking Requirements

See Sections [4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties](#), and [4.9.9 Online Revocation / Status Checking Availability](#).

4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

A CA may also use additional methods to publicize the Certificates it has Revoked. IdenTrust does not support any other method for obtaining Certificate status information than those described in Sections [4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency](#) and [4.9.9 Online Revocation / Status Checking Availability](#).

4.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise

When a CA Certificate is revoked or Subscriber Certificate is revoked because of compromise, or suspected compromise, of a private key, IdenTrust will issue a CRL as specified in the table below.

Table 6: Maximum Latency for Emergency CRL Issuance

Assurance Level	Maximum Latency for Emergency CRL Issuance
Basic	24 hours after notification
Medium (all policies)	18 hours after notification
PIV-I Card Authentication	18 hours after notification

IdenTrust will notify potential Relying Parties if it discovers or suspects that a CA's Private Key has been compromised by publishing updated Certificate status in a CRL.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

A Certificate may be placed on Suspension upon a Revocation request of the Subscriber or a Subscriber's Subscribing Organization. A Certificate may be placed on Suspension in the event of an unsigned Revocation request or Revocation request pending authorization. Certificates can be placed on Suspension upon any other reason deemed acceptable by the CA or when the Subscriber requests this service due to lack of access to the Cryptomodule holding the Certificate.

4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

Certificate Suspension can be requested by various individuals depending on the type and ownership of the Certificate, as follows:

- A Subscriber may request Suspension of his or her own Certificate at any time for any reason.
- The Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator of a Device may request the Suspension of its Certificate.
- LRAs of a CA may request the Suspension of a Certificate that it authorized to be Issued to an Individual or Device.
- An Authorizing Official or Subscribing Organization Sponsor of a Subscribing Organization may request the Suspension of a Certificate that it authorized to be Issued to an Individual or Device.

- An LRA or TA may request the Suspension of a Subscriber's Certificate on behalf of the Subscriber and the Subscribing Organization.
- The IdenTrust Risk Management Committee may request suspension of any Certificate.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Procedures for processing Certificate Suspension varies based on the type of Certificate and the party requesting suspension, as detailed in the following sub-sections.

4.9.15.1 Procedure for Suspension Request of Subscriber Certificate by Subscriber

A Subscriber's Certificate may be Suspended by sending a Digitally Signed Suspension request to the RA's LRA or TA or by establishing a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS Encrypted Session with the RA System to place the request (using the Signing Key Pair associated with the Certificate being suspended) stating the reason for Suspension. The Subscriber or the Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator is required to indicate the reason for the Suspension request, and the LRA or TA will document the reason for the request when the request is submitted via email.

If the Suspension request cannot be authenticated through a Digital Signature of the Certificate to be Suspended, then the Subscriber or Machine Operator may be authenticated by in-person appearance before the LRA or TA.

4.9.15.2 Procedure for Suspension Request of Subscriber Certificate by Subscriber Sponsoring Organization

An authorized individual from the Subscriber Sponsoring Organization may request the suspension of a Subscriber Certificate. This may be necessary if a Sponsoring Organization believes that a Subscriber's Private Key may be compromised or the Sponsoring Organization suspects that the Subscriber is not in compliance with the Subscriber Agreement. A Certificate may be suspended while an investigation can be performed. The authorized individual from the Subscriber Sponsoring Organization may request Suspension from an LRA or directly from IdenTrust. Once determination has been achieved, the Suspension should be removed, or Revocation of the Certificate should be initiated.

4.9.15.3 Procedure for Suspension Request of Subscriber Certificate by Machine Operator

If the Primary Machine Operator or the Secondary Machine Operator requests a Suspension via a phone call, confirmation of the authority of a Primary Machine Operator or Secondary Machine Operator must be made.

The authority of the requesting Primary Machine Operator can be made by viewing the Subscribing Organization Authorization form which is archived as a document included in the Device Certificate account record that is associated with the Suspension request and by confirming that the requesting individual is designated as the Primary Machine Operator.

In the case of a phone request for a Certificate Suspension made by a Secondary Machine Operator, confirmation of the request is made by confirming that the requesting individual is included on the current Secondary Machine Operators List, which can be accessed through the Device Certificate account record that is associated with the Device Certificate to be Suspended.

If the requester is not designated as the Primary Machine Operator or identified as a Secondary Machine Operator by inclusion in the archived documents described above, then the request for Suspension will be denied.

If the Suspension request cannot be authenticated through a Digital Signature of the Certificate to be Suspended, or by confirming the identity of a Primary Machine Operator or a Secondary Machine Operator by reviewing the current version of the Secondary Machine Operators List, which is archived as part of the Device Certificate account record that is associated with the Suspension request, then the Subscriber or Machine Operator may be authenticated by in-person appearance before the LRA or TA in accordance with guidelines in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#).

4.9.15.4 Procedure for Suspension Request of Subscriber Certificate by Other PKI Participants

When a request for Suspension does not originate from the Subscriber, it must be made in person by an authorized person who meets the requirements of Section [4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension](#), and it must be accompanied by adequate proof of identity and authority. LRAs and Tas are provided with instructional material on methods to authenticate Suspension requests made by third parties.

When a Suspension request has been validated, the LRA or TA will document information concerning the identification of the requestor and the reason for the request. Tas will forward the Suspension request via signed email and mail the documentation supporting the request to the LRA for archival.

4.9.15.5 Procedure for Suspension Request Executed by LRA

The LRA will suspend the Certificate through a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session with the CA System. Alternatively, the LRA may Suspend the Certificate through an RA System that submits the Suspension to the CA via a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session using a Digitally Signed data structure (ASN.1 or XKMS/XSMS). The CA will change the Certificate status in the Repository from valid to Suspended (i.e., reason code CertificateHold). Suspension occurs when the serial number and other identifying information for the Certificate is published in a CRL associated to a reason code of "Certificate Hold."

A Suspension status is resolved either by removing the Certificate from the CRL or by assigning the KeyCompromise Revocation reason code under the conditions described in Section [4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period](#) below.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

The maximum limit on a Certificate Suspension period is 14 days; however, the LRA or TA who assists with a Certificate Suspension should take care to monitor the Suspension until the Certificate is either Revoked or the Suspension is removed.

For a Certificate to be removed from Suspension status, the Subscriber must submit a request for removal of the Suspension status. The request may consist of:

- A Digitally Signed communication or an online request via a Client-authenticated SSL/TLS Encrypted Session using a Certificate delivered to a hardware Cryptomodule, other than the Suspended Certificate, Issued to the Subscriber of the Suspended Certificate; or,
- A phone call from an authorized primary or secondary Machine Operation, who can be authenticated in accordance with the guidelines in Section [4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request](#); or
- In-person request after the Subscriber has been authenticated in accordance with the guidelines in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#).

4.10 CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES

IdenTrust supports both CRL and OCSP validation as described in Section [4.9.9 Online Revocation / Status Checking Availability](#).

4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

Specifics on how to obtain status information via CRL or OCSP are described in Section [4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties](#), [4.9.9 Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability](#), and [7.3 OCSP Profile](#) of this CPS.

4.10.2 Service Availability

Certificate Status Services are available on a 24x7 basis, with a minimum of 99.9% availability overall per year and a scheduled downtime not to exceed 0.5% annually. IdenTrust accomplishes this by operating a fully redundant architecture at the primary location, as well as having tertiary devices at the disaster recovery location for critical

services including the repository and all components needed to perform validation.

4.10.3 Optional Features

Operational features of CRL and OCSP services are described in Section [7 Certificate Profiles](#).

4.11 END OF SUBSCRIPTION

End of a subscription varies based on the type of Certificate as detailed in the following sub-sections.

4.11.1 End of Subscription for Subscribers

A Subscriber may terminate its subscription to Certificate services by allowing the term of a Certificate or applicable agreement to expire without renewal.

Subscribers may also voluntarily Revoke their Certificate as explained in Section [4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request](#). If a Subscriber terminates subscription during a Certificate's Validity Period, the Certificate is Revoked.

Prior to the end of subscription, the CA or RA will send the Subscriber notice of pending Certificate expiration at least 30-day intervals beginning ninety (90) days before the expiration date of the Subscriber's Certificate.

4.11.2 End of Subscription for Subordinate CAs

Beginning at least 3 years and 6 months prior to the expiration date of the Certificate of an IdenTrust SubCA, IdenTrust will meet to determine the strategy to be used for Key changeover (see Section 5.6). Beginning at least 3 years and 6 months prior to the expiration date of the Certificate of a Participant CA, IdenTrust and the Participant CA will meet to determine the strategy to be used for Key changeover (see Section 5.6) and to ascertain whether to continue operating under the Participant CA Agreement as then existing, or to enter into negotiations to revise the arrangement and, depending on the outcome of such negotiations, execute a new agreement or a replacement CA to address business continuity for the Participant's Subscribers. If an IdenTrust Participant CA notifies IdenTrust that it does not intend to continue providing CA services and that there will be no replacement CA to take over operation of the SubCA, then the CA Certificate is Revoked.

4.11.3 End of Subscription for Cross-Certified PKI Bridge CAs

End of subscription period processes for Cross-Certification with other Bridge CAs are specified in the specific policies. Pursuant to those policies, at least 180 days prior to the expiration date of the Cross-Certification agreement, the parties shall ascertain whether there is interest in renewing the Cross-Certification arrangement as then existing or enter into negotiations to revise the Cross-Certification arrangement and, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, execute a new Cross-Certification arrangement.

4.12 KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY

Encryption key escrow and key recovery by an RA is facilitated via the use of CMS on the premise of a third-party RA, as detailed in the RPS.

4.12.1 Key Escrow for CMS

Private Keys are stored within a Key escrow database providing the database belongs to the Third-Party RA operating a CMS. Escrowed Private Keys are encrypted and protected, this process as detailed in the RPS, involves both the CA and RA for Key recovery.

4.12.1.1 Circumstances for Key Recovery

Recovery of escrowed Private Keys via CMS may be requested by a Subscriber and Subscribing Organization for the following reasons:

- Subscribers request recovery of their own escrowed Private Key(s),

- Subscriber is no longer part of the organization to which affiliation is asserted in the Subscriber's escrowed Certificate,
- Escrowed Private Key is part of a required investigation or audit,
- Requester has authorization from a competent legal authority to access the communication that is encrypted using the key,

The Subscribing Organization asserted in the Subscriber's escrowed Certificate indicates that Key recovery is mission critical or required for business continuity.

4.12.2 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

Key escrow and key recovery are not supported within the IdenTrust CA; however, encryption key escrow and key recovery by an RA can be facilitated via the use of CMS on the premise of a third-party RA.

4.12.2.1 Key Escrow Process and Responsibilities

Subscriber private keys (i.e., decryption private keys) associated with a key management certificate are securely escrowed by the KED. Keys are escrowed prior to issuance of the key management certificates. Subscriber private keys are protected during transit and storage using cryptography at least as strong as the key being escrowed. Subscribers are notified that the private keys associated with their encryption certificates will be escrowed.

4.12.2.2 Key Recovery Process and Responsibilities

Communications between the various key recovery participants (KED, DDS, KRA, KRO, Requestor, and Subscriber) is secured from protocol threats such as disclosure, modification, replay, and substitution. The strength of all cryptographic protocols is equal to or greater than that of the keys they protect.

During delivery, escrowed keys are protected against disclosure to any party except the Requestor.

When any mechanism that includes a shared secret (e.g., a password) is used to protect the key in transit, the mechanism ensures that the Requestor and the transmitting party are the only holders of this shared secret.

Third-Party Requestors may use electronic or manual means to request Subscribers' escrowed keys. The Requestor submits the request to the KRA or KRO. If the request is made electronically, the Requestor digitally signs the request using a trusted authentication or signature certificate, as determined by the recovering organization, with an assurance level equal to or greater than that of the escrowed key. Manual requests include proper identity verification by the KRA in accordance with Section 3.2.3.1.

Third party key recovery in and of itself does not require revocation of a subscriber certificate.

4.12.2.2.1 Key Recovery Through KRA

Using the RA workstation, KRA verifies the KRO's or External Requestor's identity and authorization to request a specific key.

- a) Is the message valid?
- b) Does this person have the right to make the request?
- c) Do they have a certificate strength equal to or greater than that of the key to be recovered?

KRA submits a request to the system for key recovery.

- a) This request is held in the database, accessible only to the RA workstation and the KRA workstation.
- b) The Key Recovery Request process within the database, is accessible only by KRAs.

The KRA requests permission from Security/Operations Management via digitally signed e-mail, for a KRA recovery session for a specified date and time during normal business hours.

- a) Security/Operations Management responds with written permission, also with a digitally signed email.

The KRA prints two shipping labels per Key Recovery request with unique tracking numbers and place them on

shipping envelopes, to be used once the Key Recovery process has been completed.

- a) One shipping label will be for FedEx Ground. Ensure the tracking number is in the notes section of the TS Admin account.
- b) One shipping label will be for USPS standard. Ensure the tracking number is in the notes section of the TS Admin account. i. If the Requestor requests expedited shipping, they are responsible for the shipping charges for both carriers.

4.12.2.2 Automated Self-Recovery

IdenTrust does not support Automated Self-Recovery

4.12.2.2.3 Key Recovery During Token Issuance

IdenTrust only uses FIPS accredited devices, Keys are securely transferred to a FIPS device and are not exportable from a FIPS device, by only using FIPS accredited devices ensures the device (HSM) is configured in fips mode.

4.12.2.2.4 Key Recovery by Data Decryption Server

IdenTrust does not support a Data Decryption Server, as this is optional see Section [1.3.6.2 Data Decryption Server](#).

4.12.3 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Session Key encapsulation services are not provided by IdenTrust.

5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

In the event a Participant CA or External RA operates an RA System or CMS external to IdenTrust, the Participant CA or External RA is required by contract to facility, management, and operational controls equivalent to those implemented by IdenTrust for protection of such systems. Evaluation of Participant CA and External RA controls is required as a part of the compliance audit prior to IdenTrust providing authority to operate and part of the annual compliance audit requirement; see Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) for “Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments, which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

5.1 PHYSICAL CONTROLS

All CA equipment including CA cryptographic modules are protected from unauthorized access at all times.

IdenTrust dedicates computer systems specifically to its PKI operations including the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA functions as well as databases, networking, and physical housing. These systems may be shared among IGC and other PKIs. IdenTrust CA, CSA, CMS and RA operations are serviced by trusted IdenTrust personnel. All trusted IdenTrust personnel meet the requirements of the IGC CP for Trusted Roles.

Subscribers and Relying Parties do not have access to the PKI-specific CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA platforms. Logs, lists of Certificates that are Issued and Revoked, and the directory tree are located on a dedicated certification system, where they are not accessible for modification by anyone other than IdenTrust trusted personnel functioning in their respective Trusted Roles. IdenTrust collects data from those databases and directories to broader, more comprehensive compilations for billing, repository, and similar purposes. Those wider systems are not operated from a PKI-exclusive system. Some such systems are available to Subscribers and Relying Parties to a controlled extent by agreement with IdenTrust.

IdenTrust’s CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment, including all Cryptomodules, are located in states which have statutes against computer trespass and intrusion. In addition, federal computer security legislation applies. Together, those laws generally forbid unauthorized use and access to IdenTrust computer equipment; however, legal advice should be obtained in specific cases.

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

IdenTrust has 2 facilities dedicated to host CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment. In selecting the appropriate facilities, risk management techniques have been used, and controls have been designed to mitigate risks.

IdenTrust's CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment are hosted in a primary facility that provides the highest-risk protection. For purposes of disaster recovery, a second facility in a geographically diverse location has been selected and provides risk protection on par with the primary facility. Physical security controls protecting the certification platform and Cryptomodules²⁰ are described in the following sub-sections. These physical security controls are intended as protection against theft, loss, and unauthorized use.

In cases that IdenTrust may provide LRA equipment and services, the LRA equipment is hosted in a high-risk protection facility different from the primary and disaster recovery facilities where the CA, CSA and RA are located.

5.1.1.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility for CA, CSA, and RA Operations

IdenTrust's primary facility for CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment is located in Utah, in the United States. It is housed in an unmarked building; the site is not identified as housing IdenTrust equipment in any publicly visible way.

The building is a "zone 4" essential-facilities building as established by the Uniform Building Code (UBC), capable of withstanding an earthquake in the 7.0 to 8.0-magnitude range. The computing facility is built on base dynamic isolation systems (DIS) seismic isolators, and contains a rigid exterior steel-braced frame and heavy concrete floor slabs; all are designed to minimize motion in case of an earthquake. The building has ready access to reliable sources of public power, backed up by a UPS and generator system, and provides increased layers of security as an Individual moves closer to the critical assets and computer systems in the secure room. Roof access is through an internal stairwell in a mantrap, and its door is kept locked.

The data center is located on the second floor of the building and resides within an area with no windows. The secure room, where CA, CSA, CMS and RA equipment are hosted, is built within the data center. The secure room has only one access point, which is restricted as described below. Access through the ceiling and floor is prevented by use of chain link fencing and metal cross rails. Multiple layers of security surround the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment. These include exterior barriers requiring programmable electronic badges; mantraps; further barriers protecting various interior sections of the building; dual-factor authentication for entry into the data center areas; and Two-Person Control, dual-factor authentication including biometrics for entry into the secure room itself. The equipment is further protected from physical access by locked cabinets, to which only authorized individuals possess the keys. The exterior and public interior areas of the building (e.g., halls) are under continuous recorded video surveillance by the building security staff; further recorded video surveillance within the secure room is provided by a second video system under the ownership and control of IdenTrust. No cameras are placed in such a way that sensitive data can be captured.

The secure room is also protected by motion sensors within the room, above the ceiling, and below the raised floor.

5.1.1.2 IdenTrust's Disaster Recovery Facility

IdenTrust's disaster recovery data center is located in Colorado, in the United States. This area is not prone to such environmental hazards as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, forest fires etc. The data center is housed in an unmarked concrete building; the site is not identified as housing IdenTrust equipment in any way. The data center is located on a raised level, at least 24 inches above the normal first-floor level, in an area with no windows. The secure cage is near the center of the data center room.

Multiple layers of security protect sensitive information and equipment, including trees, berms, and other natural

²⁰ Cryptomodule Private Key storage practices are described in Section 6.2.7

barriers to external entry; controlled front-door access, requiring programmable electronic badges; restricted access to various sections of the building; dual-factor authentication for entry into the data center areas; and dual-factor authentication including biometrics for entry into and exit from the IdenTrust secure cage.

The IdenTrust secure cage uses chain-link metal caging material for the walls and ceiling and has additional barriers to prevent access from under the floor. The area is surveilled 24x7 by both building cameras and IdenTrust's own camera system, which can be monitored in real time, searched for past events, or logged, if necessary, by the Security Office in Salt Lake City. No cameras are placed in such a way that on-screen data could be captured. The secure cage is also protected by motion sensors.

5.1.1.3 IdenTrust's LRA Site

LRA equipment is located in a building geographically separated from the CA, CSA, and RA site. The site is not identified as housing IdenTrust equipment in a publicly visible way. LRA equipment is located in an isolated and restricted-access room on an upper floor of the building.

The multiple layers of security surround the LRA equipment, including external building doors with security patrols and restricted access during non-business hours, internal suite door with restricted access and 24x7x365 recorded video surveillance and, LRA room door with further restricted access.

5.1.1.4 External RA and LRA Sites

In cases where RAs are external to IdenTrust, RAs and LRAs are obligated by contract and policy to host the RA System and LRA workstation equipment in a facility with controls that reduce the risk of unauthorized access to the equipment.

While an External RA is not contractually obligated to maintain a Disaster Recovery facility for the express purposes of recovering PKI related operations, it is mandatory that an External RA be able to produce all data and artifacts related to Certificate issuance and maintain such information per the archival schedules and audit requirements as defined in this IGC CPS.

5.1.1.5 External RA and LRA Sites – Primary Facility

An External RA must describe the features of the site and construction of the primary facility where RA or LRA equipment is housed, including EWS and CMS equipment, in the External RA RPS document.

5.1.1.6 External RA and LRA Sites – Disaster Recovery Facility

If an External RA maintains a facility that houses RA or LRA equipment, the features of the site and construction of the disaster recovery facility should be documented in the External RA RPS document.

5.1.2 Physical Access

5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment

Remote access to CA equipment, that is, access from outside of the IdenTrust network, is prohibited.

See details provided in the following sub-sections.

5.1.2.1.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility for CA, CSA, and RA Operations

The building is located on fenced and guarded grounds. One guard post is within 50 feet, in a clear line of sight, of the gate entrance to the building. The building entryways and passageways are videotaped. The facility is actively monitored 24x7x365, with staff onsite during normal business hours. Dedicated facility staff are responsible for monitoring the facility outside of normal business hours and are available to respond to any issues that may arise.

Additionally, IdenTrust's Security Office performs a weekly check and review of the physical security integrity of the facility to ensure that alarms, access points, biometric readers to access the secure room, safes containing Cryptomodules and activation materials, video cameras, storage containers, access logging equipment, and other items, are functioning correctly. A record of the weekly review is kept that describes the type of checks performed,

the time, and the person who performed them. Records are kept for no less than one year and reviewed with external auditors annually as part of audits; see Section [8.0, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#), which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

Programmable electronic badges for IdenTrust personnel working in the building are granted only upon authorization from the IdenTrust Security Office. Badges are programmed so that all building occupants have access only to their own authorized areas and data rooms.

Employees are prohibited from permitting unknown or unauthorized individuals from passing through doors, gates, and other entrances to restricted areas when accessing the facilities. Authorization for any individuals, including vendors, repair persons, or visitors, to enter the IdenTrust portion of the facility must be obtained in advance from the Security Office or Operations Management.

Visitors to IdenTrust are allowed within the fence only with prior authorization from IdenTrust. Visitors must also properly identify themselves to the building personnel, as well as their purposes and who they will visit before being allowed on site. Visitors are allowed access to IdenTrust offices only after their identities have been verified, they have signed an entry log, and at least one IdenTrust employee escorts them in all non-public areas of the building.

The secure room is physically secured and requires Two-Person Control, dual-authentication including biometrics for entry. The room is also surveilled with a 24x7x365 camera system whose output is maintained and reviewed by the Security Office. Only Trusted Role employees who have a clear need for access to the secure room are granted authorization by the Head of IdenTrust Operations or Security Office for such access.

The secure room is required to be under 2-of-M person control at all times when Individuals are present in the room. By policy, M is kept to the lowest number of Trusted Role employees that still allows for enough personnel to cover the needs of IdenTrust's diverse customer base. Two-Person Control is enforced through strict policy provisions, as well as the access system described previously. At no time is any Individual left alone in the secure room. At all times, any/all additional personnel or contractors are accompanied by approved Trusted Role employees.

Access to storage safes located inside the IdenTrust secure room is controlled through Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control. The safes require Two-Person Control, each with an authenticator, for access. No single employee has access to both authenticators for any safe. Authenticator types are assigned based on Trusted Role, so that one Trust Role group has one type of authenticator, and another group has another type. Once a safe is opened, all access to material inside it is documented through an access log and is signed for by 2 Trusted Role employees.

In addition to the electronic entry and exit logs generated by the access-control system, each entry into, and exit from, the secure room is logged manually with the respective persons, dates, times, and reasons for access. Prior to signing out and departing the secure room, IdenTrust personnel accessing the secure room are required by policy to check that all physical protection is in place, that all sensitive materials are securely stored, and that the alarms are properly armed.

CA, CSA, CMS, and RA equipment are located inside locked computer cabinets within the IdenTrust secure room. Cabinet Keys are maintained by the same number of Trusted Role employees who have access to the secure room. CA, CSA, and CMS Cryptomodules are secured in the locked computer cabinets within the IdenTrust secure room when in use. When not in use the Cryptomodules and activation materials are stored in separate safe boxes within the secure room, or in the secure off-site facility as described in Section [5.1.6 Media Storage](#). The Security Office reviews the following on a periodic basis to determine if any secure room access violations have occurred:

- Written access logs,
- Video surveillance tapes; and
- Biometrics logs, which are maintained by the Security Office.

5.1.2.1.2 IdenTrust Disaster Recovery Facility

The staff of the data center facility performs checks of the facility at least once a day, covering the facility's access

points, cameras, and other aspects of a physical walk-through. A record is kept that describes the types of checks performed, the time, and the person who performed them. Records are kept for not less than one year and reviewed with external auditors on an annual basis as part audits performed; see Section [8.0, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#), which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

IdenTrust personnel require programmable electronic passcards to access the building, and to enter IdenTrust areas within the building. Programmable electronic passcards for IdenTrust-related personnel working in the building are granted upon prior authorization from the IdenTrust Security Office. If access is required for someone not previously so authorized, that person may enter the building upon presenting appropriate identification to the building security staff, and while in the company of an IdenTrust Trusted Role employee.

Access to the area where the secure cage is located requires Two-Person Control, dual-factor authentication including biometrics. The cage is equipped with an IdenTrust-owned 24x7x365 camera system that can be monitored, searched, and logged by the IdenTrust Security Office in Salt Lake City. The area surrounding the IdenTrust secure cage is also surveilled by building cameras that are constantly monitored by building security staff, with video recordings retained for at least ninety (90) days. Only authorized IdenTrust Trusted Role employees or their authorized and identified visitors are granted access to the secure cage.

CA equipment is located inside locked computer cabinets within the IdenTrust secure cage. Cabinet keys are maintained by the same number of Trusted Role employees who have access to the secure cage.

5.1.2.1.3 IdenTrust's LRA Site and Room

The IdenTrust office, entries, and the room where the LRA equipment is located are video recorded. The IdenTrust Security Office performs periodic checks and reviews of the security integrity of the facilities to ensure that alarms, access points, video cameras, storage containers, access logging, etc., are operational and/or functioning correctly. A record is kept that describes the types of checks performed, the times, and the personell who performed them. Records are kept for no less than one year and reviewed with external auditors as a part of the audits

IdenTrust personnel require programmable electronic passcards to access the IdenTrust office space and the LRA room. Passcards for personnel working in IdenTrust's offices are granted only upon authorization from the IdenTrust Security Office.

Employees are prohibited from permitting unknown or unauthorized individuals from gaining access to the LRA room. Authorization to enter must be obtained in advance from Operations Management. Visitors are allowed within the LRA room only after properly identifying themselves and the purposes for their visits. Visitors are not allowed to roam without escorts. All entry to the LRA Room is logged, either electronically or manually, with the respective dates and times of access.

Cryptomodules used to access LRA workstations require Activation Data that is memorized and not written down. When not in use, modules are locked or under control of their primary users.

5.1.2.2 Physical Access for RA Equipment

See details provided in the following sub-sections.

5.1.2.2.1 External RA and LRA Equipment— Primary Facility

In cases where RAs are external to IdenTrust, RAs and LRAs are obligated by contract, the IGC CP, and this CPS to implement physical Access Controls to reduce the risk of equipment tampering even when the Cryptomodules for the RA System and Cryptomodules for the LRA workstations are not installed or activated.

LRA obligations also include memorizing and not writing down Activation Data for the Cryptomodules used to access LRA workstations, as well as locking or keeping them under control of their primary users when not in use.

RA Administrators obligations include protecting Activation Data for the Cryptomodules used to access the RA System, as well as locking or keeping them under control of their primary users when not in use.

5.1.2.2.2 External RA and LRA Equipment – Disaster Recovery Facility

If a disaster recovery facility is utilized by an External RA, the physical controls specific to such facility should be defined in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.2.3 Physical Access for CSS Equipment

See Section 5.1.2.1.

5.1.2.4 Physical Access for CMS Equipment

See Section 5.1.2.1.

5.1.2.5 Physical Access for Key Escrow Database Equipment

IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it and is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS.

5.1.2.6 Physical Access for Data Decryption Server Equipment

IdenTrust does not support Data Decryption.

5.1.2.7 Physical Access for Key Recovery Equipment

IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it and is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS..

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

See details provided in the following sub-sections.

5.1.3.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility

The facility housing the IdenTrust CA, CSA, CMS, RA, and Repository equipment is supplied with air conditioning and power that is sufficient to provide a reliable operating environment. The following controls are in place to ensure that sufficient power is available to have a graceful shutdown and complete pending actions before lack of power causes a shutdown. Site power is supplied by a generating plant approximately 3-tenths of a mile away, through a substation that is approximately two-tenths of a mile away, along power lines that cross private property only and are not located near public thoroughways. In case of public power failures, a full battery backup and a diesel generator with a 4,000-gallon fuel tank for power redundancy are available. A robust uninterruptible power supply (UPS) provides temporary power for the facility and automatically activates the generator when a power failure is detected. The fuel tank can be refueled on the go for continuous service, with priority-refill contracts in place. This system is tested weekly, and under load at least annually. The secure room (where the IdenTrust CA, CSA, CMS, RA, and Repository systems are located) is controlled for humidity and temperature by an HVAC environmental system, and is kept within 2 degrees of 72 F. The relative humidity is maintained within 10% of 35%. Monitors for the environmental protection of equipment is located in the building Control Room and display the current status of the secure room environment. Operators receive visual and audible alarms when a problem is detected.

5.1.3.2 IdenTrust's Disaster Recovery Facility

The disaster recovery facility housing the IdenTrust CA, CSA, CMS, RA, and Repository equipment is supplied with air conditioning and power that is sufficient to provide a reliable operating environment. In the event of a major power outage the data center is equipped with a UPS system that is adequate to provide power until the multiple onsite generators are delivering power. The generators can be refueled on the go for continuous service, and priority-refill contracts are in place. The data center where the secure cage is located contains 10 HVAC units that control temperature, keeping it within 2 degrees of 70 F. Relative humidity is maintained within 2% of 40%.

5.1.3.3 External RA and LRA Facilities

The controls related to air conditioning installed by an External RA in Primary, Disaster Recovery and/or satellite locations should be recorded in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.4 Water Exposures

See details provided in the following sub-sections.

5.1.4.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility

To mitigate the risks of water damage, multi-user computers and communications facilities for the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Systems are housed on the second floor. Equipment sits on a raised floor approximately 18" above the concrete flooring. No water lines exist within the ceiling or overhead in any way. All environmental equipment, such as cooling equipment, is located around the outside perimeter of the data center. Restroom facilities are not located directly above the areas hosting the systems. A braided cable is located below the floor and is capable of detecting even minute amounts of water and alerting the data center operations staff. The IdenTrust secure room fire suppression provides non-liquid oxygen evacuation to stifle combustion. The only water threat to systems is humidity control equipment that employs a water-based environmental maintenance system. The water leads and piping for this equipment are below the raised floor and behind a 4-inch concrete barrier, thus isolating under-floor wiring from potential plumbing hazards.

5.1.4.2 IdenTrust's Disaster Recovery Facility

In the disaster recovery facility, equipment sits on a raised antistatic flooring approximately 24" above the concrete floor. All HVAC equipment is located at the perimeter of the data room, and adjacent areas are monitored with moisture sensors. Braided moisture sensing cable is installed in areas that may be exposed to a potential moisture risk.

5.1.4.3 External RA and LRA Facilities

The controls related to water exposure specific to an External RA, Disaster Recovery and/or satellite locations should be recorded in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

See details provided in the following sub-sections.

IdenTrust CA building facilities comply with local commercial building codes for fire prevention, protection and are audited on an annual basis.

5.1.5.1 IdenTrust's Primary Facility

IdenTrust houses its information processing facilities in a building designed to serve as a hardened data and control center for a major natural gas company in the Intermountain West. As such, the building is equipped with advanced fire response aspects including:

- Fire-retardant construction materials,
- Advanced chemical, smoke, and heat-based detection systems,
- Water-based sprinkler fire suppression in business suites,
- Inergen inert atmospheric gas fire suppression in the secure room,
- Automated fire suppression systems that are monitored by operators who can activate and respond to alerts, as needed; and
- Seismic separation between the secure room and office space, which also serves as an interstitial gap to thwart fire spread.

In addition, computer rooms (such as the secure room where CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Systems are housed) are equipped with riot doors, fire doors, and other doors resistant to forcible entry.

A description of the IdenTrust disaster recovery plan in the event a fire disaster should occur is contained in Section [5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster](#).

5.1.5.2 IdenTrust's Disaster Recovery Facility

The disaster recovery facility offers the following features for fire prevention and protection:

- Automated fire suppression systems that are monitored by operators who can activate and respond to alerts, as needed,
- Dual action, pre-action dry pipe system; and
- Certified computer room smoke detection system.

5.1.5.3 External RA and LRA Facilities

The controls related to fire prevention and protection specific to an External RA in Primary, Disaster Recovery and/or satellite locations should be recorded in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.6 Media Storage

Media used to collect or transmit information described in Section [9.4 Privacy of Personal Information](#) must be destroyed, such that the information is unrecoverable, prior to disposal.

Sensitive CA, CSA, CMS, and RA information (including audit and archive data or backup information) written to magnetic tape, Cryptomodules, or other storage media, is stored in 1 of the 2 following locations:

- within dual-control safes inside the secure room, or
- at an offsite storage facility.

Certain CA, CSA, CMS, and RA sensitive information, such as security audit logs, is written to non-rewriteable media (e.g., CD-ROM or DVD-ROM) and is placed within tamper evident bags that are tracked via custody matrix.

Within the secure room, backup copies of PKI materials, including CA, CSA and CMS Cryptomodules and activation materials, are stored within the safes using the controls described in Section [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#). All additions to, or removals from the safes are tracked with logs that require 2 Trusted Role employees to sign them acknowledging such actions. Cryptographic materials and activation materials are contained in separate safes.

The offsite storage facility is used for backup tapes and related materials, also for tertiary copies of CA, CSA, and CMS Cryptomodules and activation materials.

This facility is situated inside a solid granite mountain a sufficient distance away from the primary data center to ensure that both sites are not likely to be impacted by the same natural or manmade event. The facility was constructed for and is dedicated to vital records and information protection. The vault is designed to be unaffected by floods, earthquakes, fires, and manmade disasters.

The storage vault is constructed of cement and steel, surrounded by solid granite. Environment-related storage mechanisms include but are not limited to constant temperature and humidity, air circulation and filtration, prohibited storage of flammable items, ionization detectors and fire extinguishers and independent power sources. Thus, records are maintained in a temperature and humidity-controlled environment that meets or exceeds all federal requirements for archival storage.

The vault entrance is protected by 3 separate security gates and a 12,000-pound vault door.

Only one point of ingress and egress exists for the facility and for the vault itself. Any attempt to use explosives or other force on the gates and vault door would be detected by heat, motion, and/or seismic sensors that trigger an alarm system. Mantraps and sign-in logs are utilized for physical Access Control and auditing.

The vault is under 24-hour electronic surveillance, and it is regularly patrolled by local law enforcement during non-business hours. During business hours, an armed guard escorts all personnel entering the facility and the vault area proper. All access to the vault requires at least 24-hour advance notice.

Because both backup tapes and tertiary copies of CA, CSA, and CMS Cryptomodules and activation materials are stored in this offsite location, IdenTrust has established procedures to ensure segregation between the 2 types of materials:

- Backup tapes are transported in metal boxes with no outside hinges, and with padlocks to which only IdenTrust has the keys,
- CA, CSA, and CMS materials are transported in minisafes for which only IdenTrust has the combinations. Both combinations and keys are stored securely within the secure room,
- Neither the boxes nor the safes have external markings indicating their IdenTrust ownership or their contents,
- At the offsite facility, the backup tapes are stored in a separate location from the CA, CSA, and CMS materials; and
- At the offsite facility, the mini safes are stored within a separate vault inside the facility's main vault. Only the storage facility personnel have the combination to the separate vault, and only IdenTrust personnel have the combinations to the mini safes.

Shipment to and from the off-site location is conducted via bonded couriers who are employees of the storage facility. By policy and practice, visitors to the vault may not deposit or remove any materials directly; all materials must be transported by the facility's couriers to and from predefined destinations.

Within its office spaces, IdenTrust adheres to a strict "clean desk" policy by which all hardcopy sensitive information not in use is locked in file cabinets, desks, safes, or other furniture. Likewise, all computer media (such as tapes, CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs) containing sensitive information is locked in similar enclosures when not in use or when not in a clearly visible and attended area.

5.1.6.1 External RA and LRA Media Storage

Controls deployed by an External RA with respect to media storage must be documented in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.7 Waste Disposal

After sensitive information and documentation is no longer needed, it is securely destroyed using procedures that are approved by the Security Office and are consistent with the requirements outlined in the IGC CP.

All outdated or unnecessary copies of printed sensitive information is shredded or are disposed of in a secure waste receptacle that is shredded on-site by a bonded company that specializes in disposing of sensitive information.

When electronic media, such as hard drives that have stored sensitive CA information, reach their end of life, the data is erased, if possible, by using a secure multi-pass procedure. The media is then physically destroyed by degaussing, followed by shredding or other physical destruction approved by the Security Office. No end-of-life media that contained sensitive information leaves IdenTrust premises intact.

The Security Office is contacted for assistance in disposing of media and equipment no longer being used by the CA, CSA, and RA Systems. Such media and equipment are stored at a level of security appropriate to the level of sensitivity of information contained in the media and equipment until they can be effectively sanitized or destroyed.

Prior to destruction, Cryptomodules remain in locked safes within the secure room; sensitive backup tapes remain in the offsite secure location's vault. All Cryptomodules are Zeroized after the Keys on them are no longer needed. If Zeroization procedures fail, then they are physically destroyed.

5.1.7.1 External RA and LRA Waste Disposal

Controls deployed by an External RA with respect to waste disposal must be documented in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.1.8 Off-site Backup

The CA systems are backed up at the primary facility in Utah to a local backup server. Data is also replicated in near real time to the system at the disaster recovery site which is geographically separated from the primary facility. These system backups provide the capability to recover from a system failure. Incremental backups are performed daily. Full system backups are performed every week. Backups are sent to the offsite, hardened, secure mountain storage vault described in Section [5.1.6 Media Storage](#) at least twice a week.

At least annually, backup tapes are consolidated, and archive media is identified and stored in the off-site storage vault to satisfy IdenTrust's 10.5-year data retention schedule.

Components needed to restore the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Systems are stored in separate areas of the off-site secure vault facility. The most sensitive material, including Cryptomodules, Activation Keys, and password copies, are stored within locked mini-vaults and their combinations are under IdenTrust control. Other material is locked in metal boxes with no external hinge and secured with 2 locks, with Keys maintained under IdenTrust's normal Two-Person Control procedures. Box labeling is generic so as not to reveal IdenTrust ownership or their content.

Only those IdenTrust employees in Trusted Roles, and only with a need-to-know status as authorized by the Head of IdenTrust Operations or the Security Officer, are authorized access to the off-site storage facility. In cases where a request is made to deliver backup material to IdenTrust facilities, the request is made by a Trusted Role employee who has been previously identified to the offsite facility as one who has authority to make such a request. The offsite facility then verifies the request with a second Trusted Role employee who has been identified previously to the offsite facility as having verification authority.

5.1.8.1 External RA and LRA Off-site Backup

Controls deployed by an External RA with respect to off-site back up procedures meet the requirements of this CPS Section 5.1.8 "Off-site Backup" (above) and are documented in this Section of the External RA RPS document.

5.2 PROCEDURAL CONTROLS

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

All employees, contractors, and consultants of IdenTrust, CAs, RAs and LRAs who have access to or control over cryptographic operations that may materially affect the Issuance, use, Suspension, or Revocation of Certificates, including access to restricted operations of IdenTrust's CA, CSA, CMS, RA, LRA Systems and Repositories are, for purposes of this CPS, considered as serving in a Trusted Role. Such personnel include, but are not limited to system administration personnel, system operators, engineering personnel, and operations managers who oversee CA, RA or LRA operations. The functions and duties performed by these people are also separated and distributed so that one person alone cannot circumvent security measures or subvert the security and trustworthiness of the PKI (see Section [5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties](#)). Oversight of IdenTrust's Trusted Roles is performed by the Risk Management Committee, Operations Management, the Human Resources Department, and Executive Management.

IdenTrust maintains a list of Individuals performing each Trusted Role. The list is maintained by the Head of IdenTrust Operations, and for audit purposes, the Security Office has an updated copy of the list.

5.2.1.1 Certification Authority (CA) Trusted Roles

The responsibilities for CA functions are carried out by IdenTrust employees acting in their Trusted Roles and include administration and operation tasks described in the CP.

5.2.1.1.1 CA Administrator

The CA Administrator is a Trusted Role. The CA Administrator's responsibilities and operating procedures, as they relate to CA Operations, are as follows:

- Installation and configuration of the CA software,

- Installation and configuration of Repository software,
- Installation and configuration of the RA software (Internal RA Administrator only),
- Establishing and maintaining CA system accounts,
- Configuration of CRL parameters,
- Configuration of Certificate Profiles,
- Cross-Certificate, Root CA, and SubCA Key management (performed under Two-Person Control); and
- Cross-Certification paperwork and workflow of the Root CA and subordinate CAs by the other Bridges.

The CA Administrator ensures the IGC Root CA Keys will not be used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

- Self-Signed Certificate to represent the Root CA itself,
- Certificates for Participant CAs and SubCAs,
- Cross-Certificates,
- Certificates for infrastructure purposes (e.g., administrative role Certificates, internal CA operational Device Certificates, and OCSP Response verification Certificates) and
- Certificates that are Issued solely for the purpose of testing products with Certificates that are Issued by the Root CA.

CA Administrators do not Issue to Subscribers.

IdenTrust maintains redundancy in the role of CA Administrators. For the IGC PKI, at least 2 CA Administrators are maintained in case a primary CA Administrator is on vacation, sick, or otherwise not available.

5.2.1.1.2 CA Agent

Within IdenTrust, the CA Agent responsibilities are performed by an LRA (see Section [5.2.1.5 Card Management System \(CMS\) Roles](#)). CA Certificates generation responsibility is also shared by Help Desk Representatives

5.2.1.1.3 CA Auditor

Within IdenTrust, the CA Auditor functions are performed by the IdenTrust Security Office with oversight by the IdenTrust Security Officer

5.2.1.1.4 CA Operator

Within IdenTrust, the CA Operator functions are divided between the CA Administrator and the System Administrator. See Section [5.2.1.5 Card Management System \(CMS\) Roles](#) for details on CA Operator's tasks performed by the System Administrator.

5.2.1.2 Registration Authority Trusted Roles

An RA who is considered a Trusted Agent as defined in Section [5.2.1.1 Certification Authority \(CA\) Trusted Roles](#), is responsible for:

- Verifying initial identity, as described in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#),
- Entering Subscriber information, and verifying correctness,
- Securely communicating requests to and responses from the CA,
- Receiving and distributing Subscriber certificates.

5.2.1.3 Key Recovery Trusted Roles

The RA Role at IdenTrust can also act as a Key Recovery Agent, however, while IdenTrust supports the escrow of encryption keys for enterprise entities who may need it, the recovery of escrowed keys is the responsibility of the enterprise entity via CMS.

5.2.1.4 Certification Status Authority (CSA) Trusted Roles

The responsibilities for CSA functions are carried out by IdenTrust employees acting in their Trusted Roles and include administration and operation tasks described in the CP.

5.2.1.4.1 CSA Administrator

Within IdenTrust, CA Administrators also carry out the responsibilities of the CSA Administrator. The CSA Administrator responsibilities and operating procedures performed by IdenTrust CA Administrators, as they relate to CSA Operation, are as follows:

- Installation, configuration, and maintenance of the CSA software,
- Generating and backing up CSA Keys (performed under Two-Person Control),
- Management of CSA Key and Certificate lifecycle, including Key recovery and renewal of OCSP Responder Certificates (performed under Two-Person Control),
- Establishing and maintaining system accounts and configuring audit parameters; and
- Operation of the CSA equipment.

5.2.1.4.2 CSA Agent

Within IdenTrust the CA Agent and the CSA Agent are equivalent and interchangeable. See Section [5.2.1.1.2 CA Agent](#).

5.2.1.4.3 CSA Auditor

Within IdenTrust, the CSA Auditor functions are performed by the IdenTrust Security Officer with oversight by the IdenTrust Security Officer.

5.2.1.4.4 CSA Operator

Within IdenTrust the CA Operator and the CSA Operator are equivalent and interchangeable. See Section [5.2.1.1.4 CA Operator](#).

5.2.1.5 Card Management System (CMS) Roles

The responsibilities for CMS functions are carried out by IdenTrust employees acting in their Trusted Roles and include administration and operation tasks described in the CP.

5.2.1.5.1 CMS Administrator

Within IdenTrust, CA Administrators also carry out the responsibilities of the CMS Administrator. The CMS Administrator responsibilities and operating procedures performed by IdenTrust CA Administrators, as they relate to CMS Operation, are as follows:

- Installing and maintaining the CMS,
- Establishing and maintaining CMS accounts,
- Configuring CMS applications and audit parameters; and
- Generating and backing up CMS Keys.

5.2.1.5.2 CMS Auditor

Within IdenTrust, the CMS Auditor functions are performed by the IdenTrust Security Office with oversight by the IdenTrust Security Officer (see Section 5.2.1.5.3 CMS Operator (below)).

5.2.1.5.3 CMS Operator

Within IdenTrust, the CMS Operator functions are performed by the System Administrators.

5.2.1.6 Registration Authority (RA) Administrator

The RAs operating under this policy are subject to the stipulations of the CP and this CPS. In cases where the RA is

external to IdenTrust, the RA is obligated by contract and policy to comply with the CP and this CPS.

5.2.1.7 Local Registration Authority (LRA)

An LRA is a Trusted Role and performs the roles, responsibilities, and operating procedures, as they relate to RA Operations, are as follows:

- Confirming identity via review and approval of documents submitted by TAs and Licensed Notaries,
- Entering Subscriber information, verifying correctness, and approving requests,
- Securely communicating requests to and responses from the CA system,
- Receiving and distributing Certificates,
- Authentication of identity upon request for Revocation and executing Revocation,
- Archival of Subscriber authentication information (i.e., copies of paper forms, etc.),
- Operation of the LRA Systems and Cryptomodules; and
- Generation of Cross-Certificate, the External Root CA and Subordinate CA's, Re-Keying and Revocation (performed under Two-Person Control).

5.2.1.8 Quality Assurance Personnel

As Quality Assurance Personnel roles perform functions that, if not carried out properly, can introduce security problems, whether accidentally or maliciously, controls are in place requiring approval from the Operations Management Personnel role prior to the introduction of code to Staging and Production environments.

All such controls are audited annually by a third-party auditor as part of the WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, in compliance with the ISO 21188 Public Key Policy and Practices Framework standard.

Quality Assurance Personnel have the following tasks:

- Develop and execute test plans,
- Identify and document defects,
- Conduct Functional, regression, performance and user acceptance testing,
- Collaborate with cross-functional teams including developers, product managers and other stake holders,
- Maintain testing environments,
- Report and track quality metrics
- Lead Change Management from code freeze through Production deployment.

5.2.1.9 Trusted Agent (TA)

A Trusted Agent is a person authorized to act as a representative of an LRA or RA in providing Subscriber identity verification during the registration process. Trusted Agents do not have automated interfaces with CAs; they act on the behalf of the LRA/RA only to verify the identity of the Subscriber. Trusted Agents are not subject to Background Checks or Security Clearance. The Trusted Agent is not a Trusted Role. TAs differ from LRAs in that they do not have privileged access to the CA system to take action to approve, reject or revoke Certificates.

5.2.1.10 Other Roles

The Trusted Role titles are defined in governing CP documents; however, the titles of individuals within IdenTrust or an External RA who perform the duties associated with the CP-defined Trusted Roles do not align on a one-to-one basis. Additionally, there are other internally defined roles that are required to support the CA and/or RA operation. The following sub-sections describe other roles that have been defined as key to the IdenTrust CA and/or RA operation and fulfill the duties of the Trusted Roles as defined in by governing CP documents.

IdenTrust's System Administrators are responsible for the following:

- Installation and configuration of operating systems, and databases,
- Installation, configuration of applications and initial setting up of new accounts,
- Performance of system backups, software upgrades, patches, and system recoverability,

- Secure storage and distribution of backups and upgrades to an off-site location,
- Performing the daily incremental database backups; and
- Administrative functions such as time services and maintaining the database.

5.2.1.9.1 External RA Administrator

The RA Administrator of an External RA is a Trusted Role with duties for the RA that are similar to those of the CA Administrator for IdenTrust, including the following responsibilities and operating procedures:

- Installation, configuration, and maintenance of software on the RA System,
- Generating and managing Keys and the Certificate lifecycle of the RA System; and
- Secure operation and management of the RA System, including patch management, backup, system logging and physical and logical security.

5.2.1.9.2 IdenTrust Internal RA Administrator

The responsibility for RA operations within IdenTrust is carried out by the CA Administrator and, in the case of specific implementations, PKI Consultants. All RAs are required to comply with all RA requirements as outlined in the CP and this CPS.

5.2.1.9.3 Network Engineer

IdenTrust's Network Engineers are responsible for:

- Initial installation and configuration of the network routers and switching equipment, configuration of initial host and network interface,
- Installation, configuration, and maintenance of firewalls, domain name services (DNS) and load balancing appliances,
- Creation of devices to support recovery from catastrophic system loss; and
- Changing the host or network interface configuration.

5.2.1.9.4 Security Officer

IdenTrust's Security Office is comprised of a number of Security Officers responsible for reviewing the audit logs recorded by CA, CSA, CMS and RA Systems and actions of administrators and operators during the performance of some of their duties. The Security Office operates under the oversight of the IdenTrust Security Officer and the IdenTrust Head of Operations.

A Security Officer reviews logs for events such as the following:

- Requests to and responses from the CA system,
- The Issuance of Certificates,
- Repeated failed actions,
- Requests for privileged information,
- Attempted access of system files, IdenTrust databases or the External RA database,
- Receipt of improper messages,
- Suspicious modifications,
- Performance of archive and delete functions of the audit log and other archive data as described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5; and
- Administrative functions such as compromise reporting.

The Security Officer performs or oversees internal compliance audits to ensure that CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA Systems are operating in accordance with this CPS, CP, and any Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) applicable to the operation of the IdenTrust IGC PKI.

5.2.1.9.5 Help Desk Representative

IdenTrust's Help Desk Representatives perform the following duties:

- Troubleshooting of Certificate lifecycle events problems,
- Maintaining Subscriber account information within the RA System,
- Initiating Revocation processes,
- Initiating Suspension processes,
- Initiating escalation of suspected Private Key compromise, or other reasons for potential Certificate Revocation,
- Generation of the IGC Root CA Certificate, SubCA or Participant CA Certificates, CA Certificate Re-Key, and Revocation of CA Certificates (all CA Certificate lifecycle events performed under Two-Person Control); and
- Generation of the CMS Certificates and Revocation of CMS Certificates (all CMS Certificate lifecycle events performed under Two-Person Control).

5.2.1.9.6 PKI Consultant

PKI Consultants are IdenTrust employees who coordinate the processes needed to securely on-board new CAs, RAs and LRAs. PKI Consultant responsibilities include:

- Installation and configuration of RA software connecting to CA system and IdenTrust RA System administration.
- Helping distribute Cryptomodules containing RA System Keys; and
- Configuring RA System access rights to CA-provided services.

5.2.1.9.7 Operations Manager

A list of IdenTrust Operations Managers (i.e., Head of IdenTrust Operations and other Operations designees below the IdenTrust Head of Operations) is kept at all times as approved and authorized by the Head of IdenTrust Business Segment. The Operations Manager performs the following duties:

- Provides internal audit oversight, and works closely with external auditors as needed,
- Handles approval/removal of Network, System and CA Administrators as well as Help Desk Representatives and LRAs,
- Acts as custodian of Activation Data for administrative Cryptomodules used with CA software,
- Works closely with the Security Officer to review requests for privileged information or sensitive system-related requests; and
- Participates as an active member of the Risk Management Committee.

5.2.1.9.8 Software Engineer

Software Engineers, also known as developers, have the following tasks:

- Build clean and efficient code based on user needs,
- Test software and debug for any issues,
- Collaborate with other developers, managers, systems personnel, and UX designers in building software,
- Identify and deploy software tools, systems, and components,
- Implement quality assurance standards,
- Write and update technical documentation; and
- Handle incident response and incident management.

As Software Engineer roles perform functions that can introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously, controls are in place requiring approval from the Security Officer or from Operations Manager roles prior to the execution of any tasks that bridge Software Engineer roles.

All such controls are audited annually by a third-party auditor as part of the WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, in compliance with the *ISO 21188 Public Key Policy and Practices Framework* standard.

5.2.1.9.9 Development Operations (DevOps)

DevOps roles have the following tasks:

- Provide infrastructure and automation to support software development and deployment of applications,
- Coding to support process automation, i.e., infrastructure as code,
- Collaborate with other developers, managers, and technical operations,
- Identify and deploy software tools, systems, and components,
- Implement quality assurance standards,
- Write and update technical documentation; and
- Handle incident response and incident management.

As DevOps roles perform functions that can introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously, controls are in place requiring approval from the Security Officer or from Operations Manager roles prior to execution of any tasks that bridge DevOps roles.

All such controls are audited annually by a third-party auditor as part of the WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, in compliance with *the ISO 21188 Public Key Policy and Practices Framework standard*.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

IdenTrust has procedural and operational mechanisms in place for both Basic and Medium (all policies) to ensure that the appropriate Individual or individuals, may perform basic and/or sensitive activities. These mechanisms apply principles of Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control and require the actions of multiple persons to perform such sensitive tasks as:

- Handling of CA, CSA, RA, CMS, and Content Signing Keys throughout the entire Key lifecycles from Generation and activation, into secure storage, through to eventual destruction; and
- Non-automated (manual) Certificate Issuance processes.

Physical and logical Access Controls are invoked to maintain Multi-party Control over CA, CSA, and CMS Cryptomodules (see Sections [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#) and [6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control](#)). Generation, backup, or activation of the Certificate Signing Private Keys requires the actions of at least 2 Individuals, one of whom is a CA Administrator and the other who may not be a Security Officer.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

The requirements for vetting personnel in Trusted Roles are found below in Sections [5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience and Clearance Requirements](#) and [5.3.2 Background Check Procedures](#). Identification and authentication for logical and physical access to CA system resources is described in this Section. In accordance with IdenTrust's security policies, IdenTrust CA personnel must first authenticate themselves before they are:

1. Included in the access list for any component of the CA system,
2. Included in the access list for physical access to a component of the CA system,
3. Issued a Certificate for the performance of their Trusted Role,
4. Given an account on a computer connected to the CA system, or
5. Otherwise granted physical or logical access to a component of the CA system.

Each of these access methods (Certificates and system accounts) are:

1. Directly attributable to the Individual,
2. Password protected,
3. Not shared; and
4. Restricted to actions authorized for that role using CA software, operating system, and procedural controls.

If accessed across shared networks, CA operations are secured, using Cryptomodules, strong system authentication, and AES encrypted SSH connections.

Individuals who administer a CMS or RA System are allowed access only when authenticated using an IGC Certificate of the highest Assurance Level as Issued by the CA in connection with the CMS or RA.

Individuals who access a CMS or RA System to perform RA functions are allowed access only when authenticated using an IGC Certificate of an Assurance Level equal to or higher than the Assurance Level of the Certificates for which services are performed by that individual.

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Trusted Roles maintain strict Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control. These controls are audited annually by a third-party auditor as part of the audits performed; see “Table 18 – Required Best-Practices Annual Audits” in Section [8.0 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#), Compliance Audit and Other Assessments, which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

Roles requiring separation of duties include (but are not limited to):

- **CA/CSA/CMS Administrator.** No person participating as IdenTrust CA/CSA/CMS Administrator will assume the role of Security Officer, LRA, Network Engineer, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Operations Manager.
- **Local Registration Authority.** An LRA may not assume an Operations Manager, CA/CSA/CMS Administrator, RA Administrator, System Administrator, Network Engineer, Security Officer, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or management oversight role (Risk Management, Operations Management, Human Resources, or Executive Management).
- **RA Administrator** (whether an IdenTrust Internal RA Administrator or an External RA Administrator). An RA Administrator may not assume the Operations Manager, LRA, Network Engineer, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Security Officer role.
- **System Administrator.** A System Administrator may not assume the Security Officer, LRA, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Operations Manager role.
- **Network Engineer.** The Network Engineer may not assume the Security Officer, LRA, CA/CSA/CMS Administrator, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Operations Manager role.
- **Security Officer.** The Security Officer may not serve in any other trusted role (e.g., the roles of CA/CSA/CMS Administrator, LRA, RA Administrator, Systems Administrator, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Network Engineer).
- **Help Desk Representative.** Help Desk Representatives may not serve in the role of CA/CSA/CMS Administrator, RA Administrator, System Administrator, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Network Engineer.
- **PKI Consultant.** PKI Consultants may not serve in the roles of CA/CSA/CMS Administrators, System Administrators, Network Administrators, Software Engineer, Development Operations, and Security Officers.
- **Operations Manager.** The Operations Manager may not serve as CA/CSA/CMS Administrator, Systems Administrator, LRA, Software Engineer, Development Operations, or Network Engineer.
- **Software Engineer.** Software Engineers may not assume any other roles.
- **Quality Assurance Personnel.** Quality Assurance Personnel may not serve in the roles of Security Officer, Software Engineer, Development Operations or Operations Management Personnel.
- **Development Operations (DevOps).** Development Operations may also serve only as System Administrator or Network Engineer, performing such additional role tasks.

CA systems also identify and authenticate users and ensure through Access Controls and policy that no user identity can assume both the Administrator and Officer, the Administrator and Auditor, or the Officer and Auditor roles. Additional Separation-of-Duties controls are described in Section [5.2.1 Trusted Roles](#) above.

Separation of duties between System Administrators and CA/CSA/CMS Administrators is further enforced separating the servers' root-level access and administrative passwords for the function running on the server (i.e., CA, CSA, CMS, etc.). Without the cooperation of both administrators, IdenTrust software is inoperable for purposes of processing requests, generating responses, generating Certificates and CRLs, re-keying, and designating LRAs.

5.3 PERSONNEL CONTROLS

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience and Clearance Requirements

Personnel for Trusted Roles are identified in a list as described in Section [5.2.1 Trusted Roles](#). Trusted Roles are selected based on trustworthiness and integrity as described in Section [5.3.2 Background Check Procedures](#). Personnel who administer or operate components of the CA, CSA, CMS, and IdenTrust RA Systems, including LRAs, are under the direct control of IdenTrust and meet the following requirements:

- Successful completion of appropriate training programs,
- Demonstrated ability to perform duties, as indicated by annual performance reviews,
- Trustworthiness as initially determined by a background investigation,
- No other duties that would interfere or conflict with the duties of their Trusted Role,
- Not previously relieved of duties in a Trusted Role for reasons of negligence or non-performance of duties as indicated by employment records,
- Not convicted of a felony offense as indicated by a criminal background check,
- Appointed in writing by Operations Management or pursuant to written contract with IdenTrust or in a Certificate of Incumbency, as evidenced by records maintained for such purpose by such Organization; and
- Hold United States citizenship*.

For External RAs, the Trusted Roles including RA administrators and LRAs are required to demonstrate compliance with at least one of the following:

- The person must be a citizen of the country* where the RA is located,
- For PKIs operated on behalf of multinational Governmental Organizations, the person shall be a citizen of one of the member countries; or
- For PKIs located within the European Union, the person must be a citizen of one of the member states of the European Union; or
- The person must have a security clearance equivalent to U.S. Secret or higher Issued by a NATO member nation or major non-NATO ally as defined by then International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) – 22 CFR 120.32; or
- For RA Administrator and LRAs, in addition to the above, the person may be a citizen of the country where the function is located.

***NOTE:** For PKIs operated only at IGC Basic Software, IGC Medium-CBP and IGC Medium Hardware-CBP Assurance Levels, there is no citizenship requirement or security clearance required.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

Individuals appointed by IdenTrust to serve in Trusted Roles have undergone local and national criminal background checks and drug tests in conformance with the jurisdictions in which they reside. The following items are examples of the background checks IdenTrust makes:

- A criminal history check, performed through a commercial database, must show no felony convictions.
- Driver's license records, checked through a commercial database, will indicate whether the person has a record of serious or criminal driving violations.
- A Social Security trace must show that the person has a valid social security number. This check is required only if the country in which the duty is performed has social security numbers or similar identifiers.

- A verification check of the highest educational degree claimed by the Individual must show that the degree was indeed awarded, regardless of the date of award.
- Reference checks

The period of investigation covers at least the previous 5 years for employment, education, criminal, and references, and the previous 3 years for places of residence. Adjudication of the background investigation is performed by a competent adjudication authority using a process consistent with U.S. Executive Order 12968, or equivalent.

RAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract of this CPS, and the IGC CP to implement background check procedures equivalent to the ones explained above. To the extent that any of the foregoing cannot be met due to circumstances peculiar to that party, substantially similar procedures must be performed and may include background checks performed by Government Agencies or other competent providers of such services in their jurisdictions.

Background checks are renewed at a minimum every 10 years. Additional checks may be performed at management's sole discretion. A successfully adjudicated National Agency Check with Written Inquires (NACI) or National Agency Check with Law Enforcement Check (NACLIC) on record is deemed to have met the minimum standards specified above. If a National Agency Check with Written Inquires (NACI) or National Agency Check with Law Enforcement Check (NACLIC) is the basis for background check, the background refresh must be in accordance with the corresponding formal clearance. If the initial or subsequent background checks reveal a material misrepresentation by the Individual, substantially unfavorable comments from persons contacted, a criminal conviction, or personal financial problems, then the Issue is brought to the attention of the Chief Information Officer and the Security Office, who will evaluate the severity, type, magnitude, and frequency of the behavior or actions of the Individual and determine the appropriate action to be taken, which may include removal from a Trusted Role.

The acquisition and use of all background check information is in accordance with stipulations in Section [9.4 Privacy of Personal Information of](#) this CPS.

5.3.3 Training Requirements

Each person performing duties with respect to the operation of the CA, CSA, RA, and LRA receives comprehensive training regarding such duties. Training is conducted regarding security principles and procedures (including Key recovery when applicable), understanding common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and other social engineering tactics), PKI hardware and software versions used, stipulations of the applicable policy documents (CP and CPS) and disaster recovery and business continuity procedures. IdenTrust maintains records of the training received by persons in Trusted Roles and other important roles. External RAs are obligated by contract and this CPS and the CP to maintain a record of training provided to such personnel. Specific additional areas are covered for each role as outlined in the following sub-sections.

5.3.3.1 CA Administrators

CA Administrators receive training associated with the following topics:

- Sub CA generation (including Key Pair generation) re-keying and revocation,
- Performing any required daily maintenance or other CA-related administrative functions,
- Hardware Cryptographic Module Configuration and programming,
- Key Pair Generation and Certificate Issuance, Re-Keying and Revocation of Root CA, SubCAs, CSAs and CMSs,
- Configuration and posting of Certificates and CRLs,
- Daily maintenance and other CA-, CSA-, CMS-related administrative functions,
- Initializing CA, CSA, and CMS hardware; and
- Key recovery.

5.3.3.2 LRAs

LRAs and TAs receive training associated with the following topics:

- Verifying identity, either through personal contact or through TAs,
- Understanding common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and other social engineering tactics),
- Entering user information and verifying correctness,
- Securely communicating requests to and responses from CAs,
- Confirming identity, either through personal contact or through TAs,
- Entry of Applicant information and verifying correctness,
- Securely handling requests to and responses from CAs,
- The Certificate Revocation process; and
- The Certificate Issuance process.

5.3.3.3 RA Administrators

RA Administrators receive training associated with the following topics:

- Operating systems, software applications and hardware (including Cryptomodules) used within the RA System, including but not limited to those components that perform enrollment services, card or Cryptomodule personalization services, Certificate delivery services, backup, logging, security, and Key storage,
- Key Pair Generation and Certificate Issuance, Re-Keying and Revocation of Subscriber Certificates, including configuration and use of the RA System to Digitally Sign and receive communications from the CA system,
- Security threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures, including but not limited to implementation of security policies and practices, physical and logical Access Controls, and system monitoring; and
- Key recovery.

5.3.3.4 System Administrators

System Administrators receive training associated with the following topics:

- Operating systems and software applications used within the PKI systems,
- Backup applications and procedures,
- Use of database tools including reporting and maintenance,
- Restriction for privileged system use; and
- Generation of audit data.

5.3.3.5 Network Engineers

Network Engineers receive training associated with the following topics:

- IdenTrust Network architecture and equipment,
- Proper secure network and switching configuration and,
- Privacy requirements for network transmissions, and Intrusion detection monitoring.

5.3.3.6 Security Officers

Security Officers receive training associated with the following topics:

- Security risk assessment and analysis,
- Security policies and guidelines,
- Computer attack trends, security threats and vulnerabilities,
- Physical security and physical Access Controls,
- Networks, distributed systems trust relationships, PKI, and cryptosystems,
- Open PKI and cryptosystems,

- Firewalls and other network security devices,
- Event logging and auditing,
- Incident response and contingency planning; and
- Access, physical controls, and security threats, and
- Key recovery

5.3.3.7 Help Desk Representatives

Help Desk Representatives receive training associated with the following topics:

- End user systems,
- Proper and secure handling of sensitive customer information; and
- Use of trouble-tracking software.

5.3.3.8 Operations Management Personnel

Operations Management Personnel receive training associated with the following topics:

- Operating systems and software applications used within the PKI system,
- Network architecture; and
- Audit and risk management oversight.

5.3.3.9 Trusted Agents

Trusted Agents receive training associated with the following topics:

- Confirming identity, and providing identity information to LRAs or Ras,
- Securely handling requests to and responses from LRAs or RAs; and
- Securely handling distribution and collection of Cryptomodules.

5.3.3.10 Software Engineer

Any employee serving as a Software Engineer role will maintain training in the following areas:

- OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks; and
- OWASP Top 10 API Security Risks

5.3.3.11 Development Operations (DevOps)

Any employee serving as DevOps role will maintain training in the following areas:

- Security risk assessment and analysis,
- Security policies and guidelines,
- Logging and auditing,
- Physical security,
- Computer attack trends and vulnerabilities,
- Basic PKI and cryptosystems,
- Proper secure handling of sensitive customer information; and
- Issue tracking software.

5.3.3.12 Enterprise RA

- Verifying Certificate requests, employment, and FQDN(s),
- Understanding common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and other social engineering tactics),
- Entering of Applicant/PKI Sponsors information and verifying correctness,
- Securely handling requests to and responses from CAs,
- Executing the Certificate Revocation process,
- Completing the Certificate Issuance process; and

- Understanding the requirements in the TrustID CP for Identity Proofing of Certificate Issuance and passing IdenTrust training covering those requirements.

5.3.3.13 Quality Assurance Personnel

- Develop and execute test plans,
- Identify and document defects,
- Conduct functional, regression, performance and user acceptance testing,
- Collaborate with cross-functional teams including developers, product managers and other stakeholders,
- Maintain test environments,
- Report and track quality metrics
- Lead Change Management from code freeze through Production deployment.

5.3.3.14 Customer Support Representative

Customer Support Representatives receive training associated with the following topics

- Proper and secure handling of sensitive customer information; and
- Use of trouble-tracking software.

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Personnel receive additional training, when any significant change (e.g., a planned upgrade of CA equipment, software, or changes in procedures) to the CA, CSA, CMS, RA or LRA Systems takes place. Through the change control processes (see Section [6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls](#)), an awareness plan is prepared and training provided to affected personnel. IdenTrust maintains records of the training.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

Job rotation is implemented by management to ensure the continuity and integrity of PKI-related services but is not required at any specific frequency.

Job rotation must not violate role separation. All access rights associated with a previous role must be terminated.

All job rotations are documented. Individuals assuming an auditor role must not audit their own work from a previous role.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

Failure of a Subscriber, an individual performing a Trusted Role, an agent of IdenTrust, a CA, RA, or agent of an RA to comply with the provisions of the IGC CP or this CPS, whether through negligence or malicious intent, will subject such entity or Individual to appropriate administrative and disciplinary actions, which may include termination as an employee or agent and possible civil and criminal sanctions. Any Individual performing a Trusted Role who is cited by management for unauthorized or inappropriate actions, unsatisfactory background investigation results, or similar infractions of IdenTrust policy and procedure will be immediately removed from the Trusted Role pending management review. Subsequent to management review, review of investigation results, discussions with the Individual, and/or discussions with the relevant CA or RA, the Individual may be reassigned to the Trusted Role, transferred to a non-trusted role, removed from ACLs, or dismissed from employment as appropriate.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

IdenTrust policy firmly discourages the use of independent contractors in any Trusted Role. Independent contractors who are assigned to perform Trusted Roles are subject to the duties and all requirements of this CPS. Independent contractors are subject to sanctions stated in Section [5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions](#) or

failure to comply with the provisions of the CP, this CPS, or the contract between IdenTrust or the relevant CA or RA and the independent contractor.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

Personnel in Trusted Roles are provided with the documentation necessary to define and support the duties and procedures of the role to which they are assigned. IdenTrust provides a copy of the IGC CP, this CPS and technical and operational documentation needed to fulfill their tasks. The information may be provided in print or online and may consist of internal IdenTrust systems and security documentation, IdenTrust policies and procedures, discipline-specific books, treatises and periodicals, and other information developed by or supplied to IdenTrust, or the CA or RA that is relevant to the role being performed. Participant CAs or RAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, the IGC CP, and this CPS to provide to their LRAs all relevant documentation, policies, contracts, and forms required to perform their duties.

5.4 AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES

For purposes of security audit, events related to operation of the IdenTrust PKI are recorded as described in this Section, whether the events are attributable to human action (in any role) or are automatically invoked by the equipment that is used to register Applicants, generate, sign, and manage Certificates and provide Revocation information. Where possible, the audit data is automatically collected; when this is not possible, a logbook or other physical mechanism is used. All security logs, both electronic and non-electronic, are retained in accordance with requirements of Section [5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Logs](#) and are made available during compliance audits. IdenTrust operates some components in a virtual machine environment (VME). In these cases, audit logs are generated for all applicable events on both the virtual machine (VM) and isolation kernel (i.e., hypervisor).

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

All systems require I&A when logging on with a unique username and password (or the use of Cryptomodules). The accessing of systems, equipment and applications is logged to establish the accountability of system operators who initiate system actions.

IdenTrust's CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment, inclusive of operating systems, routers, firewalls, applications, databases, and all physical access checkpoints automatically record all significant events related to the operations (installation, modification, and system accesses). For all systems, the minimum information recorded includes the following: type of event, date, and time when event occurred; source of the event; where the event occurred (e.g., on what systems or in what physical locations); Identity of any individuals, subjects, or objects/entities associated with the event; and outcome of the event to include a success or failure indication. For some types of events, these minimums may be expanded to include, source or destination of a message, and the disposition of a created object (e.g., a filename).

Any request or action requiring the use of a private Key controlled by the CA is an auditable event.

If out-of-band processes are used for authorization of Certificate issuance, external artifacts from the process (e.g., forms, emails, etc.) must be recorded.

IdenTrust and RAs external to IdenTrust are required by the IGC CP and this CPS to configure the systems to automatically log the PKI component events as described above and the specific audit events as described in the table below. If not automatically possible to log events, events must be logged manually.

Table 7: Types of Events Recorded

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
1	SECURITY AUDIT					

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
1.a	Any changes to the audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of event audited— The operating system and applications automatically record modifications made to audit parameters; including date and time of modification, type of event, success or failure indication and identification of user making modification;	X	X	X	X	X
1.b	Any attempt to delete or modify the audit logs— The operating system automatically records all attempted modifications made to security audit configurations and files, including date and time of modification, type of event, success or failure indication and identification of user making modification;	X	X	X	X	X
1.c	Obtaining a thirdparty time-stamp -	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2	IDENTITY PROOFING	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
2.a	Successful and unsuccessful attempts to assume a role – The operating system and applications automatically record the date and time of attempted login, username asserted at time of attempted login, and success or failure indication, are automatically logged by the CA, CSA, CMS and RA/LRA.	X	X	X	X	X
2.b	The value of maximum number of authentication attempts is changed— date and time, type of event, and identification of user making modification are logged automatically by the operating system logging facility. Changes in configuration files, security profiles and administrator privileges are logged through a combination of automatic and manual logging. All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
2.c	Maximum number of authentication attempts occur during user login— date and time of attempted login, username asserted at time of attempted login, and failure recorded automatically by the operating system and application audit logs.	X	X	X	X	X
2.d	An administrator unlocks an account that has been locked as a result of unsuccessful authentication attempts— date and time of event and identification of account holder and administrator are logged automatically by the operating system.	X	X	X	X	X
2.e	An administrator changes the type of authenticator, e.g., from a password to a biometric— date and time, type of event, and identification of user making modification are logged automatically by the operating system and manually through change management procedures. Changes in configuration files, security profiles and administrator privileges are logged through a combination of operating system and manual change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
3	LOCAL DATA ENTRY	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
3.a	All security-relevant data that is entered in the system – the system records the identity of the local operator performing local data entry so that the accepted data can be associated with the operator in the audit log.	X	X	X	X	X
4	REMOTE DATA ENTRY AND OUTPUT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
4.a	All security-relevant messages that are received by the system— date and time, digital signature/authentication mechanism, and message are automatically logged by the application	X	X	X	X	X

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
5	DATA EXPORT AND OUTPUT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
5.a	All successful and unsuccessful requests for confidential and security-relevant information— date and time of attempted access, username or identity asserted at time of attempt, record of success or failure, logged through a combination of automatic and manual logging. Manual logging by Security Team also collects name of person reporting the event and resolution.	X	X	X	X	X
6	KEY GENERATION	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
6.a	Whenever a component generates a Key (not mandatory for single session or one-time use symmetric Keys) – CA system automatically records all significant events related to CA operations, including Key Generation. Additionally, manual and audiovisual records of CA, CSA and CMS Key Generation are created. RA System and LRA Key and Certificate generation events are automatically recorded by the CA system.	X	X	X	X	X
7	PRIVATE KEY LOAD AND STORAGE	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
7.a	The loading of Component Private Keys – An auditable log of all physical access to production CA, CSA, RA, and CMS Cryptomodules is maintained, which records action taken, date and time action was taken and name of person who performed action. An electronic log of access to the LRA’s Cryptomodule is maintained by the RA System that is accessed.	X	X	X	X	X
7.b	All access to Certificate subject Private Keys retained within the CA for Key recovery purposes – Date, time, messages between the CA and the requesting component and indicator of success or failure are automatically logged.	X	X	-	-	-
8	TRUSTED PUBLIC KEY ENTRY, DELETION AND STORAGE	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
8.a	All changes to the trusted component Public Keys, including additions and deletions, are automatically logged through the applications or through manual change management processes and authorization forms.	X	X	X	X	X
9	SECRET KEY STORAGE	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
9.a	The manual entry of secret Keys used for authentication— secret Keys (PED keys) used to access the CA’s Cryptomodules is maintained under separate control from the CA’s Cryptomodule in accordance with the principles of Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control stated in Section 5.2. An auditable log of the use of PED keys for authentication is maintained, which records action taken, date and time action were taken and name of person who performed the action.	X	X	X	X	X
10	PRIVATE AND SECRET KEY EXPORT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
10.a	The export of private and secret Keys (Keys used for a single session or message are excluded) private and secret Key export involving the CA, CSA, RA, and CMS’s Cryptomodules take place in accordance with the principles of Separation of Duties/Multi-party Control stated in Section 5.2. An auditable log is maintained, which records the action taken, date and time the action was taken, and name of person who performed the action.	X	X	X	X	X

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
11	CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
11.a	All Certificate requests – All Certificate requests including: date and time of request, type of event, and request information automatically logged by the application. This includes initial application, Issuance, Renewal, and Re-Key requests as well as sender/requester DN, Certificate serial number, date and time of response and success or failure indication are automatically logged by the application; manual interactions with PKI Participants such as telephone or in person inquiries and results of verification calls will be logged manually in a logbook or in a computer-based recording/tracking system and include date/time, description of interaction and identity provided.	X	X	-	X	X
12	CERTIFICATE REVOCATION	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
12.a	All Certificate Revocation requests – All Certificate Revocation requests including: Date and time of Revocation request, sender/requester DN, Certificate serial number, subjectDN of Certificate to Revoke, End Entity's common name, Revocation reason, date and time of response and success or failure indication are automatically logged by the application; manual interactions with requestors such as telephone or in person inquiries and requests for Revocation are logged manually in a logbook or in a computer-based recording/tracking system. The date/time, description of interaction and identity provided are also recorded.	X	X	-	X	X
13	CERTIFICATE STATUS CHANGE APPROVAL	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
13.a	All records related to the approval or rejection of a Certificate status change request— identity of equipment operator who initiated the request, message contents, message source, destination, and success or failure indication are automatically logged by the application.	X	X	-	-	-
14	CA COMPONENT CONFIGURATION	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
14.a	Any security-relevant changes to the configuration of a system component – date and time of modification, name of modifier, description of modification, build information (i.e., size, version number) of any modified files and the reason for modification are manually logged during change management process.	X	X	X	X	X
15	ACCOUNT ADMINISTRATION	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
15.a	Roles and users are added or deleted – date and time, type of event, and identification of user making modification are logged automatically and manually. Changes roles are logged through a combination of automatic and manual logging. All changes are manually logged through change management procedures. Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for change of role, and authorization and approval records.	X	X	-	-	-

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
15.b	The Access Control privileges of a user account or a role are modified – date and time, type of event, and identification of user making modification are logged automatically and manually. Changes in configuration files, security profiles and administrator privileges are logged through a combination of automatic and manual logging. All changes are manually logged through change management procedures. Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for modification and authorization and approval records.	X	X	-	-	-
16	CERTIFICATE PROFILE MANAGEMENT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
16.a	All changes to the Certificate Profiles – Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for modification and authorization and approval records.	X	-	-	-	-
17	CERTIFICATE STATUS AUTHORITY PROFILE MANAGEMENT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
17.a	All changes to the Certificate status authority profile-- Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for modification and authorization and approval records.	-	-	X	-	-
18	REVOCAION PROFILE MANAGEMENT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
18.a	All changes to the Revocation profile-- Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for modification and authorization and approval records.	X	-	-	-	-
19	CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST PROFILE MANAGEMENT	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
19.a	All changes to the Certificate Revocation list profile-- Change management records capture date and time and type of change, reason for modification and authorization and approval records.	X	-	X	-	-
20	MISCELLANEOUS	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
20.a	A message from any source received by the CA requesting an action related to the operational state of the CA – date of the message, source of the message, message request and message authorization are electronically and/or manually logged.	X	-	-	-	-
20.b	Appointment of an Individual to a Trusted Role – date of the appointment, name of the appointee and authorizing signature are manually logged.	X	X	X	X	X
20.c	Appointment of an Individual to a multi-Person Role – date of the appointment, name of the appointee and authorizing signature are manually logged.	X	X	-	X	-
20.d	Installation of the Operating System -date and time of server installation, name of installer, and details of installation process are manually recorded during installation. The automatic security auditing capabilities of the underlying operating system hosting the software are enabled during installation. All changes are also manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
20.e	Installation of the PKI Application-- date and time of installation, name of installer, and details of installation process are manually recorded during installation. All changes are also manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	-

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
20.f	Installation of Cryptomodules— a manual list of Cryptomodules is maintained, and the list records action taken, date and time action were taken and name of person who performed action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.g	Removal of Cryptomodules— a manual list of Cryptomodules is maintained, and the list records action taken, date and time action were taken and name of person who performed action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.h	Destruction of Cryptomodules— a manual list of Cryptomodules is maintained, and the list records action taken, date and time action were taken and name of person who performed action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.i	System Startup – date and time of system startup is automatically logged in the system’s event log	X	X	X	X	X
20.j	Logon attempts to PKI Application— CA, CSA, CMS, and RA applications access – date and time of event, type of event, identity of user accessing the system, and success or failure indication are automatically logged by the application.	X	X	X	X	X
20.k	Receipt of hardware / software – kept manually in a database that records the hardware and software possessed, licensed, or owned.	X	X	X	X	X
20.l	Attempts to set passwords – date and time, identity of user, and success or failure indication of attempt to set password is kept automatically by the operating system/application or manually in a password change log.	X	X	X	X	X
20.m	Attempts to modify passwords – date and time, identity of user, and success or failure indication of attempt to modify password is kept by the operating system/application or manually in a password change log.	X	X	X	X	X
20.n	Back up of the internal CA database – date and time of the backup event and location of backup is kept manually in a backup log.	X	X	-	-	-
20.o	Restoration from back up of the internal CA database – date and time of restoration tests is kept manually in a disaster recovery log.	X	X	-	-	-
20.p	File manipulation (e.g., creation, renaming, moving) – the file system records the identity of the local operator who created or last modified the file so that the creation, renaming or moving of files can be associated with the operator is kept automatically by the operating system audit and logging facility.	X	-	-	-	-
20.q	Posting of any material to a repository – date and time of posting, transaction identifier and success or failure indication are automatically logged by the application. For CRL generation and publication to directory— date and time of generation, DN of Issuing CA and success or failure of publication of CRL is automatically logged by the application.	X	-	-	-	-
20.r	Access to the internal CA database— date and time of login, username asserted at the time of attempted login, and success or failure indication, are automatically logged by the database audit log;	X	-	X	-	-

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
20.s	All Certificate compromise notification requests – date and time of notification, identity of person making the notification, identification of entity compromised, description of compromise is logged manually by the personnel who receive the notification (e.g., Help Desk, LRAs, etc.) and by RA/LRA/CMS enrollment application manager system processing logs.	X	X	N/A	X	X
20.t	Loading Cryptomodules with Certificates— an auditable log of all physical access to production Root CA, CAs, CSA, CMS and RA Cryptomodules are maintained, and the log records action taken, date and time action was taken and name of person who performed action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.u	Shipment of Cryptomodules – An auditable log is maintained including receipt, servicing (e.g., Keying, or other cryptologic manipulations), and shipping of Cryptomodules for CA, CSA, CMS, and RA production Cryptomodules. Recording contains information regarding action taken, (e.g., return, receipt), date and time action was taken, name of person performing action and reason for action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.v	Zeroizing Cryptomodules – An auditable log is maintained of Cryptomodules that includes action taken, date and time action was taken, name of person who performed action, name and role of person authorizing the action.	X	X	X	X	-
20.w	Re-Key of the Component – CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Systems automatically records all significant events related to their respective operations, including Key Generation for Re-Keying. Additionally, manual, and audiovisual records of CA Key Generation are created. RA Re-Keying and Certificate generation events are also automatically recorded by the CA system.	X	X	X	X	-
21	CONFIGURATION CHANGES	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
21.a	Hardware— All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	-	-
21.b	Software— All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
21.c	Operating System— All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
21.d	Patches— All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	-	-
21.e	Security Profiles— All changes are manually logged through change management procedures.	X	X	X	X	X
22	PHYSICAL ACCESS / SITE SECURITY	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
22.a	Personnel Access to room housing component— a manual recording of physical access to secure rooms is maintained through physical logs that include recording of date and time, person accessing the secure room, and reason for access.	X	X	-	-	-
22.b	Access to a component— logged through a combination of automatic and manual logs based on the type of component and type of access.	X	X	X	-	-

Ref ID	Auditable Event	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
22.c	Known or suspected violations of physical security— any known or suspected violations of physical security – date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by Security Team.	X	X	X	X	X
23	ANOMALIES	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
23.a	Software error conditions— date and time of event, and description of event are automatically logged by the application reporting the event or the operating system;	X	X	X	X	X
23.b	Software check integrity failures— date and time of event, and description of event are automatically logged by the application reporting the event or the operating system;	X	X	X	X	X
23.c	Receipt of improper messages— date and time of event, and description of event are automatically logged by the application reporting the event or the operating system;	X	X	X	X	X
23.d	Misrouted messages— date and time of event, and description of event are automatically logged by the application reporting the event or the operating system;	X	X	X	X	X
23.e	Network attacks (suspected or confirmed) date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	X	X	X
23.f	Equipment failure— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by System Administrator and reviewed by a Security Officer.	X	X	-	-	-
23.g	Electrical power outages— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	-	-	-
23.h	Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) failure— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	-	-	-
23.i	Obvious and significant network service or access failures— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	-	-	-
23.j	Violations of Certificate Policy— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	X	X	X
23.k	Violations of Certification Practice Statement— date/time, description of suspected event, name of person reporting the event and resolution are manually logged by a Security Officer.	X	X	X	X	X
23.l	Resetting Operating System clock— date/time, description of suspected event, and name of person are automatically logged by the operating systems logging facility.	X	X	X	X	X

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

Audit logs from the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA are reviewed at least once every 30 days in accordance with Table 8 below. At a minimum, a statistically significant set of security audit data generated by the component since the last review is examined (where the confidence intervals for each category of security audit data are determined

by the security ramifications of the category and the availability of tools to perform such a review), as well as a reasonable search for any evidence of malicious activity. The analysis must document and explain all significant events in an audit log summary. Such reviews involve verifying that the log has not been tampered with, and then briefly inspecting all log entries, with a more thorough investigation of any alerts or irregularities in the logs. Actions taken because of these reviews are documented.

Table 8 – Review Audit Log Criteria

Assurance Level	Review Audit Log
Basic	At least once per month
Medium (all policies) & PIV-I Card Authentication	At least once every 30 days. Statistically significant set of security audit data generated by Entity CAs since the last review must be examined (where the confidence intervals for each category of security audit data are determined by the security ramifications of the category and the availability of tools to perform such a review), as well as a reasonable search for any evidence of malicious activity.

The IdenTrust Security Office and System Administrators continuously monitor log data, and conduct reviews of all the audit log data through a combination of automated and manual means at least once every calendar month. In order to ensure a thorough review of all data, the Security Officer selects a statistically relevant sample of CA, CSA and CMS logs for review and other security audit data generated since the last review for each category of audit data. The Security Officer uses automated tools to scan logs for specific conditions. The Security Officer then reviews the output and produces a written summary of findings. The reviews include date, name of reviewer, description of event, details of findings and recommendations for remediation or further investigation if appropriate. The reviews include CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA activities that are listed as recorded in Section [5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded](#). These reviews are made available to IdenTrust’s external auditor upon request.

External RA/LRAs are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the CP to incorporate similar audit log processing procedures and to have the audit logs reviewed by an Individual not involved in performing RA functions that performs the Security Officer / Auditor role for the RA/LRA.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Logs

Audit log information generated on CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment is kept on the equipment until the information is reviewed and moved to the offsite archive facility described in Section [5.1.8 Off-Site Backup](#). The most recent ninety (90) days of active logs remain on the equipment for analysis. The oldest 30 days, (e.g., logs dated between 90 and 120 days), will be reviewed and removed monthly to be archived by the Security Officer in accordance with Section [5.4.4 Protection of Audit Logs](#). Electronic audit logs are deleted only after they have been backed up to archive media. Only Security Officers are authorized to delete these logs and must first verify that the audit log data has been successfully backed up to archive media by checking hash values against the original and the backup copies.

External RA/LRAs are obligated by contract, this CPS and the CP to incorporate similar audit log retention periods and operational procedures but in no case the retention period will be shorter than 2 months. RA/LRA are also obligated to provide that only the Individual performing the Security Officer / Auditor role for the RA/LRA authorize deletion of audit data.

Table 9: Retention Period by Assurance Level

Assurance Level	Minimum Retention Period
Basic	7 Years 6 Months
Medium (all policies)	10 Years 6 Months
PIV-I Card Authentication	10 Years 6 Months

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Logs

IdenTrust security audit logs are written simultaneously to 3 locations: to the host itself, to a separate log server with write/modify access restricted to Systems Administration personnel, and to a separate audit log server with write/modify access restricted to the Security Office. Modification of the security audit log is restricted through Access Controls and the operating system logging process. Storage capability is monitored by the operating system to ensure that sufficient space exists to prevent overflow conditions. Alerts are sent to IdenTrust Security Office if space available becomes inadequate. When logs are archived, the integrity of the archive data is ensured with the application of a checksum and a trusted thirdparty time stamp prior to burning the log files to a read-only storage device (e.g., CD-ROM, DVD).

The Security Officer oversees procedures governing the archiving of the audit log to ensure that archived data is protected from deletion or destruction prior to the end of the security audit data retention period. Audit data and review summaries are archived monthly and moved to a secure offsite storage location identified in Section [5.1.8 Off-Site Backup](#).

RAs and LRAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, the IGC CP, and this CPS to,

1. Keep the information generated by them on their equipment until it is moved to an appropriate archive facility,
2. Have information deleted by an Individual other than the LRA; and
3. Retain the data for at least 2 months on-site. RAs and LRAs are also obligated to archive records in accordance with Section [5.5 Records Archival](#).

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit records and audit summaries are backed up at least monthly.

The process for transferring the audit records to the backup environment must be documented. Backup copies of the security audit logs and audit summary data are transferred to the secure offsite location in a locked metal storage container with no external markings identifying it as belonging to IdenTrust or describing the contents. Containers storing audit data are stored in an area within the storage facility that is separate from the daily backups, and access to the log data is restricted to Security Officers.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

Automated audit log collection systems are internal to the CA, CSA, CMS, RA, LRA, and Repository. These systems invoke audit processes at system startup, which cease only at system shutdown. Audit collection systems are configured such that security audit data is protected against loss (e.g., overwriting or overflow of automated log files). Processes are enforced technically through the operating system and a secondary monitoring application.

Should it become apparent that an automated security audit system has failed, operations of the affected system(s) will be taken offline until the security audit capability can be restored. If an initial review determines that Revocation processing and CSA services are unaffected, they will remain operable. IdenTrust incident response procedures will be used to determine the extent of the audit logging failure, to identify and remedy the cause, and to bring all systems back online as soon as this can be done in a secure manner.

In the event Participant CAs or External RAs operate RA Systems or a CMS external to IdenTrust, such Participant CAs or External RAs are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the CP to incorporate similar procedures for ensuring the secure operation of the respective audit data collection system.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

No notice is provided to the event-causing PKI Participant that an event was audited.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

Security Officers, System Administrators, and other operating personnel monitor attempts to violate the integrity

of systems, including the equipment, physical location, and personnel. The audit log is checked for anomalies and reviewed by Security Officers for events such as repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files and unauthenticated responses. Security Officers check for continuity of the security audit data. Reviews of the security audit logs are conducted by Security Officers in accordance with Section [5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log](#).

In addition, Security Officers conduct internal penetration tests quarterly, using industry-standard tools and methods. Annually, an external penetration test is performed by a qualified third-party vendor.

RAs and LRAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the CP to ensure that the person filling the Security Officer role performs a security audit review of the audit data for events that indicate the presence of vulnerabilities in their systems. Such events include repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files, unauthenticated responses, and lack of continuity in the security data.

5.5 RECORDS ARCHIVAL

The archive records of CA, CSA, CMS, and RA contain ample details to verify the correct functioning of the component or the authenticity of any Certificate, including those that have been revoked or expired, issued by the IdenTrust CA. All entities are required to adhere to their specific records retention policies, following the applicable laws governing those entities.

5.5.1 Types of Events Archived

IdenTrust maintains and archives the following records, in either electronic or paper format. The use of electronic records is preferred, and paper records are digitized whenever possible.

Table 10 – Types of Events Archived

Data To Be Archived	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
CA Accreditation (if applicable)	X	-	-	-	-
Certificate Policies	X	X	X	-	-
Certification Practice Statement	X	X	X	X	X
Contractual obligations	X	X	X	X	X
Other agreements concerning CA/CSA/CMS/RA operations	X	X	X	X	X
System and equipment configuration	X	X	X	X	-
Modifications and updates to system or configuration	X	X	X	X	-
Certificate requests, authorized or rejected	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 11.a				
Revocation requests	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 12.a				
Subscriber identity authentication data (per Section 3.2)	X	-	-	X	X
Documentation of receipt and Acceptance of Certificates	X	-	-	X	X
Subscriber Agreements	X	-	-	X	X
Documentation of receipt of Subscriber’s Cryptomodule or Cryptomodule (for non-Human Subscriber)	-	-	-	X	X
Documentation of receipt of Cryptomodules (CA/CSA/CMS/RA)	X	X	X	X	-
All Certificates that are Issued or published	X	-	-	-	X
Record of Re-Key (of PKI Participant’s Cryptomodule)	X	X	X	X	X
All CRLs Issued and/or published	X	-	X	-	-
Other data or applications to verify archive contents	X	X	X	X	X

Data To Be Archived	CA	CMS	CSA	RA	LRA
Compliance Auditor reports generated by internal reviews and documentation generated during third party audits	X	X	X	X	X
Any changes to the Audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of event audited	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 1.a				
Any attempt to delete or modify the Audit logs	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 1.b				
Whenever the CA generates a key. (Not mandatory for single session or one-time use symmetric keys)	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 6.a				
All access to Certificate subject private keys retained within the CA for key	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 7.c				
All changes to the trusted public keys, including Certificates used for trust between the CA and other components such as CMS, RA, etc.	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 8.a				
The export of private and secret keys (keys used for a single session or message are excluded)	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 10.a				
All records related to certificate status change whether generated directly on the CA or generated by a related external system or process.	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 13.a				
Appointment of an individual to a Trusted Role	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 20.b				
Destruction of cryptographic modules	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 20.h				
All Certificate compromise notifications	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 20.s				
Remedial action taken as a result of violations of physical security	X	X	X	X	-
Violations of Certificate Policy	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 23.j				
Violations of Certification Practice Statement	As specified in Section 5.4.1 Ref ID 23.k				
OCSP Requests and Responses	-	-	-	-	-

5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive

Archive records are maintained locally for at least ninety (90) days and archived offsite for no less than 3 years in accordance with IdenTrust policies. The archives are maintained without any loss of data for the duration of the retention period. IdenTrust applies a checksum to its archive files and stores them on digital tape, CD-ROM or DVD, or similar medium to prevent alteration. Transferring from one storage medium to another medium will not invalidate the applied checksum; however, any attempt to modify the data will be evident. Repository information is archived in a human readable form such as compressed Lightweight Directory Interchange Format. Paper records are archived in either their original format or as a document image. IdenTrust maintains copies of the applications that can read these types of files for at least the retention period.

IdenTrust's Security Officers oversee procedures governing the archiving of the audit log to ensure that archived data is protected from deletion or destruction during the data retention period. Data being maintained by IdenTrust such as Certificates or CRLs will be returned to a Participant CA at agreed upon terms, if necessary; or the data will be securely destroyed in accordance with IdenTrust's disposal procedures after 10 years and 6 months.

RAs and LRAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, the CP, and this CPS to maintain define a mechanism to transfer archived data to new media to maintain for the length of the retention period. Applications to process archive data are also maintained for the same period.

5.5.3 Protection of Archive

Archived data is stored in a separate area of the offsite storage facility identified in Section [5.1.8 Off-Site Backup](#).

Records are uniquely identified. The contents of the archive will not be released as a whole, except as required by law, as described in Section [9.4 Privacy of Personal Information](#). Access to the offsite storage facility is strictly limited to those Individuals authorized by IdenTrust Operations management. IdenTrust maintains a list of Individuals authorized to access the archive records and makes this list available to auditors upon request during compliance audits.

Certain sensitive materials are stored in a physically separate area within the offsite storage location, and access to the materials is limited to the IdenTrust Security Office.

To protect the integrity of electronic data, a checksum is applied to the archive files, and they are stored on digital tape, CD-ROM, DVD, or similar medium to prevent alteration. The checksum is maintained and kept within the backup software program that applies the checksum. No transfer of medium will invalidate the applied checksum.

RAs and LRAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the CP to protect the archive under the guidelines consistent with this CPS and the Policy.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

IdenTrust does not back up archives.

5.5.5 Requirements for TimeStamping of Records

See Section [6.8 Time Stamping](#).

5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

Archive information is collected internally and stored externally as described in Section [5.4.6 Audit Collection System \(Internal vs. External\)](#).

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

The archive contents are not released to any third-party, except as determined by the IdenTrust PMA or as required by law.

Upon proper request, IdenTrust will create, package, and send copies of archive information. Archived information is provided and verified using the formats and media explained in Section [5.5.3 Protection of Archive](#). Access to archive data is restricted to authorized personnel in accordance with Sections [9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information](#) and [9.4 Privacy of Personal Information](#).

Archive data is retrieved from secure storage using defined procedures for accessing archived material. Requested archive material is identified by inventory number, which was recorded for the materials when they were originally placed in the locked metal storage boxes for archival. The request procedure requires 2 IdenTrust Trusted Role employees who are previously authorized for this procedure. One such employee requests the material, and the other provides management approval, using processes established in conjunction with the offsite facility.

Material is delivered to a predefined destination by a bonded carrier employed by the storage facility. Identification of the receiving party is confirmed, then the delivery receipt is signed by the receiving party and physical custody of the archive material is transferred back to IdenTrust. The materials are stored in the secure room until they can be reviewed and/or copied in a forensically sound manner for the requestor. The materials are then returned to the archive storage facility.

5.6 KEY CHANGEOVER

CA Signing Keys have the Validity Periods set forth in Section [6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods](#). To facilitate the transition when a CA (i.e., Root or SubCA) Certificate is set to expire, the IdenTrust Key changeover process requires that the CA begin using a new CA Signing Key to sign newly Issued Certificates for a specific period of time prior to the expiration of the old CA Signing Key. The old CA Signing Key is retained to sign CRLs and OCSP Responder Certificates for the remaining years until the last Certificate Issued with the old CA

Signing Key has expired. This is because the CA Certificate must still be valid so that all Certificates that are Issued with the old Key can be properly validated.

Key changeover procedures enable the smooth transition from expiring CA Certificates to new CA Certificates. IdenTrust coordinates the lifecycles of its Root CA Keys/Certificate and SubCA Keys and SubCA Certificates by creating new CA Key Pairs and Certificates and ceasing to use expiring CA Signing Keys to sign Certificates prior to the end of their Validity Periods to minimize any adverse effects from CA Certificate expiration.

5.7 COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY

Security incidents may include violation or threat of violation to the system, improper usage, malicious or anomalous activity and violations of the IdenTrust CP or CPS. See Section 5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures (below).

5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

IdenTrust maintains security incident response and compromise handling policies and procedures as well as disaster recovery and business continuity plans, both of which are approved by the IdenTrust Head of Operations. Such procedures and plans are available for review on-site by external auditors upon request and by major customers who are under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

An initial goal of the incident response plan is to determine the degree and scope of the incident. This includes a determination of the cause or source of the incident (internal system failure or external malicious attack) and whether the immediate harm caused by the incident will be mild or severe. For all incidents, data is collected and analyzed to determine, among other things:

- Whether a crime has been committed, and if so, whether evidence can be collected that will be helpful to law enforcement,
- What data was disclosed or compromised, and whether there was a Key compromise; and
- What steps need to be taken immediately to mitigate further damage.

For anticipated threats, IdenTrust maintains step-by-step procedures, flow charts, and task assignments for members of the incident response team, depending on the type of incident that is believed to have occurred.

5.7.1.1 CA Incident

If it is determined that a CA's Private Key or the CMS has, or may have been, compromised, procedures described in Section [5.7.3 Entity \(CA\) Private Key Compromise Procedures](#) will be followed.

IdenTrust will notify the CA and applicable PAAs within 24 hours of any such disaster or compromise informally via telephone call. This call will be followed formally by a Certificate based communication if possible; otherwise, by a written letter sent via courier service. Events that will trigger this type of communication include:

- Suspected or detected compromise of the CA system,
- Physical or electronic penetration of CA systems,
- Successful denial of service attacks of CA components,
- Any incident preventing the CA from issuing a CRL prior to the next update time of the previous CRL,
- Suspected or detected compromise of a CSS,
- Suspected or detected compromise of an RA.

Once the incident has been resolved, IdenTrust will provide notification directly to the relevant PAAs which includes detailed measures taken to remediate the incident. The notice must include the following:

1. Which CA components were affected by the incident
2. The CA's interpretation of the incident
3. Who is impacted by the incident
4. When the incident was discovered

5. A complete list of all Certificates that may have been issued erroneously or are not compliant with the CP/CPS because of the incident
6. A statement that the incident has been fully remediated

The notification must include a preliminary remediation analysis.

5.7.1.2 RA Incident

RA Systems including those who utilize CMS must have defined incident handling procedures that are approved by the PMA of the operating Organization. These procedures must be documented in the RA organization RPS document and must include notification of such incident to IdenTrust. If the RA System or CMS is suspected of compromise, all RA Certificates and PIV-I Content Signing Certificates Issued to the RA System or CMS must be suspended.

If the RA System or CMS is determined to have been compromised, all RA Certificates and PIV-I Content Signing Certificates Issued to the RA System or CMS will be Revoked.

The damage caused by the RA System or CMS compromise will be assessed by both the operating entity PMA and the IdenTrust PMA, and all Subscriber Certificates that may have been compromised will be Revoked. Subscribers will be notified of such Revocation.

The CMS will be reestablished as soon as practical through Issuance of a new RA Certificate required for operation upon approval of the IdenTrust PMA.

5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

IdenTrust replicates its data in near real time to its disaster recovery site, IdenTrust also performs tape backups daily, ensuring their data integrity with the controls explained in Section [5.5.3 Protection of Archive](#). Backup tapes and backups of Cryptomodules are stored offsite in a secure location. In the event of a disaster in which both principal and backup CA operations become inoperative, IdenTrust's CA operations will be re-initiated on appropriate hardware using backup copies of software, after their integrity is verified, and Cryptomodules.

Re-initiation will occur according to one of the following contingencies:

- If the CA Signature Keys are not destroyed, CA operation will be reestablished, giving priority to the ability to generate Certificate status information within the CRL Issuance schedule specified in Section [4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency](#).
- If the CA Signature Keys are destroyed, CA operation will be reestablished as quickly as possible, giving priority to the Generation of a new CA Key Pair and Certificate with new DN. The CA Certificate will be revoked and notification will be placed on a CRL as specified in Section [4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request](#). New Subscriber Certificates will be Issued.

If the CA is the Root CA, Cross-certified CAs will be asked to Revoke the Certificates that are Issued to the Root CA, a new Root CA Key Pair and corresponding new self-signed Certificate with a new DN will be generated. Participant CAs and Cross-certified CAs will be asked to submit new Certificate requests. A new CRL will be Issued by the new Root. Subscribers will be notified and instructed via email and a secure IdenTrust or Participant CA's site (e.g., <https://secure.identrust.com>) how to remove the old Root CA from their Certificate store and install the new root in their Certificate store.

If the CA cannot Issue a CRL prior to the time specified in the next-update field of its current valid CRL, then all CAs that have Issued Certificates to the CA will be notified informally via telephone call immediately. This call will be followed formally by a Certificate-based communication if possible; otherwise, by a written letter sent via courier service.

A CA will request Revocation of its Certificate if Revocation services are not reestablished within a reasonable time period. The period of time will be established between the CA's representatives and the Head of IdenTrust Operations and representatives from the IdenTrust's Risk Management Committee by analyzing risk exposure at the time. However, the CA may request Revocation at any time. It is advisable, that this period does not exceed

18 hours after a Revocation has been requested of any Certificate Issued under the CA, or 72 hours after the last CRLs next update whichever occurs earlier.

When the Root CA is unable to Issue a CRL, the Head of IdenTrust Operations and representatives from the IdenTrust Risk Management Committee will establish risk exposure and determine whether to stand up a new Root CA. If a CA has requested Revocation of its Certificate by the root, the risk exposure must be considered as high and within an 18-hour period after the Revocation has been requested, the procedures described in a prior paragraph in this Section are used to Revoke the old Root and to establish and promulgate the new Root.

In the event of an incident as described above, IdenTrust will post a notice on its web page identifying the incident and provide notification to all related parties. See Section [5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures](#) for contents of the notice.

5.7.3 Entity CA Private Key Compromise Procedures

Procedures pertaining to private Key compromise vary based on the type of key compromise identified. See specific details in the following sub-sections.

5.7.3.1 CA Private Key Compromise Procedures

If any CA Private Key has been or is suspected to have been compromised, the Head of IdenTrust Operations will convene a meeting of management representatives (including representatives of the CA and RAs) to assess the situation and take appropriate action. IdenTrust personnel in Trusted Roles will implement the procedural steps and tasks that have been outlined for Key compromise in the Security Incident Response Plan, including:

- Quantifying the scope, extent, and effects of the compromise,
- Revoking the compromised CA Certificate and ensuring that it is promptly included in a published Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
- Explaining the situation to all employees and notifying all interested parties (either by Certificate-based communication, telephone or written letter sent by courier service). Recipients of this communication will include:
 - The IdenTrust PMA and any cross-certified Bridge PAAs, if they have not already received notice,
 - Other IdenTrust Participant CAs,
 - All RAs and LRAs; and
 - All Subscribers.

As soon as possible, the IdenTrust PMA will investigate the incident, and if necessary, will forensically record and analyze the causes of the compromise.

A report will be prepared and delivered to the IdenTrust PMA concerning the causes of the compromise and the measures that have been or will be taken to prevent a future recurrence.

If the CA do not terminate operations (see Section [5.8 CA or RA Termination](#)) and that the factors leading up to the Key compromise can be satisfactorily addressed, IdenTrust will generate a new Key Pair and Subordinate CA Certificate with a new DN, in accordance with its CA Key Generation ceremony procedures. The CA will Issue new Subscriber, RA System and LRA Certificates, upon completing identity verification processes outlined in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#), signing them with the new Subordinate CA Certificate, and will Issue a new, blank CRL.

Any .p7c, .cer, or other PKCS#7 files that contain or refer to the Certificate, Public Key or corresponding Private Key will be replaced with a new file to reflect that a new CA Certificate has been Issued. All appropriate HTTP and LDAP pointers will be updated to ensure proper path construction and validation.

5.7.3.2 KRS Private Key Compromise Procedures

IdenTrust does not escrow or recover keys.

5.7.3.3 CA Private Key Compromise Procedures-Root CA

When Revocation of the Root Certificate is required, in addition to the foregoing procedures, IdenTrust will immediately notify the PAAs of all Bridges that are Cross-certified and request that the Cross Certificate Issued by those Bridges be Revoked. A new Root CA Key Pair, self-signed Root CA Certificate with new DN, and CRL will be generated in a Key Generation ceremony consistent with the procedures of Section [6.1.1 Key Pair Generation](#).

CAs and RAs are required by contract to facilitate the replacement of the Revoked Root CA Certificate with the new Root CA Certificate in Subscriber and Relying Party applications. IdenTrust will also notify PKI Participants that the new Root Certificate is available in a secure area of the IdenTrust website (HTTPS) where it can be downloaded in a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-encrypted session. See Section [6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties](#), for additional details on distribution of the Root CA.

Subordinated CAs and Cross-certified CAs will be asked to submit new Certificate requests.

IdenTrust will notify all interested parties via email, telephone or written letter sent by courier service. In addition, IdenTrust will set up an informational secure site (<https://>) that establishes a Server-side session secured using one of its high assurance IdenTrust Root Certificates (e.g., DST Root CA X1 or DST Root CA X3), which are embedded in the most widely distributed commercial browsers.

Cross-Certification of the new Root CA with the Bridges will proceed in accordance with each specific PKI Cross Certification Process.

5.7.3.4 CA Private Key Compromise Procedures-CSA Key

OCSP Responder Certificates are Issued with the nocheck extension (id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck) specifying that OCSP Responder Certificates are not checked by the Relying Party applications for the lifetime of the Certificate (30 days). If the CSA Signing Key has been or is suspected of being compromised, then the Head of IdenTrust Operations will convene a meeting of personnel involved in CSA operations to assess the degree and scope of the compromise. If it is determined that Private Keys were compromised, a new OCSP Responder Key Pair and Certificate will be immediately created (signed by the SubCA) and installed in the OCSP Responder as soon as possible.

For any period of compromise, all signed validations for that period (during which the CSA Key was suspected to have been compromised) will be reviewed and either re-signed with a new Key, or may be handled by agreement with the Participants CAs involved in each affected transaction.

5.7.3.5 CA Private Key Compromise Procedures-CMS Keys

If a CMS Content Signing or master Keys have been or are suspected of being compromised, the Head of IdenTrust Operations convenes a meeting of management representatives (including representatives of the CA, RAs, and smart card vendor/bureau) to assess the situation and take appropriate action. IdenTrust personnel in Trusted Roles implements procedural steps and tasks that have been outlined for Key compromise in the Security Incident Response Plan, including:

- Quantifying the scope, extent, and effects of the compromise,
- Suspending all Certificates that are Issued to the CMS if there is suspicion of compromise,
- Suspending end entity Certificates that are suspected of being Issued after the compromise,
- Revoking Certificates that are Issued to the CMS and end entities if there is confirmation of compromise,
- Suspension of the CMS operation,
- Notifying all interested parties (either by Certificate-based communication, telephone or written letter sent by courier service). Recipients of this communication will include:
 - IdenTrust, if they have not already received notice,
 - Smart card vendor/bureau,
 - All of RAs and LRAs; and
 - All Subscribers affected.

As soon as possible, the IdenTrust PMA investigates the incident, and if necessary, forensically records and analyzes the cause of the compromise. A report is prepared and delivered to the IdenTrust PMA concerning the cause of the compromise and what measures taken to prevent a future recurrence.

If no compromise has been confirmed, all Certificates are unsuspending in accordance with Section [4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period](#).

If compromise of the Content Signing Private Key has been confirmed, the CMS operator generates a new Content Signing Key Pair and requests a Certificate with a new DN, this is in accordance with original Key Generation procedures. If the compromise of master Keys is confirmed, in collaboration with the smart card vendor, new master Keys will be generated and transferred to the CMS Operator. The CMS will Issue new smart cards and associated Certificates, upon completing identity verification processes outlined in Section [3.2 Initial Identity Validation](#).

5.7.3.6 CA Private Key Compromise Procedures-RA System and LRA Private Keys

All RA Administrators and LRAs, including External RA Administrators and LRAs who are obligated by contract, notify IdenTrust and request Revocation if they believe an RA System Private Key or an LRA's Private Key has been or is suspected of being compromised. IdenTrust Revokes the Certificate and the Head of IdenTrust Operations, the Security Officer or an Authorizing Official for the RA meet with the LRA or RA Administrator to assess and address the situation (including deciding on Revocation) and take any other actions needed to identify and remedy the cause of the compromise, ensuring no recurrence. Actions include, but are not limited to, Issuance of new RA System or LRA Certificates in accordance with this CPS, Renewal, or reissuance of compromised Subscribers' Certificates. In cases where approved Subscribers Certificates cannot be ascertained as legitimate, the Certificates will be Revoked and the Subscribers notified of Revocation.

5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

IdenTrust maintains a detailed Disaster Recovery Plan. The following is a summary of IdenTrust's disaster recovery processes:

IdenTrust has implemented a completely redundant hardware configuration at its principal site, and has tertiary devices at the disaster recovery location for critical services including repositories and all components needed to perform validation and Revocation services available as described in Section [4.10.2 Service Availability](#). Updates to the repository information is written in near-real time to the disaster recovery site, providing a backup repository that is current to the last validated transaction. Validation and Revocation services can automatically switch from the primary location to the disaster recovery location using global load balancers to direct domain name services. In the event of a disaster in which the main CA operations are physically damaged or otherwise become inoperative, the disaster recovery facility is made aware of a problem at the primary location and these critical services are automatically redirected to the disaster recovery facility. This process typically takes less than a second. Backup copies of the CA's Signing Keys are used if necessary to restore CA services at the disaster recovery site. Priority is given to re-establishing validation services and the ability to publish Revocation information. This ensures compliance with the necessary uptime requirements for the program.

IdenTrust maintains processes to facilitate drop-shipment of hardware to IdenTrust following a major incident. This allows IdenTrust to restore CA operations at the principal site or elsewhere as quickly as possible and avoids a single point of failure that could exist in the interim at the disaster recovery site. IdenTrust performs tape backups daily. Backup tapes and backup Cryptomodules are stored offsite in a secure location.

In the event of disaster whereby the CA at both principal and disaster recovery sites becomes inoperative, CA operations are re-initiated on appropriate hardware using backup copies of software, backup data and backup Cryptomodules at a third site. Priority will be given to re-establishing validation services and the ability to publish Revocation information.

If the CA system cannot re-establish Revocation capabilities prior to the next update field in the latest CRL Issued, then IdenTrust reports this informally by phone call to interested PKI Participants as soon as reasonably possible.

The call will be followed by a formal Certificate-based communication if possible, otherwise by a written letter or other reliable means of communication.

In the event of a disaster whereby all operations suffer total physical damage beyond disaster recovery or repair (including destruction or compromise of the backup CA Keys), or if it is otherwise determined that the CA Signing Key has been compromised, then the procedures of Section 5.7.3 Entity (CA) Private Key Compromise Procedures and/or section 5 sub-sections are implemented.

5.8 CA AND RA TERMINATION

If it is necessary for IdenTrust, a CA, CMS, or an RA to cease operation, all affected PKI Participants, including all Cross-certified Bridges, are notified of the planned termination, promptly and as far in advance as is commercially reasonable. A termination plan is submitted to the IdenTrust PMA by the terminating entity. The termination plan proposes methods of minimizing the disruption to the operations of PKI Participants caused by the planned termination and also include provisions for the following.

Whenever possible, IdenTrust notifies all vested parties at least 2 weeks prior to termination of any CA operated by an Entity cross certified under this policy. For emergency termination, IdenTrust will follow the notification procedures in Section [5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery](#).

5.8.1 RA Termination

In the event of an RA termination, the following steps are taken:

- Archival of all audit logs and other records prior to termination,
- Delivery of current operating records to a responsible successor RA, that will provide Certificate Revocation services for the remaining terms of Certificates and accept the assignment of any related, contracted-for support services. Note that if the termination is for convenience, or other non-security related reason, and provisions have been made to continue compromise recovery, compliance and security audit, archive, Revocation, and data recovery services, then the Certificates approved by the RA, not need to be Revoked; however, all RA System and LRA Certificates will be Revoked.
- Refund of pro rata portions of Certificate fees and any payments for services that will not be delivered,
- Ensuring of the transfer to, and preservation of, archived records by a responsible RA successor, for the archive retention period specified in Section [5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive](#),
- Surrender and/or Zeroization of Cryptomodules containing Private Keys in accordance with Section [6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Keys](#) and Revocation of all Certificates, if necessary; and
- If a successor RA will be assuming responsibilities for existing customers, provisions for such transition, e.g., replacement Certificates, customer relations, etc.

5.8.2 CA Termination

In the case of a CA termination, all steps above occur, with these exceptions: (1) Revocation of all Certificates that are Issued under the CA will not be optional, (2) Revocation will be affected prior to revoking the CA Certificate, and (3) the nextUpdate in the CRL will be past the expiry date of all Certificates that are Issued by the CA. OCSP validation will not be available since its Certificate must be Revoked.

5.8.3 Root CA Termination

If the Root CA is terminated, prior to the event IdenTrust notifies all Subscribers via signed email about the termination, and will provide instructions on how to remove Trust Anchors representing the CA.

6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1 KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

All PKI Participants generate their own Keys instances where such is possible. Generation of CA, CSA, RA, and CMS Key Pairs is performed using only devices evaluated to meet approved cryptographic standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS approved mode).

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

CA Key Pairs are generated within Cryptomodules validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher. Activation of all Cryptomodules are connected to PED. The PED comes with Keys that are initialized with unique digital identifiers that are made specific to the Cryptomodule during the initialization process.

The CA Key generation ceremonies are performed in the IdenTrust secure room. The ceremony is scripted, video recorded and witnessed. The ceremony is performed by personnel in Trusted Roles who use different Keys at the appropriate time depending on whether Key generation, Certificate generation or Cryptomodule backup/cloning operation is being performed.

6.1.1.1.1 CSA Key Pair Generation

CSA Key Pairs are generated within Cryptomodules validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher. Activation of all Cryptomodules are connected to PED. The PED comes with Keys that are initialized with unique digital identifiers that are made specific to the Cryptomodule during the initialization process.

CSA Key generation ceremonies are performed in the IdenTrust secure room. The ceremony is scripted, video-recorded and witnessed. The ceremony is performed by personnel in Trusted Roles who use different Keys at the appropriate time depending on whether Key generation, Certificate generation or a Cryptomodule backup/cloning operation is being performed.

6.1.1.1.2 RA and CMS Key Pair Generation

RA and CMS Key Pairs are generated within Cryptomodules validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher. The ceremony is performed in a secure room, scripted, and witnessed by personnel in Trusted Roles. The CMS master Keys are Generated by the smart card issuer and securely transferred to the CA or RA. The Keys are encrypted and split into 3 parts for transport. The encrypted master Keys and the components of the transport Key are sent in tamper-evident envelopes to Individuals in Trusted Roles via courier with tracking services. The master Key ceremony consists of decryption and injection of the master Keys into the HSM. The ceremony is performed by Individuals in Trusted Roles in the secure room and is scripted and witnessed.

IdenTrust may reset manufacturer CMS master Keys for cards delivered by IdenTrust to a Participant CA or External RA operating a CMS. In such cases, a PKI Consultant directly provides the master Keys in a secure manner to an Individual in a Trusted Role of the Participant CA or External RA for entry into the CMS.

Only the CMS with the correct master Keys can interact with the associated smart cards. During the card personalization process, diversified Keys that result from the combination of the smart card's serial number with the master Keys are injected in the smart cards. The diversified Keys are then used to allow and securely protect the operations between the CMS and the smart card when new objects are inserted in it.

6.1.1.1.3 PIV-I Content Signing Key Pair Generation

PIV-I Content Signing Key Generation ceremonies are performed in a secure room under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control by personnel in Trusted Roles. The ceremony is scripted and witnessed.

6.1.1.2 Subscriber Key Pair Generation

Key pair generation varies based on the type of Certificate issued. See sub-sections below for specific processes.

For all IGC Certificates where encryption Keys are escrowed, the CA, CMS or RA System generates the Encryption Key Pair in an attached FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 HSM and securely injects the Keys into the Subscriber Cryptomodule.

6.1.1.2.1 Subscriber Non-PIV-I Certificates Key Pair Generation

Subscribers, including LRAs, RA Administrators and TAs are all issued Subscriber Certificates.

For non-PIV-I Certificates, Key Pair Generation may be performed by the Applicant, Subscriber, CA, or RA for all IGC Certificate Assurance Levels. Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers are configured to disallow export of Private Keys.

Whenever possible, Key Pair Generation is performed by the Subscriber within the Cryptomodule in which the Keys are stored. If the CA, CMS, or RA System generates Subscriber Key Pairs, Key Pair delivery meets the requirements specified in Section [6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber](#).

Medium Hardware Signing Certificate Private Keys are generated by the Subscriber in the hardware Cryptomodules in which they are stored or by the CMS or RA System. When Key Pairs are generated by the CMS/RA System, they are generated in hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher and injected into the Subscriber hardware Cryptomodule. Subscriber Hardware Cryptomodules are validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher. Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers for Medium Hardware Certificates are configured to not allow export of Private Keys.

Basic and Medium Software Certificate Signing Key Pairs are generated by the Subscriber in the hardware or software Cryptomodules in which they are stored, by the CMS or by the RA System. When Key Pairs are generated by the Subscriber in software Cryptomodules, such Cryptomodules must be validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. When Key Pairs are generated by the CMS/RA System, they are generated in hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher and injected into only hardware Subscriber Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher. Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers for IGC Basic or Medium Software Certificates are configured to not allow export of Private Keys.

6.1.1.2.2 Subscriber PIV-I Certificates Key Pair Generation

For PIV-I Hardware Certificates, only PIV-compatible smart cards from the FIPS PUB 201 APL are utilized, ensuring the hardware Cryptomodules are validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher. Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers for PIV-I Certificates are configured to not allow export of Private Keys. The CMS ensures the Validity Period of these Certificates do not extend beyond the expiration date of the smart card.

PIV-I Card Authentication Certificate Private Keys and symmetric Card Authentication Keys are generated within the FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher FIPS 201 APL PIV-compatible smart card, or generated by the CMS in hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher and injected into the PIV-compatible card. Private Key operations are performed using these Keys without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with these Keys).

6.1.1.2.3 Device Key Pair Generation

Devices are required to generate Keys in Cryptomodules meeting the storage requirements for the Certificate type requested:

- IGC Device Medium Software— FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher.
- IGC Device Medium Hardware— FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher.

Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers are configured to not allow export of Private Keys.

Subscribers are notified of their obligation and are required by Subscriber Agreement to protect all Private Keys

and passwords or PINs required to gain access to them. Subscribers are notified of their obligation to ensure Private Keys never exist in plain text outside of the Cryptomodule in which they were generated.

6.1.1.3 CSS Key Pair Generation

Cryptographic keying material used by CSSs to sign status information are generated in FIPS 140 validated cryptographic modules as specified in Section [6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#).

6.1.1.4 PIV-I Content Signing Pair Generation

Cryptographic keying material used by PIV-I issuing systems or devices for PIV-I Content Signing are generated in FIPS 140 validated cryptographic modules as specified in Section [6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#).

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Where possible, Subscribers generate their own Key Pairs for Signing Certificates and non-escrowed Encryption Certificates. In all other cases, LRAs generate a Subscriber's Keys in the PIN-Protected-Cryptomodule process explained in Section [4.3.1.2 Subscriber Certificates](#). IdenTrust, the CA or RA creates and delivers Key Pairs for all encryption Certificates where Keys are escrowed.

Hardware Cryptomodules provided to Subscribers are configured to not allow export of Private Keys.

Subscribers are notified of their obligation and are required by Subscriber Agreement to protect all Private Keys and passwords or PINs required to gain access to them. Subscribers are notified of their obligation to ensure Private Keys never exist in plain text outside of the Cryptomodule in which they were generated.

The process of delivering Private Keys to Subscribers varies depending on the type of Certificate and whether or not the Encryption Key is escrowed. Refer to the following sub-sections for specific details.

6.1.2.1 Signing Private Key Delivery to Subscribers

Signing Private Keys and non-escrowed Encryption Keys are generated within the boundaries of FIPS PUB 140-2 evaluated hardware or software Cryptomodules. If the Subscriber's Cryptomodule generates the Keys, then there is no need to deliver the Private Key.

If the Private Keys are not generated by the Subscriber, accountability for the location and state of the containing hardware Cryptomodule is maintained until delivery and possession occurs. The process used to generate the Keys and protect the Private Key(s) from activation, compromise, or modification until possession occurs is described in Section 4.3.1.2, PIN-Protected-Cryptomodule process. During this process, the Key Pair is generated on an HSM in a secured area of the RA facility, and the Subscriber Cryptomodule is protected by a randomly generated PIN that is sent to the Subscriber in a channel that is separate from the delivery of the Cryptomodule.

6.1.2.2 Encryption Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

For generation of Encryption Keys, 3 methods are available (see sub-sections):

6.1.2.3 IdenTrust Generation

- Immediately after the encryption Keys are generated, they are encrypted with a Public Key of an administrative Certificate and stored in the escrow database. The Administrative Certificate is a self-signed 2,048-bit Key Certificate. The administrative Private Key is held on a FIPS PUB 140-2 level 2 validated Cryptomodule.
- During the Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS session also described above in Sections [4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities](#) and [4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance](#), the system assembles and downloads a PKCS#12 and its protecting 20-digit, randomly generated PKCS#12 password.

- If the Subscriber is retrieving the Certificate to a hardware Cryptomodule, the PKCS#12 is downloaded into hidden fields in a non-cached web page. Then, a client-side component (e.g., ActiveX control, Java Applet) invokes the Cryptomodule's PKCS#12 import function and inserts the Certificate and encryption Private Key into the Cryptomodule, which has been previously activated by the Subscriber to allow the Generation of the Signing Certificate and Private Signing Keys.
- Keys generated for Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware are encapsulated into PKCS#12/P12 password pairs for transport between the CA and CMS over an encrypted XSMS protocol. Then, the CMS builds a Secure Channel with the smart card using the master Keys, which channel is used to transfer and inject the Certificates and Private Keys into the smart card.
- Under some circumstances, PIV class cards are used for Certificates other than IGC PIV-I Certificates. In these cases, the Certificates are encapsulated into PKCS#12/P12 password pairs for transport between the CA and a card issuance system over an encrypted XSMS protocol, similar to how PIV-I Certificates are delivered through a CMS. The card issuance system builds a Secure Channel with the smart card using the master Keys, which channel is used to transfer and inject the Certificates and Private Keys into the smart card.
- If the PKCS#12 belongs to a Certificate delivered to a software Cryptomodule, both the file and its protecting password are made available to the Subscriber over a secured session and instructions on how to import the Encryption Certificate and Key to the software Cryptomodule are provided.

6.1.2.4 CMS Generation:

In this model, IdenTrust as the CA operator never has possession of or access to the Subscriber Encryption Private Key unless IdenTrust is also the operator of the CMS. The CA securely escrows only the symmetric Escrow Wrap Key associated with a given Encryption Key Pair.

- The CMS causes the Encryption Key Pair to be generated within an attached HSM validated to FIPS 140-2 level 3. Additionally, a symmetric Escrow Wrap Key (EWK) is generated within the HSM,
- The CMS extracts the Encryption Key Pair and cryptographically wraps (encrypts) the Key Pair utilizing EWK,
- The CMS stores the encrypted Key Pair locally,
- The CMS transports the EWK to the CA for escrow with the corresponding PKCS#10 Certificate request; and
- The CMS destroys the local instance of the EWK.

Key recovery through the CMS requires recovery of the wrapped Encryption Key Pair stored local to the CMS and obtaining the EWK from the CA, ensuring multi-Party control for any key recovery process.

6.1.2.5 Subscriber Generation:

When the encryption Private Key and Certificate are not escrowed, the system allows the Subscriber to generate all Private Keys in the same way Signature Keys are generated.

6.1.2.6 Private Key Delivery for CA, CSA, CMS, IGC PIV-I Content Signing and RA System

CA and CSA Private Keys remain under IdenTrust's control during the lifetime of the Keys. For CMS and RA Systems operated by IdenTrust, CMS, Content Signing and RA System Private Keys remain under IdenTrust's control during the lifetime of the Keys.

Participant CAs and External RAs that operate a CMS or RA System are required to maintain strict control over CMS, PIV-I Content Signing and RA System Private Keys.

The RA Administrator, LRA and TA Keys are Subscriber Keys and are under Subscriber control as explained earlier in this Section.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

Delivery of Public Keys may vary based on the type of Certificates. See sub-sections below for specific details.

Where key pairs are generated by the Subscriber or RA, the public key and the Subscriber's identity are delivered securely to the CA for Certificate issuance.

6.1.3.1 Subscriber Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

The Subscriber's Public Key is delivered to the CMS, RA, or CA in a secure and trustworthy manner. The delivery of the Public Key, in a PKCS#10 structure, binds the Private and Public Keys and is submitted to the CA during a Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session that is secured with a valid SSL Certificate that chains to one of IdenTrust's Root Certificates. In addition to the PIN-Protected-Cryptomodule-Process described in the previous Section (and in Section [4.3.1.2 Subscriber Certificates](#)), 2 other methods are used to bind the confirmed identity to the Public Key:

1. During the registration phase outlined in Sections [4.3.1.3 Publication](#) and [4.3.1.4 Activation Code-Account Password Process with Automated I&A](#), the Applicant's information, PKCS#10, and hash of the Applicant-provided Account Password are bound together via the Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted transmission to the CA. Only the Applicant knows the Account Password because only the Account Password hash is stored. After identity confirmation, the LRA provides one or more Activation Codes to the Applicant through confirmed OOB channels. The secret Account Password and Activation Code(s) are used in combination by the Applicant to retrieve the Certificate during a subsequent Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session.
2. During the registration process, an LRA enrolls the Applicant and approves Issuance of a Certificate to the Subscriber. Activation Code(s) is/are generated and sent OOB to the Applicant to a confirmed destination. The Applicant uses the Activation Code(s) in a Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session during which the Public Key is submitted to the RA/CA in a PKCS#10 and a Certificate is returned back during the same session (see Section [4.3.1.1 CA Certificates](#) and Section [4.3.1.3 Publication](#)).

Public Keys generated for Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware are encapsulated on a PKCS#10 and transferred between the smart card and the CMS over the Secure Channel created using the master Keys. Then, the CMS builds a request message and transfers the PCKS#10 to the CA over XSMS.

6.1.3.2 RA Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

For RAs (RA Administrators, LRAs, TAs and RA System), Public Keys are submitted using any of the methods used by standard Subscribers. LRAs are Issued Subscriber Certificates. For RA and CMS Systems, a PKCS#10 is also used. An IdenTrust PKI Consultant works with the RA or CMS Administrator during the system setup process to ensure that there is adequate binding between the Public Key and the Certificate Issued to the system.

6.1.3.3 CA Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

All CA Public Keys are created within the confines of the CA system and are delivered directly to the Root CA for the creation of the SubCA Certificate. Manual means, which are documented in the Key Generation ceremony script, ensure that the Public Keys are bound to the correct subject.

6.1.3.4 CA Cross Certification Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

Public Keys for Cross-Certification are delivered and exchanged between the IdenTrust and the Cross-Certifying Bridges as defined herein unless otherwise agreed in other contractual documents required by the Bridges.

1. The identity and authority of persons submitting the Other's PKI Public Key to be Cross-certified will be documented in accordance with Section 3.2.2 (Authentication of Organization Identity for the Bridge's Representatives) and include a facsimile of the manual signature and email address of the authorized Individual who is responsible for delivering the Public Key.
2. The Public Key must be delivered to IdenTrust in a base64-encoded PKCS#10 via a mutually acceptable secure method, such as via an authenticated session on a secure FTP server, on a CD-ROM or flash memory device sent via USPS/commercial courier, or by hand delivery in-person by an authorized representative of the Bridge.

- a. If by Mail or Courier. The base64-encoded PKCS#10 may also be sent to IdenTrust on a CD-ROM or flash memory device via USPS or courier in a tamper-evident envelope. The envelope must also contain the SHA-256 hash of the Bridge's Public Key to be signed and a printed version of the Bridge's base64-encoded PKCS#10
3. To confirm the binding between the Bridge's CA with the Bridge's Key Pair, IdenTrust's CA Administrator reviews the PKCS#10 and cryptographically compares it against the Bridge's CA Public Key.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

IdenTrust ensures that Subscribers and Relying Parties receive and maintain the IGC Root CA (Trust Anchor) and IGC SubCA Public Keys in a trustworthy fashion. Additionally, PKI Service Providers are required by contract to ensure Subscribers and Relying Parties receive and maintain the IGC Root CA (Trust Anchor) and IGC SubCA Public Keys in a trustworthy fashion, if involved in delivery of CA Public Keys. Public Keys for CAs are contained within CA Certificates. Methods for delivery of CA Certificates include:

1. CA Certificates may be delivered to Subscribers during the Certificate retrieval process for their own Subscriber Certificates during the Server-Authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted Session as part of a message formatted in accordance with PKCS#7. When a CMS intermediates the retrieval process, the delivery of the Public Keys may occur through the Secure Channel created between the CMS and the smart card using the master Keys associated to the CMS.
2. Relying Parties may obtain CA Certificates from IdenTrust's secure web site. An email or other communication may be sent to PKI Participants directing them to download the CA Certificate at an <https://> website secured with a valid SSL Certificate that chains to one of IdenTrust's Root Certificates. Alternatively, Subscribers and Relying Parties may be directed to an <http://> website that is not secured in which case, IdenTrust will provide the hash or fingerprint via authenticated OOB sources (i.e., IdenTrust help desk phone support).
3. In cases where the External RA manages the insertion of CA Certificates into the Cryptomodule, IdenTrust provides the CA Certificates securely to the RA using an IdenTrust PKI Consultant during initial system setup. Once delivered, the RA is obligated by contract, the CP, and this CPS to ensure the Subscriber receives the CA Certificates in a trustworthy fashion.
4. PKI Participants relying on CA Public Keys may deploy CA Certificates through enterprise-wide patch management, system maintenance utilities, directory services and active directories.

6.1.5 Key Sizes

Requirements for Key sizes may vary based on the Certificate to which the Keys are associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.1.5.1 Key Sizes for Subscriber and Device

All end entity (Subscriber or Device) Certificates contain Public Keys that are at minimum 2048 bits for RSA or 256 bits for elliptic curve algorithms. End entity Certificates that expire after December 31, 2030, will contain Public Keys that are at minimum 3072 bits for RSA or 256 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.

6.1.5.2 Key Sizes for Subordinate CAs

Subordinate CAs that generate Certificates and CRLs Sign with Keys that are at least 2048 bits for RSA, or 256 bits for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). All Certificates that expire after December 31, 2030, will be signed with Keys that are at least 3072 bits for RSA or 256 bits for ECDSA. At minimum, a SHA-256 hash algorithm is used when generating Digital Signatures. CSSs that Sign OCSP Responses do so using the same signature algorithm, Key size, and hash algorithm used by the CA to sign CRLs.

6.1.5.3 Key Sizes for CAs

For the IdenTrust Global Common Root CA, the subject Public and Private Signature Keys are 4096-bit modulus

RSA.

6.1.5.4 Key Sizes for TLS or Other Protocols

TLS or other protocols providing similar security to accomplish any of the requirements of this CPS use a minimum of 128-bit AES for the symmetric Key, and at least 2048-bit RSA or equivalent for the asymmetric Keys. After December 31, 2030, these protocols will be configured to use at least 3072-bit RSA or equivalent for asymmetric Keys.

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

For RSA, Cryptomodules and associated software platforms used by CAs, the CSA, CMS, Subscribers and RAs are validated as conforming to NIST SP 800-89 (Section 5.3.3), and provides random number generation and on-board creation of 2048-bit or higher Key lengths for RSA Public Key Generation.

IdenTrust uses Cryptomodules conforming to [NIST SP 800-56A Rev.3] as vendors make products available.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

The specific Usage of a Key is determined by the key usage extension in the X.509 Certificate. Certificate key usage fields are used in accordance with RFC 5280.

Public Keys that are bound into Certificates assert digitalSignature or keyEncipherment, but not both. Except for Device Certificates, “dual use” Certificates asserting both digitalSignature and keyEncipherment are not to be Issued by CAs operating under this CPS. Certificate key usage is fully defined in IGC Profiles and may include additional extensions and additional key usages or extended key usages not indicated below. Subscribers and Relying Parties are advised to refer to IGC Profiles or the extensions of Issued IGC Certificates for all Certificate key usage purposes.

Key Usage purposes vary based on the type of Certificate to which they are associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.1.7.1 Key Usage Purposes for Signing Certificates

The following key usage values are present in the Individual Subscriber Signing Certificates: (i) digitalSignature; and (ii) non-Repudiation, which will be marked as critical.

For End Entity Certificates, the Extended Key Usage extension is always present and does not contain anyExtendedKeyUsage {2.5.29.37.0}.

For further details see IGC Profiles which address Subscriber Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.2 Key Usage Purposes for Encryption Certificates

The following key usage values are present in the Individual Subscriber Encryption Certificates: (1) KeyEncipherment, which will be marked as critical.

For End Entity Certificates, the Extended Key Usage extension is always present and does not contain anyExtendedKeyUsage {2.5.29.37.0}.

For further details see IGC Certificate Profiles which address Subscriber Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.3 Key Usage Purposes for DirectTrust Signing and Encryption Certificates

All Subscriber (end-entity) Certificates that include a DirectTrust Policy OID and are non-CA Certificates assert Basic Constraints as a Critical Extension and must assert a value of CA=False.

For End Entity Certificates, the Extended Key Usage extension is always present and does not contain anyExtendedKeyUsage {2.5.29.37.0}.

For further details, see IGC the Certificate Profiles which address DirectTrust Subscriber Certificates in profiles that

are separate from the standard IGC Subscriber Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.4 Key Usage Purposes for Group Certificates

A Group Certificate asserts digitalSignature or keyEncipherment, but not both within the same Certificate. A Group Certificate does not assert non-Repudiation.

For End Entity Certificates, the Extended Key Usage extension is always present and does not contain anyExtendedKeyUsage {2.5.29.37.0}.

6.1.7.5 Key Usage Purposes for CA Certificates

All CA Private Signature Keys are used only to sign Certificates and CRLs.

The following key usage value is present in the CA Certificates: (1) cRLSign; and (2) KeyCertSign.

For further details about the key usage fields in CA Certificates, see the IGC Certificate Profiles which address CA Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.6 Key Usage Purposes for RA System Certificates

RA System Certificates are Device Certificates. The following key usage values are present in the Device Signing Certificates: (1) digitalSignature; and (2) KeyEncipherment, which is marked as critical.

For further details see the IGC Certificate Profiles which address Device Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.7 Key Usage Purposes for Content Signing Certificates

IGC PIV-I Content Signing Certificates contain a key usage value of digitalSignature, which is marked as critical. Additionally, IGC PIV-I Content Signing Certificates include an Extended key usage of id-fpki-pivi-content-signing, which is marked as critical.

For further details see the IGC Certificate Profiles which address Content Signing Certificate Profiles.

6.1.7.8 Key Usage Purposes for OCSP Responder Certificates

The following key usage values are present in the OCSP Responder Certificates: (1) digitalSignature; and (2) nonRepudiation, which are marked as critical.

For further details see IGC the Certificate Profiles which address OCSP Responder profiles.

6.2 PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

All Cryptomodules used within the IdenTrust PKI are validated to the appropriate FIPS PUB 140-2 security level as identified in this Section.

- RA Administrators and LRAs are required to use hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher. When obtaining IGC Hardware or IGC PIV-I Hardware Certificates, Subscribers are required to use hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher.
- IGC Software Certificate Subscribers are required to use software or hardware Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher.
- IGC PIV-I Content Signing Keys and RA System Keys are generated and stored in Cryptomodules validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher.
- All CA Keys are generated and stored in HSMs validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher.
- All CSA Keys are generated and stored in HSMs validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher.
- Any pseudo-random numbers used for Key generation material must be generated using a FIPS-validated cryptographic module.

CMS master Keys are generated and stored in HSMs validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher.

6.2.1.1 Custodial Subscriber Key Stores

Custodial Subscriber Key Stores hold keys for several Subscriber Certificates in one location. The Custodial Subscriber Key Store is implemented by the Custodial Organization in such a way as to prevent any Custodial entity from accessing the Subscriber Private Keys and prevents any other Subscriber from accessing the Private Keys of another Subscriber.

6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control

The CA, CSA, CMS, RA system and PIV-I Content Signing Private Keys are stored in the secure room under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control as described in Sections [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#), [6.1.1 Key Pair Generation](#) and [6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key](#).

For purposes of disaster recovery, backups of CA, CSA, RA system and CMS, and PIV-I Content Signing Private Keys are made under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control (see Section [6.2.4.1 Backup of CA Private Signature Key](#)) and are stored in the secure room and in a secure offsite facility where Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control are implemented as explained in Sections [5.1.6 Media Storage](#), [5.1.8 Off-site Backup](#), [5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task](#), and [5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster](#).

This Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control prevents a single Individual from gaining access to CA, CSA, CMS, RA system or PIV-I Content Signing Private Keys.

6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

Private encryption keys of a CA Certificate are not escrowed as escrow and key recovery are not supported.

6.2.3.1 Escrow of Subscriber Private Signature Keys

Private Keys of Subscriber encryption Certificates may be escrowed. RAs are prohibited from escrowing the Private Keys of Certificates asserting key usages of nonRepudiation or digitalSignature.

6.2.3.2 Escrow of Subscriber Private Encryption and Dual Use Keys

Except for Device Certificates, IdenTrust issues only single-use Certificates under the IGC policy. Dual use Certificates issued to humans, are not issued under the IGC policy; therefore, key escrow is allowed for Subscriber private encryption keys.. Subscriber signing keys are never escrowed.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup

See sub-sections below.

6.2.4.1 Backup of CA Private Signature Key

CA Private Signature Keys are backed up and stored under the same security precautions and multi-Person control as the original CA Private Signature Key on cloned Cryptomodules to obviate the need to Re-Key in the case of hardware failure or disaster. No entity other than IdenTrust is allowed to backup or archive CA Private Signature Keys.

Two sets of the Root CA are generated, each stored in distinct Cryptomodules. In contrast, duplicate copies of all remaining CAs are created and stored within a shared Cryptomodule. It's important to note that all backup Cryptomodules meet the FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher security standard. The backup of all other CA Keys is performed during a ceremony that is scripted, videotaped, and witnessed under the same controls used for original Key Generation. The backup is performed using PED keys specified for such purposes. PED keys are kept under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control as explained in Section [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#).

IdenTrust stores the Root CA and all other CA Private Keys and one of the copies in the secure room. The second backup of the Root CA and all other CAs Private Signature Keys are kept in a secure offsite facility.

When the Root CA and all other CAs Keys are no longer needed, the Cryptomodule containing them is Zeroized in

accordance with Section [6.2.10 Methods of Destroying Private Keys](#).

6.2.4.2 Backup of RA Private Signature Keys

Backup Private Keys of RA system Certificates by the RA is permitted only to facilitate disaster recovery. Such Private Keys are backed up under the same multi-Person control as used to generate the original Private Key, as described in Section [5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task](#) and undergo audit(s) in accordance with Section [8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#) of this CPS.

6.2.4.3 Backup of Subscriber Private Signature Keys

Private Keys of Signing Certificates delivered to hardware Cryptomodules are not backed up. The hardware Cryptomodules are configured to not allow export of Private Keys.

Private Keys of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules may be backed up or copied if they remain under the control of the Subscriber, the Private Signature Keys never appear outside the Cryptomodule in plain text and the Cryptomodule in which they are stored is evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. Subscribers are obligated to protect backed up or copied Private Keys.

6.2.4.4 Backup of Subscriber Key Management Private Keys

Private Keys of Subscriber Encryption Certificates delivered to hardware cryptomodules are not able to backup, as they are not exportable from the hardware Cryptomodule. Issuing CAs may escrow Encryption Private Keys for recovery purposes as described in Section [4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery](#).

Private Keys of Encryption Certificates delivered to software cryptomodules may be backed up or copied if they remain under the control of the Subscriber, the Private Keys never appear outside the Cryptomodule in plain text and the Cryptomodule in which they are stored is evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. Subscribers are obligated to protect backed up or copied Private Keys.

6.2.4.5 Backup of CSA Private Key

CSA is also referenced as CSS in this document and the terms can be considered as interchangeable. CSA Private Signature Keys are backed up and stored under the same security precautions and multi-Person control as the original CSA Signature Private Key on cloned HSMs to obviate the need to Re-Key in the case of hardware failure or disaster. No entity other than IdenTrust is allowed to backup or archive CSA Private Signature Keys. Two copies of all CSAs are created in a shared HSM. All backup Cryptomodules are evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher.

The backup of all other CSA Keys is performed during a ceremony that is scripted, videotaped, and witnessed under the same controls used for the original Key Generation. The backup is performed using the PED keys specified for such purposes. PED keys are kept under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control

IdenTrust stores CSA Private Keys and one of the backup copies in the secure room. The second backup of CSA Private Keys is kept in a secure offsite facility.

When the CSA Keys are no longer needed, the HSM containing them is Zeroized.

6.2.4.6 Backup of IGC PIV-I Content Signing Private Key

IGC PIV-I Content Signing Private Signature Keys are backed up and stored under the same security precautions and Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control as for generation of the IGC PIV-I Content Signing Private Signature Key.

One backup copy of IGC PIV-I Content Private Signature Key is kept in the secure room. A second backup copy is kept in a secure offsite facility.

When the IGC PIV-I Content Private Signature Key is no longer needed, the HSM containing them is Zeroized.

6.2.4.7 Backup of Device Private Keys

Private Keys of Device Certificates may be backed up or copied, but must be held under the control of the Primary Machine Operator of the Device. Backed up Private Keys must not exist in plain text outside the Cryptomodule. Storage must ensure security controls consistent with the protection provided by the original Cryptomodule in which Keys were generated.

6.2.5 Private Key Archival

The Private Keys of Signing Certificates that are Issued to Subscribers are not archived or escrowed by IdenTrust.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module

The process for Private Key transfer may vary based on the type of Certificate to which the Private Key is associated. See the following sub-sections for specific details.

6.2.6.1 Subscriber Private Key Transfer into or From a Cryptographic Module

Private Keys of Certificates delivered to hardware Cryptomodules are generated and required to be kept inside of hardware Cryptomodules evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher. LRAs and Subscribers are notified of their obligation not to transfer the Private Keys from the Cryptomodule in which they were generated.

Private Keys of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules are generated in a Cryptomodule evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. Such Private Keys may be transported to another Cryptomodule, provided evaluation is to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. During transport, Private Keys must remain under the control of the Subscriber and never exist in plain text outside of the Cryptomodule boundary. Private or symmetric Keys used to encrypt other Private Keys for transport must be protected from disclosure. Subscribers are notified of their obligation to protect Private Keys during transport and to only utilize Cryptomodules evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher.

6.2.6.2 CA, CSA, CMS, and PIV-I Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module

CA, CSA, RA, and CMS Private Keys are generated and kept inside HSMs evaluated at FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher. Where such Keys must be transferred to other media for backup and disaster recovery purposes, they are transferred in encrypted form. CA, CSA, RA, and CMS Private Keys are backed up in accordance with the controls described in Section [6.2.4.1 Backup of CA Private Signature Key](#). For backup purposes, a clone of the HSM is made using the PED key, and the cloning process ensures that the Private Keys never appear in plain text outside of the HSM.

6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

Procedures for Private Key storage on a Cryptographic Module may vary based on the type of Certificate to which the Private Keys are associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.2.7.1 Subscriber Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

Private Keys of Certificates delivered to hardware Cryptomodules are maintained in Cryptomodules evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 or higher.

Private Keys of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules are maintained in Cryptomodules evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 1 or higher. The Cryptomodule may store Private Keys in any form as long as the Keys are not accessible without an authentication mechanism. Private Keys must never exist in plain text outside of the Cryptomodule.

6.2.7.2 CA Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

CA Private Keys are maintained in HSMs evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher and are always kept in encrypted form. The HSM containing the Root Private Key used in performing IdenTrust's CA certification services is used for no other Keys (apart from certain Keys used in managing the device itself, in some instances). Each

HSM containing SubCA Private Keys may be shared with multiple other SubCA Keys. They are handled by the same IdenTrust Trusted Role employees and kept in the same secure storage locations as other HSMs, but CA HSMs are used only for CA Keys. Moreover, their Activation Data differs from that used for other Cryptomodules. HSMs containing CA Private Keys are activated by a PIN Entry Device.

6.2.7.3 CSA, RA, CMS Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

CSA, RA, and CMS Private Keys are maintained in HSMs evaluated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher and are always kept in encrypted form. Each Cryptomodule containing CSA, RA and CMS Private Keys may be shared with multiple other CSA, RA, and CMS Keys.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Keys

Methods of Activating Private Keys may vary based on the Certificate type to which they are associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

When passphrases, passwords or PINs are used, they are a minimum of 6 characters. Data entry of the passphrase, password or PINs are masked.

6.2.8.1 Method of Activating Private Keys for Subscribers

Subscribers of Certificates delivered to hardware Cryptomodules protect their Private Keys from unauthorized use with a strong password. Subscribers of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules are instructed to protect their Private Keys from unauthorized use with a strong password. Subscribers are obligated by contract, the IGC CP, and this CPS to authenticate to the Cryptomodule before the activation of Private Keys, as well as to protect the password or other data used to activate the Cryptomodule from disclosure.

6.2.8.2 Method of Activating Private Keys For PIV-I

For PIV-I Card Authentication Certificates, Subscriber activation of Private Keys is not required.

6.2.8.3 Method of Activating Private Keys for CA, CSA, RA, and CMS

CA, CSA, RA, and CMS Private Keys are activated by Activation Data stored securely and separately from the Cryptomodules in which they are kept. Activation of the Private Key requires a PIN Entry Device (PED) key to be connected to the module. The PED keys and Cryptomodules are stored in separate safes. PED keys and Cryptomodules are retrieved and used always under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control (see Sections [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#), [6.1.1 Key Pair Generation](#) and [6.2.2 Private Key Multi Person Control](#)).

For the CA and CSA, the Private Key is activated by use of the proper PED keys during a scripted, videotaped and witnessed Key Generation or Certificate signing ceremony under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control.

For the RA and CMS (including the PIV-I Content Signing Certificate), the Private Key is activated by use of the proper PED keys during a scripted and witnessed Key Generation or Certificate signing ceremony under Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control.

6.2.9 Methods of Deactivating Private Keys

The methods for deactivating Private Keys may vary based on the type of Certificate to which the Private Key is associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.2.9.1 Methods of Deactivating Private Keys for Subscribers

All Subscribers are notified of their obligation not to leave their Cryptomodules unattended or open to unauthorized access while active. Subscribers are required to deactivate their Cryptomodules either by a manual logout or by configuring a passive inactivity timeout that does it automatically.

6.2.9.2 Methods of Deactivating Private Keys for LRAs

LRAs are provided with instruction on the security procedures by which they remove their Cryptomodule when

not in use and configure the automatic passive inactivity timeouts in the Cryptomodule accordance with the security policy.

6.2.9.3 Methods of Deactivating Private Keys for CA, CSA, CMS, and RA

CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Cryptomodules are:

- Deactivated via logout or removal procedures when not in use; and
- Not left unattended or otherwise active to unauthorized access.

Cryptomodules, when unattended and active, are kept locked inside steel cabinets located inside the secure room.

6.2.10 Methods of Destroying Private Keys

The Methods of destroying Private Keys may vary based on the type of Certificate to which the Private Key is associated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.2.10.1 Methods of Destroying Private Keys for Subscribers

All Subscribers are notified of their obligation to destroy their Private Keys and are provided instructions on Zeroizing, re-initializing or destroying the Cryptomodule when they are no longer needed, or when the Certificates to which they correspond are expired or have been Revoked. Subscribers of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules are instructed to delete their Private Keys, delete the swap file, then erase the unused disk space using disk/file eraser program, and reboot the workstation.

In cases when the Zeroization or re-initialization procedure fails, the Subscriber is instructed to crush, shred and/or incinerate the Cryptomodule in a manner that destroys the ability to extract Private Keys from the Cryptomodule.

6.2.10.2 Methods of Destroying Private Keys for CA, CSA, CMS, and RA System

Upon expiration or Revocation of a CA, CSA, CMS or RA System Certificate, or other termination of use of the Private Signature Key, all copies of the Private Signature Key are securely destroyed. When no longer needed, all Private Keys are destroyed in accordance with the FIPS PUB 140-2 validated Zeroize destruction method that is part of the Cryptomodule's design. Physical destruction of the Cryptomodule is not required.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

See [Section 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls](#).

6.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT

6.3.1 Public Key Archival

IdenTrust retains copies of all Public Keys for archival purposes as part of the Certificate archive process in accordance with [Section 5.5 Records Archival](#).

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Usage Periods

CAs that distribute their self-signed Certificates for use as trust anchors limit the use of the associated private key to a maximum of 30 years.

For all other CAs, the CA limits the use of its private keys to a maximum of 10 years for Subscriber Certificates and 10 years for CRL signing and OCSP responder Certificates.

Content signers may use their private keys for 3 years; the lifetime of the associated public keys does not exceed 9 years.

Subscribers' signature private keys and Certificates have a maximum lifetime of 3 years. Subscriber key management Certificates have a maximum lifetime of 3 years; use of Subscriber key management private keys is unrestricted.

PIV-I Subscriber Certificate expiration is not later than the expiration date of the PIV-I hardware token on which the Certificates reside.

IdenTrust will not issue Subscriber Certificates that extend beyond the expiration date of their own CA Certificates and public keys.

Subscriber public keys in Certificates that assert the id-fpki-pivi-content-signing OID in the extended key usage extension have a maximum usage period of 9 years. The private keys corresponding to the public keys in these Certificates have a maximum usage period of 3 years. Expiration of the id-fpki-certpcy-pivi-contentSigning Certificate is later than the expiration of the id-fpki-certpcy-pivi-hardware and id-fpki-certpcy-pivi-cardAuth Certificates.

For PIV-I, CSS Certificates that provide revocation status have a maximum Certificate validity period of 35 days.

All Certificates issued by IdenTrust and corresponding Keys have maximum Validity Periods not to exceed the following table:

Table 11: Key Usage Period by Key Type

Key Type	Key Usage Period ²¹	Certificate Lifetime
Root CA	30 years	30 years
Subordinate CA	10 years	10 years
CSA/CSS	3 years	31 days
RA	3 years	3 years
IGC PIV-I Content Signer	3 years	9 years(*)
Individual Identity, Signing, and Card Authentication ²²	3 years	3 years
Individual Encryption	No restriction	3 years
Group Signing	3 years	3 years
Group Encryption	No restriction	3 years
Device	3 years	3 years
LRA	3 years	3 years
Bridge Cross Certificate	10-30 years ²³	3 years

(*)PIV-I Subscriber Certificate expiration cannot be later than the expiration date of the PIV-I hardware token on which the Certificate resides and the expiration date of the PIV-I Content Signer Certificate used to sign the Subscriber Certificate on the PIV-I card will not expire before the expiration date of such Subscriber Certificate.

²¹ These Certificate lifetime periods are configured in the CA system according to each Certificate type (e.g., IGC PIV-I Content vs. Machine Subscriber) and this system enforces these limits. For Certificates generated during ceremonies (e.g., Root CA or CSA) the script will state the period and the CA administrator will manually enforce it and a witness will verify it.

See Section 5.6 (Key Changeover), which explains that SubCA Private Signature Keys are voluntarily retired from signing Subscriber Certificates before this time to accommodate for Key Changeover processes. (They are still used to sign CRLs and OCSP Responder Certificates to allow for validation of 3-year Subscriber Certificates that are Issued with old SubCA Signing Key).

²² IGC PIV-I hardware and IGC PIV-I Card Authentication Certificates expiration shall not be later than the expiration date of the smart card on which the Certificates reside, which is enforced by the CMS.

²³ 10-year usage period is used for subordinate CAs and 30-year period for Root CA.

6.4 ACTIVATION DATA

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

A passphrase, PIN or other Activation Data is used to protect access to Private Keys.

Generation of Activation Data may vary based on the type of Certificate being activated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.4.1.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation for Subscribers

All Subscribers are instructed to use strong passwords in accordance with FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 2 and to protect their passwords. When Activation Data is transmitted, it is sent through a secure OOB channel as explained in Sections [4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance](#) of this CPS.

Subscribers of Certificates delivered to software Cryptomodules are instructed to use Strong Passwords.

6.4.1.2 Activation Data Generation and Installation for Participant CAs and External RAs

Participant CAs and External RAs may use a remote PED and PED keys for administration of RA and CMS system HSMS, provided controls surrounding use of such remote PED devices are described in their RPS and acceptable to IdenTrust.

6.4.1.3 Activation Data Generation and Installation for CA, CSA, CMS, and RAs

IdenTrust uses manually held PED and PED keys to activate its Private Keys for CAs, CSAs, CMSs, and RAs. The Activation Data used meets the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3. The PED and PED keys are held in the secure room under the multi-Person controls explained in Section [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#).

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

Protection of Activation Data may vary based on the type of Certificate being activated. See sub-sections below for specific details.

6.4.2.1 Activation Data Protection for Subscribers

All Subscribers are notified of their obligation to protect Activation Data as follows:

- It should be memorized whenever possible, not written down,
- If written down, it must be secured at the level of the data that the associated Cryptomodule is used to protect, and will not be stored with the Cryptomodule; and
- Activation Data must never be shared with or disclosed to another Individual.

RA Administrators will enforce a mechanism to temporarily lock the Cryptomodule, or terminate the application, after a maximum of 6 failed login attempts.

LRAs and Subscribers will enforce a mechanism to temporarily lock the Cryptomodule, or terminate the application, after a maximum of 10 failed login attempts.

6.4.2.2 Activation Data Protection for Participant CAs and External RAs

Participant CAs and External RAs using remote PED keys must ensure PED keys are held by individuals in Trusted Roles in a manner through which Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control is ensured when accessing HSMS. When not in use, PED keys must be kept in separate secure locations to ensure Separation-of-Duties/Multi-party Control when accessing HSMS. Controls for ensuring security of PED keys must be described in the Participant CA or External RA RPS.

6.4.2.3 Activation Data Protection for CA, CSA, CMS, and RAs

Activation Data for Cryptomodules used by IdenTrust for CAs, CSAs, CMS and RAs CMSs are protected by keeping

the PED keys in separate safes inside the secure room. As explained in Section [5.1.2.1 Physical Access for CA Equipment](#), access to the secure room requires two Individuals in Trusted Roles with different authentication mechanisms.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

For Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware, the Activation Data may be reset after a successful biometric 1:1 match of the Applicant against the biometrics collected during the identity proofing process in Section [3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human Subscribers](#). This match is conducted by an LRA or TA and consists of both a positive manual comparison of the facial image on record and an automated comparison of the fingerprints data on record with the Subscriber requesting Activation Data Reset. The comparison is performed by the LRA or TA utilizing an EWS attached to the CMS.

6.5 COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

All CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment will use a self-protecting operating system that prevents and detects attempts to alter it, or to disable its security functions. CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment is configured and hardened using industry best practices and IdenTrust's system configuration guides. Procedures also pertain to those portions of the CA operating in a VME, and also pertain to the hypervisor. CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment uses operating systems that require Individual I&A for authenticated logins, discretionary Access Control (including managing privileges of users to limit their assigned roles), Access Control restrictions that limit services based on authenticated identity, residual information protection, trusted path for I&A, security audit capability, a protected audit record, self-protection, recovery mechanisms for Keys and system failure and process isolation. CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment is scanned for malicious code on first use and at least weekly afterward.

CA, CMS, RA and LRA equipment is configured with the minimum number of accounts necessary for operation of the equipment. The production environments containing the CSA and RA systems are remotely accessible under these controls: the CSA system requires the use of public/private key protocols such as SSH, and the RA system requires Certificate-based access via a browser application. In all cases, data is encrypted from workstation to host.

IdenTrust's Computer Architecture documents and equipment configurations are available for review on-site by external auditors and major customers upon request and under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

RA Systems (including CMSs) of Participant CAs and External RAs are required to be implemented as multi-server systems in a multi-tier network architecture. Such RA Systems consist of:

1. A web server layer,
2. An application layer,
3. An application database, and
4. A RA communication layer.

The web server layer is implemented in a DMZ network tier that is separated via a firewall receiving/sending network traffic from/to a public network (i.e., Internet). The application server layer and application database server are implemented in a secure network tier that does not directly receive any network traffic from a public network (e.g., internet). The RA communication layer is dedicated to communications between the application layer of the RA System and the IdenTrust CA. The RA Communication layer manages XKMS messages and the RA's Cryptomodule. The application layer hosts the functionality that supports the LRA and Applicant/Subscriber functions explained in Section [1.3.2 IdenTrust Principal Certification Authority \(CA\)](#). External RAs are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the CP to implement computer security controls consistent with this CPS and the CP.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

The IdenTrust issuing CA system servers use equipment and operating systems with the following attributes: (i)

self-protection; (ii) process isolation; (iii) discretionary access control; (iv) object reuse controls; (v) Individual Identity Proofing; and (vi) a protected audit records.

6.6 LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS

6.6.1 System Development Controls

IdenTrust develops appropriate documentation establishing that PKI components are properly installed, configured and operate in accordance with required technical specifications. This includes:

- Installation qualification plans, procedures/scripts/data, acceptance criteria, and results; and
- Operational qualification plans, procedures/scripts/data, acceptance criteria, certifications, and test results.

IdenTrust's PKI components have been designed and developed to meet applicable security standards for PKI systems. IdenTrust's design and development processes are sufficiently documented to support third-party security evaluation of IdenTrust components and third-party verification of process compliance, and on-going assessments to influence security safeguard design and minimize residual risk.

IdenTrust has a process in place to minimize the likelihood of any component being tampered with. Vendors selected are chosen based on their reputation in the market, ability to deliver a quality product, with the likelihood of remaining viable companies in the future. Controls ensure that management is involved in the vendor selection and purchase decision process. External purchasing paperwork will only generically identify the purpose for which the component will be used.

CA, CSA, CMS, RA and LRA hardware and software PKI components are shipped directly to a Trusted Role Individual using shipping providers that have shipment tracking mechanisms allowing continuous tracking. Tracking information is provided to IdenTrust directly by the equipment vendor. Cryptomodules are received in tamper-evident containers. A Cryptomodule's shipment-specific information (e.g., serial number) is requested by IdenTrust to confirm the content when it is received. Other major PKI components (e.g., servers) are shipped under standard conditions. At reception, a chain of custody is maintained from that point forward and information provided by the vendor during the purchase order process is used to confirm the correct equipment has been received. From the point of the tamper-evident container being opened, Cryptomodules are maintained under multi-Person control by Individuals in Trusted Roles.

IdenTrust develops some PKI software components used to provide PKI services. Standard development methodologies are used. Strict quality assurance is maintained throughout the process and supporting documentation maintained. Development and test environments are maintained on separate servers in a separate network from the main operational (production) environment with appropriate segregation rights restricting developers and testers from having access to production equipment or operating environments. When open-source software is used, it is selected focusing on specific functionality and goes through unit and integration testing on a controlled environment. Prior to use in production, the entire developed module goes through the standard change control process.

IdenTrust dedicates a PKI platform specifically to its PKI production operations including the CA, CSA, CMS, and RA System functions. IdenTrust utilizes VME for some functions. All VM systems operate in the same security zone as the CA. This includes server hardware, operating system software, Cryptomodules, PKI application software and the VME hypervisor. Non-PKI applications are not installed on production PKI platforms. Functionality for a given PKI's CA, CSA, CMS, and RA Systems, as well as databases, networking and physical housing is shared with other PKI systems.

IdenTrust maintains controls to prevent malicious software from being loaded. CA, CSA, CMS, and internal RA System platforms are protected by host-based intrusion detection systems that monitors files in the system to detect any unapproved changes and inform System Administrators, CA Administrators and Security Officers, enabling them to correct the situation.

LRAs and TAs are required to take reasonable care to prevent malicious software from being loaded on their

equipment. Only applications required to perform the RA function are loaded on an LRA's computer, and all such software will be obtained from sources authorized by local policy. Data on LRA equipment must be scanned for malicious code on first use and at least weekly afterward. Equipment updates must be purchased or developed in the same manner as original equipment and be installed by trusted and trained personnel in a defined manner.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

IdenTrust has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the configuration of its CA, CSA, CMS, and internal RA Systems. IdenTrust installs its equipment and software in a controlled environment using a documented change control process. Software, when first loaded, is verified using file checksums provided by vendors at the file or file archive level.

Change control processes consist of a change control form that is processed, logged, and tracked for any changes to CA, CSA, CMS, RA Systems, firewalls, routers, software, and other Access Controls. File modifications are controlled through the change control process. In this manner, IdenTrust can verify whether a change to the system has been properly evaluated for risk mitigation and authorized by management.

Hashes for CA, CSA and CMS systems files are recorded upon installation and validated weekly thereafter as explained in the previous Section. Host based intrusion detection is utilized to detect changes to files. Notifications are monitored and are reviewed daily.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

Equipment (hardware and software) procured to operate a PKI is purchased in a fashion to reduce the likelihood that any component was tampered with as specified in Section [6.6.1 System Development Controls](#).

All hardware and software that supports IdenTrust's Certificate management system is shipped or delivered via controlled methods that provide a continuous chain of accountability as specified in Section 6.6.1 System Development Controls (noted above).

IdenTrust's TAs and LRAs are required to take reasonable care to prevent malicious software from being loaded on RA equipment through user education coupled with the use of antivirus programs and adhering to the software manufacturers recommended patches applicable to the installed software. Only applications required to perform the organization's mission will be loaded on the RA computer, and all such software will be obtained from sources authorized by local policy. Data on RA equipment is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically afterward. Equipment updates are purchased or developed in the same manner as original equipment and are installed by trusted and trained personnel in a defined manner.

6.7 NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS

The IdenTrust Root is kept offline and turned on under controlled conditions only when necessary for Signing of Sub-Certificates, Root OCSP Responder Certificates or CRLs. Subordinate CAs are connected to one network and protected against known network attacks.

IdenTrust implements a multi-tiered network utilizing the principles of defense in depth, such as multi-tiered security and redundancy. This infrastructure is comprised of firewalls, proxy servers, intrusion detection systems and other devices. All CA, CSA, CMS, RA, and Repository computer systems are located in secure facilities behind the previously mentioned multi-tiered infrastructure.

Firewalls are configured with a minimum number of accounts. Only services and protocols required to support CA, CSA, CMS, and RA functions are enabled. Firewalls and boundary control devices are configured to allow access only by the addresses, ports, protocols, and commands required for the trustworthy provision of PKI services by such systems. IdenTrust blocks all ports and protocols by default and open only the minimum necessary ports to enable CA, CSA, CMS, and RA functions. Any network software present on firewalls is required for their functioning. Any accounts, ports, or protocols added to firewall configurations are documented, authorized, tested, and implemented in accordance with the IdenTrust System Security Plan and other IdenTrust Policies and Procedures.

IdenTrust's Network Technical Architecture documents and equipment configurations are available for review on-site by its auditors and major customers upon request and under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

RAs and LRAs external to IdenTrust are obligated by contract, this CPS, and the IGC CP to implement Network Security controls consistent with this CPS and the IGC CP.

Remote workstations used to administer the CA use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to access the CA. The VPN is configured for mutual authentication, encryption, and integrity.

Remote administration is allowed only after successful multi-factor authentication of the Trusted Role with the applicable assurance level.

6.8 TIME STAMPING

IdenTrust's system clock time is derived from multiple trusted thirdparty time sources in accordance with applicable requirements and is used to establish accurate timestamps for the following:

- Initial Validity time of a Certificate,
- Revocation of a Certificate,
- Posting of CRLs and CRL updates,
- OCSP Responses; and
- System audit journal entries.

System time for servers providing CA, OCSP and CMS services is updated using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize system clocks at least once every sixty (60) minutes. External time sources operated by government agencies and other trusted sources are used to maintain an average accuracy of one (1) second or better. Electronic or manual procedures may be used to maintain system time on a contingency basis, if automated processes encounter a failure, requiring a time resynchronization.

7 CERTIFICATE, CARL/CRL, AND OCSP IGC Profiles Format

7.1 CERTIFICATE PROFILE

Detailed IGC Profiles are found in the IGC-Profiles and are comparable with X.509. For ease of reference, some high-level profile information is described in this Section 7.

7.1.1 Version Numbers

IdenTrust issues X.509 v3 Certificates with version field populated with integer "2".

7.1.1.1 Serial Numbers

All Certificates include a unique serial number. IdenTrust generates a non-sequential serial number greater than 0 that exhibits at least 64-bits of output from a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator of entropy using a FIPS-validated cryptographic module.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

Certificate extensions used are compliant with IETF RFC 5280 and include but are not limited to: authority key identifier, subject key identifier, key usage, extended key usage, Certificate policies, subjectAlternativeName, authority information access, CRL distribution points, and basic constraints (Root CA and CA Certificates).

7.1.2.1 Certificate Policies

The CertificatePolicies extension is populated in all Certificates that are Issued by the Root CA with one or more of the OIDs in Section [1.2.2 Object Identifier \(OID\)](#).

One or more of these OIDs are included in the CertificatePolicies extension of Certificates that are Issued to Subscribers. The CertificatePolicies extension is set to non-critical.

7.1.2.2 Policy Constraints

The PolicyConstraints extension in Certificates that are Issued by the Root CA to Subordinate CAs is not populated.

7.1.2.3 Critical Extensions

Table 12: Critical Extensions

Certificate Type	Key Usage	Extended Key Usage	Basic Constraints	Name Constraints	Inhibit anyPolicy
Cross Certificate	keycertSign cRLSign		cA=True; path length constraint is absent	presence is optional	inhibit anyPolicy skipCerts=0
Root CA Certificate	keycertSign cRLSign		cA=True; path length constraint is absent		
Subordinate CA Certificate	keycertSign cRLSign		cA=True; path length constraint is absent		
Subscriber Signing Certificate	digitalSignature nonRepudiation				
Subscriber Encryption Certificate	keyEncipherment				
Non-PIV-I Identity Certificate	digitalSignature	keyPurposeID = id-pkinit-KPClientAuth			
Non-PIV-I Card Authentication Certificate	digitalSignature				
PIV-I Authentication (Identity) Certificate Subscriber	digitalSignature	keyPurposeID = id-pkinit-KPClientAuth			
PIV-I Card Authentication Certificate	digitalSignature	keyPurposeID = id-PIV-cardAuth			
PIV-I Content Signing Certificate	digitalSignature	keyPurposeID = id-fpki-pivi-content- signing			
PIV-I Key Management (Encryption) Certificate	keyEncipherment				
Device Certificate	digitalSignature keyEncipherment	keyPurposeID= id_kp_clientAuth id_kp_ipsecEndSystem id_kp_ipsecTunnel id_kp_ipsecUser			
OCSF Responder Certificate	digitalSignature	keyPurposeID = id-kp-OCSPSigning			
PIV-I Signing Certificate	digitalSignature nonRepudiation				

Certificate Type	Key Usage	Extended Key Usage	Basic Constraints	Name Constraints	Inhibit anyPolicy
DirectTrust Domain Bound Signing Certificate	digitalSignature		cA=False		
DirectTrust Domain Bound Encryption Certificate	keyEncipherment		cA=False		
DirectTrust Address Signing Certificate	digitalSignature		cA=False		
DirectTrust Address Encryption Certificate	keyEncipherment		cA=False		

See the IGC Profiles document for additional information.

7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

7.1.3.1 Signature Algorithm OIDs

Certificates are or may be Issued with the following algorithms and OIDs.

Table 13: Signature Algorithm OIDs

Algorithm	OID
sha256WithRSAEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11} "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11"
Sha384WithRSAEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12} "1.2.840.113549.1.1.12"
Sha512WithRSAEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13} "1.2.840.113549.1.1.13"
ecdsa-with-Sha256	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) specified(3) sha256(2)} "1.2.840.10045.4.3.2"
ecdsa-with-SHA384	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } "1.2.840.10045.4.3.3"
ecdsa-with-SHA512	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } "1.2.840.10045.4.3.4"

7.1.3.2 Subject Public Key Information

Certificates that are Issued under this CPS use the following algorithms and OIDs for identifying the subject Public Key information:

Table 14: Subject Key Information

Algorithm	OID
rSAEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1} 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.1
id-ecPublicKey	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) public-Key-type(2) 1} 1.2.840.10045.2.1

7.1.3.3 Elliptic Curve Public Key

Where non-CA Certificates contain an elliptic curve Public Key, the parameters must be specified as one of the following named curves:

Table 15: Elliptic Curve Public Key

Named Curve	OID
Curve P-256 (ansip256r1)	{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 curves(3) prime(1) 7 } 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
Curve P-384 (ansip384r1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } 1.3.132.0.34

7.1.4 Name Forms

Certificate subject and issuer fields are populated with X.500 Distinguished Names composed of standard attribute types such as those defined in RFC 5280. Refer to Table below for name forms.

Table 16: Name Form for CAs

Subject Identifier type:	With data content of:	Indicates:
countryName (c)	Root CA = The letters "US" SubCA = A 2-letter code Optional	Root CA and that the Root Certificate is managed by a CA operated in the United States. SubCA and the 2-letter country code indicating the country of operation for IdenTrust branded SubCAs, or the country of Subscribing Organization for Participant CAs.
organizationName (o)	Root CA = The word "IdenTrust" SubCA = The word "IdenTrust"	Root CA and that the Root CA is owned and operated by IdenTrust. SubCA and that the SubCA is owned and operated by IdenTrust.
commonName (cn)	Root CA = The words "IdenTrust Global Common Root CA [x] ²⁴ " SubCA = The word "IGC CA [x] ²⁵ ", or in the case of a Subscribing Organization sponsored SubCA, the words [Customer] CA [x] ²⁶ .	Root CA and that the name of the Root CA followed by a number starting in one (1) and progressively increasing with each new instance of the Root Certificate SubCA and the name of the SubCA. A number could be appended to indicate the instance of the SubCA.

Table 17: Name Form for End Entity Certificates

²⁴ [x]: Iteration of the SubCA cn, (e.g., IGC CA 1, IGC CA 2, etc.)

²⁵ [x]: Iteration of the SubCA cn, (e.g., IGC CA 1, IGC CA 2, etc.)

²⁶ [Customer]: Unique Subscribing Organization SubCA name as authorized by IdenTrust PMA. [x]: Iteration of the SubCA cn, (e.g., [Customer] CA 1, [Customer] CA 2, etc.)

Subject Identifier type:	With data content of:	Indicates:
countryName=co	Root CA = The letters "US"	Root CA and that the Root Certificate is managed by a CA operated in the United States.
	SubCA = A 2-letter code Optional	SubCA and the 2-letter country code indicating the country of operation for IdenTrust branded SubCAs, or the country of Subscribing Organization for Participant CAs.
organizationName=o	Root CA = The word "IdenTrust"	Root CA and that the Root CA is owned and operated by IdenTrust.
	SubCA = The word "IdenTrust"	SubCA and that the SubCA is owned and operated by IdenTrust.
commonName=cn	Root CA = The words "IdenTrust Global Common Root CA [x]"	Root CA followed by a number starting in one (1) and progressively increasing with each new instance of the Root Certificate
	SubCA = The word "IGC CA [x]," or in the case of a Subscribing Organization sponsored Subordinate CA, the words [Customer] CA [x]	SubCA and the name of the SubCA. A number could be appended to indicate the instance of the SubCA.
serialNumber	Hexadecimal Characters for a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) in the form prescribed by [IETF RFC 4122]	A unique subject ID explained in Section 3.1.5 Cannot be the value of a PIV-I serial number Randomly generated unique value used to ensure name uniqueness
dnQualifier	Hexadecimal Characters for a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) in the form prescribed by [IETF RFC 4122]	A unique subject ID explained in Section 3.1.5 Randomly generated unique value used to ensure name uniqueness

When multiple values exist for an attribute in a DN, the DN is encoded so that each attribute value is encoded in a separate relative Distinguished Name.

For more detailed information and other Certificate fields, see IGC Profiles.

7.1.5 Name Constraints

IdenTrust does not utilize name constraints except in the instance of Cross-Certificates as necessary to permit or exclude trust sub-trees. When name constraints are utilized, they are marked critical.

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

CA and Subscriber Certificates that are Issued under this CPS assert one or more of the IGC Certificate policy OIDs listed in Section [1.2.2 Object Identifier \(OID\)](#). Additional OIDs asserting compliance with other Certificate policies may be included.

Certificates issued for PIV-I Card Authentication or PIV-I Content Signing do not express any other policy OIDs.

Delegated OCSP Responder Certificates assert all policy OIDs for which they are authoritative.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

CAs must adhere to the Certificate formats described in this CPS.

7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Certificates with a Policy Qualifier in the Certificate Policies extensions contain a User Notice that incorporates this CPS by reference and makes this CPS binding on all PKI Participants, including any potential Relying Party. By

using or otherwise relying on a Certificate, the Relying Party Accepts and consents to not only the language in the User Notice, but also to the applicability of this CPS including limitations of liability, disclaimers of warranties, applicable law, and other notices and disclosures made herein that may be determined to have been necessarily made within the Certificate.

Policy Qualifiers will be populated as required in IGC Profiles.

7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

IdenTrust IGC Certificates contain a non-critical Certificate policies extension.

The CertificatePolicies extension indicates the CP. The CP defines the policy for Issuance of all IGC Certificates, including those Issued by Participant CAs. The CertificatePolicies extension may assert policies that are in addition to IGC, such as compliance the DirectTrust CP. Certification practices for all IGC CAs are defined in this CPS. The CP and CPS are downloadable from the URL listed in the policy qualifier field of the CertificatePolicies extension in each IGC Certificate. IdenTrust shall have no liability for damages asserted by anyone who has used an IGC Certificate for an inappropriate purpose or in an inappropriate manner, as stipulated in the CP.

7.1.10 Inhibit Any Policy Extension

IdenTrust may assert InhibitAnyPolicy in CA Certificates. When present, this extension may be marked critical, to support legacy applications that cannot process InhibitAnyPolicy. SkipCerts is set to 0 to support the requirement for Certificate policies in the Federal PKI.

7.2 CRL PROFILE

7.2.1 Version Number(s)

IdenTrust Issues X.509 version 2 CRLs and populated with integer "1". CRLs conform to RFC 5280.

Signature Algorithm in accordance with Section [6.1.5 Key Sizes](#).

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

IdenTrust CRLs comply with IGC Profiles.

7.3 OCSP PROFILE

OCSP Requests and responses are in accordance with RFC 6960. IGC Profiles contains the OCSP Request and response formats.

7.3.1 Version Number(s)

The version number for request and responses is version one (1).

7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

Critical OCSP extensions must not be used.

8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

IdenTrust has compliance audit mechanisms in place to ensure that the requirements of this CPS, the CP and provisions of any relevant MOA are being implemented and enforced. Participant CAs and External RAs are similarly required to have compliance mechanisms in place for any functions performed regarding performance under this CPS.

IdenTrust also utilizes a qualified external auditor to conduct annual audits of all IdenTrust’s operations used in performing its obligations under this CPS.

Participant CAs and External RAs are required to have compliance mechanisms in place for any functions performed regarding performance of their RA function and operation of any CMS or RA Systems. The compliance audit is to ensure the requirements of the entity’s RPS, this CPS, CP and relevant agreements are being implemented and enforced. Annual compliance audit results must be provided to IdenTrust by the Participant CA or External RA before IdenTrust grants authority to operate, and subsequently by May 31st of each year for inclusion in IdenTrust’s external compliance audit.

The following table details appropriate compliance audits performed annually by external auditors pertaining to the CP and CPS.

Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits

Required Audit
Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI) FPKI Annual Review Requirements
WebTrust for Certification Authorities

8.1 FREQUENCY OF AUDIT OR ASSESSMENTS

IdenTrust’s operations used in performing the CA, CMS, CSA, RA and LRA services described in this CPS are audited annually by an external auditor. Contracts that IdenTrust has with third party entities that perform RA functions (Participant CAs, External RAs) obligate those parties to undergo a periodic compliance meeting the requirements of Section 8 for all RA and LRA activities listed in this CPS that are performed by such party.

The IdenTrust PMA has the right to require aperiodic compliance audits or inspections of RA operations to validate that subordinate entities are operating in accordance with the security practices and procedures described in this CPS and the RA RPS. The IdenTrust PMA must state the reason for any aperiodic compliance audit.

IdenTrust also conducts internal and external audits and/or completes requisite certifications as required by other governing CP documents (such as Federal Bridge or DirectTrust) to participate in each respective program; in which case the program will outline the requirements in respect to assessments. Results of these audits are provided to each organization upon completion or re-certification of the audit and/or certification; see “Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits” in Section 8.0, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments, which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

8.2 IDENTITY AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR

The auditor, Individual or audit group performing internal or external audits of PKI Service Providers must have the following qualifications:

- 1. Qualifications and experience.** Auditing must be the Individual’s or group’s primary business function. The Individual or at least one member of the audit group must be qualified as a Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA), an AICPA Certified Information Technology Professional (CPA CITP), a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), or have another recognized information security auditing credential.
- 2. Expertise.** The Individual or group must be trained and skilled in the auditing of secure information systems and be familiar with Public Key infrastructures, certification systems, and the like, as well as Internet security Issues (such as management of a security perimeter), operations of secure data centers, personnel controls, and operational risk management.

3. **Rules and standards.** The Individual or group must conform to applicable standards, rules, and best practices promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England & Wales (ICAEW), the International Accounting Standards adopted by the European Commission (IAS), Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), or another qualified auditing standards body.

8.2.1 IdenTrust's External Auditor Qualifications

To perform the annual external compliance audit, IdenTrust engages the services of a professional, external auditing firm having the following qualifications:

1. **Focus and experience.** Auditing must be the firm's principal business activity. Moreover, the firm must have experience in auditing secure information systems and Public Key infrastructures.
2. **Expertise.** The firm must have a staff of auditors trained and skilled in the auditing of secure information systems. The staff must be familiar with Public Key infrastructures, certification systems, and the like, as well as Internet security Issues (such as management of a security perimeter), operations of secure data centers, personnel controls, and operational risk management. The staff must be large enough to have the necessary depth and range of expertise required to audit IdenTrust's operations in a competent manner.
3. **Reputation.** The firm must have a reputation for conducting its auditing business competently and correctly.
4. **Disinterest.** The firm must have no financial interest, business relationship, or course of dealing that could foreseeably create a significant bias for or against IdenTrust.
5. **Rules and standards.** The firm must conform to applicable standards, rules, and best practices promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the International Accounting Standards adopted by the European Commission (IAS), Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA, or another qualified auditing standards body, and must require its audit professionals to do the same. Moreover, in auditing secure information systems, the firm should be guided by best practices standards; see "Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits" in Section 8.0, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments, which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies. The engagement of the auditing firm takes the form of a contract obligating the firm to assign members of its professional auditing staff to perform the audit when required. While the audit is being performed, those staff must, by agreement, perform the audit as their primary responsibility.

In addition, the members of the firm's staff performing the audit are contractually subject to the following requirements:

1. **Professional qualifications.** Each auditing professional performing the audit must be a member of the AICPA, CICA, ISSA, (ISC)2, IIA, or ISACA. In addition, at least one staff member must be qualified as a Certified Information Systems Auditor, AICPA Certified Information Technology Professional (CITP), or have another recognized information security auditing credential.
2. **Primary responsibility.** The auditing professional assigned by the auditing firm to take the lead in the audit must have the audit as his or her primary responsibility until the audit is completed. That staff member and IdenTrust will agree on a project plan before beginning the audit to ensure that adequate staff, other resources, and time are provided.
3. **Conformity to professional rules.** Each professional active in auditing IdenTrust must conform to the ethical and other professional rules of the AICPA, CICA, ICAEW, ISSA, (ISC)2, IIA, or ISACA or those of the applicable other qualified auditing standards body.

4. **Professional background.** The professionals assigned to perform the audit must be trained to a standard generally accepted in the auditing field. They must also be familiar with PKI and other information security technologies and their secure operation. IdenTrust's operations are audited to ensure that IdenTrust conforms to its CPs and CPS, as well as to all audits as listed in "Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits" in Section 8.0, Compliance Audit and Other Assessments, which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies, and familiarity with those documents is necessary for performing the audit. The auditor that IdenTrust has selected for past audits has in every case been one of the large, well-known auditing firms. IdenTrust expects to continue this practice while changing from time to time the specific firm selected.

8.2.2 External RA Auditor Qualifications

The auditor selected by an External RA will evaluate controls that are stated in the IdenTrust approved RPS document created by the External RA and determine whether the External RA PKI operation is operating according to the stated controls.

The auditor must possess sufficient knowledge of the PKI function and other information security technologies and their secure operation.

The auditor must be trained to a standard generally accepted in the auditing field.

8.3 ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY

Details provided in sub-sections noted below.

8.3.1 IdenTrust External Auditor Relationship

IdenTrust will establish a contractual relationship with the auditing firm for performance of the audit, but otherwise, auditors must be independent, unrelated entities having no financial interest in each other. Auditors must maintain a high standard of ethics designed to ensure impartiality and the exercise of independent professional judgment, subject to disciplinary action by their licensing bodies. The auditor(s) must have no other relationships with IdenTrust or its officers and directors, including financial, legal, social, or other relationships that would constitute a conflict of interest.

8.3.2 External RA Auditor Relationship

The auditor, individual or audit group, may be a party that is external to the External RA organization or may be a party within the External RA organization that is sufficiently removed from the RA PKI operation as to be objective. The audit party must have access to and/or the ability to view documentation and procedures stated as controls in the RPS document sufficient to assess compliance with such controls.

The External RA RPS document must state the qualifications of the selected auditor and describe the relationship of the auditor to the PKI operational team.

8.4 TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT

Details provided in sub-section noted below.

8.4.1 IdenTrust Audit Scope

The scope and substance of the annual compliance audits performed on CA, CMS, CSA, RA and LRA operations meet those required under the laws and policies specified in the CP to maintain approval to operate.

The annual compliance audit covers all aspects of the CP, this CPS, the RA RPS (if any), and any relevant Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or agreement between IdenTrust and entity; see "Table 18 - Required Best-Practices Annual Audits" in Section [8Compliance Audit and Other Assessments](#), which includes specific criteria that each audit satisfies.

Components other than CAs may be audited fully or by using a representative sample. If the auditor uses statistical

sampling, all PKI components, PKI component managers and operators are considered in the sample. The samples must vary on an annual basis.

8.4.2 External RA Audit Scope

The annual audit review conducted by an External RA must be consistent with the requirements stated in this CPS Section [8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment](#) for should encompass the following criteria:

- Assessment of the IdenTrust approved, External RA Registration Practices Statement (RPS) document to ensure that stated controls have been deployed by the External RA organization
- Examination of policies, procedures, artifacts, or other evidence to determine if practices stated in the RPS can be substantiated and adhere to stated controls

IdenTrust will also coordinate PIV-I card testing as described in this CPS Section 8.4.2.1 Annual PIV-I Card Testing (below).

8.4.2.1 Annual PIV-I Card Testing

All RAs that issue PIV-I cards will be subject to annual card testing as detailed in the most current version of the *NIST PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines* document. IdenTrust will coordinate with the External RA organization to obtain a production PIV-I card which will be tested in the Federal PIV card test lab. Alternatively, the External RA may issue a production PIV-I credential to a staff member and participate in the onsite PIV card testing at the Federal PIV card testing lab.

All cards meet the minimum test requirements as defined in the testing document. If the lab testing is not successful, then the testing must be repeated until all criteria is met. IdenTrust will assist in troubleshooting with approved PIV-I EWS and CMS vendors to remediate any deficiencies identified during the lab testing.

The results of the PIV card test are submitted to IdenTrust as part of the RA annual audit package as stated in this CPS Section [8.4.1 IdenTrust Audit Scope](#).

8.5 ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY

Details provided in sub-section noted below.

8.5.1 IdenTrust Annual Audit Deficiencies

If the IdenTrust external auditor reports any material non-compliance with applicable law, the CP, this CPS, any relevant MOA, or any other contractual obligations related to the services performed by IdenTrust, including CMS, CSA, RA or LRA services, then following actions will be executed:

- The IdenTrust Security Officer will note the discrepancy;
- The IdenTrust Security Officer will notify the IdenTrust PMA and any other relevant PMAs about the discrepancy; and
- The IdenTrust process owner will develop a plan to resolve the discrepancy, subject to IdenTrust PMA approval.
- A recap of the findings and the IdenTrust remediation plan must be included in the annual audit package submitted to the FPKIPA.

8.5.2 External RA Annual Audit Deficiencies

If an annual compliance audit report submitted by an External RA cites any material non-compliance with applicable law, the CP, this CPS, the External RA RPS, the IdenTrust/External RA MOA, or any other contractual obligations related to the CMS, RA or LRA services operated by the External RA must provide a document to IdenTrust, as a part of the audit package submitted to IdenTrust that includes at least the following information:

- Recap of the deficiencies identified by the auditor,
- The External RA's remediation plan to resolve each deficiency,
- A target date for full resolution of the deficiency; and

- The status of the remediation effort.

Upon receipt of the External RA audit submission package, the IdenTrust IGC policy owner will review the External RA deficiencies remediation plan and notify the IdenTrust PMA of the reported deficiencies. The IdenTrust IGC policy owner is responsible to coordinate with the External RA to ensure that all deficiencies are resolved.

If the External RA fails to take appropriate action in response to the report or due to the nature of discrepancy, the IdenTrust PMA may instruct the IdenTrust Head of Operations to Revoke Certificates that are Issued to or halt temporarily operations of the affected CA, RA and/or CMS, or take other actions deemed as appropriate. The PMA may also refer the matter to IdenTrust legal counsel for further action. The nature of the problem may dictate (per this CPS or CP) to Revoke Certificates or halt operation even if the audited party is planning to take action.

8.6 COMMUNICATIONS OF RESULTS

8.6.1 IdenTrust Audit Submission

Results of annual compliance audits are required to be communicated by Participant CAs and External RAs to IdenTrust's Security Officer no later than May 31st. of each year. Annual compliance audit results from Participant CAs and External RAs may be included in IdenTrust's annual compliance audit.

Results of external audits are communicated by IdenTrust's Security Officer to the IdenTrust PMA and any appropriate regulatory bodies, as may be required by law, regulation, or agreement. IdenTrust will provide interested PKI Participants with a letter containing the attestation of management and its auditor's letter concerning the effectiveness of controls. Otherwise, all audit information will be considered confidential business information in accordance with Section [9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information](#).

All audits will identify the CP, CPS, RA RPS (if any) and any MOA documents used in the assessment including their dates and version numbers.

Additionally, IdenTrust Policy Management representative drafts a letter to each External RA organization accepting the RA audit submission and reiterating any actions that are required to remediate any deficiencies identified during the course of the audit review. The letters are approved by the PMA before remitting to the External RA organization.

8.6.2 External RA Audit Submission

The audit submission package that IdenTrust is required to submit to the FPKIPA includes at least the following documentation from each External RA:

- A letter from the RA auditor stating the scope of the audit as described in Section [8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment](#)
- A recap of findings including any deficiencies identified during the audit assessment
- A management assertion stating the plan to remediate any deficiencies as identified by the auditor

In addition, IdenTrust will include the following artifacts in the FPKIPA submission:

- A report provided by the federal PIV card test lab as described in this CPS Section [8.4.2.1 Annual PIV-1 Card Testing](#) indicating compliance with NIST PIV card guidelines
- A letter addressed to the External RA organization stating acceptance of that entity's annual audit submission, including any deficiencies needing remediation
- A sample of each type of Certificate issued by the External RA organization

9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1 FEES

9.1.1 Certificate Issuance/ Renewal Fees

IdenTrust and RAs may charge reasonable fees for Certificate Issuance and Certificate Renewal in accordance with a fee schedule. The fee schedule is established either by publication or by written agreement between the provider of the service (CA, or the RA) and the consumer of the service.

9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

IdenTrust does not charge Certificate access fees. All Participant CAs shall not charge Certificate access fees.

9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

IdenTrust publishes CRLs for all Certificates and provides OCSP-based Certificate status information for Certificates asserting an Assurance Level of PIV-I Hardware at no charge.

9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

IdenTrust or RAs may set any reasonable fees for any other services that the CA or RA may offer.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

IdenTrust or RAs may have a documented refund policy.

9.2 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

IdenTrust and RAs must have either: (1) errors & omissions insurance and an employee fidelity bond, each with coverage limits of at least \$10 Million U.S. Dollars; or (2) balance sheet equity on audited financial statements sufficient to self-insure such risks. IdenTrust maintains an equal amount of errors and omissions insurance coverage for its PKI-related operations.

9.2.2 Other Assets

IdenTrust and RAs must maintain reasonable and sufficient financial resources to maintain operations, fulfill duties, and address commercially reasonable liability obligations to entities described in Section [1.3 PKI Participants](#) of this CPS.

9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

See Section [9.2.1 Insurance Coverage](#).

9.3 CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION

All information stored locally on CA or RA equipment is handled as sensitive, and access is restricted to those with an official need-to-know to perform their official duties. Private Keys used to sign Certificates asserting security privileges are classified at the same level as the privileges that are to be asserted. In cases where IdenTrust does not independently confirm security privilege information, RAs are required to perform such confirmation.

Audit information is considered sensitive and may not be disclosed to anyone for any purpose other than for auditing and mandatory reporting requirements, or as required by law.

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

The following are considered within the scope of confidential business information:

- All Private Keys,
- Any Activation Data used to access stored Private Keys or to gain access to any CA system component,
- Any business continuity and disaster recovery plans,
- Any other security practices, measures, mechanisms, plans, or procedures used to protect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information used by PKI Participants,
- Any audit reports (except for an auditor's letter confirming the effectiveness of the controls set forth in this CPS),
- Any information held by CAs, an LRA, and TA that is held as private information in accordance with Section [9.4 Privacy of Personal Information](#); and
- Any transactional, audit log and archive record identified in Section [5.4 Audit Logging Procedures](#) or [5.5 Records Archival](#).

9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, OCSP Responses, and other publicly available information in the Repository are not considered confidential business information.

9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

IdenTrust and all PKI Participants are responsible for protecting the confidential business information in their possession, custody, or control in accordance with the terms of the agreements entered into between IdenTrust and the FPKI.

9.4 PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

As described below, Certificates, and personal or corporate information appearing in them or in public directories, are not considered confidential. All other personal or corporate information held by IdenTrust, a Participant CA, External RA, LRA or a TA are considered confidential and must be used only for the purpose of providing PKI-related services.

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

CAs, RAs, LRAs, and TAs collect only such personal information about an Applicant and Subscribing Organization as necessary for Issuance of the Certificate. For proper administration of Certificates, a CA, RA, LRA or TA may request information not intended to be included in the Certificate for use in issuing and managing the Certificate (e.g., identifying numbers, business or home addresses and telephone numbers, etc.). Personal information collected for the purposes of Certificate Issuance, maintenance and Revocation is used only for such purposes, unless otherwise permitted by the Subscriber. CAs, RAs, LRAs, and TAs comply with the information collection and storage requirements of the privacy and data protection laws applicable in the jurisdictions for which they operate. Also, personal information will be made available to, and subject to correction by, the subject following an appropriate request by, and authentication of, the subject.

9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

Confidential information about a Subscriber and their Subscribing Organization that is not publicly available in the contents of a Certificate, CRL or in the LDAP Directory is considered private.

Collection of PII is limited to the minimum necessary to validate the identity of the Subscriber. This may include attributes that correlate identity evidence to authoritative sources. IdenTrust provides a Privacy Statement available on the IdenTrust website. Additionally, the Subscriber Agreements include notice to the Subscriber regarding the purpose for collecting and maintaining a record of the PII necessary for identity proofing and the consequences for not providing the information. PII collected for identity proofing purposes is not to be used for any other purpose.

9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private

Certificates, CRLs and OCSP Responses, and personal or corporate information appearing in them and in the LDAP Directory, are not considered private; and therefore, is not subject to protections described in Section [9.4.2 Information Treated as Private](#) but may not be sold to a third party.

9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

Each PKI Participant is responsible for protecting the confidentiality of private information that is in its possession, custody, or control with the same degree of care that it exercises with respect to its own information of like importance, but in no event less than reasonable care, and must use appropriate safeguards and otherwise exercise reasonable precautions to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of private information.

If IdenTrust terminates PKI activities, IdenTrust will be responsible for disposing of or destroying sensitive information, including PII, in a secure manner, and maintaining its protection from unauthorized access until destruction.

9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

A PKI Participant may use private information with the subject's express written consent or as required by applicable law or court order.

9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial / Administrative Process

Private information is not disclosed to any law enforcement agency, except when:

- a. Authorized or required by CP,
- b. Required to be disclosed by law, Government rule/regulation, or court order; or
- c. Authorized by the Subscriber when necessary to affect an appropriate use of the Certificate. All requests for disclosure of private and/or confidential information from a law enforcement agency must be made in accordance with applicable law.

All requests for disclosure of private and/or confidential information for purposes of litigation must be made in writing. Unless prohibited by law, the custodian of such information must give all interested persons or parties reasonable prior written notice before making any disclosure of private information.

9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

Except as provided above or in a written agreement, the disclosure of private information requires the Subscriber's express written consent.

9.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Neither IdenTrust nor any CA or RA must knowingly violate any intellectual property rights held by others.

A Private Key will be treated as the sole property of the legitimate holder of the Certificate containing the corresponding Public Key.

This CPS and related documentation are the intellectual property of IdenTrust, protected by trademark, copyright, and other laws regarding intellectual property, and may be used only pursuant to a license or other express permission from IdenTrust. Any other use of the above without the express written permission of IdenTrust is expressly prohibited.

A RA RPS must define restrictions of use of the intellectual property within the RPS.

9.6 REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

CAs represent and warrant that they conform to the stipulations of this document, including:

- Conforming their practices and procedures to the stipulations of RPS (if any), this CPS, the CP, any applicable cross-certified CPs, and the policies associated with any third party OIDs asserted in CertificatePolicies,
- For DirectTrust the Issuer CAs MUST represent to DirectTrust, Subscribers, and Relying Parties that they comply, in all material aspects, with this CPS, their CPS, and all applicable laws and regulations.
- For RAs providing services related to Issuance of DirectTrust Certificates, ensuring that the organization is accredited under the Direct Trusted Agent Accreditation Program for Registration Authorities (DTAAP-RA) prior to issuing the RA a production DirectTrust Certificate,
- For HISPs providing services related to use of DirectTrust Certificates, ensuring that the organization is accredited under the Direct Trusted Agent Accreditation Program for Health Information Service Providers (DTAAP-HISP) prior to issuing the HISP a production DirectTrust Certificate,
- Ensuring that registration information is accepted only from RAs or LRAs who understand and are obligated to comply with this CPS and applicable policy(s),
- Including only valid and appropriate information in the Certificate, and maintaining evidence that due diligence was exercised in validating the information contained in the Certificate,
- Ensuring that obligations are imposed on Subscribers in accordance with Section [9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties](#), and the Subscribers are informed of the consequences of not complying with those obligations,
- Revoking the Certificates of Subscribers found to have acted in a manner counter to those obligations; and
- Operating or providing for the services of an on-line repository that satisfies the obligations under Section [9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants](#) and informing the repository service provider of those obligations if applicable.

CAs represent and warrant that they conform to the provisions and stipulations of any applicable Cross-Certified entity MOA.

CAs maintain an agreement with Subscribing Organizations concerning the obligations pertaining to authorizing affiliation with Subscribers.

A CA who is found to have acted in a manner inconsistent with these obligations is subject to action as described in Section [8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency](#).

9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

An RA represents and warrant to the CA at the time it approves a Certificate for Issuance that:

- It has verified all information required for Issuance for a Certificate and all information contained in the Certificate as required by processes defined in the RA RPS (if any), this CPS and the CP,
- It approved Issuance of the Certificate in accordance with the RA RPS (if any), this CPS, and CP,
- It knows of no material misrepresentations of fact in the Certificate; and
- There are no errors in the information in the Certificate that were introduced by it as a result of a failure to exercise reasonable care in processing the application for the Certificate.

In addition to these representations and warranties, RAs represent and warrant that they conform to and comply with the stipulations of RPS (if any), this CPS and the CP and ensure that their LRAs and Tas also comply with these stipulations. Any RA, LRA or TA who is found to have acted in a manner inconsistent with these obligations is subject to Revocation of their registration authorizations and responsibilities.

For RAs performing I&A for DirectTrust Certificates, RAs are additionally required to represent and warrant that they conform to and comply with the stipulations of the DirectTrust CP.

9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

At the time of Issuance and during the Certificate's Validity period, if it has not been Revoked, the Subscriber warrants and represents to CA and the RA (if any) that:

- All information provided by it (and its Subscribing Organization, where applicable) and included in the Certificate, and all representations made by it during its efforts to obtain a Certificate, are true and not misleading,
- Each Digital Signature created using the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key listed in the Certificate is the Subscriber's Digital Signature,
- The Private Key has been continuously protected and that no unauthorized person has ever had access to the Private Key; and
- The Certificate and Key Pair are being used exclusively for authorized and legal purposes.
- Their Private Key will be used only from machines that are protected and managed using commercial best practices for computer security and network security controls.
- In addition to these representation and warranties, Subscribers are required to represent and warrant that they conform to and comply with the stipulations of this CPS and the CP, including that they will:
 - Accurately represent themselves in all communications with the PKI,
 - Protect their Private Keys from compromise at all times (including if the Subscriber Keys are held by a Custodian, or authorized third party who has implemented a Custodial Subscriber Key Store and uses secure processes against potential compromise), in accordance with this CPS and the CP, as stipulated in their Subscriber Agreement,
 - Notify, in a timely manner, the CA, RA, or LRA that Issued their Certificates of suspicion that their Private Keys are compromised or lost. Such notification must be made directly, or indirectly through mechanisms consistent with this CPS,
 - Abide by all the terms, conditions, and restrictions levied upon the use of their Private Keys and Certificates; and
 - Use Certificates in accordance with this CPS and the CP.

Primary Machine Operators are required to assume the obligations of Subscribers for the Certificates associated with their Devices. They also warrant and represent that FQDNs or other information used to identify Devices, Organization names and domain names are accurate, current, complete, and not misleading and that they will install the Certificate only on the Device corresponding to the Device represented in the Certificate subjectDN or server accessible at the domain name listed on the Certificate.

Group Certificate Sponsors are required to assume the obligations of Subscribers for the Certificates associated with Groups. They also warrant and represent that information contained in applications for Group Certificates is accurate, current, complete, and not misleading and that they will use the Certificate only for legitimate business purposes of the Group Certificate.

9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Any time that a Relying Party uses or otherwise relies on a Certificate, he or she represents and warrants to the CA and the RA (if any) that:

- He or she has read and agree to the terms and conditions of relevant Sections of this CPS,
- He or she has sufficient information, independent from the Certificate, to make an informed decision as to the extent to which they will rely on the information in the Certificate,
- That he or she is solely responsible for deciding whether or not to rely on such information and use the Certificate for the purpose for which it was Issued, as indicated in the Certificate information (e.g., the key usage extension) in accordance with guidelines set by the X.509 Version 3 Amendment,
- To establish trust in the Certificate using certification path validation procedures described in RFC 5280, prior to reliance; and
- To preserve original signed data, the applications necessary to read and process that data, and the cryptographic applications needed to verify the Digital Signatures on that data for as long as it may be necessary to verify the signature on that data.

NOTE: Data format changes associated with application upgrades may invalidate Digital Signatures and therefore are avoided.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Affiliated/Organizations

A Subscribing Organization represents and warrants that it:

- a. Authorizes the affiliation of Subscribers with the Organization for Affiliated Certificates,
- b. Verifies that any information it may provide during the identity proofing and/or registration processes is accurate; and
- c. Will immediately inform the CA of any severance of affiliation with any current Subscriber.

9.6.6 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

9.6.6.1 Repository Representations and Warranties

See Section [2.1 Repositories](#).

9.6.6.2 CSA Obligations

A CSA, who provides Revocation status and/or complete validation of Certificates represents and warrants that it conforms to the stipulations of this CPS and the CP, including:

- Providing this CPS, as well as any subsequent changes, for conformance assessment,
- Conforming to the stipulations of this CPS and the CP,
- Ensuring that Certificate and Revocation information is accepted only from valid CAs; and
- Including only valid and appropriate response, and maintains evidence that due diligence was exercised in validating the Certificate status.

A CSA who is found to have acted in a manner inconsistent with these obligations is subject to action as described in Section [8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency](#) of CP.

9.7 DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES

EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY WARRANTED IN (A) SECTIONS [9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties](#) AND [9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties](#) ABOVE, CAs AND RAs GOVERNED BY THIS CPS AND CP HEREBY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT WITH REGARD TO ANY CERTIFICATE, REPOSITORY OR CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICE.

Except as expressly warranted in (a) Sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.2 (above) and without limiting the foregoing disclaimer, neither IdenTrust, CA, RA, nor any of their affiliates, officers, directors, licensors, employees or representatives represent or warrant (i) that a Certificate, Repository or Certificate Status Service will meet particular requirements or be error free; (ii) that any Certificate, Repository or Certificate Status Service will be available, uninterrupted, accessible, timely or secure; (iii) that any defects will be corrected, or that a Certificate, Repository or Certificate Status Service will be free from viruses, worms, Trojan horses or other harmful properties; or (iv) that the information provided will be accurate, reliable, timely, or complete.

9.8 LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of IdenTrust to Participant CAs to which IdenTrust CA Certificates are Issued shall be set forth in the applicable agreements.

OTHER THAN THE ABOVE DESCRIBED LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IN NO EVENT SHALL IDENTRUST BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, OR OTHER DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS CPS, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THE TOTAL, AGGREGATE LIABILITY FOR A PARTICIPANT CA ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO IMPROPER ACTIONS BY THE PARTICIPANT CA SHALL BE LIMITED TO ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$1,000 USD) PER TRANSACTION AND ONE MILLION DOLLARS (\$1 MILLION USD) PER INCIDENT).

9.9 INDEMNITIES

Unless agreed upon in separate agreement, neither IdenTrust nor any PKI Service Provider assumes financial responsibility for improperly used or improperly relied upon Certificates.

A CAs agreement between itself and other entities (such as Cross-Certification Bridge Authority) shall specify any additional indemnification terms between the CA and entity (e.g., indemnification of the Cross-Certification Bridge Authority).

Each Subscriber shall indemnify PKI Service Providers for any loss suffered by any PKI Service Provider(s) that are occasioned by the Subscriber's (a) improper use of Certificates or Key Pairs; (b) failure to safeguard Private Keys; (c) failure to comply with the provisions of the CP, this CPS, or any agreement with such PKI Service Provider, (d) breach of a representation or warranty of Subscriber hereunder, or (e) other acts or omissions giving rise to the loss.

Subject to the other provisions of this Section and the rest of Section [9 Other Business and Legal Matters](#), bilateral agreements between PKI Service Providers and other PKI Participants may include additional indemnity obligations.

9.10 TERM AND TERMINATION

9.10.1 Term

This CPS and any amendments hereto become effective upon publication in the Repository.

9.10.2 Termination

This CPS as amended from time to time shall remain in force until it is replaced by a new version.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

The conditions and effect resulting from termination of this document will be communicated via IdenTrust's or the alternative Participant CA's Repository upon termination outlining the provisions that may survive termination of the document and remain in force.

- For IdenTrust repository: <https://www.identrust.com/support/documents/igc-standard>
- For the Participant CA repository see Appendix A.

The responsibilities for protecting business confidential and private personal information shall survive termination, and the terms and conditions for all existing Certificates shall remain valid for the remainder of the Validity Periods of such Certificates.

9.11 INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS

The provisions below in this Section shall govern with respect to any notice provided in relation to this CPS to or from IdenTrust; provided; however, this Section shall not be construed to govern with respect to any communication, including notices, for which a different method is expressly provided for (a) in this CPS (e.g., notices under Section [9.12 Amendments](#)) or (b) in an agreement between IdenTrust and the Participant.

9.11.1 Notices by Individual Participants to IdenTrust

Notices by individual Participants to IdenTrust shall be made by at least one of the following methods, with the choice between methods to be made by the Participant:

- by digitally signed communication sent from the Participant to IdenTrust via email Registration@IdenTrust.com, which communication will be deemed effective when acknowledged via email by IdenTrust; or

- by written communication sent from the Participant to IdenTrust via internationally recognized overnight courier to IdenTrust Registration, 5225 Wiley Post Way, Ste 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, which such communication will be deemed effective when delivered as evidenced by written confirmation of receipt as recorded by the courier.

9.11.2 Notices by IdenTrust to Individual Participants

Notices by IdenTrust to individual Participants shall be made by at least one of the following methods, with the choice between methods to be made by IdenTrust:

- i. by digitally signed communication sent from IdenTrust to the Participant via email to any email address of the Participant submitted to IdenTrust during the Participant's registration, contracting, or Certificate lifecycle maintenance interactions with IdenTrust, which communication shall be deemed effective when sent by IdenTrust; or
- ii. by written communication sent from IdenTrust to Participant via U.S. Postal Service mail of the First Class to any physical address of Participant that Participant submitted to IdenTrust during the Participant's registration, contracting, or Certificate lifecycle maintenance interactions with IdenTrust.

The method(s) of providing notice between each CA (other than IdenTrust) and Participants (other than IdenTrust) shall be set forth in the CA's CPS, provided that at a minimum the CA must provide a physical address at which notice by via internationally recognized overnight courier will be deemed effective when delivered as evidenced by written confirmation of receipt as recorded by the courier.

9.12 AMENDMENTS

This CPS will be reviewed by IdenTrust from time to time. Errors, updates, or suggested changes to this document should be communicated to policy@IdenTrust.com. Such communication must include a description of the change, a change justification, and contact information for the person requesting the change.

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

All changes to this CPS that may materially affect Subscribers or Relying Parties are subject to a 15-day notification requirement. Affected PKI Participants may file comments with IdenTrust within 15 days of original notice. Written and signed comments on proposed changes must be directed to IdenTrust. Decisions with respect to the proposed changes are at the sole discretion of IdenTrust.

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

IdenTrust will notify all interested persons of proposed changes, the final date for receipt of comments, and the proposed effective date of change. A copy of this CPS is available in electronic form on the Internet at: <https://www.identrust.com/support/documents/igc-standard>, and via email from policy@IdenTrust.com. In the event that IdenTrust considers making changes to this CPS that are subject to notification requirements, IdenTrust will post the proposed changes on its Web site, the final date for receipt of comments, and the proposed effective date of change.

Editorial and typographical corrections, changes to contact details and other minor changes that do not materially impact PKI Participants may be changed without notice and are not subject to the notification requirements herein.

9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which an OID Must be Changed

A Certificate policy OID for Certificates that are Issued pursuant to this CPS will change only if the change in the CP results in a material change to the trust by the relying parties.

9.13 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS

In the absence of other agreements between the parties covering the services provided under this CPS, the dispute resolution procedures specified in this CPS provide the sole remedy for any claim against a PKI Service Provider

for any loss sustained by any, Applicant, Subscriber, Subscribing Organization, or Relying Party, whether that loss is claimed to arise from reliance on a Certificate, from breach of a contract, from a failure to perform according to the CP, and/or this CPS, or from any other act or omission. No Relying Party, Applicant, Subscriber, or Subscribing Organization shall require IdenTrust or Bridge Service Providers under its Root Certificate to respond to any attempt to seek recourse through any other means.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Applicant, Subscriber, Subscribing Organization, or Relying Party may enter into a separate bilateral agreement with a PKI Service Provider under which those parties may agree that the remaining provisions of this Section shall provide (a) the sole remedy for any claim against a PKI Service Provider, or (b) an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

9.13.1 Claims and Initial Determinations

Before making a claim to recover a loss for which a PKI Service Provider may be responsible, an Applicant, Subscriber, Relying Party, or Subscribing Organization (the “Claimant”) shall make a thorough investigation. IdenTrust will cooperate reasonably in that investigation.

The Claimant will then present to IdenTrust reasonable documented proof:

- That the Claimant has suffered a recoverable loss as a result of a System Transaction,
- Of the amount and extent of the recoverable loss claimed; and
- Of the causal linkage between the alleged System Transaction and the recoverable loss claimed, itemized as necessary.

Immediately upon the occurrence of any reliance event, the Claimant will notify IdenTrust of any matter, which may result in a claim against a PKI Service Provider. In any event, the Claimant must file notice and all required proof of the claim (using a mandatory procedure accessed through IdenTrust’s web site) not later than 4 months after the reliance event out of which the claim arises. Any failure to provide the required notice and proof of claim within the required 4-month period will constitute a conclusive waiver of the claim and an agreement with the PKI Service Provider that the Claimant will seek no remedy against it to recover for any liability for the claim.

Notice of the claim must be given on the form “IdenTrust Claim Loss Form” that is downloadable at:

<https://www.identrust.com/support/documents/igc-standard> in the Forms Section. Instructions for completion and submission of the claim form also appear on that web page.

On receipt of a claim form, IdenTrust will forward the claim to the PKI Service Provider who may determine to pay the claim or deny it. The PKI Service Provider may also pay the claim in an amount less than the amount claimed if it determines that the loss calculations exceed the amount that the PKI Service Provider is obligated to pay. IdenTrust will notify the Claimant of the PKI Service Provider’s determination within 30 days of receipt of the claim form. If a response is not made within 30 days of receipt of the claim form, then the claim is deemed denied. If the Claimant is not satisfied with the initial determination, the Claimant may appeal it as provided in the next Section.

If IdenTrust determines that the Claimant has failed to provide information required to determine the claim, IdenTrust shall deny the claim, subject to the right of the Claimant to resubmit the claim one time, within 30 days after IdenTrust’s initial denial, with all required information. A Claimant shall not submit more than one claim form for the same claim except for a resubmission pursuant to the preceding sentence. The Claimant shall pay to IdenTrust the reasonable costs of processing any claim for which IdenTrust finds the proof required by this Section to be so clearly lacking that the claim must be considered frivolous.

9.13.2 Appeals

In the event that the Claimant wishes to contest the PKI Service Provider’s initial determination of the claim, it may appeal that determination to the IdenTrust Appeals Officer, which can review the decision in the exercise of its oversight of IdenTrust’s policies and their implementation in practice.

To appeal an initial determination of a claim, the Claimant must notify the IdenTrust Appeals Officer that it appeals

the decision. Failure to file formal written notice of appeal within 30 days after denial of the initial claim constitutes waiver of the appeal and the PKI Service Provider's initial determination shall be final and binding upon the Claimant. Claimant's waiver of the appeal as provided herein shall be a complete defense and shall bar any attempt at judicial review of the initial determination on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The notice of appeal may simply request the IdenTrust Appeals Officer to review the initial determination, or it may state reasons why the initial determination is in error. The IdenTrust Appeals Officer has the discretion to undertake an investigation of the basis for the claim, consider additional evidence or facts not previously considered, or base its decision entirely on evidence previously provided for the initial determination.

The IdenTrust Appeals Officer must decide the appeal within 30 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, unless the claimant agrees to an extension of time. In deciding the appeal, the IdenTrust Appeals Officer may reverse the initial determination and determine that the PKI Service Provider pay or otherwise resolve the claim, or the IdenTrust Appeals Officer may affirm the initial determination. The IdenTrust Appeals Officer may also require payment of any portion of the original claim that was not already paid or take other action to settle or resolve the claim.

The IdenTrust Appeals Officer shall give notice to the Claimant of the final determination of claim appeal in writing. If the final determination of the claim is to pay the claimant any sum, payment shall be made within 30 days after the final determination is sent.

The decision of the IdenTrust Appeals Officer shall be final and binding upon the Claimant.

9.13.3 Confidentiality of Claims Process

Neither IdenTrust, nor the PKI Service Provider, nor the Claimant shall disclose to any third party:

1. The fact that the claim was made
2. The amount or other details of the claim;
3. The circumstances that gave rise to the claim;;
4. The outcome of the claim, including the amount recovered; or
5. Any opinion regarding the processing or disposition of the claim.

This Section, however, does not apply in relation to legal counsel representing either the Claimant or the PKI Service Provider. It also does not apply in the event that the Claimant seeks relief through arbitration.

9.14 GOVERNING LAW

Choice of Law. Subject to any limits appearing in applicable law, the laws of the state of New York, U.S.A., shall govern the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of this CPS, irrespective of contract or other choice of law provisions and without the requirement to establish a commercial nexus in the State of New York. This choice of law is made to ensure uniform procedures and interpretation for all PKI Participants, no matter where they are located. This governing law provision applies only to this CPS. Agreements incorporating the CPS by reference may have their own governing law provisions, provided that this Section governs the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of the terms of the CPS separate and apart from the remaining provisions of any such agreements, subject to any limitations appearing in applicable law.

Headings. The headings of the Sections of this CPS are included for the purposes of convenience only and shall not affect the interpretation of any provision hereof.

Plurals/Pronouns/Gender. All pronouns and any variations thereof shall be deemed to refer to the masculine, feminine or neuter, singular, or plural, as appropriate.

9.15 COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

This CPS shall be subject to applicable national, state, local, and foreign laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, decrees, and orders including but not limited to restrictions on exporting or importing software, hardware, or technical information.

9.16 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

9.16.1 Entire Agreement

This CPS shall constitute the entire understanding and agreement between the parties with respect to the transactions contemplated, and supersedes any and all prior or contemporaneous oral or written representation, understanding, agreement or communication concerning the subject matter hereof. No party is relying upon any warranty, representation, assurance, or inducement not expressly set forth herein and none shall have any liability in relation to any representation or other assurance not expressly set forth herein, unless it was made fraudulently. Without prejudice to any liability for fraudulent misrepresentation, no party shall be under any liability or shall have any remedy in respect of misrepresentation or untrue statement unless and to the extent that a claim lies for breach of a duty set forth in this CPS.

9.16.2 Assignment

PKI Participants (other than IdenTrust) may not assign any of their rights or obligations under this CPS or applicable agreements without the written consent of IdenTrust.

9.16.3 Severability

In the event that a clause or provision of this CPS is held to be unenforceable by a court of law or other tribunal having authority, the remainder of the CPS shall remain valid.

9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorney Fees and Waiver of Rights)

Except where an express time frame is set forth in this CPS, no delay or omission by any PKI Participant to exercise any right, remedy, or power it has under this CPS shall impair or be construed as a waiver of such right, remedy or power. A waiver by any party of any breach of this CPS shall not be construed to be a waiver of any other or repeated breach of this CPS. Bilateral agreements between PKI Service Providers and other PKI Participants may contain additional provisions governing enforcement; provided, however that in no event can such additional provisions alter the rights of IdenTrust hereunder.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

NO PKI SERVICE PROVIDER SHALL INCUR LIABILITY IF IT IS PREVENTED, FORBIDDEN OR DELAYED FROM PERFORMING, OR OMITTS TO PERFORM, ANY ACT OR REQUIREMENT BY REASON OF: (I) ANY PROVISION OF ANY APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR ORDER; (II) CIVIL, GOVERNMENTAL OR MILITARY AUTHORITY; (III) THE FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL, COMMUNICATION OR OTHER SYSTEM OPERATED BY ANY OTHER PARTY OVER WHICH THE PKI SERVICE PROVIDER HAS NO CONTROL; (IV) FIRE, FLOOD, OR OTHER EMERGENCY CONDITION; (V) STRIKE; (VI) ACTS OF TERRORISM OR WAR; (VII) ACT OF GOD; OR (VIII) OTHER SIMILAR CAUSES BEYOND ITS REASONABLE CONTROL AND WITHOUT THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE PKI SERVICE PROVIDER.

9.17 OTHER PROVISIONS

9.17.1 Legal Validity of Certificates

9.17.1.1 Waivers

Waivers will not be granted under any level of assurance. Variation in the Issuing CA's practice will either be deemed acceptable under this Policy, or a change will be requested to this Policy, or a new Policy will be established for the non-compliant practice.

9.17.1.2 Issuance

To be legally valid, an IGC Certificate must be issued in accordance with this Policy and any applicable law.

9.17.1.3 Acceptance

The act of Acceptance will be logged by the Issuing CA and may consist of a record made when the End Entity downloads the Certificate. Such acts will be recorded and maintained in an auditable trail kept by the Issuing CA in a trustworthy manner that comports with industry standards and any applicable laws or provisions of this Policy or related agreements.

9.17.1.4 Operational Period

A revoked or expired IGC Certificate may not be used for any purpose. For revoked or expired Certificates, no action taken by an Authorized Relying Party will be considered valid for purposes of this PKI unless the Authorized Relying Party's Digital Signature verification request is able to confirm that the Digital Signature in question was created during the Operational Period of a valid IGC Certificate. Exceptions to the Private Key Usage period may be permissible if approved by the PMA and so long as such exceptions do not conflict with documented best practices, including RFC 5280.

9.17.1.5 Rules of Repose Allowing Ultimate Termination of Certificate

Unless otherwise specified by the Parties, reliance on an IGC Certificate is no longer enforceable by an Authorized Relying Party against IdenTrust or RA 4 months after termination of the applicable Authorized Relying Party Agreement or 2 years after the Authorized Relying Party's validation of the TrustID Certificate with IdenTrust's Repository, whichever occurs first.

10 DIRECTORY INTEROPERABILITY PROFILE

10.1 PROTOCOL

An area in the IdenTrust's secure website that is accessed via Server-authenticated SSL/TLS-Encrypted session contains the Root CA Certificate.

Other areas in the IdenTrust website that are accessed through HTTP protocol will contain the Root CRL, all the latest versions of all other CRLs and the subordinate signing CA Certificates.

The LDAP Directory contains the CRL for the Root CA, and optionally, signing CA Certificates and the most recent corresponding CRLs for each Participant CA.

10.2 AUTHENTICATION

No Client authentication is required to read or get information from the Repository.

Access to the LDAP Directory is allowed through anonymous authentication and no authentication is needed to read CRL information.

All write, update, add entry, delete entry, add attribute, delete attribute, change schema, and exercise of other directory modification rights in the Repository require Client Certificate authentication and encryption using Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.

10.3 NAMING

When CA Certificates are stored under the directory entry for the Subject Name of the CA. The `issuedByThisCAelement` of `crossCertificatePair` contains the Certificate(s) issued by a CA whose name the entry represents.

All CRLs are filed under the directory entry of the CA that issued the CRL.

10.4 OBJECT CLASS

Entries that describe CAs are defined by the `organizationalUnit` structural object class. All CA entries belong to the `pkiCA` `cpCPS` auxiliary object classes.

10.5 ATTRIBUTES

CA entries are populated with the `caCertificate`, `crossCertificatePair`, `CertificateRevocationList`, and `cpCPS` attributes, as appropriate.

APPENDIX A – PIV-INTEROPERABLE SMART CARD DEFINITION

The intent of PIV-I is to enable issuers to issue cards that are technically interoperable with Federal PIV Card readers and applications, and that may be trusted for particular purposes through a decision of the relying Federal Agency. Thus, reliance on PIV-I Cards requires compliance with technical specifications and specific trust elements. This appendix defines the specific requirements of a PIV-I Card. It relies heavily on relevant specifications from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

The following requirements apply to PIV-I Cards:

1. To ensure interoperability with Federal systems, PIV-I Cards use a smart card platform that is on GSA's FIPS 201 Evaluation Program Approved Product List (APL) and uses the PIV application identifier (AID).
2. PIV-I Cards conform to [NIST SP 800-73-4]. Special attention is placed to UUID requirements for PIV-I.
3. The mandatory X.509 Certificate for Authentication must be issued under a policy that is cross certified with the FBCA PIV-I Hardware policy OID.
4. All Certificates issued a policy OID cross certified with the PIV-I Hardware policy OID conform to [PIV-I Profile].
5. PIV-I Cards contain an asymmetric X.509 Certificate for Card Authentication that:
 - a. conforms to [PIV-I Profile];
 - b. conforms to [NIST SP 800-73-4]; and
 - c. is issued under the PIV-I Card Authentication policy.
6. PIV-I Cards contain an electronic representation (as specified in SP 800-73-4 and SP 800-76-2) of the Cardholder Facial Image printed on the card.
7. The X.509 Certificates for Digital Signature and Key Management described in [NIST SP 800-73-4] are optional for PIV-I Cards.
8. Visual distinction of a PIV-I Card from that of a Federal PIV Card is required to ensure no suggestion of attempting to create a fraudulent Federal PIV Card. At a minimum, images or logos on a PIV-I Card are not placed entirely within Zone 11, Agency Seal, as defined by [FIPS 201].
9. The PIV-I Card physical topography includes, at a minimum, the following items on the front of the card:
 - a. Cardholder facial image,
 - b. Cardholder full name,
 - c. Organizational Affiliation, if exists; otherwise, the issuer of the card; and
 - d. Card expiration date.
10. PIV-I Cards must have an expiration date not to exceed 6 years of issuance.
11. Expiration of the PIV-I Card should not be later than expiration of PIV-I Content Signing Certificate on the card.
12. The digital signature Certificate that is used to sign objects on the PIV-I Card (e.g., CHUID, Security Object) must contain a policy OID that has been mapped to the FBCA PIV-I Content Signing policy OID. The PIV-I Content Signing Certificate must conform to [PIV-I Profile].
13. The PIV-I Content Signing Certificate and corresponding private key must be managed within a trusted Card Management System as defined by Appendix B.
14. At issuance, the RA must activate and release the PIV-I Card to the Subscriber only after a successful 1:1 biometric match of the Applicant against the biometrics collected in Section 3.2.3.1.
15. PIV-I Cards may support card activation by the CMS to support card personalization and post-issuance card update. To activate the card for personalization or update, the CMS must perform a challenge response protocol using cryptographic keys stored on the card in accordance with [SP800-73-4]. When cards are personalized, card management keys must be set to be specific to each PIV-I Card. That is, each PIV-I Card must contain a unique card management key. Card management keys must meet the algorithm and key size requirements stated in Special Publication 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. [SP800-78-4]

APPENDIX B – CARD MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

PIV-I Cards are issued and managed through information systems called CMS. The complexity and use of these trusted systems may vary. Nevertheless, Entity CAs have a responsibility to ensure a certain level of security from the CMSs that manage the token on which their Certificates reside, and to which they issue Certificates for the purpose of signing PIV-I Cards. This appendix provides additional requirements to those found above that apply to CMSs that are trusted under this Certificate Policy.

The Card Management Master Key must be maintained in a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Cryptographic Module and conform to [NIST SP 800-78-4] requirements. Diversification operations must also occur on the Hardware Security Module (HSM). Use of these keys requires PIV-I Hardware or commensurate. Activation of the Card Management Master Key must require strong authentication of Trusted Roles. Card management must be configured such that only the authorized CMS can manage issued cards.

The PIV-I identity proofing, registration, and issuance process must adhere to the principle of separation of duties to ensure that no single individual has the capability to issue a PIV-I credential without the cooperation of another authorized person.

Individual personnel must be specifically designated to the 4 Trusted Roles defined in Section 5.2.1. Trusted Role eligibility and Rules for separation of duties follow the requirements for medium assurance in Section 5.

All personnel who perform duties with respect to the operation of the CMS must receive comprehensive training. Any significant change to CMS operations must have a training (awareness) plan, and the execution of such plan must be documented.

Audit log files must be generated for all events relating to the security of the CMS must be treated the same as those generated by the CA (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5).

A formal configuration management methodology must be used for installation and ongoing maintenance of the CMS. Any modifications and upgrades to the CMS must be documented and controlled. There must be a mechanism for detecting unauthorized modification to the CMS.

The CMS must have document incident handling procedures that are approved by the head of the organization responsible for operating the CMS. If the CMS is compromised, all Certificates issued to the CMS must be revoked, if applicable. The damage caused by the CMS compromise must be assessed and all Subscriber Certificates that may have been compromised must be revoked, and Subscribers must be notified of such revocation. The CMS must be re-established.

All Trusted Roles who operate a CMS must be allowed access only when authenticated using a method commensurate with PIV-I Hardware.

The computer security functions listed below are required for the CMS:

- authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
- manage privileges of users to limit users to their assigned roles;
- generate and archive audit records for all transactions; (see Section 5.4)
- enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
- support recovery from key or system failure.

APPENDIX C – IN-PERSON ANTECEDENT

Collection of Identity Data from an Antecedent In-Person Appearance

Internal TAs utilizing an Antecedent In-Person Appearance are required to:

- Utilize a specialized ID Form designed for TAs to record identity information inclusive of information from an Antecedent In-Person Appearance (if applicable);
- Record the nature of the ongoing relationship between the Subscribing Organization and the Applicant, i.e., “employee” or “contractor;”
- Record the date of the Antecedent In-Person Appearance,
- Record the relationship between the Subscribing Organization and the Applicant,
- View the Applicant-provided I-9 form and copies of credentials provided,
- Record the date the I-9 Form was signed by the Applicant as a declaration of identity,
- Record the required identity credentials as defined in Section 3.2.3.1,
- Record the data to be used by Applicant in response to authentication questions to establish a Subscriber account and complete the application process:
 - Date of Antecedent In-Person Appearance (usually date of hire),
 - Applicant’s date of birth,
 - Applicant’s last 4 digits of Social Security Number,
 - Applicant’s work email address (must be of the same domain as Subscribing Organization);
 - Last name of Applicant’s direct manager,
 - Applicant’s previous employer,
 - Applicant’s home street address; and
 - Applicant’s home phone number (or mobile telephone number if no home telephone number).
- Sign or Digitally Sign the ID Form and securely transmit the form to the CA or RA for verification.

Verification of Applicant Data from an Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing

On receipt of the ID Form from the Internal TA, an LRA verifies:

- The Internal TA submitting the ID Form has been authorized to do so through execution of a Subscribing Organization Authorization Agreement Internal Trusted Agent Addendum executed by an Authorizing Official of the Subscribing Organization to which the Applicant is to be affiliated; and
- The ID Form has been fully completed and signed in ink under penalty of perjury or Digitally Signed by the Internal TA.

The Antecedent In-Person Identity Proofing Process requires that the Certificate Validity Period not exceed 12 years from the Antecedent In-Person Appearance date. To ensure that the Validity Period of a Certificate Issued on the basis of an Antecedent In-Person Appearance does not extend beyond the in-person identification limits stated above, the LRA enters the date of the Antecedent In-Person Appearance as the date of registration into the RA System. The RA System then ensures the Validity Period does not exceed 12 years beyond the registration date entered as described in Section 3.3.1. In the event a requested Certificate’s expiration would exceed 12 years from the Antecedent In-Person Appearance, the Applicant is required to undergo new identity proofing.

If any of the above requirements are not met or there is any question by the verifying LRA as to the authenticity of the data provided by the Internal TA, the application is rejected and the Internal TA is notified to instruct the Applicant to appear for an in-person identity proofing process as defined in Section 3.2.3.1. Otherwise, the LRA enters the Applicant identity information into the RA System, creating a non-activated Subscriber Account for the Applicant.

APPENDIX D – REFERENCES

Incorporated by reference from FBCA, and DirectTrust CP documents.

APPENDIX E – ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

Section 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

See Section 1.6.2 Acronyms

APPENDIX F – GLOSSARY

Section 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

See Section 1.6.1 Definitions